6 May 2016

CMU, Argument Diagramming (1) “Course Introduction”. (Carnegie Mellon University Open Learning Initiative)

 

by Corry Shores

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[The following is summary, except for my bracketed commentary. Typographical emphasis is mine unless otherwise indicated. Parenthetical citation numbers refer to paginated subsections.]

 

 

 

Argument Diagramming (Open + Free)

 

Carnegie Mellon University

 

Open Learning Initiative

(Creative Commons License)

 

UNIT 1: Course Introduction

 

Brief summary:

The structural features of arguments can be given visual representation by means of argument diagrams. One complicating factor is that arguments are often embedded in lengthy text, and so they need to be extracted into a simplified format and organized into relations of premise and conclusion. An arrow pointing from a premise to a conclusion indicates that the premise supports the conclusion.

image12

(Source / license)

When premises depend on one another for supporting a conclusion, they can be bracketed together and given a single arrow.

image13

(Source / license)

 

 

Summary

 

UNIT 1: Course Introduction

 

1.1 What is an Argument Diagram?

 

Argument diagrams will allow us “to visually represent an argument” in order “to understand and evaluate the argument” (1).

 

The authors say that we need first to understand “the Big Picture of Argument Diagramming” (1)

 

They write, “The process of argument diagramming starts when we identify a text that we want to understand. This contains the Argument” (1, emphasis theirs).

 

They first depict the argument itself with this diagram:

image1

(Source / license)

 

They continue, “An argument is made up of a conclusion and the premises that are supposed to support the conclusion:” (1)

image2

(Source / license)

 

The authors write that arguments are often “embedded in a lot of text”, and they represent this situation in this way: (1)

image3

(Source / license)

 

Now, since the argument is entangled in the text, we might want to disentangle it by making an argument diagram, which “visually displays both the statements and the connections between them, without the clutter of the rest of the text”: (1)

image4

(Source / license)

 

In order to get from the text to the argument diagram, “We can use identifying words (or indicator words) in the text to help us determine which statements are the premises and which is the conclusion:” (1)

image5

(Source / license)

 

After we form the diagram, we can evaluate the argument to see if it is a good or a bad one. “When evaluating, we determine whether the premises are true and whether the premises actually support the conclusion:” (1)

image6

(Source / license)

 

After we establish the truth of the premises and their ability to support the conclusion, “we can offer an overall evaluation of the argument:” (1)

image7

(Source / license)

 

The authors then summarize the entire process with the following description and illustration:

So overall, the process you are going to learn in this course is illustrated below. We investigate the text, using indicators to determine which statements are premises and which is the conclusion, and how they work together. We can then represent the argument as a diagram, which is essentially a representation of our understanding of the argument in the text. Once we have the diagram, we can identify the questions we need to ask in order to evaluate the argument. The answers to those questions allow us to say whether the argument is good or bad.

(1)

image8

(Source / license)

 

 

1.2 Two Motivating Examples

 

Let us examine the first example, which narrates a situation within which an argument is presented.

“Ten o’clock? I’m not sure if I’ll be able to make it. Let me call you back, okay?” Alexis closed her phone and turned to Brandy, “That was Char. She wants go out to see the Wanderers later. I really want to go…”

“No, you shouldn’t go! Are you kidding? You know we’re going to have a quiz in math tomorrow! You’re not doing so great in the class, and you really should study. Look, I’ll study with you, okay?”

Alexis sighed, “My parents said the same thing. My mom thinks I haven’t been getting enough sleep lately. She wants me to go to bed early. And not just tonight—for the next few.” She sighed again and sat down.

“Well, she has a point.” Brandy sat down too, “Even if we weren’t almost definitely going to have a quiz tomorrow, that’s a good reason why you shouldn’t go.”

“Yeah, maybe,” Alexis trailed off. She flopped back on the bed, “Ugh! You know my dad’s in on it too.”

“What do you mean?”

He says I’ve been spending too much money. He says the tickets are too expensive. If I want to buy them,” Alexis raised both her hands up to do air-quotes, “I’ll have to ‘crack open someone else’s piggy-bank.’ Ugh,” Alexis sighed again, “But I really want to go!”

Brandy stood up again. “So let me get this straight. You have three separate reasons, and good reasons at that, and you still don’t believe it? That you shouldn’t go out?” Brandy laughed and threw a pillow at her friend, “You’re unbelievable!” She laughed again, as Alexis threw the pillow back.

“You’re right, you’re right. I’m convinced; I won’t go,” Alexis lowered her voice conspiratorially, “but please don’t tell my parents that anything they said made a difference.”

(2, emphasis mine)

 

We see that the conclusion of the argument is that “Alexis should not go to the concert”, and she has three separate reasons that support this conclusion. The authors diagram this structure in the following way. Note that in the diagram, the upward pointing arrows indicate that the bottom beliefs support the top belief.

image12

(Source / license)

 

The authors then narrate another situation [which we here omit], and the argument within the text can be summarized as:

Lemons contain a combination of citric acid and water.

All combinations of citric acid and water are electrolytes.

So, lemons contain an electrolyte.

(2)

 

Here we have two reasons (the first two lines) and one conclusion. In the prior example, the three reasons operated independently of one another. For, “if one of the reasons were taken away—if, for instance, Char had bought Alexis’ ticket for her—she would still have good reasons to believe that she shouldn’t go out” (2). But here in the second example the two reasons for the conclusion

must work together to support the conclusion. In other words, if we took away the fact that “All combinations of citric acid and water are electrolytes,” then the fact that lemons contain this combination would not be a reason to believe that lemons contain electrolytes (2, emphasis theirs).

(2)

So this argument has a structure where the premises operate together rather than in parallel, and we can show that by forming the diagram in this way:

image13

(Source / license)

 

 

 

 

 

“Argument Diagramming (Open + Free)”. Creative Commons Attribution: Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. ©2015 Open Learning Initiative. https://oli.cmu.edu

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Argument Diagramming (CMU open online course), entry directory. Carnegie Mellon University Open Learning Initiative

 

by Corry Shores

[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

 

[Central Entry Directory]

[Logic & Semantics, Entry Directory]

 

 

Entry Directory for the Carnegie Mellon online course:

 

Argument Diagramming (Open + Free)

 

Carnegie Mellon University

 

Open Learning Initiative

(Creative Commons Attribution: Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. ©2015 Open Learning Initiative)

 

 

Argument Diagramming

 

 

UNIT 1: Course Introduction

 

UNIT 2: Creating Argument Diagrams

 

Module 1: Introduction to Creating Argument Diagrams

 

Module 2: Basic Vocabulary

 

Module 3: Understanding and Representing Argument Structure

 

Module 4: Interpreting Arguments to Create Diagrams

 

Module 5: Conclusion: Creating Argument Diagrams

 

UNIT 3: Evaluating Arguments

 

Module 6: Evaluating Deductive and Non-deductive Arguments

 

UNIT 4: Argument Diagramming for Interpreting Public Arguments and Longer Texts

 

Module 7: Part 1: Identifying Rhetorical Elements

 

Module 8: Part 2: Diagramming Longer, Public Texts

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

“Argument Diagramming (Open + Free)”. Creative Commons Attribution: Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. ©2015 Open Learning Initiative. https://oli.cmu.edu

Licence summary:

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/

Licence:

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5 May 2016

Terence Blake on Deleuze’s Eternal Return


by
Corry Shores

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[Bracketed commentary is mine.]



Terence Blake consistently writes very interesting and important posts, but I wanted to focus on this one:

 

DELEUZE WITHOUT RETURN

 

He explains that Deleuze’s problematic in Difference and Repetition and in the Logic of Sense evolved over time, and “so not only did his terminology evolve but also his concepts.” He continues, “Particular cases of this are the relative importance of the concepts of difference and of the eternal return in his later philosophy” (from Blake, and the following quotes and paraphrase are also from this source).

 

Because Deleuze moved away from his earlier way of conceptualizing the eternal return, Blake sees “no reason to insist on the Eternal Return as a central Deleuzian concept”. He gives a couple reasons why he thinks so. The first is that we rarely see the term eternal return appear after Difference and Repetition and the Logic of Sense. [The second reason I will misconstrue. **See Blake’s clarification in the comments and ignore the following**  The idea seems to be that the notion of the eternal return from Deleuze’s earlier thinking was later absorbed into Deleuze’s and Guattari’s notion of rhizome. I am not certain, but it seems one point is that there is an important feature of the eternal return, namely, that it somehow lacks an obvious unity although it does have a unity at a higher level. I assume the higher level has to do with its eternal structure. This feature can be found as well in rhizomatic thinking. I do not understand this material enough to explicate it. The idea might be that a rhizomatic pattern of concept-relations may seem at first to have no coherence or unity. However, somehow on a higher level such unity can be found. I am not sure how. Perhaps the unity is found as an interconnected totality that is apparent not when looking at the parts but only when seeing the whole network of concepts. Or perhaps the unity is to be understood in terms of the dynamics of the connections, and the eternal return of rhizomatic thinking would have something to do with how concepts form connections non-linearly in an ongoing fashion. Let me quote, as I will only misrepresent Blake’s ideas:]

Secondly, in RHIZOME it [the eternal return] is assimilated to the fascicular system aborting explicit unity but maintaining it at a higher level:

“Nietzsche’s aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown in thought” (ATP,6).

(Blake, bracketed insertion mine)

 

Blake then concludes that he does not “think it correct to treat Deleuze’s later philosophy as a philosophy of difference (but rather of multiplicity) nor a philosophy of Return (but rather of consistence)” (Blake). [I highly recommend also his post on Deleuze’s later philosophy being more a philosophy of multiplicity than a philosophy of difference. Blake’s excellent post here. I mention it also here.] [I am also very interested in this idea of Deleuze’s later philosophy being a philosophy of consistence. I would love to learn more!]

 

Blake then makes the interesting point that Deleuze’s move away from eternal return is a sort of progress in his thinking, because this earlier notion of a return of difference is incoherent and not what Nietzsche had in mind anyway.

In the later work, all the mystagogical mantras about a “return” of difference have been jettisoned. Which is just as well as they were incoherent, and a falsification of Nietzsche. The terminology has changed, but so has the concept, and I think this is an improvement.

(Blake)

[I would be curious to know more why the earlier notion of eternal return of difference is incoherent. Perhaps it has to do with the conceptual tension between the notions of return and difference. For, how can something new or different return, since in order to be different or new, it would need to have never happened or existed before?]

 

Blake further offers some criticism of this notion.

Changing the name of a concept is not an empty gesture but changes its dimensions as well the concept. The “return” is a bad name and DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION is full of inflated empty rhetoric to get across the notion of a “return of difference”, an ultimately incoherent idea, and an unnecessary part of the concept of a deterritorialised time. So the usage is quite different. Both these concepts of difference and return came under attack from Badiou and Laruelle, and rightly so, but Deleuze had already moved on. It would be a rather strange affair if the philosopher of becoming and transformation always had the same ideas, and never changed.

(Blake)

[Like with Blake’s other post about Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, I find these observations to be very important for understanding and interpreting Deleuze. I have little comment of my own on the concept of eternal return, because I never grasped its meaning well enough to know if I could make any use of it. If Blake is right, then we need not give this notion too much weight when trying to understand Deleuze’s philosophy on the whole. But if someone will disagree with Blake’s assessment, then I would kindly request a clear and coherent explanation of the meaning and philosophical importance of Deleuze’s concept of an eternal return of difference. For example, is the idea merely that change is always happening? ...that what returns and is the same is simply the structure of renewal? If so, why would it be a “return” and not an ongoing status? Is Deleuze’s point that there are breaks of some kind between each renewal? What Deleuze is trying to do with this concept is not entirely clear to me. Even when I encounter certain convincing explanations of the notion, I still wonder why Deleuze could not have found a more effective way to formulate it.]

 

 


Terence Blake, ‘DELEUZE WITHOUT RETURN’

https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2016/04/30/deleuze-without-return/





 

4 May 2016

Agler (5.4) Symbolic Logic: Syntax, Semantics, and Proof, "Strategies for Proofs", summary

 

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. Boldface (except for metavariables) and bracketed commentary are my own. Please forgive my typos, as proofreading is incomplete. I highly recommend Agler’s excellent book. It is one of the best introductions to logic I have come across.]

 

 

 

Summary of

 

David W. Agler

 

Symbolic Logic: Syntax, Semantics, and Proof

 

Ch.5: Propositional Logic Derivations


5.4 Strategies for Proofs

 

 

 

Brief summary:

Certain guidelines can enable us to figure out proofs more effectively. There are two rules that do not involve assumptions, called strategic proof rules (SP#). They are:

SP#1(E)

First, eliminate any conjunctions with ‘∧E,’ disjunctions with ‘∨E,’ conditionals with ‘→E,’ and biconditionals with ‘↔E.’ Then, if necessary, use any necessary introduction rules to reach the desired conclusion.

SP#2(B)

First, work backward from the conclusion using introduction rules (e.g., ‘∧I,’ ‘∨I,’‘ →I,’ ‘↔I’). Then, use SP#1(E).

(Agler 194)

And there are four rules that do involve assumptions:

SA#1(P,¬Q)

If the conclusion is an atomic proposition (or a negated proposition), assume the negation of the proposition (or the non-negated form of the negated proposition), derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’

SA#2(→)

If the conclusion is a conditional, assume the antecedent, derive the consequent, and use ‘→I.’

SA#3(∧)

If the conclusion is a conjunction, you will need two steps. First, assume the negation of one of the conjuncts, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’ Second, in a separate subproof, assume the negation of the other conjunct, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’ From this point, a use of ‘∧I’ will solve the proof.

SA#4(∨)

If the conclusion is a disjunction, assume the negation of the whole disjunction, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’

(Agler 199)

 

Summary

 

 

5.4 Strategies for Proofs

 

Agler will provide some strategies for making proofs more effectively. There are two kinds of strategies.

(1) strategies aimed at the direct manipulation of propositions in the proof, and

(2) strategies aimed at the deliberate and tactical use of assumptions.

(Agler 194)

 

 

5.4.1 Strategies Involving Premises

 

The first two strategies do not involve assumptions, and Agler calls them SP rules, for strategic proof.

SP#1(E)

First, eliminate any conjunctions with ‘∧E,’ disjunctions with ‘∨E,’ conditionals with ‘→E,’ and biconditionals with ‘↔E.’ Then, if necessary, use any necessary introduction rules to reach the desired conclusion.

SP#2(B)

First, work backward from the conclusion using introduction rules (e.g., ‘∧I,’ ‘∨I,’‘ →I,’ ‘↔I’). Then, use SP#1(E).

(Agler 194)

 

So we will begin with the first strategic rule. Agler explains that “the basic idea behind this strategic rule is to start a proof by simplifying or breaking down any available premises.” (195). He has us consider the following example.

P→(R∧M), (P∧S)∧Z ⊢ R

(Agler 195)

[So let us first set it up with the goal proposition noted.

image

As we can see there can be a series of eliminations that will lead us finally to R. So we begin with using conjunction elimination on line 2.

5.4.1 a4

We are going to want just the P from line 3, but we will decompose the conjunction entirely with conjunction elimination.

5.4.1 a3

Now that we have P, we can use conditional elimination on line 1.

5.4.1 a2

And finally we can derive our goal proposition using conjunction elimination.]

5.4.1 a

 

Agler then has us consider a variation on the above example.

P→R, (P∧S)∧Z ⊢ R∧S

[Let us set it up.

5.4.1 b5

And we use conjunction elimination to derive some more propositions.

5.4.1 b4

And again, we will need the P.

5.4.1 b3

Now with the P, we can derive R.

5.4.1 b2

And we have all the basic parts we need to derive the goal proposition, but we will need to use an introduction rule.]

5.4.1 b1

 

Now recall the second SP rule.

SP#2(B)

First, work backward from the conclusion using introduction rules (e.g., ‘∧I,’ ‘∨I,’‘ →I,’ ‘↔I’). Then, use SP#1(E).

(Agler 194)

Agler says that “the basic idea behind this strategy is this: rather than moving forward (downward) in a proof from the premises or assumptions to a conclusion, work backward (upward) from the conclusion to the premises or assumptions” (196).

 

He has us consider the following argument:

P→R, Z→W, P ⊢ R∨W

(Agler 197)

[Note, in my version of the text, the argument is given as:

P→R, Z→W, P Z ⊢ R∨W

] [So let us set it up.

5.4.1 c1

Now note that we could use an elimination rule on lines 1 and 3. However, Agler will have us jump to the conclusion, so that we can find the path to it.

5.4.1 c2

We now work backward; we ask, by means of what derivation rule might we obtain R∨W? Since it is a disjunction, it could very well have been obtained from disjunction introduction.]

We will call propositions that are obtained as a result of the working-backward method intermediate conclusions. Thus, working backward we obtain the intermediate conclusions ‘R’ and ‘W’:

5.4.1 c5

(Agler 198)

[What the ‘V’ spanning R and W means is that so long as we can derive either R or W, then we can derive R∨W using disjunction introduction. There seems to be no way to obtain W, but R we can derive using conditional elimination.]

5.4.1 c6

In the above, we have created two paths. The first path links the premises to one of the intermediate conclusions. The second path links the intermediate conclusion to the conclusion of the proof. With both of these paths, we can finish the proof as follows:

5.4.1 c7

Thus, the general idea behind SP#2(B) is to start with the conclusion and work backward, using any introduction rules that would yield an intermediate conclusion. Once you have worked backward to a sufficient degree, try to use any elimination rules that would lead you to an intermediate conclusion.

(Agler 198)

 

5.4.2 Strategies Involving Assumptions

 

Agler now will discuss strategic rules for proof solving for “proofs that either do not involve premises or that require the use of assumptions” (199).

 

Agler begins with rules involving assumptions. He says there are “roughly” four of them. Each is “classified by the main operator of the goal operation” (199). He continues:

That is, there is a strategic rule for atomic propositions and negated propositions (‘P,’ ‘¬Q’), one for conditionals (→), one for disjunctions (∨), and one for conjunctions (∧).

 

SA#1(P,¬Q)

If the conclusion is an atomic proposition (or a negated proposition), assume the negation of the proposition (or the non-negated form of the negated proposition), derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’

SA#2(→)

If the conclusion is a conditional, assume the antecedent, derive the consequent, and use ‘→I.’

SA#3(∧)

If the conclusion is a conjunction, you will need two steps. First, assume the negation of one of the conjuncts, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’ Second, in a separate subproof, assume the negation of the other conjunct, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’ From this point, a use of ‘∧I’ will solve the proof.

SA#4(∨)

If the conclusion is a disjunction, assume the negation of the whole disjunction, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’

(Agler 199)

 

Agler begins with this example:

P→Q, ¬Q ⊢ ¬P

(Agler 199)

So let us set it up.

5.4.1-d5_thumb

[Recall SA#1: If the conclusion is an atomic proposition (or a negated proposition), assume the negation of the proposition (or the non-negated form of the negated proposition), derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’] Agler notes that since the goal proposition is a negated atomic proposition, ¬P, we should begin by assuming the non-negated form, P.

5.4.1-d4_thumb

[I do not recall the use of “contra” in the justifications from before. I think when doing negation introduction or elimination, we would just put the other form of the proposition. From what follows I gather the reason for using “contra” is that we may not know at the beginning which contradiction we are trying to obtain. At any rate, we see that with P we can derive Q.

5.4.1-d3_thumb

And we can reiterate ¬Q.

5.4.1-d2_thumb

On the basis of this contradiction we can derive ¬P in the main proof.

5.4.1-d1_thumb

 

 

Agler has us now consider this example:

P ⊢ ¬¬P

(Agler 200)

[As we can see, we have a negated form of an atomic formula. It should not matter that it is doubly negated. We will assume the form that is once less negated, ¬P.

5.4.1-e3_thumb

That contradicts the premise P.

5.4.1-e2_thumb

Thus by using negation introduction, we can derive ¬¬P.

5.4.1-e1_thumb

Agler explains:

The goal proposition of this proof is a negated proposition. SA#1(P, ¬Q) says to start by assuming the opposite of our desired goal. In this case, ‘¬P’ is assumed. Next, SA#1(P,¬Q) says to derive a contradiction. This is done at lines 2 and 3. Finally, SA#1(P,¬Q) says to close the subproof with ‘¬I.’ This is done at line 4.

(Agler 201)

 

Next Agler has us consider this argument:

⊢ ¬(P∧¬P)
(Agler 201)

As we can see, there are no premises to it. As such, “it will require starting the proof by making an assumption” (201). [As there are no premises, our first line will be the assumption. We will assume the unnegated form of the goal proposition.

5.4.1-f3_thumb

As we can see, we can draw out a contradiction from it.

5.4.1-f2_thumb

Thus we can derive the goal proposition in the main proof.]

5.4.1-f1_thumb

(Agler 201)

[This intuitively seems valid. We cannot have a proposition and its negation, because this is a contradiction. So given our rules of logic, we should be able to prove ¬(P∧¬P) without needing any more support, that is to say, we should be able to prove it merely with an assumption and with our rules of derivation alone.]

[Recall the second strategic assumption rule: SA#2(→): If the conclusion is a conditional, assume the antecedent, derive the consequent, and use ‘→I.’] Next we consider:

R ⊢ P→R

(Agler 201)

Let us set it up.

5.4.1-g4_thumb

If we follow SA#2, then we begin by assuming the antecedent, P.

5.4.1-g3_thumb

We then can derive R by reiterating it.

5.4.1-g2_thumb

And finally by using conditional introduction, we can derive the goal proposition.

5.4.1-g1_thumb

 

Agler next gives this example:

R ⊢ (P∨R)→R

(Agler 202)

So we first set it up.

5.4.1-h4_thumb

SA#2 tells us to assume the antecedent of the goal proposition.

5.4.1-h3_thumb

Now we need to derive the consequent. We see that it is the premise, so we reiterate it.

5.4.1-h2_thumb

Then we can use conditional introduction to derive the goal proposition.

5.4.1-h1_thumb

(Agler 202)

 

Agler then has us consider one last example for the second assumption rule:

⊢  P→(Q→P)

Since it has no premises, we must begin with an assumption. As we can see, it is a conditional, so we will assume the antecedent.

5.4.1-i5_thumb

By itself this will not not allow us to accomplish anything else. We see that we will need P implies that Q implies P. We can obtain the Q implies P by first assuming Q in a sub-subproof.

5.4.1-i4_thumb

We then reiterate P from the outer proof.

5.4.1-i3_thumb

With this structure we can then derive Q→P in the outer subproof.

5.4.1-i2_thumb

We now have all the contents we need to derive the goal proposition in the main proof.

5.4.1-i1_thumb

(Agler 203)

 

We now recall the third assumptional strategy:

SA#3(∧)

If the conclusion is a conjunction, you will need two steps. First, assume the negation of one of the conjuncts, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’ Second, in a separate subproof, assume the negation of the other conjunct, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’ From this point, a use of ‘∧I’ will solve the proof.

(Agler 203)

 

To illustrate, he has us consider this example:

¬(P∨Q) ⊢ ¬P∧¬Q

[This one is perhaps less obvious how to solve. We need to recall disjunction introduction. We can disjoin any given proposition to any other. We also know from the rule that we will want to assume the non-negated forms, P and Q. When we have the assumption of either, we can then disjoin it to the other, which will contradict the premise. For each case, we will be able to derive the negated forms, and thus in the main proof we can derive ¬P∧¬Q. So let us set it up.

5.4.1-j10_thumb

And we begin by assuming P.

5.4.1-j9_thumb

We then use disjunction introduction to disjoin P to Q.

5.4.1-j8_thumb

We notice the contradiction with the premise. So let us reiterate the premise to establish that contradiction.

5.4.1-j7_thumb

This means we can use negation introduction to derive ¬P in the main proof.

5.4.1-j6_thumb

Now let us assume Q, so that we can in the end derive the right-conjunct in the goal proposition.

5.4.1-j5_thumb

We will follow the same procedure. We disjoin Q to P.

5.4.1-j4_thumb

We reiterate the premise to establish the contradiction.

5.4.1-j3_thumb

This allows us to derive ¬Q in the main proof.

5.4.1-j2_thumb

And we can now derive the goal proposition using conjunction introduction.

5.4.1-j_thumb

(Agler 204)

 

Now we turn to the fourth strategic proof involving assumptions. Recall that it was:

SA#4(∨)

If the conclusion is a disjunction, assume the negation of the whole disjunction, derive a contradiction, and then use ‘¬I’ or ‘¬E.’

(Agler 204)

 

To illustrate it, Agler offers this example:

¬(¬P∧¬Q) ⊢ P∨Q

(Agler 204)

[This example is very tricky. It is probably not immediately obvious how to solve it, even with the forth rule in mind. Let us first run quickly through some reasoning, then we will repeat it below with illustration. The rule says we should assume ¬(P∨Q). But then what? The rule says to find a contradiction next. We just need to find any contradiction whatsoever, and then we can derive the unnegated form of ¬(P∨Q) using negation elimination. Given the tools we have, our only options seem to be finding either (¬P∧¬Q) to contradict the premise, or P∨Q to contradict the assumption. In order to obtain P∨Q in the first layer of subproof, we will need to obtain either P or Q in the second layer of subproof. We could do that by assuming their negations. However, with our available tools, it is not obvious how we will find a contradiction based on that assumption. So let us instead see our prospects with deriving ¬P∧¬Q in the first level of subproof. To get this, we need by means of two independent sub-subproofs to derive ¬P and ¬Q. To do this, we might begin by assuming P in one case and Q in another, then finding a contradiction in each case. This can conceivably be done by using disjunction introduction to obtain P∨Q in the sub-subproof, which will contradict our first assumption, thereby allowing us for each case of a sub-subproof to derive ¬P and ¬Q in the outer subproof. With these propositions we can derive ¬P∧¬Q in the subproof, which contradicts the first premise. That means we can derive the negation of our first assumption, which is the goal proposition. So let us work through this complicated proof little by little, beginning by setting it up.

5.4.1-k14_thumb

We will run through the above reasoning again step by step with depictions. So at this point, with our given derivation tools, no easy straightforward path to a solution is immediately obvious. So here we notice that the conclusion is a disjunction, hence we follow the fourth rule. It tells us to first assume the negation of the disjunction.

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As we noted, our contradiction can be any contradiction whatsoever. But given our derivation rules, there is not much we can produce to which we might find a contradiction. We have a negated conjunction and a negated disjunction. Perhaps later with De Morgan’s Laws we can derive something useful from them. But for the time being, the best we can do at this point is find a contradiction with either ¬(¬P∧¬Q) (from line 1) or with ¬(P∨Q) (from line 2), in their entirety. So long as we can at least do that, then we have a contradiction with our main assumption, which will allow us to use negation elimination to derive the non-negated form of the first assumption and thereby obtain the conclusion. So that means we have two options, we can find either ¬P∧¬Q or P∨Q.

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(Agler 205)

Agler will only show us the first option. Perhaps this is because the second option is too complicated or impossible. Suppose we try for the second option. How can we derive P∨Q? Nothing available allows us to do that. So we will need to make further assumptions. What assumptions can we make that will allow us to get P∨Q? All we need is either P or Q, and then we can add the other using disjunction introduction. Our only tool for obtaining either P or Q is to assume their negation and find a contradiction. Can we do that? I cannot think of a way. So recall our two options:

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What about the first option? To derive that formula, we could build it up using conjunction introduction. To do that we need to make subproofs that assume P or Q, then find a contradiction, thereby allowing us to derive both ¬P and ¬Q in the first subproof. Let us begin with P and see how we might go from there.

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With just P, I do not think we can derive something to contradict line 1. However, by using disjunction introduction, we could contradict the second line. So let us do that.

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We reiterate line 2 to expose the contradiction within the sub-subproof.

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This allows us to derive ¬P in the outer subproof.

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Now we need to do the same to get ¬Q. So let us assume Q.

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We again use disjunction introduction to find a contradiction with line 2.

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We reiterate line 2 again to expose the contradiction now in this sub-subproof.

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This allows us to derive ¬Q in the outer subproof.

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We currently have within the outer subproof the contents we need to make a contradiction with line 1. So let us use conjunction introduction to get ¬P∧¬Q.

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We will reiterate line 1 to expose the contradiction in the subproof.

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On the basis of this contradiction, we can derive the unnegated form of the assumption using negation elimination.

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(Agler 204-206)

 

Agler then comments on the strategic rules so far.

Let’s take stock. We are working with two different kinds of strategies for solving proofs. First, there are the strategic proof rules that involve manipulating propositions that are available in the proof by either breaking down complex propositions with elimination rules or working backward with introduction rules. Second, there are strategic rules involving assumptions. Whenever you need to make an assumption, the proposition you assume should be guided by the main operator in the proposition you are trying to derive; that is, if it is a conditional, use SA#2(→).

(Agler 206)

 

 

 

 

Agler, David. Symbolic Logic: Syntax, Semantics, and Proof. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.