by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. Boldface and bracketed commentary are mine. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos.]
Summary of
Charles Sanders Peirce
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
Volume 1: Principles of Philosophy
Book 3: Phenomenology
Chapter 2: The Categories in Detail
C: Thirdness
§2: Representation and Generality [1.338-1.342]
Brief summary:
Thirdness, which is a matter of generality, is a tricky concept that requires careful examination. Representations (signs) for instance are matters of thirdness and generality. A sign has three parts to its composition. The first is the actual structure or thing that is recognized as a sign for something (like a symbol for example). The second part is the object that the sign stands for. The third is the idea in the mind involved when recognizing that a sign represents some object. This is called the ‘interpretant’, [and it seems similar to what Frege calls sense]. There are important ideas involved in thirdness that call for further examination, namely, generality, infinity, continuity, diffusion, growth, and intelligence. An example of thirdness, or generality in terms of rules, is a cook who will make an apple pie. The firstness here is the dream the cook has of the pleasure she will enjoy when eating the pie. It is a first, because there is simply the pure quality of feeling of the pleasure of eating the pie. The secondness are the acts of preparing the pie and of eating it. These are seconds, because the cook’s volition meets external resistance from the things in the world when preparing and eating the pie. What bridges this firstness to this secondness is the desire which begins from the dream and leads to the preparation for and realization of the dream. Given that it is a medium that mediates a first and second, it is thus a third. We note also in this process there is a play of generality and particularity. The pleasure of eating an apple pie is general and it can be realized by a number of various particular experiences of eating pies. The type of apple needed is general, but the apples that will be selected are particular, and so a general rule of selection is needed, namely, pick those that, all things being equal, are readiest to one’s hand in the barrel.
Summary
1.338
[Thirdness involves very complicated notions that require careful attention to analyze.]
[Thirdness is more complicated than Firstness and Secondness. To understand it properly, we will need to analyze it with care. If we are too lazy, we will just judge the finer points of thirdness to be too difficult. So we must be diligent.]
The ideas in which Thirdness is predominant are, as might be expected, more complicated, and mostly require careful analysis to be clearly apprehended; for ordinary, unenergetic thought slurs over this element as too difficult. There is all the more need of examining some of these ideas.
(171)
1.339
[Signs are composed of {a} the structure or thing which does the representing (like a symbol for example), {b} the object being represented or referenced, and {c} the idea in the mind involved while cognizing that sign (and this idea is either synonymous with or similar to what is called the “interpretant”)]
[The easiest of the notions involved in the concept of Thirdness is the idea of a sign or representation. He writes that, “A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant.” Not all of this is entirely clear to me. The section of the Collected Papers on signs does not appear until much later. So for now I will draw from a post I made a number of years ago on Peirce’s theory of signs. What I gather from this other post, placed in relation to these passages, is the following. The sign is some structure or form that initiates a certain type of cognitive operation in the mind of the person recognizing that sign. Let us suppose our sign is “horse”. The object is that for which the sign stands, namely, the thing horse or the category of horses. When someone recognizes the sign, there is a cognitive act by which an internal sort of sign is evoked, and this is the meaning or idea that the sign gives rise to in the recognizer’s mind, and it is called the interpretant. He next writes, “The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant.” This I do not follow. He might mean that normally we would say that the object of a representation is some actual thing in the world. But in certain cases, rather than the object being a thing, it is instead another representation, like a sign for a sign. Peirce does not give an example, and I am not sure what qualifies as one. I in fact have a lot of trouble parsing that quoted sentence and thinking of the situation using its terminology. I will have to return to this section later when we look at the sections on signs. He will make three similar claims:
1) The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant.
2) The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation.
3) Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again.
I am not able yet to distinguish with a high degree of conceptual clarity the difference between the meaning and the interpretant. All in all, the basic idea here might be something vaguely like we can have signs which represent other signs (like in cases of translation, possibly), but taking into account the different ways this can happen on the basis of the different parts of a sign. But exactly how it all works I am not sure yet. He also says that in each case it involves an infinite regress. Another important point in this section is that the meaning of the representation is nothing but the representation stripped of all its irrelevant clothing. I am not sure what that clothing is, but perhaps it is the contingent factors of the sign which help us recognize the sign but which are not essential to its conceptual content. I am guessing again. He says furthermore that the irrelevant clothing of the representation is never completely removed, but rather is just changed for something more diaphanous. Again, without an example I am struggle to conceptualize what he means. Perhaps the notion is something vaguely like the idea that were we to try to explicate what some idea means, we would use other ideas, and to explicate them, yet more. But probably that is not it. So again, I will have to return to this paragraph later to fill in these details by making reference to the sections on signs.]
The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a sign, or representation. A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.
(171)
1.340
[Generality, infinity, continuity, diffusion, growth, and intelligence are important ideas related to Thirdness which should be studied further.]
[Peirce says that generality, infinity, continuity, diffusion, growth, and intelligence are “ideas of prominent Thirdness,” but I am not sure what he means by “prominent Thirdness”. He notes that these ideas call for attentive study.]
Some of the ideas of prominent Thirdness which, owing to their great importance in philosophy and in science, | require attentive study are generality, infinity, continuity, diffusion, growth, and intelligence.
(171-172)
1.341
[An example of thirdness, or generality in terms of rules, is a cook who will make an apple pie. In such actions, there is a play of generality and particularity. The desire is for a pleasure, which is a general quality that can be had by a variety of pleasurable experiences. However, the pleasurable experience itself will be something particular. Furthermore, the sort of pie that will provide this pleasure can be one of many similar instances of apple pie, but the specific pie that is eaten and that will give this pleasure will be something particular. And as well, the apples that will be selected need not be particular; rather, they merely must have certain general qualities that allow the appropriate pie to be made. However, the cook must select the apples from the particular ones available. Here this clash between the unspecific generality of the needed type of apple with the too extensive collection of apples that have these qualities is negotiated by means of a general rule of random selection: the cook will select all those apples, being equivalent, that are the readiest to her hand.]
[Peirce will now examine the notion of generality a little more closely. We should first note a distinction he makes. An experience can give us pleasure. The experiences giving pleasure are individual, distinct, singular, enumerable and so on. But we cannot speak of a singular individual pleasure. This is because pleasure is a quality. His reasoning behind the distinction is a bit hard to follow. One interpretation might be that qualities fall along a continuous spectrum of variation, and as such, there are an infinite number of variation. He gives the example of metallic qualities, and he says he “can imagine an infinite variety between tin and lead, or between copper and silver, or between iron and nickel, or between magnesium and aluminum.” I am not sure I follow. Perhaps the idea is that we have two metals, tin and lead. They have features that can be said to be different variations of some trait. I do not know metals very well, but suppose for example that tin is a certain degree shinier than lead. Perhaps Peirce is saying that he can imagine an infinity of qualitative variation in shininess between the shininess of tin and the shininess of lead. I am not sure, but whatever he means by this example applies somehow to pleasure. So perhaps the idea is that we cannot speak of pleasure, which is a quality, as some denumerable thing but rather as something that somehow admits of infinite variation in some way. I still cannot conceptualize this very well yet, but maybe Peirce is saying that pleasure is something like a category rather than a concrete instantiation of that category. At any rate, he mentions this notion of pleasure as a quality when giving an example for generality. In the example, we have a cook. She has a recipe book. The recipes are to be understood as sets of rules that she is accustomed to follow. We now think of her desiring an apple pie. Peirce makes the point here about her not desiring some apple pie as a single individual thing. Rather, she desires the pleasure that will result from one apple pie or another, it does not matter which one exactly or what its contingent variations are, so long as it delivers the pleasure she desires. So perhaps here we might interpret Peirce’s point about pleasure in terms of the pies. The experience of the pie is specific, but the pleasure it gives is something general. At any rate, Peirce then notes that to make the apple pie that will fulfill her desire, she needs apples. But in this case, any apple will do. So when she goes to the cellar barrel of apples, she takes the ones that are at the top and easiest to get. Peirce says that she is following a general rule. I am not sure exactly how to state that rule, but perhaps it is something like: take the object that has the qualities of an apple. The generality here seems to also involve the fact that the qualities are general and can be found in this or that particular apple. Her sense and volition (her seeing apples and acting to get them) can only be involved with particular apples. But her desire relates not to particulars but to qualities, which are general. In fact, desire is an idea, which in the example, would be “the idea of how delightful it would be for me, the cook’s master, to eat an apple pie”. However, Peirce adds, while the desire itself is this idea, the thing desired is “that the dream of eating an apple pie should be realized in Me; and this Me is an object of experience”. So here Peirce makes a distinction between the non-particularity of the pie but the particularity of the person eating it. I am not sure why however that is an important distinction. Peirce’s next point is that while selecting the apples, their particularity did not matter, but once they are selected, their particularity does matter, because it is these that she will use and if she sees others in the meantime, she will not use those other ones. Again, I am not sure what importance this distinction makes. Peirce then stresses again that throughout this process, the cook is pursuing a dream without “any particular thisness or thatness” which is also called hecceity. However, there is an object of experience (the pie I am supposing, but I am not sure) which does have hecceity. And also, since the cook must take actions that act upon actual things in the world, those things upon which she acts, like the apples for example, also have hecceity. Peirce then ends this point in an interesting way. His idea here seems to be that because she must act upon particulars while using a general rule of action (in this case, of selection), she must choose at random. And that randomness is not totally random, but it follows its own rule, a pragmatic one, namely, she randomly selects from those particulars that are equally the most handy.]
Let us examine the idea of generality. Every cook has in her recipe-book a collection of rules, which she is accustomed to follow. An apple pie is desired. Now, observe that we seldom, probably never, desire a single individual thing. What we want is something which shall produce a certain pleasure of a certain kind. To speak of a single individual pleasure is to use words without meaning. We may have a single experience of pleasure; but the pleasure itself is a quality. Experiences are single; but qualities, however specialized, cannot be enumerated. There are some two dozen kinds of metals well known to me. I remember to have examined lumps of those qualities. But it is only the limitation of experience which attaches that number; there is simply no end to the metallic qualities I can imagine. I can imagine an infinite variety between tin and lead, or between copper and silver, or between iron and nickel, or between magnesium and aluminum. An apple pie, then, is desired – a good apple pie, made of fresh apples, with a crust moderately light and somewhat short, neither too sweet nor too sour, etc. But it is not any particular apple pie; for it is to be made for the occasion; and the only particularity about it is that it is to be made and eaten today. For that, apples are wanted; and remembering that there is a barrel of apples in the cellar, the cook goes to the cellar and takes the apples that are uppermost and handiest. That is an example of following a general rule. She is directed to take apples. Many times she has seen things which were called apples, and has noticed their common quality. She knows how to find such things now; and as long as they are sound and fine, any apples will do. What she desires is something of a given quality; what she has to take is this or that particular apple. From the nature of things, she cannot take the quality but must take the particular thing. Sensation and volition being affairs of action and reaction relate to particular things. She has seen only particular apples, and can take only particular apples. But desire has nothing to do with particulars; it relates to qualities. Desire is not a reaction with reference to a particular thing; it is an idea about an idea, namely, the idea of how delightful it would be for me, the cook’s master, | to eat an apple pie. However, what is desired is not a mere unattached quality; what is desired is that the dream of eating an apple pie should be realized in Me; and this Me is an object of experience. So with the cook’s desire. She has no particular apple pie she particularly prefers to serve; but she does desire and intend to serve an apple pie to a particular person. When she goes into the cellar for the apples, she takes whatever bowl or basket comes handy, without caring what one, so long as it has a certain size, is clean, and has other qualities, but having once selected it, into that particular bowl she intends to put some apples. She takes any apples that are handy and seem good; but having taken them she means to make a pie of those apples. If she chances to see some others in the kitchen, on her return from the cellar, she will not use them for the pie, unless for some reason she changes her mind. Throughout her whole proceedings she pursues an idea or dream without any particular thisness or thatness – or, as we say, hecceity – to it, but this dream she wishes to realize in connection with an object of experience, which as such, does possess hecceity; and since she has to act, and action only relates to this and that, she has to be perpetually making random selections, that is, taking whatever comes handiest.
(172-173)
1.342
[In the cook’s apple pie example, the dream of the pleasurable experience of eating the pie, insofar as it is not yet realized, is a first, because it is a pure quality of feeling of what it would be like to eat the pie. The interactions with the things in the world that the cook acts upon for the sake of realizing that dream (including both the acts of cooking and finally eating) are seconds, because they involve the cook’s volition meeting with external resistance. And the desire is a third, because it mediates this first and second, serving as a bridge leading from the one to the other.]
[In the example of the cook baking a pie, the dream itself “has no prominent thirdness”. From what Peirce says later, it seems that the dream is a first, that is a pure quality of feeling, somehow. The object of experience (the pie in this example, or perhaps the apples also) is a second. I suppose this is because it involves our volition encountering resistance in the world. So we must reach out and grab an apple that resists our pull with its weight. And eating the apple pie also requires some effort. Making it at least does. But the desire for the pleasure of eating the apple pie is a third. He says this is because it is a desire for attaching one thing (the dream) to the other (the experience) and is thus a medium. Perhaps the idea is like the following. We dream of some pleasurable experience. This is a firstness, as we are merely experiencing a qualitative feeling bound up with the imagery in that dream. The experience that we will have is a secondness, because it involves our volition’s encounter with external resistance. But the desire, which mediates the firstness and the secondness by bridging them together, is a third. He then says that this is the way it is with any law of nature. But I am not sure what he means by that. Does he mean something like the law of gravity? Or certain laws of behavior in the animal kingdom? He finally then states that the mere idea (the dream?) insofar as it is unrealized is a pure first, but the actual experienced cases to which the dream is applied are seconds.]
The dream itself has no prominent thirdness; it is, on the contrary, utterly irresponsible; it is whatever it pleases. The object of experience as a reality is a second. But the desire in seeking to attach the one to the other is a third, or medium.
So it is with any law of nature. Were it but a mere idea unrealized – and it is of the nature of an idea – it would be a pure first. The cases to which it applies, are seconds.
(173)
Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol 1: Principles of Philosophy. In Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce [Two Volumes in One], Vols. 1 and 2. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1965 [1931].
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