Dupréel (1.2) La consistance et la probabilité constructive, sect 1.2, ‘Les contraires’, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Eugène Dupréel, entry directory]

[Dupréel, La consistance et la probabilité constructive, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary and not translation. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, so typos are present, including in the quotations. Please consult the original text to be sure about the contents. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not especially good with French.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Eugène Dupréel

 

La consistance et la probabilité constructive

 

Part 1

“La consistance”

 

1.2

Les consistance des êtres

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(1.2.1) We will first think about sensible beings in space and time, and then we will turn next to an examination of all things that, although being neither spatial nor temporal, can nonetheless still be considered as beings of some sort. (1.2.2) The consistency of a being is its capacity to maintain its identity throughout the variations that result from its relations with other beings. All beings possess some degree of consistency. (1.2.3) A unified object cannot be oppositionally divided against itself; for, then it is no longer a unified, self-same object but is rather a pairing of separate things. This means that everything in a thing’s constitution must somehow be part of its consistency. It therefore cannot be something that would have preexisted its consistency; for, suppose there was such a part that existed in the thing before it had consistency. That means the thing would not have been able to endure and thus that element would not have endured as part of that thing. Also, a thing can have nothing in its constitution that is foreign to its consistency. For, any such component would have to have its own consistency and thus its own separate identity and therefore be a haphazard companion to the thing rather than an actual component of it. (1.2.4) We should not regard a thing as being isolated from everything that lies outside it. For, the thing has undergone numerous alterations that rather than having destroyed it instead have contributed to its capacity to resist other potential variations. (1.2.5) These “vicissitudes” or “alterations” result from the influence of the other beings that it happens to encounter in the universal torrent of accidents, causing alterations from prior states no matter how small. (1.2.6) Another fundamental property of a thing, in addition to it having consistency, is that its consistency itself varies in degree within certain limits. All encounters with other beings will cause some variation of degree in its consistency, increasing or diminishing it. (1.2.7) A body comes to know and evaluate its own consistency, and it tries to more or less know (often through guesswork) what it is that is causing its consistency to vary, in order to better grasp its possible or probable challenges. (1.2.8) Our common sense is right that consistency is the mark of a being, but it misleads us into thinking that to be a real being this consistency must be absolute. Rather, whenever common sense would have us regard something as a “real” being as absolutely distinct from its appearances is really a matter of noticing that there are conditions under which the thing is more consistent compared to other conditions when it is under greater variance. For example, we are rowing a boat, and when the oar is out of water it looks straight and when it is in the water it looks bent. We come to regard the oar as straight as the “real” oar and the oar as bent as the “false appearance” of the oar. But in fact, even the oar as straight varies somewhat depending on the observer’s perspective. It is just that out of the water it has a greater degree of consistency than when going into the water. (1.2.9) The subject-object distinction is also really a matter of relative difference between more and less consistent. Even the subject herself undergoes great variation. (1.2.10) Knowing things is a matter of having information about their degrees of consistency and of the factors that vary this degree. (1.2.11) So we should not begin by observing things under a mode that considers them somehow in their self-isolation, frozen at some specific time and place. Rather, we should use a mode of observation that sees primarily the indefinite multiplicity of intermixing and interacting beings that reciprocally alter one another through their encounters and combinations. What is most primary here are the multiple and unannounced encounters that combine the variable consistencies themselves, which constitute the interacting beings.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

1.2.1

[Sensible Beings and Other Beings]

 

1.2.2

[Consistency as the Maintenance of Identity Throughout Variations Resulting from Interactions]

 

1.2.3

[The Thing’s Constitution as Excluding Anything Not Involved with Its Consistency]

 

1.2.4

[The Non-Isolation of Things. Their Developing Immunities Through Modificatory Interactions]

 

1.2.5

[Changes in the Things]

 

1.2.6

[The Increase and Decrease of the Thing’s Degree of Consistency on Account of Interactions]

 

1.2.7

[Assessing the Causes of the Variations in Consistency]

 

1.2.8

[Relative Consistency Illustrated: The Oar Bent Underwater]

 

1.2.9

[Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Consistency]

 

1.2.10

[Knowledge as Information About Consistency and About Its Factors of Variability]

 

1.2.11

[Being as Multiple, Reciprocally Consistency-Modifying Encountering]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

 

1.2.1

[Sensible Beings and Other Beings]

 

(p.7: “On raisonnera d’abord sur ... qualifié comme un certain être.”)

 

[We will first think about sensible beings in space and time, and then we will turn next to an examination of all things that, although being neither spatial nor temporal, can nonetheless still be considered as beings of some sort.]

 

[Recall from section 1.1.9 that instead of philosophy using its oppositional contraries, foremost of which being Being and Non-Being, we will substitute a notion more capable of dealing with diversity and relativity, namely, consistency. Dupréel says now that we will first think about sensible beings in space and time, and then we will turn next to an examination of all things that, although being neither spatial nor temporal, can nonetheless still be considered as beings of some sort.]

On raisonnera d’abord sur les êtres sensibles, dans l’espace et le temps, et l’on portera ensuite l’examen sur tout ce qui, sans être spatial ni temporel, peut néanmoins être qualifié comme un certain être.

(7)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.2

[Consistency as the Maintenance of Identity Throughout Variations Resulting from Interactions]

 

(p.7: “La consistance d’un être ...degré de consistance.”)

 

[The consistency of a being is its capacity to maintain its identity throughout the variations that result from its relations with other beings. All beings possess some degree of consistency.]

 

[(ditto)]

La consistance d’un être est la capacité de conserver son identité à travers les vicissitudes qui résultent de ses rapports avec les autres êtres. Tout corps est pourvu d’un certain degré de consistance.

(7)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.3

[The Thing’s Constitution as Excluding Anything Not Involved with Its Consistency]

 

(p.7: “Au fait, c’est cela même ... qu’adventice et non constitutionnel.”)

 

[A unified object cannot be oppositionally divided against itself; for, then it is no longer a unified, self-same object but is rather a pairing of separate things. This means that everything in a thing’s constitution must somehow be part of its consistency. It therefore cannot be something that would have preexisted its consistency; for, suppose there was such a part that existed in the thing before it had consistency. That means the thing would not have been able to endure and thus that element would not have endured as part of that thing. Also, a thing can have nothing in its constitution that is foreign to its consistency. For, any such component would have to have its own consistency and thus its own separate identity and therefore be a haphazard companion to the thing rather than an actual component of it.]

 

[In fact, the very constitution of the being is its consistency. For, we will never discover in a body something that is prior and foreign to all that permits the being to endure throughout any contact that may affect it. (I do not have this right, so I am going to make some guesses here. We say that the thing has consistency, which is the factor that allows it to maintain its identity throughout its variations from modificatory interactions. Now we try to suppose that there is some part of the thing’s constitution which existed before this consistency came into play. But then, that other element of its constitution would not have survived as part of that thing, because the thing would not have survived if it lacked its preservational factor. Similarly, there cannot be a component of the thing’s constitution that is foreign to its consistency. This one is harder for me to guess about. But maybe the idea is similarly that any such element somehow is able to entirely disintegrate the thing, but I am not sure how. At any rate, perhaps the next point is related to that. Whatever in the thing that is in the process of destroying it is only something extraneous that by chance has entered into the thing, and it cannot be part of its actual constitution. The thinking here might be that a unified thing cannot be divided against itself.)]

Au fait, c’est cela même qui le constitue, car jamais on ne découvrira dans un corps quelque chose de préalable et d’étranger à tout ce qui lui permet de durer à travers tout contact qui puisse l’affecter. Ce qui dans son intérieur peut être en passe de le détruire, ne lui est qu’adventice et non constitutionnel.

(7)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.4

[The Non-Isolation of Things. Their Developing Immunities Through Modificatory Interactions]

 

(p.7: “On remarquera qu’ici l’être ... de résistance aux vicissitudes éventuelles.”)

 

[We should not regard a thing as being isolated from everything that lies outside it. For, the thing has undergone numerous alterations that rather than having destroyed it instead have contributed to its capacity to resist other potential variations.]

 

[(ditto)]

On remarquera qu’ici l’être n’est pas par lui-même isolé de tout extérieur, on ne le considérera jamais que dans un ensemble de vicissitudes qu’il a traversées, qui ne l’ont pas annihilé et qui, au contraire ont contribué à sa capacité de résistance aux vicissitudes éventuelles.

(7)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.5

[Changes in the Things]

 

(p.7-8: “Que sont ces « vicissitudes » ... si petites qu’elles puissent être.”)

 

[These “vicissitudes” or “alterations” result from the influence of the other beings that it happens to encounter in the universal torrent of accidents, causing alterations from prior states no matter how small.]

 

[We now wonder: what are these “vicissitudes” (or “alterations” as I have been calling them up to now) that all beings undergo? They are the results of the influence of the other beings that it happens to encounter in the universal torrent of accidents. All such contacts with other beings are mutual alterations from the prior states, no matter how small they may be.]

Que sont ces « vicissitudes » auxquelles tout être n’est jamais étranger ? Elles sont le fait d’autres êtres avec lesquels il lui arrive de se rencontrer dans le torrent universel des accidents. Tout ces | contacts sont en fait des altérations mutuelles par rapport à l’état antérieur, si petites qu’elles puissent être.

(7-8)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.6

[The Increase and Decrease of the Thing’s Degree of Consistency on Account of Interactions

 

(p.8: “A cette propriété fondamentale de tout corps, ... accroissement ou diminution.”)

 

[Another fundamental property of a thing, in addition to it having consistency, is that its consistency itself varies in degree within certain limits. All encounters with other beings will cause some variation of degree in its consistency, increasing or diminishing it.]

 

[(ditto)]

A cette propriété fondamentale de tout corps, quoi qu’il ait de particulier, d’être pourvu d’un certain degré de consistance, s’ajoute le fait non moins fondamental que cette consistance peut varier en degré, au moins dans certaines limites. Toute rencontre avec d’autres êtres pourra entraîner quelque variation du degré de sa consistance, accroissement ou diminution.

(8)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.7

[Assessing the Causes of the Variations in Consistency]

 

(p.8: “Dans la connaissance d’un corps ... ses tribulations possibles ou probables.”)

 

[A body comes to know and evaluate its own consistency, and it tries to more or less know (often through guesswork) what it is that is causing its consistency to vary, in order to better grasp its possible or probable challenges.]

 

[(I think have this next part wrong, but I am guessing it is the following. A body comes to know and evaluate its own consistency, and it tries to more or less know (often through guesswork) what it is that is causing its consistency to vary in its efforts to grasp its possible or probable challenges.)]

Dans la connaissance d’un corps il entre pour une grande part l’appréciation de sa consistance et en plus celle, plus ou moins conjecturale, de ce qui est en état de la faire varier, c’est-à-dire des vues sur ses tribulations possibles ou probables.

(8)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.8

[Relative Consistency Illustrated: The Oar Bent Underwater]

 

(p.8: “Donnons tout de suite un exemple ... est substituée une différence variable. ”)

 

[Our common sense is right that consistency is the mark of a being, but it misleads us into thinking that to be a real being this consistency must be absolute. Rather, whenever common sense would have us regard something as a “real” being as absolutely distinct from its appearances is really a matter of noticing that there are conditions under which the thing is more consistent compared to other conditions when it is under greater variance. For example, we are rowing a boat, and when the oar is out of water it looks straight and when it is in the water it looks bent. We come to regard the oar as straight as the “real” oar and the oar as bent as the “false appearance” of the oar. But in fact, even the oar as straight varies somewhat depending on the observer’s perspective. It is just that out of the water it has a greater degree of consistency than when going into the water.]

 

[(I will need to make more guesses, sorry, so please consult the text below. The main idea seems to be the following. There is no perfectly self-consistent being. Rather, a being is more or less self-consistent, depending the the circumstances. We consider an oar under two sets of conditions: {1} it is in the air before us, {2} it is submerged halfway into the water, making it appear bent. The temptation is to say that the oar as straight is the “real” oar in an absolute sense, and the oar as bent is one of its illusory appearances. However, even the oar as straight appears differently from the various perspectives of its multiple observers. It is only simply a little more self-consistent than the oar as bent, which in a more obvious way demonstrates this perspectival variation, because the angle of the bending will vary more apparently depending on the point of view. So while it is true that the common sense sees consistency as the mark of a being, it is wrong to absolutize that consistency and thereby make an absolute distinction between real and appearance. There instead are degrees on consistency, with none being absolute.)]

Donnons tout de suite un exemple du bénéfice de ce passage de l’être selon le sens commun, qui en fait un absolu à l’être en tant que consistant : la rame, vue droite telle qu’elle est hors de l’eau, est, pour le sens commun, seule un être réel ou véritable, tandis que plongée et paraissant coudée, ce n’est là qu’une « fausse apparence ». On retiendra au contraire qu’il n’y a ici que deux degrés de consistance. Forte chez la rame droite, le peu de consistance est extrême chez la rame coudée, puisque cette forme varie immédiatement selon tout changement de position et de l’objet et de l’observateur ; la rame droite au contraire résiste à tout déplacement, et impose son apparence à la multiplicité des sujets percevants. A une opposition irréductible, réalité-apparence est substituée une différence variable.

(8)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.9

[Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Consistency]

 

(p.8: “De la même manière se résoudra ... comme des moments de l’aperception.”)

 

[The subject-object distinction is also really a matter of relative difference between more and less consistent. Even the subject herself undergoes great variation.]

 

[(Again I am probably misreading the text here, so please check the quotation. It might be the following. We have been elaborating this notion that consistency admits of degrees of variation. Something is never absolutely consistent, but its degree of consistency can be important when related to lesser degrees of consistency. Here this is applied to the subject-object distinction and the problems it normally causes us conceptually. We should not think of these being two absolutely distinct things, different in kind, one being the subject and the other the object. Rather, what determines something as subject and another as object is a comparison of consistencies, with the lesser consistent one being the subject and the more consistent one being the object. A subject knows her own vicissitudes, which vary according the circumstances of the encounters with other beings, and although there are a number of different subjects that are connected by one continuity of experience, one subject for each moment of apperception, it is the relative consistency spanning throughout those variations that is really the subject.)]

De la même manière se résoudra l’impasse logique du subjectif et de l’objectif. Au lieu de s’opposer irréductiblement en perdant toute prise sur l’intervalle, les deux termes se rangent sur l’échelle de la consistance. Ce qui n’est que subjectif est dépendant de toutes les vicissitudes du sujet isolé dont c’est la connaissance, éminemment variable selon l’état, les moyens et les rencontres de celui-ci, le réputer subjectif est donc lui reconnaître un degré de consistance plus faible, que n’apparaîtra tout objet, aperçu comme conservant son identité à travers la diversité des sujets percevants comme des moments de l’aperception.

(8)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.10

[Knowledge as Information About Consistency and About Its Factors of Variability]

 

(p.: “Tout progrès dans la connaissance ... de la variation de ce degré.”)

 

[Knowing things is a matter of having information about their degrees of consistency and of the factors that vary this degree.]

 

[(ditto)]

All progress in the knowledge of things appears to not be far from the being reduced to information on the degree of their consistency and of the possible or probable conditions of the variation of this degree.

Tout progrès dans la connaissance des choses paraît n’être pas loin de se ramener à des renseignements sur le degré de leur consistance et sur les conditions possibles ou probables de la variation de ce degré.

(8)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.2.11

[Being as Multiple, Reciprocally Consistency-Modifying Encountering]

 

(p.8-9: “Le point de départ de l’observation ... les consistances multiples et variables”)

 

[So we should not begin by observing things under a mode that considers them somehow in their self-isolation, frozen at some specific time and place. Rather, we should use a mode of observation that sees primarily the indefinite multiplicity of intermixing and interacting beings that reciprocally alter one another through their encounters and combinations. What is most primary here are the multiple and unannounced encounters that combine the variable consistencies themselves, which constitute the interacting beings.]

 

[(ditto)]

Le point de départ de l’observation en général ce n’est donc pas | la considération d’un être isolé, en lui-même, cliché à tel ou tel endroit, fixé à tel moment, c’est la multiplicité indéfinie des êtres mêlés et mobiles susceptibles de s’altérer réciproquement par leurs rencontres et leurs combinaisons. Le donné ce n’est pas l’être, c’est la réciprocité des êtres dans leurs rencontres multiples et inopinées. Ce qui se combine, ce sont les consistances multiples et variables.

(8-9)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dupréel, Eugène. (1961). La consistance et la probabilité constructive. (Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques 55, no.2). Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique.

PDF at:

http://www.academieroyale.be/fr/les-publications-memoires-detail/oeuvres-2/la-consistance-et-la-probabilite-constructive/.\

.

.

Priest (2.2) One, “Breaking the Regress”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Logic and Semantics, entry directory]

[Graham Priest, entry directory]

[Priest, One, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. You will find typos and other distracting mistakes, because I have not finished proofreading. Bracketed commentary is my own. Please consult the original text, as my summaries could be wrong.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Graham Priest

 

One:

Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness

 

Ch.2

Identity and Gluons

 

2.2

Breaking the Regress

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(2.2.1) To explain how gluons bind parts into a unified whole, we need to break the Bradley regress, which prevents gluons from simply being object-parts. (2.2.2) We might name the parts of a unified object with letters, as for example, a, b, c, and d. The gluon, symbolized 中, is what binds all the other parts into the unified whole. If the gluon were distinct from the other parts (in the sense of not being identical to them), there would always be room for another gluon to intervene between the first gluon and the given parts, which leads to the Bradley regress. To avoid it, we say that the gluon is identical to each of the parts, thereby closing those “gaps”. (2.2.3) The gluon is non-transitively identical with each and every part. That means that although each part is identical to the gluon, they are not thereby identical to one another. And, parts can themselves be composed of parts by means of another internal gluon.

x

xxxxb

xxxx||

ax=x中x=xc

xxxx||

xxxxd

x

(2.2.4) Gluonic unity involves non-transitive identity, meaning that a = 中 and 中 = c, but not thereby a = c.

 

 

 

Contents:

 

2.2.1

[Gluons as Needing to Break the Bradley Regress]

 

2.2.2

[The Gluon as Identical to the Parts]

 

2.2.3

[The Non-Transitive Identity of Parts to the Gluon, Part 1]

 

2.2.4

[The Non-Transitive Identity of Parts to the Gluon, Part 2]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

2.2.1

[Gluons as Needing to Break the Bradley Regress]

 

[To explain how gluons bind parts into a unified whole, we need to break the Bradley regress, which prevents gluons from simply being object-parts.]

 

[Recall from section 1.4.2 that we cannot think of the gluon as an object-part, because as such, it would require yet another gluon to explain its binding among the parts it binds, and that newer gluon will need its own to bind it into the unity, and there can be no end to this regress. Priest reminds us that to explain how gluons bind parts into the unity, we need to break this regress.]

The problem of unity is to explain how it is that gluons glue. What stands in the way of an explanation is the Bradley regress. As we saw in Section 1.4, this is vicious, and so it must be broken. But how?

(16)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

2.2.2

[The Gluon as Identical to the Parts]

 

[We might name the parts of a unified object with letters, as for example, a, b, c, and d. The gluon, symbolized 中, is what binds all the other parts into the unified whole. If the gluon were distinct from the other parts (in the sense of not being identical to them), there would always be room for another gluon to intervene between the first gluon and the given parts, which leads to the Bradley regress. To avoid it, we say that the gluon is identical to each of the parts, thereby closing those “gaps”.]

 

[Priest will symbolize the gluon with the Chinese (and maybe also Japanese) character 中. We think of a thing having a number of parts, which we can give letter names to, like a, b, c, and d. The gluon 中, then, is what binds these parts into the whole. Now, the gluon cannot simply be another part, for then it will cause our account to fall victim to the Bradley regress. Priest notes that the regress happens when we come to think of the gluon as being another object for which yet another gluon could intervene between the first and the other parts. Priest then says that if we make the gluon identical to the parts, that closes the metaphysical “gap” that otherwise would stand between the gluon and the parts. So we will need to make the gluon identical to the parts to avoid the Bradley regress.]

Suppose that an object has parts a, b, c, and d, and that these are held together by a gluon 中.¹ The Bradley regress is generated by the thought that 中 is distinct | from each of the other parts. If this is the case, then there is room, as it were, for something to be inserted between 中 and a, and so on. Or to use another metaphor, there is a metaphysical space between 中 and a, and one requires something in the space to make the join. Thus, the regress will be broken if 中 is identical to a. There will then be no space, or need, for anything to be inserted.

(16-17, boldface mine)

1. The character 中 (Chinese: zhong; Japanese: chu) means centre, which seems like a pretty good symbol for a gluon. (By coincidence, it is also sometimes used as part of one of the Chinese names for Madhyamaka Buddhism: zhong dao zong.) As the amount of logic increases, it also seems a good time for Western logicians to move to some less familiar languages in search of symbols. Unfortunately, | I will use the character in this section only, due to the current difficulty of typesetting Chinese characters in heavily symbolic contexts.

(16-17)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

2.2.3

[The Non-Transitive Identity of Parts to the Gluon, Part 1]

 

[The gluon is non-transitively identical with each and every part. That means that although each part is identical to the gluon, they are not thereby identical to one another. And, parts can themselves be composed of parts by means of another internal gluon.]

 

[The gluon is non-transitively identical with all of the parts, including itself. We can depict it by having all of the parts equal the gluon, but none of the parts equaling one another.

x

xxxxb

xxxx||

ax=x中x=xc

xxxx||

xxxxd

x

Priest then gives an analogy to explain why the identity here is not transitive. We think of how the mortar between bricks binds the bricks without making them one solid brick. Likewise, the gluon binds the parts by being identical to them, without making those parts be identical with each other. The footnote here is important, but I did not quite grasp it all. The basic idea seems to be that each part can be consider as being made of parts, bound with their own subgluon of sorts (not his term). These subparts still form parts of the whole, but how all this works I did not quite follow. Let me just go slowly through that footnote, line by line:

Of course, the parts of an object can themselves have parts.

This we noted.

Thus, it could be the case that, for example, c has parts m and n.

That simply sets up a naming convention.

These will be joined by a gluon, 中′.

That would seem to be what I called the subgluon, namely, the gluon that unifies the subpartitions of a thing’s main parts.

So we will have m = 中′ = n.

This simply says that the subgluon bears the same non-transitive identity relation with respect to the subpartitions it unifies.

If one takes the parthood relation to be transitive, m, 中′, and n, are also parts of the original object. So we will have 中 = m, 中 = 中′, and so on.

Here is where I get lost. As far as I can tell, such main parts as a, b, c, d, 中 are bound by non-transitive identity. And I would assume also that for m and n we would also not want them to be identical. So when Priest says, “If one takes the parthood relation to be transitive,” I am guessing by “parthood relation” he refers to the subpartition’s relation to the main part. But how does that work? Let us try to make a figure for it:

x

xxxxb

xxxx||

ax=x中x=xc {m = 中′ = n}

xxxx||

xxxxd

xSomething we have not established here, which would show the

In order to get enough levels of parthood for a transitive relation, let us call the whole object Ω:

x

Ω {xxxxb

xxxxxx||

xxax=x中x=xc {{m = 中′ = n}}

xxxxxx||

xxxxxxdxx}

x

My best guess at the moment is that when Priest says, “If one takes the parthood relation to be transitive” he does not mean that the parthood relation is one of identity. I am guessing he simply means that if m is a part of c, and if c is a part of Ω, then m is a part of Ω. But then, I do not understand the line using equations: “So we will have 中 = m, 中 = 中′, and so on.” Because if 中 = m and 中 = n, and this is a transitive identity relation, then we have n = m. In the two given formulas, 中 = m, 中 = 中′, there is in both cases an equation of a higher scale part with a lower scale part. So the only way I can think of this all working is if we think instead of the parthood relation as a non-transitive identity relation. And maybe specifically it is the non-transitive identity relation between the subpartitions specifically with the main gluon. This would bind each subpartition into the whole without equating them. I apologize; please read the text below to see what is really meant here.]

Of course, 中 must be identical with b, c, d, for exactly the same reason. Thus, 中 is able to combine the parts into a unity by being identical with each one (including itself). The situation may be depicted thus:

x

xxxxb

xxxx||

ax=x中x=xc

xxxx||

xxxxd

x

The explanation of how it is that the gluon manages to unite the disparate bunch is, then, that it is identical with each of them.² Consider, if it helps, an analogy. Suppose that one wants to join two physical bricks together with physical glue. The glue is inserted between the bricks. It bonds to each one, and so joins them. It does not make the two bricks one, but the molecules of the glue and each brick become physically indissoluble. In the metaphysical case, the parts of an object do not become identical either, but the gluon bonds with each part in the most intimate way, by being identical with it.

(17)

2. Of course, the parts of an object can themselves have parts. Thus, it could be the case that, for example, c has parts m and n. These will be joined by a gluon, 中′. So we will have m = 中′ = n. If one takes the parthood relation to be transitive, m, 中′, and n, are also parts of the original object. So we will have 中 = m, 中 = 中′, and so on.

(17)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

2.2.4

[The Non-Transitive Identity of Parts to the Gluon, Part 2]

 

[Gluonic unity involves non-transitive identity, meaning that a = 中 and 中 = c, but not thereby a = c.]

 

[Priest now explains how the transitivity of identity fails under this conception of gluonic unity. For, “We have a = 中 and 中 = c, but we will not have a = c.” Priest will now provide a more precise theory of non-transitive identity to show how it is a coherent notion.]

It should be immediately obvious that the relation of identity invoked here will not behave in the way that identity is often supposed to behave. In particular, the transitivity of identity will fail. We have a = 中 and 中 = c, but we will not have a = c. Two bricks of a house are not identical. It might be doubted that there is any such coherent notion, or that, if there is, it is really one of identity. These concerns cannot be set aside lightly, and the only way to assuage them is to provide a precise theory of identity which delivers what is required. Let us turn to this.

(17)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

 

Priest, Graham. 2014. One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford University.

 

 

 

.

Priest (2.1) One, “How Gluons Glue”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Logic and Semantics, entry directory]

[Graham Priest, entry directory]

[Priest, One, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. You will find typos and other distracting mistakes, because I have not finished proofreading. Bracketed commentary is my own. Please consult the original text, as my summaries could be wrong.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Graham Priest

 

One:

Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness

 

Ch.2

Identity and Gluons

 

2.1

How Gluons Glue

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(2.1.1) The gluon is the factor that binds parts into a unity. It has the contradictory properties of both being and not being an object. We now will see how gluons bind parts into unities, which involves breaking the Bradley regress. (2.1.2) The binding action of gluons involves non-transitive identity.

 

 

 

 

Contents:

 

2.1.1

[How Gluons Will Glue]

 

2.1.2

[Gluons’ Non-Transitive Identity]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

2.1.1

[How Gluons Will Glue]

 

[The gluon is the factor that binds parts into a unity. It has the contradictory properties of both being and not being an object. We now will see how gluons bind parts into unities, which involves breaking the Bradley regress.]

 

[In section 1.3.1 we noted how things have parts that together compose the unity they belong to by means of a factor that binds the parts together in a unifying way. This unificatory binding factor is called the gluon. We discussed the problems with seeing it just as an object-part and with seeing it just as not being an object-part (as for example being instead a relation) (see section 1.4, section 1.5, and section 1.6). As a result, in section 1.6.6, Priest proposed that it is best to hold the dialetheic position that gluons both are and are not objects. In sections 1.3.4 and 1.6.6, Priest noted that the gluon is a contradictory entity, having the contradictory properties both of being an object and of not being an object (and see section 1.3.5). But we still need to explain how the gluon binds the parts into a unity. (On this importance of the how question when accounting for something philosophically, see section 1.5.5.) This is what we now endeavor, which involves us seeing how we will break the Bradley regress (see section 1.4 especially).]

In the previous chapter we saw that there must be something which accounts for a unity composed of parts where one exists – a gluon; and we saw that a gluon may be expected to have contradictory properties. But we have not yet faced the question of how the gluon does its job: how does it bind the parts (including itself) into a whole? Its having contradictory properties does not immediately address this question (though, one might suspect, it is going to play an important role). In this chapter, we look at the answer. The key is breaking the Bradley regress. We will start by seeing how.

(16)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

2.1.2

[Gluons’ Non-Transitive Identity]

 

[The binding action of gluons involves non-transitive identity.]

 

[In order to explain how gluons glue, we will also need to change the logical properties that we normally ascribe to identity, namely, we need to conceive it as being non-transitive. First Priest will give an informal account of gluonic non-transitive identity, and at the end, he provides a more technical account.]

This will immediately launch us into a discussion of identity. Identity cannot work in the way that orthodoxy takes it to if gluons are to do their job. In particular, it must be non-transitive. How so? The rest of the chapter explains, and articulates the nature of gluons more precisely in this theoretical context. The ideas are spelled out informally. Full technical details can be found in the technical appendix to the chapter, Section 2.10, which can be skipped without loss of continuity by those with no taste for such things.

(16)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

 

Priest, Graham. 2014. One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford University.

 

 

 

.

Priest (1.6) One, “The Aporia”, summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Logic and Semantics, entry directory]

[Graham Priest, entry directory]

[Priest, One, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. You will find typos and other distracting mistakes, because I have not finished proofreading. Bracketed commentary is my own. Please consult the original text, as my summaries could be wrong.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Graham Priest

 

One:

Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness

 

Ch.1

Gluons and Their Wicked Ways

 

1.6

The Aporia

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(1.6.1) None of our available options of explaining unity in terms of the factor that binds parts together into the whole (which is called the “gluon”) are viable. (1.6.2) We might say there are no gluons, thereby claiming that there are parts in the world but no wholes. This cannot be so, because in thought there are unified mental entities. (1.6.3) We also cannot argue that there are no gluons on account of the world being one whole without containing any parts. For, even in this case we do in practical life think of wholes with parts, meaning that the mental entities involved in those conceptions are wholes with parts and thus have gluons. (1.6.4) Gluons can be referred to, so we cannot claim they are not objects. (1.6.5) We cannot say that the gluon is an object, because that takes unity for granted rather than explain it. (1.6.6) Our best option for understanding gluons is with the dialetheic claim that they both are and are not objects.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents:

 

1.6.1

[The Lack of Available, Viable Options to Explain Gluonic Unification]

 

1.6.2

[The Inadequacy of Rejecting the Existence of Gluons and Positing a Wholeless World]

 

1.6.3

[The Inadequacy of Rejecting the Existence of Gluons and Positing a Partless World]

 

1.6.4

[Gluons as Necessarily Objects on Account of Being Referable]

 

1.6.5

[Gluon as not Being an Object]

 

1.6.6

[Gluons as Dialetheias]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

1.6.1

[The Lack of Available, Viable Options to Explain Gluonic Unification]

 

[None of our available options of explaining unity in terms of the factor that binds parts together into the whole (which is called the “gluon”) are viable.]

 

[In section 1.5, we discussed the problem of explaining unity. We noted all of our available options, and we saw how none are satisfactory. The unifying factor we want to give an account of is called the gluon (see section 1.3.4). Priest then notes a point he makes in section 1.3.4 and section 1.3.5, namely, that gluons are contradictory objects, because in order to be what they are, they must both be entities while also not being entities. They are entities in that we are talking about them (and anything you can talk about is an entity, for what else would it be?), and yet they are not entities on account of the Bradly regress (see section 1.4, especially 1.4.2), and so by thinking of a gluon simply as an entity makes it a part of the problem of explaining unity rather than a part of the solution. We are thus at an impasse or aporia. Priest says we have three options:

{1} We can say that there are no gluons.

(I suppose for this option, we are claiming that there is no binding, unifying factor in things. But then we are giving up the question altogether it seems. And that is not what we want, because the question is of great philosophical importance.)

{2} We can reject the claim that a gluon is an object.

(Here we would solve the problem of the Bradley Regress, but then we would seem to be unable to talk about it, which is very unhelpful for trying to account for it.)

{3} We can reject the claim that it is not an object.

(This will allow us to talk about it, but then we encounter the Bradley Regress, which prevents us from accounting for unity or the gluon.) (Note, Priest gives his own reasoning in the following sections.) Given that all these options are highly problematic, we seem not to have any good way to proceed.]

We have, then, an aporia.Whatever it is that constitutes the unity of an entity must itself both be and not be an entity. It is an entity since we are talking about it; it is not an entity since it is then part of the problem of a unity, not its solution. ‘Aporia’ is often glossed as ‘puzzle’ or ‘uncertainly’, but it literally means something like ‘impasse’. An aporia is a source of puzzlement and uncertainty precisely because it seems to leave no way to go forward. In the present case, if we wish to go back, there are only three options:

1. We can say that there are no gluons.

2. We can reject the claim that a gluon is an object.

3. We can reject the claim that it is not an object.

Prospects look bleak.

(14)

[contents]

 

 

 

1.6.2

[The Inadequacy of Rejecting the Existence of Gluons and Positing a Wholeless World]

 

[We might say there are no gluons, thereby claiming that there are parts in the world but no wholes. This cannot be so, because in thought there are unified mental entities.]

 

[Recall the first option from section 1.6.1 above.

{1} We can say that there are no gluons.

Because gluons are the binding factor that unifies parts into wholes, if we deny they exist, we also deny that there can be a difference between a unity that has parts and a simple plurality of those parts. (For, without this factor, there would be nothing to make a plurality of parts unified into a whole, and thus it would be no different from an unified plurality of parts.) One way to work around this could be to say that there are just parts but no wholes, and thus “the world is just a congeries of congeries” (14). But this cannot be so. For, we have unities in thought, which although being mental entities, still qualify as unities and thus their gluonic unification still needs to be accounted for.]

Consider the first case. If there are no gluons, then we are bereft of an explanation as to the difference between a unity with parts and the plurality of the parts, which there certainly is. We could avoid this by supposing that there are no unities: the world is just a congeries of congeries. All parts, no unities. But this does not seem to help either. If there are no unities, there certainly appear to be; that is, there are unities in thought. This means that the mind constitutes unities— as, perhaps, for Kant. But in this case, there are gluons.These are mental entities, but they fall foul of the aporia in the usual way.²²

(14)

22. The view that there are no material wholes, only simples, is defended in Unger (1979). There are no tables: only atoms ‘arranged table-wise’ (as van Inwagen puts it (1990), p. 72ff). Sider (1993) points out that this commits the view to the (counterintuitive) necessity of the existence of physical simples (partless wholes). (Gluon theory is not so committed.) And Uzquiano (2004) argues that | attempts to paraphrase away talk of unities in the way suggested is problematic. In any case, the view hardly seems credible for abstract objects. A proposition is a single thing: one can believe it, express it. You can not do this to a plurality of meanings arranged proposition-wise, whatever that might be supposed to mean. (14-15)

[contents]

 

 

 

1.6.3

[The Inadequacy of Rejecting the Existence of Gluons and Positing a Partless World]

 

[We also cannot argue that there are no gluons on account of the world being one whole without containing any parts. For, even in this case we do in practical life think of wholes with parts, meaning that the mental entities involved in those conceptions are wholes with parts and thus have gluons.]

 

[Recall yet again the first option from section 1.6.1 above.

{1} We can say that there are no gluons.

Priest now notes another way this could be so. Suppose the world is one whole unity without any parts. It in this sense would also not have any gluons; for there would be no parts to be bound together into wholes. But this goes against common sense and practical life, where for example our car certainly has parts that would render the car inoperable if they were missing. But someone might say that the car is not really such a unity of parts (I am not sure what else it would be, I suppose we only have the one world, and the car is not some unity within it, but I am not sure), and we only mistakenly think that the car is a whole. But even in that case, we are admitting that we conceive of it as a whole containing parts, which means the mental entity of that conception would still involve gluons.]

At the other extreme, one might suppose that there are unities, but that they have no parts, and hence that there are no gluons. All unities, no parts. A very extreme form of this position is to the effect, not only that there are only unities, but there is only one of them. All else is appearance. The view is to be found in Parmenides and Bradley. Supposing that there are only unities with no parts is a desperate move. It flies in the face of common sense: if someone steals a wheel of my car then it is missing an essential part. And before one says that the car is not really a whole, but we only think of it in that way, recall that this means that there is a unity in intention, and we are back with intentional gluons.

(15)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.6.4

[Gluons as Necessarily Objects on Account of Being Referable]

 

[Gluons can be referred to, so we cannot claim they are not objects.]

 

[Now recall the second option from section 1.6.1 above.

{2} We can reject the claim that a gluon is an object.

But “we can refer to it, quantify over it, talk about it.” Priest says that there is little other sense to what would qualify something as being an object.]

In the second case, we must insist that the gluon is simply not an object. But this seems even more desperate: we can refer to it, quantify over it, talk about it. If this does not make something an object, I am at a loss to know what could. Anything we can think about is an object, a unity, a single thing (whether or not it exists). There seems little scope here.

(15)

[contents]

 

 

 

1.6.5

[Gluon as not Being an Object]

 

[We cannot say that the gluon is an object, because that takes unity for granted rather than explain it.]

 

[Now finally recall the third option from section 1.6.1 above.

{3} We can reject the claim that it is not an object.

We have seen from section 1.4 (see especially 1.4.2) that this leads to the Bradley Regress. (But Priest’s point this time seems different. I do not quite grasp it, so consult the quotation below. He seems to be saying the following. Let us suppose the gluon is an object. But what we are trying to explain are unified objects. He next says that the only way an object can constitute the unity of another object is by taking unity for granted. That is the part I do not follow so well. Are we talking about taking the unity of the gluon for granted, so that it does not lead to a regress? Or are we taking the whole thing’s unity for granted? At any rate, this somehow involves simply thinking that the unity of things are obvious or unquestionable. But examples of unities very often involve combinations of parts, and we do not explain their compositional bonding by claiming that gluons are objects ((or by otherwise taking unity for granted)). But I am guessing here.]

Finally, in the third case, we may suppose that the gluon is simply an object. But we have seen that this just leaves us bereft of an explanation of the unity of an entity. How could we even have had the impression that any object could constitute the unity of another bunch of objects? Only because of taking the unity for granted. Thus, we write ‘Socrates is a person’ and the rest is obvious. But putting ‘Socrates’ and ‘is a person’ next to each other does not do the job; it just produces a plurality of two things. When we think of the two as cooperating, the magic has already occurred.

(15)

[contents]

 

 

 

1.6.6

[Gluons as Dialetheias]

 

[Our best option for understanding gluons is with the dialetheic claim that they both are and are not objects.]

 

So we cannot use any of the available options, and we should instead say that gluons both are and are not objects. What prevents us is the Principle of Non-Contradiction. But since it is not a well-founded logical principle and since also it is best not obeyed in all cases, we will take the dialetheic position that Gluons have contradictory properties (again, they both are and are not objects.)

If we cannot go back, then we must go forward. What stands in the way? Evidently, the Principle of Non-Contradiction. If we accept that gluons both are and are not objects, then some contradictions are true. Whilst it must be agreed that horror contradictionis is orthodox in Western philosophy, at least since Aristotle’s canonical –but fundamentally flawed – defence, the friends of consistency have done little as yet to establish that there is anything rational in this.²³ So let us go forward. Gluons are dialetheic: they have contradictory properties. Of course, if this were all there were to matters, the situation would not be particularly interesting. Going on means crossing the bridge of inconsistency;²⁴ and what is important is what lies on the other side.

(15)

23. See Priest (2006).

24. Not that there are no other good reasons to do so. See Priest (1987) and (1995a).

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

 

Priest, Graham. 2014. One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford University.

 

 

Or if otherwise cited:

 

Priest, G. (1987), In Contradiction, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff; second (extended) edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

 

Priest, G. (1995a), Beyond the Limits of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; second (extended) edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

 

Priest, G. (2006), Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Sider, T. (1993a), ‘Parthood’, Philosophical Review 116: 51–91.

 

Sider, T. (1993b), ‘Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk’, Analysis 53: 285–9.

 

Unger, P. (1979), ‘There are no Ordinary Things’, Synthese 41: 117--54.

 

Uzquiano, G. (2004), ‘Plurals and Simples’, Monist 87: 429–51.

 

 

 

 

.

Priest (1.5) One. ‘Explaining Unity,’ summary

 

by Corry Shores

 

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Logic and Semantics, entry directory]

[Graham Priest, entry directory]

[Priest, One, entry directory]

 

[The following is summary. You will find typos and other distracting mistakes, because I have not finished proofreading. Bracketed commentary is my own. Please consult the original text, as my summaries could be wrong.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

Graham Priest

 

One:

Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness

 

Ch.1

Gluons and Their Wicked Ways

 

1.5

Explaining Unity

 

 

 

Brief summary:

(1.5.1) One possible explanation for what a gluon (the unifying factor in something’s composition)  is, is that it is the binding relationality of the thing’s internal arrangement or structure. (1.5.2) But not all relations are compositional, as for example the relation of child to a mother. (1.5.3) The relational interpretation of the gluon only makes matters worse, because it then presents a difficult metaphysical problem of explaining how something non-physical can bind physical things. (1.5.4) (The relational interpretation of the gluon also fails because the thing’s relationality only presents itself as another entity needing yet another to explain its integration in the whole, and that new binding entity would need yet another, and so on. (1.5.5) Another possible sort of account for unity is ontological dependence. One might claim that whenever the identity of the parts depends on the identity of the whole, that this very dependence itself is what accounts for the thing’s unity. But this fails as an account, because it does not yet explain how the parts cooperate to form a unity. (1.5.6) There are a lack of conventional accounts of unity. Priest will propose a new one, which will involve modifications in our notion of identity. (1.5.7) Accounts of unity that merely describe the causal processes that go into something’s generation or production, like a carpenter’s explanation of how to construct a table, satisfy to some extent the how curiosity we have for an account of unity. But they fall short for a number of reasons. {1} They do not explain the unity brought about but only the processes bringing it about. {2} They lack an explanation for what makes unifying causal processes different from non-unifying ones. And {3} they cannot explain the unity of abstract objects. (1.5.8) Thus, we do not have any easy ways to account for unity.

 

 

 

 

 

Contents:

 

1.5.1

[The Gluon as a Relation That Binds]

 

1.5.2

[Relations as Not Necessarily Compositional]

 

1.5.3

[The Failure of the Relational Interpretation of the Gluon on Account of Metaphysical Incompatibility]

 

1.5.4

[The Failure of the Relational Interpretation of the Gluon on Account of the Bradley Regress]

 

1.5.5

[The Ontological Dependence Account of Unity and Its Failure]

 

1.5.6

[Priest’s Offer]

 

1.5.7

[The Causal Process Account of Unity and Its Failure]

 

1.5.8

[The Lack of Convenient Accounts of Unity]

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

Summary

 

1.5.1

[The Gluon as a Relation That Binds]

 

[One possible explanation for what a gluon (the unifying factor in something’s composition)  is, is that it is the binding relationality of the thing’s internal arrangement or structure.]

 

[Previously in section 1.3.4 we discussed the notion of the gluon, which is the unifying factor in the composition of something. Priest now addresses a possible notion of how to explain the gluon. Some might say that what accounts for the unity is the “configuration, arrangement, structure” or the like of the parts. As such, this would be saying that the gluon is a relationship between the parts, and it would cast this relationship as having binding properties.]

A common thought at this point is that what accounts for the unity of the parts of an object, its gluon, is their configuration, arrangement, structure, or some such. Whatever you call it, it is a relationship between the parts, and relationships relate, | by definition. Call relationships objects if you wish; but they are a special kind of object; and they bind together the parts by their very nature.¹⁹

(11-12)

19. We are not a million miles away here from Aristotle’s proposed solution to the problem.We will look at the details of his account in Chapter 3.

(12)

[contents]

 

 

 

1.5.2

[Relations as Not Necessarily Compositional]

 

[But not all relations are compositional, as for example the relation of child to a mother.]

 

Priest notes that this conception of the gluon (see section 1.5.1 above) confuses two ideas, namely, between relating and unifying. A relation by its own is not normally something that compositionally unifies what it relates. To illustrate, Priest has us consider for example the relationship of oneself being a child to one’s mother. Here the relationship does not unify the two people. [I would have expected another sort of example, given the biological and psychological bond that such a relation is thought to have. Perhaps the idea is that simply by being a mother’s child is not sufficient a bond to compose a unity of the two into one object. Deleuze when discussing Spinozistic composition gives the example of a married couple composing one composite thing. I would think that a mother-child relation would not be too far off from such a structure, but I am not sure.]

There is already a confusion at the heart of this thought –and not an uncommon one. The confusion is between relating and unifying. Relations do not, in general, unify. I am related to my mother by bearing the relationship of child to her. This may even be an internal relation (whatever, exactly, that means) – at least as far as I am concerned: I could not have been me had I not had that relation. But obviously the relation does not serve to render my mother and myself a unity in the appropriate sense.

(12)

[contents]

 

 

 

1.5.3

[The Failure of the Relational Interpretation of the Gluon on Account of Metaphysical Incompatibility]

 

[The relational interpretation of the gluon only makes matters worse, because it then presents a difficult metaphysical problem of explaining how something non-physical can bind physical things.]

 

[Priest’s next point seems to be the following. The notion of the gluon as a composition-forming relation that we noted above in section 1.5.2 still construes it as an entity. As we noted, it is a different kind of entity than the thing’s parts, namely, it is a relation, and what it relates are “things” more straightforwardly understood. In our example of the house, the bricks are the things, and the gluon under this relational interpretation would be the particular relational organization of the parts on account of which the parts compose a whole house rather than a mere collection of independent bricks. Priest now says that this does not help, and his reasoning seems to be the following. The main problem lies in the fact that not only is a relation a different kind of thing than its parts, it is of such a kind that we now have yet a greater problem of understanding how it can be said to combine with those parts. His raises the mind-body problem, which stems largely from the mind being of such a different kind of thing as the body that it is very difficult to both maintain their conventional distinction while also understanding how they have the intimate relation we think them to have. So suppose we take this relational interpretation of the gluon. We now have the even greater challenge of explaining how a relation, being so very different than a part, especially a physical part, “latches-on” so to speak to the parts and binds them in their physical unity but in a way that is different from the normal physical properties and interactions we assign to the objects. To venture to put it another way, the gluon that organizes the house under this relational interpretation would need to have some sort of “sense” to it, like the houseness or house-form expressed by the bricks in their entire inter-relationality. But this sense cannot be something that is in itself physical. The mortar binding the bricks is physical, but the mortar can bind them haphazardly or under a different sense, like “wall”. The gluon however is not something physical like the mortar is. But as such, how does something not physical bind together physical things? (So as we see, our account of unity must include a notion of a binding factor, hence the gluonics. But that “binding” we seek to explain is not a physical thing but rather a principle to understand how it is that things by being so bound constitute a unity, I think. To venture a rewording, what we seek is a notion of compositional binding that accounts for unity. For, the main aspect of unity to be explained is not the oneness as much as the factor that brings the multiple parts together into a oneness.)]

Even setting aside the confusion, though, the thought still does not work. The fact that a gluon is a different kind of object does not solve the problem of unity. If anything, it simply makes it worse. Thus, what it is that joins the mind and body into a unity is a traditional and vexed problem in dualistic theories of mind. It is the very fact that they are different kinds of thing that seems to make the problem so intractable. In a similar way, suppose that it is the configuration of the bricks that binds them together to form a house. The bricks are physical objects; the configuration is, presumably, an abstract object. (Different sets of bricks can have the same configuration.) Any interaction between the bricks and the configuration would therefore seem just as problematic, perhaps even more so, as that in the mind/body case.

(12)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.5.4

[The Failure of the Relational Interpretation of the Gluon on Account of the Bradley Regress]

 

[The relational interpretation of the gluon also fails because the thing’s relationality only presents itself as another entity needing yet another to explain its integration in the whole, and that new binding entity would need yet another, and so on.]

 

[Priest’s next point seems to be the following. We said in section 1.5.3 above that one problem with the relational interpretation of the gluon is that it posits an entity whose metaphysical compatibility with its parts is not easy to account for. Now we return to the Bradley regress. By positing the relationality as the binding, organizing element, we have only created another entity which calls for yet another binding entity to explain how it binds with the parts, and that new entity will need yet another, and so on. Priest may be saying something else or more, so let me quote:]

So it has to be the particular nature of the special object that is supposed to solve the problem. But how does it do so? To say that it just does do this – by its nature – is not to solve the problem; it is simply to name it. As Bradley puts it (speaking of the mind, but with considerations that apply quite generally):²⁰

When we ask ‘What is the composition of [an object]’, we break up [that object], which comes to us as a whole, into units ... But since it is clear that these units by themselves are not all the ‘composition’, we are forced to recognize the existence of relations. But this does not stagger us. We push on with the conceptions we have brought to the work, and which of course can not be false, and we say, Oh yes, we have there more units, naturally not quite the same as the others, and – voilà tout. But when a sceptical reader, whose mind has not been warped by a different education, attempts to form an idea of what is meant, he is somewhat at a loss.

For when one invokes the object in question, one simply adds an extra element to the melange. If one is puzzled by the unity in the first case, one should be equally puzzled by the supposed unity in the second. Thus, for example, instead | of a plurality of physical parts of an object, we now have a plurality of [parts plus configuration]. Or more generally, we have the parts plus the relationship between them (or the action of the relation, or the fact that they are so related). How is this any better? This is exactly what the Bradley regress highlights.

(12-13)

20.

Bradley (1922), sect. 65. Here and throughout the book, all italics in quotations are original unless otherwise specified.

(12)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.5.5

[The Ontological Dependence Account of Unity and Its Failure]

 

[Another possible sort of account for unity is ontological dependence. One might claim that whenever the identity of the parts depends on the identity of the whole, that this very dependence itself is what accounts for the thing’s unity. But this fails as an account, because it does not yet explain how the parts cooperate to form a unity.]

 

[Priest now notes another way to account for the unity of an object. I may not summarize this properly, so it is best to skip to the quotation below. But let us follow the reasoning first. We first consider a pile of stones. Now, what gives the pile of stones its identity? To be a pile of stones means first that it is a pile, and thus a pile of things, and secondly it means that what it is a pile of are stones. In other words, the identity of a pile of stones depends entirely in the identity of its parts. But what about the identity of the stones, the parts of the pile? They would have the same identity as being whatever stone they are, independently of the pile they happen to be in. Were they in another pile or lying outside a pile, they would have the same identity. Next consider some person’s body. Each body part, like a hand, has (it seems from the text) an identity related to the owner. Priest writes: “We would not have that hand unless it were part of that body.” This means that the identity of the body part (being, it seems, individualized and identifiable by means of the body it belongs to) depends on the identity of the body it is a part of. (I am not sure if the body’s identity also depends on the parts’ identities or not.) Some use this notion to explain unity. They say that this dependence of the parts’ identities on the whole’s identity is what explains the unity of the thing. (Perhaps the insight here is the following, but this is a spontaneous guess, sorry. The parts have identities. That is something fundamental to them, maybe even what is most fundamental to them. Now, what is most fundamental to the parts is not something lying within them but rather is something lying in their belonging-together to the whole. The parts as such would not even exist were they not part of that whole (or at least they would be different things altogether). So we might think then of this dependence of the parts on the whole as being a fundamental “bond” they hold with each other; for without this bond, they would not be what they are. This “bond” would seem to be some fact of their “being” or some such metaphysical concept. To put it another way, we have established that the parts’ being, identity, existence, etc. stems from their being in the particular whole they are in. But that being in some particular whole is a matter of their particular relational combination with the other parts. Thus this very dependence on the whole for identity is at the same time the inter-relative bonding dependence of the parts. I am reaching.) Priest next explains why this notion of ontological dependence does not still account for unity. He says that this account only provides a description of some feature of unified things. What it cannot do, but needs to for such an account, is to explain how the parts interrelate so to compose a unified thing. (Philosophically speaking, I find this claim striking, but perhaps it is obvious. In philosophy, when we want to give an account of something, the question we ask is how. For example, to give an account of unity, we ask, how do the parts form the whole. What sort of an answer would satisfy such how questions? In the case of unity, we will find out as we go. But I suspect that it could involve identifying structural elements and describing both the structural features they have which play a role in forming the unity and also their manner of interaction or interrelation in that formation. In other words, we might need something more of a mechanical explanation, or an account or story that tells us, how it all works.)

A quite different possibility for explaining the unity of an object is one which appeals to the notion of (ontological) dependence. Consider a pile of stones and a person’s body. The former, it might be suggested, is not a true unity; the latter is. And what makes the difference is that the identity of the pile depends on the identity of its parts, the stones; whereas in the case of the body, it is the other way around: the identity of the parts depends on the identity of the whole. (We would not have that hand unless it were part of that body.) Thus, the thought continues, what explains the oneness of a partite genuine unity is the dependence of its parts on the whole. There will be much to be said about dependence in Part III of the book. For the moment, let us grant the claims about what depends on what. Even given these, the suggestion will not work. The fact that in a unity the natures of the parts depend on the nature of the whole in no way explains how they cooperate to form a unity. For all their dependence, the parts are still parts; and facts about identity do not bear on cooperation. Granted, the parts would not be the parts they are unless they were parts of the whole. But that hardly explains how it is that the various parts do what they do to create the whole. We know, by their nature, that they are parts of that whole; but how is it that they have this nature?

(13)

21. This possibility was suggested to me by Jonathan Schaffer. It is hinted at in his (2010b).

(13)

[contents]

 

 

 

1.5.6

[Priest’s Offer]

 

[There are a lack of conventional accounts of unity. Priest will propose a new one, which will involve modifications in our notion of identity.]

 

Priest now notes that unity could be one of those things that are impossible to explain and that thus we must just accept without further investigation. Priest says that we should not quit so fast, because if we are willing to modify certain concepts like identity, we can arrive upon a satisfactory account, which is what Priest will be doing.

One could, I suppose, be a quietist about the whole matter: one might just accept that one cannot provide an explanation. All one can say about the phenomenon is to aver, every time one walks past a united object, ‘there it goes again’. Perhaps one has to be a philosophical quietist about some things. But giving up without a fight is an untoward defeatism. And if a perfectly good explanation can be found, as I shall argue that it can, unwarranted. Of course, explanations always come at a cost—some kind of commitment; and the explanation I shall offer is no exception. The cost in this case is revising how it is we currently think that certain things, and especially identity, work. But such is to be expected in any conceptual advance.Thus, for several hundred years scientists had no account of how gravitational effects are transmitted. Everything has an instantaneous effect on everything else, and that is that. No explanation. Since Einstein, we now have an explanation; but the explanation has caused major revisions in our conceptions of space, time, matter. The cost of a revision may be entirely warranted.

(13)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.5.7

[The Causal Process Account of Unity and Its Failure]

 

[Accounts of unity that merely describe the causal processes that go into something’s generation or production, like a carpenter’s explanation of how to construct a table, satisfy to some extent the how curiosity we have for an account of unity. But they fall short for a number of reasons. {1} They do not explain the unity brought about but only the processes bringing it about. {2} They lack an explanation for what makes unifying causal processes different from non-unifying ones. And {3} they cannot explain the unity of abstract objects.]

 

Priest next discusses explanations of unity that are simply accounts of the causal processes that are needed for the unity to come about. He says that such explanation are not satisfactory. For, such explanations do not tell us about what the thing actually is as the unity that it is. It simply tells us how that unity comes into being. He gives the example of marriage. To explain how to get married tells us nothing about what marriage is. Also, not all causal processes produce unities [so to use causal processes as the basis of the account still requires an explanation of what makes these unifying causal processes different from those that do not produce unities.] And lastly, even if we were satisfied with such causal accounts, they would only work for explaining the unities of physical things and not of “abstract objects, such as propositions, pieces of music (types, not tokens), sets” (14).

Alternatively, one might suggest that no explanation in the pertinent sense is called for. What constitutes the unity of a table? Simply that I take a piece of wood and nail four legs to it in appropriate places. There is nothing more to be | said. This will not do, however. What we are being offered here is an explanation of how the unity came into being – the causal processes that brought it about. Now, explaining how something is brought about is not explaining what it is that has been brought about. To explain how to get married is not to explain what a marriage is. One who nails the legs to a table top in the appropriate way has indeed brought the table into existence by certain causal processes. But causal processes are going on all around us, and only some of them bring objects into existence. So what is it that one which does so, actually does? In any case, the suggestion, appealing as it does to causal processes, can account at best for the unity of things subject to such processes. It cannot account for the unity of abstract objects, such as propositions, pieces of music (types, not tokens), sets.

(13-14)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

1.5.8

[The Lack of Convenient Accounts of Unity]

 

[Thus, we do not have any easy ways to account for unity.]

 

Priest ends by saying, “There are no easy roads here” [for, we have seen all of our viable options, and none works well enough. Priest’s own suggestion is probably not an “easy” road either, as it will involve tweaking some fundamental concepts. But although it is not easy, at least it will work, unlike with our other options.] (14)

[contents]

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography:

 

Priest, Graham. 2014. One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford University.

 

 

Or if otherwise cited:

 

Bradley, F. H. (1922), The Principles of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Schaffer, J. (2010b), ‘The Internal Relatedness of All Things’, Mind 119: 341–75.

 

 

 

 

 

.