Showing posts with label dice throw. Show all posts
Showing posts with label dice throw. Show all posts

4 Mar 2018

Terence Blake’s ‘ON THE INCIPIT TO DELEUZE’S LOGIC OF SENSE’

 

by Corry Shores

 

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Terence Blake

 

ON THE INCIPIT TO DELEUZE’S LOGIC OF SENSE

(published 28-Feb-2018)

 

(published also on academia.edu:

https://www.academia.edu/35601180/ON_THE_INCIPIT_TO_ANTI-OEDIPUS )

 

 

 

Terence Blake does some very important close commentary and retranslation of the first lines of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, at this post. Here is his translation, which I find quite useful and close to the original:

Alice and Through the Looking-Glass deal with a category of very special things: events, pure events. When I say “Alice grows,” I mean that she becomes bigger than she was. But by the same token too, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. But it is at the same time that she becomes both. She is bigger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same time, in the same stroke, that one becomes bigger than one was and one is made smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present (translation modified).

(Blake, “ON THE INCIPIT ”)

 

There are some subtle yet critical points he brings to light.

 

{1} As we see from the first sentence, Deleuze’s project here is “an investigation of categories, of logical grammar. In particular, it is an investigation into the grammar of events” (Blake, “ON THE INCIPIT ”).

 

{2} The use of “mais”/“but” forms paradoxical movements:

It is noteworthy that three of first seven sentences in the chapter begin with “but” (in French “mais”, in each case). In each case we have a common sense, doxic, affirmation not contradicted, but completed by and contrasted with a more paradoxical statement. The interplay between the two signals at the level of grammar that we are engaged in a series of paradoxes.

(Blake, “ON THE INCIPIT ”)

 

{3} Blake comments on the parts “en même temps, du même coup” in the line, “Mais c’est en même temps, du même coup, qu’on devient plus grand qu’on n’était, et qu’on se fait plus petit qu’on ne devient” (Blake’s translation: “But it is at the same time, in the same stroke, that one becomes bigger than one was and one is made smaller than one becomes”), especially with respect to the temporal aspects and the relation to moves in a game:

The expression “at the same time” seems to suggest something composite happening, when it is really a case of undetermined time, that of the event, Aion. Determined time, Chronos, is the time of the composite, of mixtures. Aion is the time of the pure event. So “at the same time” is a categorically ambiguous expression, between Chronos and Aion.

As Aion, Deleuze treats the expression “en même temps” as synonymous with “par là-même” (“by the same token”) and “du même coup”. One could translate this last as “in the same stroke”, but “coup” also evokes the “move” in a game (for example chess) and the “throw” of the dice. This second expression (“in the same stroke/move/throw” is omitted in the published translation).

By leaving this expression out the published translation blurs the distinction between chronological time (Chronos, time of composites) and evental time (Aion, time of the pure event, of pure becoming, of eluding the present) that is already being foreshadowed at the level of the vocabulary.

(Blake, “ON THE INCIPIT ”)

 

 

 

 

 

Blake, Terence. “ON THE INCIPIT TO DELEUZE’S LOGIC OF SENSE.” Web. Published 28-Feb-2018. Accessed 04-Mar-2018.

https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2018/02/28/on-the-incipit-to-deleuzes-logic-of-sense/

 

 

 

 

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18 Aug 2015

Somers-Hall, (4.10), Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, ‘4.10 The Origin of Ideas (195–202/244–52)’, summary


by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos and other distracting mistakes. Somers-Hall is abbreviated SH and Difference and Repetition as DR.]



Summary of


Henry Somers-Hall


Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition:
An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide


Part 1
A Guide to the Text


Chapter 4. Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference

 

4.10 The Origin of Ideas (195–202/244–52)

 



 

Brief summary: 
Ideas for Deleuze are bound up with problems, solutions, and questions. The problem is an encounter with an intensive field of differential relations that we cannot process using our given resources. It causes us to put together Idea fragments to formulate an Idea on the basis of which we find solutions. The question is what relates the Idea as a basis for a solution to the problematic situation. So consider if we without ever swimming before are thrown in rough waters. We encounter the intensive field of differential relations of the waves, which threaten our survival, and in response we pose the question, “how do I not drown?” On the basis of how we come to understand the particulars of the problematic situation, we formulate our own particular arrangement of Idea fragments to make an Idea. This Idea then serves as the basis for the particular kind of solution we find, which would be one of many possible swimming strokes we spontaneously learn to enact to save ourselves from drowning. Deleuze uses the metaphor of the dice throw to illustrate. So again, when we learn, we encounter a problematic situation that presents to us a question (we are handed dice to throw). But how we understand the problematic situation and formulate the Idea for its solutions is a matter of chance, since we could have made many other arrangements of Idea fragments but we happened in this case to choose certain ones (the faces of the dice in a way are as such by chance and rolling them and getting some particular outcome is the affirmation of chance). Our Idea for the solution can in fact find many different kinds of solutions (there are many combinations that can be rolled). But only one solution is found at a time (we in fact roll one particular combination). However, we could have devised many other solutions from the same Idea, and also the Idea could have been formed differently depending on the different components we use to form it, and thus there is the repetition of difference built into the system (we can roll many other times or we can obtain different dice and repeat the process of solving problems).

 



Summary


We have been discussing Deleuze’s notion of Ideas in this chapter, and now we will ask, what is the origin of Ideas themselves? [Recall from the prior section that problems are not merely conceptual things but are inherent to actual states of affairs.]

Deleuze begins by noting that what we have encountered so far is a reorientation of the nature of a problem. Rather than a problem being seen as a purely subjective matter, we have seen that exploring the nature of the problem is a properly ontological or metaphysical matter. Thus, as he has noted, the organism can be seen as a solution to a problem. In fact, the question-problem complex is ‘the only instance to which, properly speaking, Being answers without the question thereby becoming lost or overtaken’ (DR 195/244).
(SH 159)


We now ask, what is the relation between a problem and a question? (SH 159). [It seems the answer is that we encounter problems when the world presents us with things we cannot comprehend so well, and these situations challenge us to think creatively since our given inner resources are at that moment inadequate for processing the situation. In Plato we saw this happened when we encounter contrary properties. But for Deleuze it is instead happens in situations when we experience extreme intensity, which erupts the field of representation. I am not sure how that works yet.  I am also not sure I follow the next ideas about the fractured I. It seems the idea is that we have the sense that we have a fixed self-identical I, which also serves as a basis of our representations, but really this I is constantly mutating since it has certain frailties or cracks. Thus our representations as well are unstable. So it seems those experiences which shatter our I also erupt the field of representation. This seems to happen when we encounter problems and engage them with Ideas, which is also, as we noted, when our faculties operate discordantly. Maybe we might say the following. When we jump in the water for the first time without yet learning to swim, in order to survive, we need to reconstitute ourselves, going from non-swimmer to swimmer. Our identity is not fixed, and in the same process, our concepts, reflexes, and habitual behaviors are also shattered as we figure out how to swim. The next sentence is: “Questions map this relationship between the encounter with intensity and the problematic unground responsible for it” (159). We later learn what unground means. For now the important idea is that there is a relation between the encounter with intensity and the problem underlying it, and the question is what maps that relation. Perhaps when we jump in the water, we have the encounter with intensity, which is the very different way that the parts, that is, the differentials, of the waves operate and affect our bodies, and the problem is this situation of the water differentials which calls us to change ourselves. The question then might be simply, “how do I not drown?” or “how do I swim to safety?” but I am not sure.]

What, therefore, is the relationship between a problem and a question? Deleuze presents his answer in the following manner: ‘Problems or Ideas emanate from imperatives of adventure or from events which appear in the form of questions’ (DR 197/247). Such an imperative would be the kind of encounter that we discussed in the previous chapter, paralleling Socrates’ discovery of the incommensurability of his categories of thought (the large, the small) with the purely relative determinations found within the world of becoming. Rather than operating in terms of contrary properties, however, the encounter for Deleuze is tied to the eruption into the field of representation of a moment of intensity. In the discussion of the fractured I in Chapter 2 (2.6), we saw that representation was subject to a natural illusion that the ‘I’ had a substantive nature. Deleuze’s claim was instead that the ‘I’ could be traced back to a pre-individual field of intensive difference. As we saw in relation to Blanchot however (2.12), this illusion to which representation is prone is perpetually threatened by the disruptive influence of intensity. For this reason, Deleuze makes the claim that ‘Ideas swarm in the fracture, constantly emerging on its edges, ceaselessly coming out and going back, being composed in a thousand different manners’ (DR 169/216). These encounters with intensity raise the faculties to a transcendental operation, and hence allow them to engage with Ideas. Questions map this relationship between the encounter with intensity and the problematic unground responsible for it. As such, ‘questions express the relation between problems and the imperatives from which they proceed’ (DR 197/247).
(SH 159)

So far Deleuze’s account parallels Plato’s [since for both there is an encounter that challenges us to formulate a question]. But, Deleuze notes, in Plato’s account, the problem leads us to necessarily true, or ‘apodictic’, principles serving as grounds. [I am not sure how this works, but we worked with the example of imperfectly equal things causing us to recall perfect equality, which is perhaps an apodictic principle grounding all our empirical knowledge of imperfect or inconsistent equality in our experiences.] For Deleuze, however, the process of dealing with problems leads instead to an “unground of the problem” (SH 160). SH then distinguishes ground and unground: “This difference between grounds and ungrounds ultimately simply relates to the fact that apodictic principles have the same structure as the system of propositions they ground (they are amenable to the structure of judgement)” (160). [So the pure Idea of perfect Equality perhaps takes a structure of conception that is similar to the system of propositions it grounds. I am not sure how this works, but perhaps the Idea of perfect equality takes a subject-predication form which is shared in all experiences of imperfect equality.] “On the contrary, the problem differs in kind from the solutions it engenders.” [I am not sure how this would work with the swimming example, but perhaps the problem again is this field of differential relations of the parts of the wave, with their own special significant relations among them, and the solution is a mode of swimming, which is somehow different in kind. However, I am not sure about this, since I would think that modes of swimming are also fields of differential relations with special significant points.] “As such, it [the problem] cannot ground solutions by providing a principle that we know to be true, because truth is a function of judgement, and the problem is different in kind to judgements” (160). [This one is harder to follow, but it seems fairly straightforward. It seems the point is that we cannot in the first place speak of truth in problems, since truth is a function of judgment, which is different in kind from the problems (since one is propositional and representational and the other is non-propositional and sub-representational). Therefore, we cannot say that because some principle of the problem is true, we can therefore say that its solutions are true or at least ground their truth in the truth of the problem.] “Thus, rather than a ground, it serves as an ‘unground’, destabilising the vision of the world as amenable to judgement in its entirety” (160). [I guess then ‘serving as an unground’ here means making ungroundable. So the problem is the origin for the solution, but it makes that solution not have any ground of truth. Perhaps for that reason there can be many solutions to the same problem, since none have any greater basis to claim more truth than others, but I am not sure.] [The next notion about the dice throw is a bit hard to follow. Let me quote it first:]

Rather than invoking ‘the moral imperative of predetermined rules’ (DR 198/248), Deleuze instead therefore invokes the notion of the dice throw and decision [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]:

It is rather a question of a throw of the dice, of the whole sky as open space and of throwing as the only rule. The singular points are on the die; the questions are the dice themselves; the imperative is to throw. Ideas are the problematic combinations which result from throws. (DR 198/248)

The imperative is the problematic instance within the state of affairs (the throw), that points beyond itself, through the question (the dice itself), to the problem that engenders the state of affairs and the problematic instance itself (the combination on the die). The Ideas result from this process as the result of our going beyond the state of affairs to find its conditions. The remaining moment of the analogy to explain is the significance of the points on the dice themselves. We can explain this by introducing the moment of decision. As we saw in the first case of learning, we move to the sub-representational level by combining ‘adjunct fields’, or similar cases, to reach the problem (in Bergson’s example, we relate walking to swimming). Now, depending on which cases we combine to form the problem, our understanding of it will differ. How we relate together different encounters, and which encounters we relate, will give a different emphasis to the problem (a different set of singularities), and hence to our Ideas. If the relation of different adjunct fields gives us different Ideas, then how is it that a given throw is able to ‘affirm the whole of chance’ (to provide an objective Idea) (DR 198/248)? When we looked at the example of the conic section (4.7), we saw that depending on how we took a section on the cone, we would derive a different curve, and with it, a different set of singularities. Each of these | curves was, nonetheless, an objective characterisation of the cone. In a similar way, each enquiry gives us an objective problem, but these are not exclusive, since different enquiries will take a different section of the cone, and hence derive different singularities.
(160-161)

[So we first acknowledge that we are dealing with a metaphor, and it seems the task it to find the analogies between the dice metaphor and this issue of problems and questions. (By the way, you can find some discussion of the dice throw metaphor from Deleuze’s Nietzsche book here.) I get lost in the explanation of the analogy here, I am sorry. Let me try to establish some possible analogies:
1) the problematic instance: the possible combinations implied by the given sides of the dice
2) the question: the dice themselves
3) the pressure to solve the problem: the imperative to throw the dice
4) the Ideas as solutions: any one outcome from an actual cast
Let me just quote it again since I am certain I got it wrong: “The imperative is the problematic instance within the state of affairs (the throw), that points beyond itself, through the question (the dice itself), to the problem that engenders the state of affairs and the problematic instance itself (the combination on the die). The Ideas result from this process as the result of our going beyond the state of affairs to find its conditions”. It further gets complicated, and I will miss this point too. We still have to explain what is analogous to the significant points on the dice themselves. (I do not know what they are even in the metaphor. Maybe they are the sides? Or maybe it has to do with combinations?) I will again quote the following sentences, but first I will make some guesses. We need now to introduce the moment of decision, which I suppose is the moment when the outcome of the dice throw is determined (unless it is the moment we decide to throw it). Now it seems that we are dealing with the notion of learning as gathering Idea fragments, and it seems that we form the problem (and not the Idea?) in different ways depending on which parts we select. I suppose also that other selections and arrangements will have other solutions, and thus it is by chance that we selected the ones we did, and thus any one throw (any one attempt at a solution) is an affirmation of chance. I quote again: “The remaining moment of the analogy to explain is the significance of the points on the dice themselves. We can explain this by introducing the moment of decision. As we saw in the first case of learning, we move to the sub-representational level by combining ‘adjunct fields’, or similar cases, to reach the problem (in Bergson’s example, we relate walking to swimming). Now, depending on which cases we combine to form the problem, our understanding of it will differ. How we relate together different encounters, and which encounters we relate, will give a different emphasis to the problem (a different set of singularities), and hence to our Ideas. If the relation of different adjunct fields gives us different Ideas, then how is it that a given throw is able to ‘affirm the whole of chance’ (to provide an objective Idea) (DR 198/248)? When we looked at the example of the conic section (4.7), we saw that depending on how we took a section on the cone, we would derive a different curve, and with it, a different set of singularities. Each of these | curves was, nonetheless, an objective characterisation of the cone. In a similar way, each enquiry gives us an objective problem, but these are not exclusive, since different enquiries will take a different section of the cone, and hence derive different singularities” (160-161).]


[The next idea seems to have to do with the inexhaustibility of the Idea (or of the problem). There are many solutions that will come from the same problem/Idea. But for each solution is a different (arrangement of the) Idea. Thus we should not repeat the same question but rather reformulate it anew each time, perhaps.]

This is the reason why in spite of each throw being an objective constitution of the problem, ‘there are nevertheless several throws of the dice: the throw of the dice is repeated’ (DR 200/251). In this sense, there is no ultimate characterisation possible, as there would be with knowledge, but rather a whole series of questions, each of which generates its own field of singularities. Each philosophical enquiry therefore puts forth its own question, on the basis of an imperative, which constitutes its own field of singularities. Remaining true to the encounter does not, therefore, lead us to one apodictic principle, but rather to an objective organisation of a problem. Just as each conic section gives us a different curve, each question gives us a different distribution of singularities. But as each conic section also repeats the structure of the others, each question is also a repetition, albeit a repetition that differs, not just in terms of solutions, but also in terms of its Ideas: ‘Repetition is this emission of singularities, always with an echo or resonance which makes each the double of the other, or each constellation the redistribution of another’ (DR 201/251). At this point, Deleuze notes an affinity with Heidegger’s emphasis on the question, while also cautioning that the emphasis on one single question risks covering over the real structure of the dice throw [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]:

Great authors of our time (Heidegger, Blanchot) have exploited this most profound relation between the question and repetition. Not that it is sufficient, however, to repeat a single question which would remain intact at the end, even if this question is ‘What is being?’ [Qu’en est-il de l’etre?]. (DR 200/251)
(SH 161)

 

 

 




Citations from:

Somers-Hall, Henry. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2013.



Or if otherwise noted:


DR:
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994/London: Continuum, 2004.




 


 


 

 




 

8 Mar 2010

Forks & Dice: Bifurcation in Prigogine & Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]Link

[Central Entry Directory]

Forks & Dice:
Bifurcation in Prigogine & Stengers,
Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature
La Nouvelle Alliance: Métamorphose de la science



In the second section of the third chapter in Cinema 2, Deleuze describes a kind of forking where a path of development skews-off wildly at unstable points:

And it is not just the circuits forking between themselves, it is each circuit forking within itself, like a split hair. [...] its repetitions are not accumulations, its manifestation refuse to be aligned, or to reconstitute a destiny, but constantly split up any state of equilibrium and each time impose anew 'meander', a new break in causality, which itself forks from the previous one, in a collection of non-linear relations. [footnote 8: On this notion of forking, cf. Prigogine and Stengers, Order out of Chaos: man's new dialogue with nature, London: Heinemann, 1984, pp. 189-90.] [Deleuze 47bc; 47c; 280a]

Et ce ne sont pas seulement les circuits qui bifurquent entre eux, c' est chaque circuit qui bifurque avec soi-même, comme un cheveu four-chu. [...] ses répétitions ne sont pas des accumulations, ses manifestations ne se laissent pas aligner, ni reconstituer un destin, mais ne cessent de morceler tout état d'équilibre, et d'imposer chaque fois un nouveau « coude », une nouvelle rupture de causalité, qui bifurque elle-même avec la précédente, dans un ensemble de relations non-linéaires [note 7: Sur cette notion de bifurcation, cf. Prigogine et Stengers, La nouvelle alliance, Gallimard, p. 190]. [Deleuze 68d; 69a; 69d]


We will avoid most of what is difficult about bifurcation, even though it is essential for fully grasping the concept. We do so on account of your author's limitations. I probably know less than most readers, who are invited to make corrections and provide better explanations. But also it seems the basic ideas that we need to apply in the context of cinema can be presented in a highly simplified form. So that is what we hope to accomplish in the following.

We will first discuss the notions of linearity and non-linearity, drawing from this page at Mathematics Illuminated.

Consider first x = 2.


And x = 2y


We notice that there is one line that tends the same direction throughout.

The equation is "linear" because its graph (all the "x,y" points on the coordinate plane that satisfy the equation) is a straight line, and also because a small change in the value of x effects a proportional, constant change in y. ("Linear vs. Nonlinear Systems")

But now consider x-squared = 4





And now also x-squared = y


We notice two things about the diagram immediately above. The higher power caused there to be a bifurcation of values. And the lines they graph are not straight or 'linear'.

A nonlinear equation is something that doesn't have just a first power of the independent variable and consequently can't be graphed as a simple straight line. ("Linear vs. Nonlinear Systems")

Mathematics Illuminated then gives the example of pendulum motion to illustrate the difference between linear and non-linear systems.

These so-called nonlinear systems can exhibit some wild behaviors, behaviors that might be considered surprising, behaviors that don't fit so nicely into equations. For example, our simple pendulum behaves very smoothly and predictably as long as it doesn't swing too high.
For larger and larger angles, the range of possible behaviors is more varied than the simple cycling back and forth. For example, if the pendulum has sufficient momentum, it will swing past the horizontal line of the pivot and go all the way around, over the top. If it has a little less momentum than this, it might stall near the vertical position above the pivot, lose the tension of the string, and drop almost straight down under the influence of gravity. Both of these behaviors are examples of nonlinearities. ("Linear vs. Nonlinear Systems," emphasis mine)

(Image obtained gratefully from Mathematics Illuminated)

For the sake of illustration, we might imagine that the pendulum can reach a critical point where there are a number of outcomes, none of which can be predicted. We might then again for the sake of illustration regard there to be a bifurcation point where the development of the system can fork-off into very different directions. Perhaps the slightest infinitesimal fluctuation can cause profoundly different outcomes.

In Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (La Nouvelle Alliance: Métamorphose de la science), Prigogine & Stengers describe bifurcation in chemical reactions. Hopefully we can profoundly simplify their explanation without falsifying it too much. The system will be stable if the variables are kept within certain bounds. But when an independent variable is pushed to a critical chaotic point, the dependent variable can veer-off or fork-away into two possible directions of development. They write:

Consider the bifurcation diagram represented in Figure 11.


This differs from the previous diagram in that at the bifurcation point two new stable solutions emerge. Thus a new question: Where will the system go when we reach the bifurcation point? We have here a "choice" between two possibilities; they may represent either of the two nonuniform distributions of chemical X in space, as represented in Figures 12 and 13.


The two structures are mirror images of one another. In Figure 12 the concentration of X is larger at the left; in Figure 13 it is larger at the right. How will the system choose between left and right? There is an irreducible random element; the macroscopic equation cannot predict the path the system will take. Turning to a microscopic description will not help. There is also no distinction between left and right. We are faced with chance events very similar to the fall of dice. (162-163, emphasis mine)

They write a bit later:

If we consider Figure 17 [...] we see that the system already has a wealth of possible stable and unstable behaviors.


The "historical" path along which the system evolves as the control parameter grows is characterized by a succession of stable regions, where deterministic laws dominate, and of instable ones, near the bifurcation points, where the system can "choose" between or among more than one possible future. Both the deterministic character of the kinetic equations whereby the set of possible states and their respective stability can be calculated, and the random fluctuations "choosing" between or among the states around bifurcation points are inextricably connected. This mixture of necessity and chance constitutes the history of the system. (169-170, emphasis mine)

Soon we will discuss the bifurcations of Mankiewicz' movies. When we do so, we will see that we arrive at critical and unstable points in the narrative where a character forks or bifurcates unpredictably. Prigogine & Stengers' bifurcation diagrams will illuminate this concept.



Credits:
Pendulum image and direct quotations regarding linear and non-linear systems obtained gratefully from:

Linear and non-linear graphs made using the following freeware:
GIMP, and

The Prigogine & Stengers text citations and images from:

Prigogine, Ilya, and Isabelle Stengers. Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature. London: Heinemann, 1984.

Also,
Prigogine, Ilya, and Isabelle Stengers. La Nouvelle Alliance: Métamorphose de la science. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1979.


Deleuze citations from:

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time Image. Transl. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London & New York: 1989.

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinéma 2: L'image-temps. Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1985.

22 Jul 2009

Deleuze’s Dance, III. Wonders of Phenomena: The Infinite Grace of Bergson and Kleist; or the Nietzschean Dance of Deleuzean Dice


by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
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[Other entries in the Deleuze & Dance series]





Deleuze’s Dance, III

Wonders of Phenomena:

The Infinite Grace of Bergson and Kleist;

or the Nietzschean Dance of Deleuzean Dice



Kvond's recent posting – The Bear with the Rapier: Kleist on Leibniz and Microscopic Infinities – discusses Heinrich von Kleist’s marvelous tale, “On the Marionette Theatre,” translated by Idris Parry. (Robert Lonoke’s translation can be found here.) Kleist recounts a conversation with a dancer-friend who explains his understanding of grace. He uses a geometrical example. What it refers-to is very unclear. Fortunately, kvond figured it out. He does so by making use of Leibniz’ vanishing triangle illustration of infinitesimal magnitudes.


Kvond’s insightful commentary on Kleist’s depiction of grace will help us

1) to elaborate Bergson’s notion of grace, and

2) to gain a grasp of Deleuze’s phenomenological critique of graceful continuities.

All this will enable us to begin articulating Deleuze’s Nietzschean phenomenology.


So Kleist is talking to an old friend. He’s a dancer. He tells Kleist that puppets are more graceful than even the most skilled dancers. For, their mechanisms are designed to move in accordance with centers of gravity and other natural physical forces.

Each movement, he told me, has its centre of gravity; it is enough to control this within the puppet. The limbs, which are only pendulums, then follow mechanically of their own accord, without further help. He added that this movement is very simple. When the centre of gravity is moved in a straight line, the limbs describe curves. Often shaken in a purely haphazard way, the puppet falls into a kind of rhythmic movement which resembles dance.

In a way, the puppets’ motions are largely automatic and fluidly mechanical. [Soon we will see this is a sort of Bergsonian grace.] The puppeteer needs merely to start the physical mechanics in motion, and the puppets exhibit natural, fluid, graceful motions, almost as though they move on their own.

A second advantage puppets have over dancers is this: dancers must exert much effort merely to break gravity so to lift-up but a little bit into the air. Puppets, however, are light, and are pulled-up from above.

Puppets need the ground only to glance against lightly, like elves, and through this momentary check to renew the swing of their limbs. We humans must have it to rest on, to recover from the effort of the dance. This moment of rest is clearly no part of the dance. The best we can do is make it as inconspicuous as possible..."

Another advantage of puppets is that their mechanics allow them to maintain their center of gravity. Usually dancers fall victim to “affections,” which cause their centers of gravity to move outward to their lower backs or elbows for example.

For affectation is seen, as you know, when the soul, or moving force, appears at some point other than the centre of gravity of the movement. Because the operator controls with his wire or thread only this centre, the attached limbs are just what they should be.… lifeless, pure pendulums, governed only by the law of gravity.

The dancer then evokes the metaphor of the fall from paradise, and as well our long human journey back to it. He wants to illustrate the point that there is a naïve form of grace, and it will become corrupted by self-consciousness. But we may regain this pure form of grace by attaining to a hyperbolic form of consciousness. Paradise may be regained.

"we've eaten of the tree of knowledge. But Paradise is locked and bolted, and the cherubim stands behind us. We have to go on and make the journey round the world to see if it is perhaps open somewhere at the back."

Kleist agrees that self-consciousness ruins grace. He relates a story about a graceful young man. Once he tried imitating the statue, Boy with Thorn.

But he only succeeded at making a comical fool of himself.

I laughed [...] He blushed. He lifted his foot a second time, to show me, but the effort was a failure, as anybody could have foreseen. He tried it again a third time, a fourth time, he must have lifted his foot ten times, but it was in vain. [...] The movements he made were so comical that I was hard put to it not to laugh.

From that day, from that very moment, an extraordinary change came over this boy. [...] An invisible and incomprehensible power seemed to settle like a steel net over the free play of his gestures. A year later nothing remained of the lovely grace.

The dancer relates a similar story. He visited Russian noblemen. The sons were expert fencers, especially the eldest one. This young nobleman challenged his guest to a match. But the dancer’s finesse allowed him to outmaneuver the trained fighter. This frustrated the son, but he had a surprise for the dancer.

he said, half in anger and half in jest, that he had met his master but that there is a master for everyone and everything – and now he proposed to lead me to mine.

He takes the dancer to a shed. In it is a bear who is undergoing some sort of training.

I was astounded to see the bear standing upright on his hind legs, his back against the post to which he was chained, his right paw raised ready for battle. He looked me straight in the eye. This was his fighting posture.

They give the dancer a rapier and tell him to attack the bear. The dancer lunges with all his skill and finesse. The bear, almost like a statue, merely flicks his paw slightly to deflect the attack, as though it required no effort at all. The dancer even tries making fake attacks to throw-off the bear. But the beast could easily discern the true attacks from the false ones.

In one sense, it seems the bear is acting purely on its nature. It’s not likely he was trained to fence. But on the other hand, the dancer portrays him as having intense awareness and concentration. Yet his focus is so profound that it seems he need not pay any attention at all.

Let’s consider our own example. Someone with absolutely no intent to make good music might pick up a guitar and play upon it as would a child, and do things that practiced musicians might find original or interesting. The musicians say to this person, “you have a natural ability. You should try guitar.” Then the novice begins formal lessons. His instructor encourages him to be intently aware of what his fingers are doing, so that he can learn to control them. At this stage, he no longer can play naturally or make anything musical. He sees his left hand but neglects his right. He notices his posture, but forgets his fingers. A person walks in on his drills, and his focus falters. But the more he practices, the more he becomes familiar with all these details. In one sense, he need no longer attend to them after practicing enough. He will know already how his fingers will move, so he can instead look-out at his audience, for example. But in another sense, this is only possible because he has developed a tacit awareness of all these infinite details popping-up simultaneously around him. So now while performing on stage, someone could erupt into the room, and he might blend his strum into a pointing motion toward her, as though it were already a practiced part of his solo. And after the show, he might be able to relate every detail that was going on around him, even though the whole time he was ‘in the zone.’ So when he first toyed-around with the guitar long ago, he was explicitly unaware of what was going on, and so he played gracefully and naturally. But then he became explicitly aware of all the infinite details that go into a good performance. Slowly he became familiar with each detail, and he could place them in the back of his awareness. In this way, he becomes implicitly aware of all the infinity of details, which has the same appearance as back when he was explicitly unaware of them all. In paradise he had grace. Falling, his self-awareness corrupts it. But by increasing his awareness to the infinite, he regained what is virtually the same as that original innocent unconscious grace.

So the dancer concludes his tale with this observation: our grace increases as our consciousness decreases. But paradoxically, consciousness decreases only after first increasing to infinity. The dancer explains:

grace itself returns when knowledge has as it were gone through an infinity. Grace appears most purely in that human form which either has no consciousness or an infinite consciousness.

He offers two illustrations. The first is the one kvond figured out [again, at this entry]. The dancer says specifically that our minds pass through infinity

just as a section drawn through two lines suddenly reappears on the other side after passing through infinity.

I could not comprehend what Kleist means here. So I worked with the other translation:

Consider how the intersection of two lines, which begins on one side of a point and after passing through infinity, completes itself on the other side.

I would offer this explanation. Lines have length but not breadth. That means we could never see them, because they have no form. So when we draw or imagine them, we have to give them a little width, all while supposing that really they have none. Hence we might depict the intersection of two lines this way:


Now we will increase our microscope power, and zoom-in on where the lines meet. But in this case, we will not adjust the width of the lines. So the lines will become thicker as we zoom in.

What we discover is that the two lines touch before they intersect. This is because we have given our lines breadth, which means their outer edges intersect before the internal ideal lines actually cross. But really lines do not touch before they cross. They intersect at a point, which is also invisible even to the most powerful microscope. This is because points have neither length nor width.

But we could also use a program like GeoGebra. When we zoom-in on the intersection, it readjusts the line-width so that it always remains about the same width, no matter how far we zoom-in. So here it is at one scale.

Now we zoom in much further, and find still the same representation. We could keep zooming to infinity, and we will never close-in on where the lines ‘touch’.

Yet even though the lines never ‘touch’ in the way we can imagine lines to cross, they still pop-out on the other side. But first they must pass through an infinity of not-touching.

So if Kleist’s dancer is saying something along these lines, then we can appreciate kvond’s remarkably insightful connection to Leibniz’ triangle demonstration of the differential. We are to imagine the diagonal line moving to the right until crossing through to the other side.

And we are to imagine the horizontal line e moving toward intersection point A, until there is only an infinitely small distance between the line and the point. As infinitesimal, there is no extensive distance between them. The same holds for line c. However, there is an intensive magnitude that is the ratio of the infinitely small length of c compared to the infinitely small length e.

[Here we see something similar to Spinoza’s different sizes of infinity, but in this case, different sizes of the infinitely small.]

But even though the diagonal line must pass through an infinity before reaching the limit at point A, it still magically pops-out on the other side. We could imagine the movement of the diagonal as being equivalent to the increase in our GeoGebra zoom. Hence kvond’s remarkable insight into this geometrical example.

Kleist’s dancer offers another illustration: the concave mirror.

or as the image in a concave mirror turns up again right in front of us after dwindling into the distance. (Parry transl.)

Or, consider how the image in a concave mirror is first seen, then vanishes to infinity, and then reappears right before us. (Robert Lonoke transl.)

I am not qualified to explain this example, so I ask that those who can, please correct my errors (or just re-explain it properly). I will work with basic descriptions from the internet.

To conceive of a concave mirror, we first imagine a large sphere. On the inside surface is the mirror part. We cut a circular section from the sphere, and then we have a concave mirror. Where the sphere’s center is, relative to the mirror curvature, is called the center of curvature (C). [The image below was obtained gratefully from http://www.phys.ttu.edu. I take the terminological definitions from: http://www.physicsclassroom.com]

Half-way between the center of the sphere, and the center of the mirror, is the focal point (F). We see above that if parallel rays reflect from the mirror, they converge at the focal point.

When the object is outside the center, it is inverted and smaller.

When it is at the center, it is inverted although showing the same size.


When it is between the center and the focal point, it is inverted and larger.

Then when it is between the focal point and the mirror, it will become upright and larger.

So we see that as the image moves inward toward the focal point, it gets larger-and-larger. And at the focal point, it will invert and become infinitely large. Then it continues on the other side of the focal point, upright, and it is larger than the original (but not infinitely large like it is right at the focal point.) But how does it make that transition from down to upright at the focal point?

For an instant, it will disappear. This is because the reflected rays will only converge at infinity. Look below at the way the rays converge, and how at the focal point (fourth image below), they become (nearly) parallel and hence converge only at infinity.


Focal Point Infinity:


I honestly do not know what these lines mean. But let’s look first at some animations, then an actual demonstration.

We might go to this site, and click on the play icon for the “concave mirror image” animation. We can slide the object location and height around the space in front-of the mirror. Notice that as we near the focal point, the reflecting rays become more-and-more parallel until they reach the point where they seem unlikely ever to converge. In a sense, they converge at infinity (see the table in the middle of this wikipedia entry). Also notice how the mirrored image’s height is determined by how far the reflecting rays converge from the axis. But if the rays at the focal point only converge at infinity, then the image will grow to be infinity large, which might be why it disappears. On the one hand, we are looking at something whose image is infinitely large. But on the other hand, the mirror only displays one very tiny part of that infinitely large image. As the object nears the focal point, we are zooming-in on that small part. So as the reflection grows outward to infinity, we zoom inward into an infinitely small part of the image. All at once, we see something both infinitely large and infinitely small, and as well, something that is both upright and upside-down, simultaneously. Somehow these polar opposites contract together.

Now let’s watch a video of a girl filming herself move from behind the focal point to in front of it. So we will see her image flip. [May I thank the creators of this video for their wonderful site on optics: http://www.wfu.edu/physics/]

I wish we could isolate the point where the image expands to infinity while at the same time flipping-over. But there is a series of temporally-spaced frames, so of course that magical moment lies between two frames. But let’s look anyway for something to notice. Right around the time that the image flips, we see this here.

Before this point in time, the yellow started from the top, but then pops out at the bottom below the blue. At the same time, the blue started from the bottom, but pops out near the top. See how there is the blue-band enveloping the bottom, and how this lower blue-band is mirrored by the yellow-band enveloping the top. Similarly and inversely, the yellow top band envelops a blue region, and the bottom blue band envelops a yellow region. We see something like the yin yang symbol, where the top is in the bottom, and the bottom is in the top. This screen frame does not depict the moment of infinity. But it helps us understand how such a polar inversion can occur.

So what we miss of course is the instant when the image stretches to infinity, leaving us to peer into the infinite. This is equivalent to taking an infinitely powerful microscope to the object's part lying right upon the focal point. So indeed, like Kleist’s dancer suggests, to move through the focal point of the concave mirror is to pass through infinity. Before that we are a recognizable image of our self. So too after. But we are inverted. It’s we, but on the other side of the looking glass. Hence our metaphor for grace. The practicing guitarist must also pass through an infinity of consciousness before he can again be gracefully unconconscious of the infinity of details around him, (and inverting from explicit unawareness to implicit awareness).


Gracing Bergson


In §9 of Time and Free Will, Bergson explains his theory of grace. We consider someone’s motion to be graceful if at every moment the movement calls-forth the following changes of direction.

If jerky movements are wanting in grace, the reason is that each of them is self-sufficient and does not announce those which are to follow. If curves are more graceful than broken lines, the reason is that, while a curved line changes its direction at every moment, every new direction is indicated in the preceding one. Thus the perception of ease in motion passes over into the pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of holding the future in the present. (Bergson, Time and Free Will, 12b)

Si les mouvements saccadés manquent de grâce, c'est parce que chacun d'eux se suffit à lui-même et n'annonce pas ceux qui vont le suivre. Si la grâce préfère les courbes aux lignes brisées, c'est que la ligne courbe change de direction à tout moment, mais que chaque direction nouvelle était indiquée dans celle qui la précédait. La perception d'une facilité à se mouvoir vient donc se fondre ici dans le plaisir d'arrêter en quelque sorte la marche du temps, et de tenir l'avenir dans le présent. (9bc)

In Mind and Matter, Bergson speaks again of fluid continuous motions that result from motional habits built-up through familiarities. But before we become familiar with our surroundings, our motions are ungraceful and discontinuous.

For instance, I take a walk in a town seen then for the first time. At every street corner I hesitate, uncertain where I am going. I am in doubt; and I mean by this that alternatives are offered to my body, that my movement as a whole is discontinuous, that there is nothing in one attitude which foretells and prepares future attitudes. (Bergson, Matter and Memory, 110a.b, emphasis mine)

Je me promène dans une ville, par exemple, pour la première fois. A chaque tournant de rue, j’hésite, ne sachant où je vais. Je suis dans l’incertitude, et j’entends par là que des alternatives se posent à mon corps, que mon mouvement est discontinu dans son ensemble, qu’il n’y a rien, dans une des attitudes, qui annonce et prépare les attitudes à venir. (93a)

Consider if we are visiting the wilderness in another part of the world, Australia, Brazil, Africa, wherever. We hear some noises that are made by harmless creatures. Others by deadly predators. But we don’t know which is which. Every thing around us is a sign overflowing with meaning. All that appears to us might mean something. Because we don’t know which things indicate important information, and which do not, everything around us then appears and shines-forth with weight or significance to us, popping-up like firework flashes going-off at unexpected places and times.

Soon our bodies learn the proper ways to react to things. Some sounds tell us to duck and hide. Others call us to enjoy a beautiful mating song. Bergson explains that we slowly come to develop recognitions for the things around us. We recognize something when this happens: we perceive it, and our bodies automatically undergo a fluidly-mechanical automated-reaction.

So at first in new situations, we are ungraceful, because our attention is tossed-about from detail-to-detail. Slowly, we develop tacit awarenesses of these details, which are exhibited in our habitual reactions to them as familiar recognizable things. We become graceful, but also mindless in a way. In one sense, we are completely aware of everything around us, but in another sense, we don’t notice a thing that is happening. When driving our familiar daily route to work, we might arrive at our destination and have the feeling that we were not aware of anything on the way over.

Co-contributor Scott Wollschleger asked long ago to this entry on Bergson’s grace:

...what about the "flash" that occurs in communication? wouldn't this be viewed as an interruption of some sort? can grace even be gracefully communicated?

I was not able to answer the question at that time. But because kvond introduced me to the Kleist writing, I think we might reply.

The “flash” that Scott refers-to I presume is the “phenomenal flash” that Deleuze describes in Difference & Repetition. [See this entry for an aesthetics discussion of this flash.]

Whenever something appears to us, it is a phenomenon. So that means we notice it, explicitly or implicitly. But for Deleuze, if there is no change or difference, and everything is familiar, than nothing has appeared. Recall how for Bergson, we are in ‘autopilot’ when we recognize everything around us. However, when we are in new situations, everything around us is its own singularity with its own overflow of significance. A wide variety of unique things surrounding us all at once. In the foreign wilderness, new sounds coincide with unrelated new sights; we find colors placed together in arrangements we do not normally see. Unrecognizable animals move-about in such strange ways they seem like aliens to us. Perhaps we see something that at the same time makes us think it’s a cat, while also just as much it seems like a monkey. All these differences contract together. We cannot place any phenomenal distance between them, because they’re all there together in one instant, one smashed-in with the other. Consider when we force two magnets together, north-end to north-end. Their oppositional differences resonate in each other. They communicate their incompatibility with each other. They are both ‘north’, but they do not assimilate. In fact the closer we contract one towards the other, the more they make each other shudder and shake. If we force them together real fast, we’ll feel a shock-wave through both arms, through our whole bodies. This is a ‘flash’ that contracted differences communicate. [See this entry for the logic behind these contractions.]

The same happens when we see the cat-monkey. It stops us in our tracks, because it is unfamiliar, and because it resists assimilation. We cannot synthesize it into a blend. They are discrete differences forced together despite the oppositional resonances they communicate to each other. So we only experience phenomena when there are these breaks and discontinuities, when our bodies no longer function like fluid organic mechanisms, but rather are push-and-pulled in many directions at once. In other words, grace & phenomena, and as well, grace & consciousness, do not go hand-in-hand for Deleuze.

Something is graceful for Bergson when one motion calls-forth another new and different one, all while that new one is already beginning. Motions are changing. But each one overlaps and thus is somewhat predictable from the previous one. This is continuity of the analog variety. But we can only have the phenomenal flashes if something happens that we did not expect. In the Bergson model, we anticipate something, and thus we assimilate it in advance. But when we are surprised, there is a breach in our associations and assimilations.

Deleuze illustrates this with his notion of Nietzsche’s dice throw. Life is a children’s game. The rules are always changing. A tree at one time is a hide-and-go-seek “base.” Then it might suddenly become a ship-mast riding the open sea. Every time the rules change, the game changes. And every time the game changes, the things in the game change too. Predators and prey become sailors and sea monsters. When children are playing these rule-changing games, they themselves change (as their play-roles shift), and the world around them changes radically from moment-to-moment. This is the reality of the Nietzschean dice-throw. Every instant, chance decides how the rules of reality will change. [See this entry for Deleuze's interpretation of Lewis Carroll's unpredictable rule-change games, and also section 8 of this entry for Gregory Bateson's version of the same idea.] When the change is made, we must recognize that it could not have been otherwise. This is Deleuzean grace, if there would be such a thing. We shudder-and-shake from one moment of life to another, when we realize that the world around us is constantly a new world, and that we repeatedly become new selves. This too is a dance. When we affirm each chance outcome as fate, we appreciate “the heavenly necessity which compelleth even chances to dance star-dances.” (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book III, "The Seven Seals," Common transl.) Deleuzean grace is the ability to be Alice on the other side of the looking glass. In wonderland, one new world and reality is contracted immediately to the next. In each scene, the rules are different, and Alice continually adapts to the new selves she must repeatedly become as a result of each unpredictable rule-change. [It’s like in dreams when an object or scene changes to something totally unrelated and unrealistic, and yet our dream-selves treat it like absolute normality.]

But, is not Alice’s wonderland the most phenomenal of all? And are not dreams made-up of the most phenomenal appearances, strung one-upon-another, each discontinuity affirmed gracefully in full?


Bergson, Henri. Matière et mémoire: Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit. Ed. Félix Alcan. Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Bailliere et Cie, 1903. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/matireetmmoiree01berggoog


Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Transl. Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott Palmer. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004; originally published by George Allen & Co., Ltd., London, 1912. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/mattermemory00berg


Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, Transl. F. L. Pogson, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001).

Available online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog


French text from:

Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Originally published Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1888.

http://www.archive.org/details/essaisurlesdonn00berguoft


Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spake Zarathustra. Transl. Thomas

Common. London: T.N. Foulis, 1911. Online text available at: http://www.archive.org/details/thusspakezarath00ludogoog and http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1998/1998-h/1998-h.htm