No Objective Time, Husserl, para 127, Supplementary B1 to: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

by Corry Shores
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No Objective Time

Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

II

The Suspension of Objective Time, The Temporal Object, The Phenomenology of Objectivation and its Aporiae

No. 19

The Complete Exclusion of All Suppositions with Respect to Objective Time

Paragraph 127

In phenomenology, we are not concerned with an objective time that might be thought of as existing independent of consciousness. So time in phenomenology is not a container in which our acts of consciousness fall into.

Consider for example a new-born child’s visual field. It sees a band of what lies before her. But the way that space is given to her has little to do with an objective space with no center of perspective. (194) Likewise for time. Also, our minds constitute the objects we see. They also constitute the time we experience. Hence in phenomenology we do not ask about some original objective time that our minds intuit. (195c)

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Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Vol 4 ofEdmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.