The Passing Time of Time-Past, para 27, Supplementary B1 to: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

by Corry Shores
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The Passing Time of Time-Past

Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

I "On the Introduction of the Essential Distinction between 'Fresh' Memory and 'Full' Recollection and about the Change in Content and Differences in Apprehension in the Consciousness of Time"

No. 2

Evidence Pertaining to the Perception of Time, to Memory, etc

Paragraph 27

Previously we discussed the immediate past. We hear a melody. The first note plays. Then the second. While we are aware of note number two, we are also aware of note one in its process of passing-away into the past.

Husserl wonders now about a more distant past. For example, yesterday we heard a melody. We recall it now. Each note plays again in our phantasy, just as we experienced it the day before. In this way, we obtain a sense of time’s flow, even though it is based on our reviewing an event in the more distant past.

If I remember something I experienced yesterday, I have a phantasy-representation of yesterday’s experienced event. I may reproduce in this representation the whole event consisting of various successive steps. In doing this, I have an apprehension of temporality. First one step is reproduced, then in definite sequence the second, and so on. (156c)

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Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 ofEdmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.