Somers-Hall, (4.9), Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, ‘4.9 Learning and the Discord of the Faculties (188–97/237–47)’, summary

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. All boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my typos and other distracting mistakes. Somers-Hall is abbreviated SH and Difference and Repetition as DR.]

Summary of

Henry Somers-Hall

Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition:
An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide

Part 1
A Guide to the Text

Chapter 4. Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference

 

4.9 Learning and the Discord of the Faculties (188–97/237–47)

 

 

Brief summary: 
For Deleuze, learning is not a matter of drawing inferences from propositions. Instead, it occurs when 1) we deal with the problematic situation in current states of affairs, then 2) gather together Idea fragments from a variety of sources to devise a ‘map’, so to speak, of the important relations in the situation, which is the Idea, and then 3) develop solutions which would change those states of affairs in ways which solve the problems. In an evolutionary sense, each bodily organ is itself like such a solution to certain problems, since for example the eye is the solution to the problem of light. Likewise, each faculty is a solution or Idea on its own. The reproductive imagination (or memory) for example could be the solution to the problem of intuitions (or perceptions) continually being lost due to the passage of time. Now, in those confusing moments while we are learning something very new, our faculties are working together discordantly, meaning that they each have their own object that is different from the other faculties’ objects. But this discordant relation of the faculties, since it is what allows us to learn, is a solution to the problem of Difference itself, which is what presents to us the many problematic situations that call for us to reconfigure our minds and workings in order to continually adapt to a complicated and changing world.

 

Summary

Previously we have been examining Deleuze’s notion of the Idea. We return now to two topics from chapter 3, namely, learning from section 3.10 and the relationship of the faculties from section 3.6. We will see that we need Ideas in Deleuze’s sense for learning, and we turn to Plato’s notion of the hypothesis. Recall again Plato’s divided line. [We also made use of the excellent diagram from the Thesis Eleven website. Many thanks!]

Of intelligible knowledge, there are two kinds: 1) mathematics and 2) knowledge of the forms. Mathematical fields like geometry use images, and they proceed deductively to a conclusion. But

The strength and the limitation of a deductive argument, however, is that its conclusion does not contain anything that is not implicitly assumed in its premises. The most it can do is simply make explicit what we have assumed at the outset. For this reason, it is essential to know that the premises of one’s argument are true, since it is from these that the argument gains its content, and validity.
(155)

[Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems that geometry begins with hypotheses, which are uncertain, but philosophy tries to begin with certain premises by invoking Ideas or using clear and distinct concepts. And thus philosophy would be using a higher form of reasoning than geometry.] “Philosophy traditionally, according to Deleuze, has therefore attempted to show that we can convert hypotheses into categorical statements by arguing from premises that are absolutely certain, either by invoking the Ideas, or by, in Descartes’ case, positing certain concepts that are clear and distinct, and hence indubitable” (155). SH then says [I quote because I am not sure I follow the inference] “Now, as we have seen, Plato understands the Ideas by analogy with objects of empirical recollection, and Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas are fully transparent to consciousness. In both cases, therefore, we remain within the domain of consciousness and the proposition” (155).

In this procedure above, we move between two propositions directly [I suppose between premise to premise or from premises to conclusion]. Deleuze proposes a different procedure, called ‘vice-diction’, which “moves from a proposition to an Idea and then to a solution” (155). In the first stage, there is “the determination of the conditions of the problem” and in the second there is “the correlative genesis of cases of solution” (SH 156, qtg. DR 190/239). Deleuze offers two examples of learning, namely, learning to swim and learning a foreign language, which are favorite examples of Bergson. SH then quotes Bergson for the swimming example:

If we had never seen a man swim, we might say that swimming is an impossible thing, inasmuch as, to learn to swim, we must begin by holding ourselves up in the water and, consequently, already know how to swim. Reasoning, in fact, always nails us down to the solid ground. But if, quite simply, I throw myself into the water without fear, I may keep myself up well enough at first by merely struggling, and gradually adapt myself to the new environment: I shall thus have learnt to swim. So, in theory, there is a kind of absurdity in trying to know otherwise than by intelligence; but if the risk be frankly accepted, action will perhaps cut the knot that reasoning has tied and will not unloose. (Bergson 1998: 192)
(SH 156)

SH notes that we can contrast two kinds of learning here. There is the “propositional account” [learning by reasoning or intelligence, perhaps in Bergson’s terms]. But on this account, learning to swim would seem impossible or absurd, since learning to swim, that is, gaining knowledge of how to swim, already seems to presuppose that we had that knowledge in the first place. [SH then moves to Deleuze’s other sort of learning, which seems to be more dynamic, spontaneous, and interactive with the problematics involved with what is being learned. I do not follow this description very well. Let me quote it first.]

Deleuze’s rather abstract analysis of the process of learning to swim or learning a language is that we do so by ‘composing the singular points of one’s own body or one’s own language with those of another shape or element, which tears us apart but also propels us into a hitherto unknown and unheard-of world of problems’ (DR 192/241). In order to escape the deductive sterility of the proposition, therefore, he claims that thinking needs to raise itself to the level of the Idea. The first stage of vice-diction is therefore that of finding other relevant cases that together specify the problem we are faced with, ‘fragments of ideal future or past events’ (DR 190/239). By ‘discovering the adjuncts’, Deleuze means this procedure of finding equivalent cases that emerge from the problem. As the Idea is an interpenetrative multiplicity, these elements must be combined to generate the Idea corresponding to the problem, just as the shades of light were passed through the convergent lens in Bergson’s example. Once we have the Idea of the problem, we can attempt to find those singular points of the Idea where it engenders solutions that are different from the present state of affairs. Deleuze gives the example of Lenin’s thought, which would involve the extraction from the present state of affairs of the Idea of the economic (abstract modes of production), and then the generation of a solution that involves a different | conjunction of singularities (just as selecting a different plane of a conic section will give us a different curve). Thus, we move from the present society to the problematic genetic principles that give rise to it, and then back to an alternative solution, or form of society. In a similar way, we do not look at the relations between parts of animals directly, as they may have different functional roles, but instead relate each to the others through the transcendental rules for their production. Thinking thus does not go from proposition to proposition. Rather, thinking becomes creative by tracing back propositions to the non-propositional field of problems that engender them.
(SH 157)

[Let us start with the examples. Deleuze discusses the swimming example in a Spinozistic context in his course lecture of 1981/03/17 and in his course lecture of 1981/03/31. The idea is that all bodies, our own and the body of water we swim in, are made up of smaller and smaller parts, ultimately of pure differential relations between vanishing terms (simplest bodies). But when we first encounter the wave, our field of differential relations and its differential relations are not at first compatible, in fact the wave’s internal relations decompose our own, and so we struggle in the water. But by learning how to modify our own workings to suit the workings of the wave, we learn to swim, and we also thereby constitute a larger composite body together. Perhaps this applies also to learning language. We must in a sense rearrange our own systems of associations and meanings in order to navigate in the other language. SH mentions the first stage of vice-diction as “finding other relevant cases that together specify the problem we are faced with, ‘fragments of ideal future or past events’ (DR 190/239)”. I am not sure what this is or how it would work in the examples. Perhaps the idea is that we need to try to direct our imagination into the future and try to figure what sorts of techniques might work were we to try them, and perhaps we might also look to similar past experiences. But I apologize that I do not know really what this sentence means. Either this or something new is what is called  ‘discovering the adjuncts’, which is when we find equivalent cases. The next sentence is then “As the Idea is an interpenetrative multiplicity, these elements must be combined to generate the Idea corresponding to the problem, just as the shades of light were passed through the convergent lens in Bergson’s example.” I am not sure what this means, but it seems one thing is that we generate an Idea that corresponds to the problem in the situation we encounter, and perhaps what is happening is we put together undetermined parts that we encounter in that situation and that we generate through finding equivalent cases. I am not sure how this works in our examples. Maybe when we first try to swim, we have these non-explicit intuitions or vague notions from memory and imagination which would somehow be applicable since they deal with a similar problematic. Perhaps we recall how oars worked when we learned how to row a boat, and we add other vague sorts of notions like observations of water-wheels, experiences while bathing, experimental thoughts about what might work- I have no idea really how this works. Then, maybe all these little undetermined Idea fragments converge as we begin successfully swimming. Or maybe the fragments converge before we successfully swim. Perhaps we have the Idea, like a light bulb going off, so to speak, then we begin successfully swimming. For, SH next says, “Once we have the Idea of the problem, we can attempt to find those singular points of the Idea where it engenders solutions that are different from the present state of affairs”. So maybe the fragments of the Idea converge as we try to adapt to the water, then we see special conceptual elements of the Idea which can generate solutions different from our current struggling not to drown. So maybe some of the singular points would be some notion about propulsion and another about staying afloat rather than sinking, and another about a mechanical rhythm of motion, and another about control of breathing. On the basis of these significant elements of the Idea, we might then figure one or another way to swim, like the different “strokes” one may use. I again am just guessing. The next sentence is: “Deleuze gives the example of Lenin’s thought, which would involve the extraction from the present state of affairs of the Idea of the economic (abstract modes of production), and then the generation of a solution that involves a different | conjunction of singularities (just as selecting a different plane of a conic section will give us a different curve).” So maybe what happened is that Lenin encountered a new sort of situation at the beginnings of the Soviet Union. There was the breakdown of the old system, as new political ideas were influencing the situation and calling for a fundamental rearrangement of social and economic relations. So maybe Lenin gathers Idea fragments somehow from the actual states of affairs and develops a sense of modes of production that could take place, and he figures out ones to actualize since they would work in that situation. Others were possible too, and they would have created a different structure to the society with its own special significant elements (like different shapes from the cone). The next sentence is: “Thus, we move from the present society to the problematic genetic principles that give rise to it, and then back to an alternative solution, or form of society”. So this seems to sum up the steps. First Lenin sees the instable current situation that resulted from demands for changes in economic relations and the breakdown of old relations, which leads him to think theoretically about the changes in modes of production and labor conditions leading up to this situation, which then lends to him devising a socialist society to successfully work with these new conditions. Then SH says, “In a similar way, we do not look at the relations between parts of animals directly, as they may have different functional roles, but instead relate each to the others through the transcendental rules for their production.” I am not sure I get this analogy. Perhaps the idea is that Lenin for example is not so concerned specifically and only with elements of the actual states of affairs, but he is concerned also with more basic relations that could be expressed in a variety of situations. Lastly SH writes, “Thinking thus does not go from proposition to proposition. Rather, thinking becomes creative by tracing back propositions to the non-propositional field of problems that engender them.” So Lenin for example did not reduce his current states of affairs to propositions from which he drew inferences, but rather on the basis of them he thought more deeply about the non-propositional problematic they are bound up in, and in this way he was able to create new social structures that solve the problems of that situation.]

So here we are “moving from one empirical state to another via an Idea” (157). We can also learn just by investigating Ideas themselves. First we note that Deleuze’s notions of problems and solutions do not apply just to matters of knowledge. We return to this point later. We for now might think of how evolution is solving problems through the ‘differenciation’ of organs. For example, the eyes are the solution to the problem of light. Each faculty also can be seen as a solution to problems, [as for example the faculty of speech is a solution to the problem of phonetic combinations:]

We can see that each of the faculties themselves is a solution to a problem [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]:

Take, for example, the linguistic multiplicity, regarded as a virtual system of reciprocal connections between ‘phonemes’ which is incarnated in the actual terms and relations of diverse languages: such a multiplicity renders possible speech as a faculty as well as the transcendent object of that speech, that ‘metalanguage’ which cannot be spoken in the empirical usage of a given language, but must be spoken and can be spoken only in the poetic usage of speech coextensive with virtuality. (DR 193/242–3)

In this case, the faculty of speech is rendered possible by the virtual multiplicity, which gives the rules for actual speech production. If we relate the structure of speech to the Idea, we can see that it contains each of its moments. The phonemes are undetermined, but able to enter into determinable relations. These relations describe the expressiveness of the language. In turn, an individual speech act corresponds to the integration | of this field of expressions. There is a reciprocity here, however, since the multiplicity is constituted in terms of the differential relations between phonemes because it is related to the field of a given language (‘each dialectical problem is duplicated by a symbolic field in which it is expressed’ [DR 179/227]). So the constitution of the faculty of speech (the solution) in turn determines the virtual multiplicity (problem) relative to it. ‘The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior, or transcendent exercise’ (DR 143/180). In this sense, each of the faculties is an Idea as well as a relation to an Idea.
(157-158)

[I do not follow the next paragraph very well. Let me quote it first.]

We have already seen that each faculty communicates violence to the others, to the extent that they communicate in terms of objects that differ in kind. Thus, the object of sensation differed in kind from the object of memory, but yet was able to enter into a relationship with it. What is it that allows these faculties to communicate? Well, once we recognise that each of the faculties has its own transcendent object, because their objects are ‘express[ed] technically in the domain of solutions to which they give rise’ (DR 179/227), it becomes simple to explain how they can communicate with one another, yet still be distinct. On an empirical level, each faculty is distinct, as each has its own set of objects (both transcendent and empirical). While each of the faculties contains a difference between empirical and transcendental exercises, this is only the first degree of difference. The ‘second degree’ of difference is where each of these faculties is in turn the solution to the problem of pure difference [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]:

This harmonious Discord seemed to us to correspond to that Difference which by itself articulates or draws together. There is thus a point at which thinking, speaking, imagining, feeling, etc., are one and the same thing, but that thing affirms only the divergence of the faculties in their transcendent exercise. (DR 193–4/243)

Each faculty is therefore the expression of an Idea, Difference itself being the Idea of an Idea. In this way, each of the faculties is both the same as, and different from, the others (what Deleuze calls para-sense as opposed to common sense, because it escapes the structure of representation). While all of the faculties relate to Ideas, it is still the case that thought is in some sense superior to the other faculties. If we take speech, then we can see that it is constituted in terms of phonemes. The elements that constitute thought, however, are Ideas themselves. Thought is thus the Idea of Ideas, and relates the other faculties. Thus, ‘while the | opposition between thought and all forms of common sense remains stronger than ever, Ideas must be called “differentials” of thought, or the “Unconscious” of pure thought’ (DR 194/244).

[The first idea is that the faculties work discordantly, because their objects are different in kind, but they still must try to communicate despite these differences. We next seem to be building from the point we just made, which is that the faculties are solutions to problems. To this it seems we expand it to say that the faculties’ objects are also Ideas (or maybe this means something else: “each of the faculties has its own transcendent object, because their objects are ‘express[ed] technically in the domain of solutions to which they give rise’”). The next sentence I do not understand: “On an empirical level, each faculty is distinct, as each has its own set of objects (both transcendent and empirical)”. I am not sure what the “on the empirical level” means. So on the empirical level, the understanding and the imagination have their own sets of objects. Then to this we add that each faculty, on the empirical level, also has both transcendent and empirical objects. I am not sure what we would say about the faculties on the transcendental level. Perhaps first we can say this. On the empirical level they have different objects, since for example the concept of a triangle is different in kind from intuitions of triangles or of whatever else. But on the transcendental level they all have the same object, namely a problematic they are all dealing with in their own way and working together to try to solve. Then, regardless of the level, they have both a transcendental and an empirical object. The empirical object would perhaps be the specific object they have of its own kind, and the transcendental object would be the Idea each has of its own kind, which is like its own way to solve the problem. I am just making huge guesses. The next sentence is: “While each of the faculties contains a difference between empirical and transcendental exercises, this is only the first degree of difference”. So we need to distinguish empirical from transcendental exercises, but I do not know how to clearly make that distinction. Perhaps it has to do with whether their objects are empirical or transcendental. I will guess here. Maybe the idea is that insofar as the faculty is dealing with their own sort of solution, they are dealing with the empirical object, and insofar as they are dealing with the problem, they are dealing with the transcendental object. So maybe in a certain situation, our understanding is dealing with trying to find the right concept, and in that sense it’s transcendental object is the problem itself regarded in conceptual terms, and maybe it supplies the notion of triangle, which is a proposed solution and is also its empirical object. Insofar as it is dealing with that problem, its exercise is transcendental and insofar as it is dealing with the solution its exercise is empirical. Again I am just making very huge and most certainly incorrect guesses. We then note that there is a difference between these two exercises, which is the “first degree of difference”. The next sentence is: “The ‘second degree’ of difference is where each of these faculties is in turn the solution to the problem of pure difference [the following up to citation is Deleuze quotation]: This harmonious Discord seemed to us to correspond to that Difference which by itself articulates or draws together. There is thus a point at which thinking, speaking, imagining, feeling, etc., are one and the same thing, but that thing affirms only the divergence of the faculties in their transcendental exercise. (DR 193–4/243)”. I again cannot give an interpretation that I am confident in. But it seems perhaps we can say the following. If we look at a situation where our faculties are working together discordantly, we see they are dealing with a specific problem, which involves the twin exercises (empirical and transcendental) of each faculty that we mentioned above. But why would they need to work together discordantly in the first place? Perhaps this discordant exercise is itself the solution to the problem of dealing with fundamental difference in our world, which lie at the basis of all problematics that our faculties contend with. So the discordant exercise “evolved” you might say as a means for us to be able to learn how to deal with all the very complicated and challenging situations we encounter in the world, just like how the eye specifically evolved to deal with the problem of light. If the faculties only worked concordantly and only communicated the same objects, they would not be equipped with the flexibility needed to deal with our complicated and changing world. The first degree of difference is that between the transcendent and empirical exercises of the faculties, while the second degree of difference is perhaps the more basic difference that the discordantly related faculties are contending with. (Or perhaps it is another difference, like the difference between each faculty or their object, I am not sure). The next sentence is: “Each faculty is therefore the expression of an Idea, Difference itself being the Idea of an Idea”. Maybe the point here is that each faculty is a solution or an Idea, and difference, which is the problem or Idea to which each faculty is dealing, is the Idea of each facultative Idea. Then, “In this way, each of the faculties is both the same as, and different from, the others (what Deleuze calls para-sense as opposed to common sense, because it escapes the structure of representation)”. So each faculty is fundamentally a solution of its own kind, so they are different and they operate discordantly, but since they all are solutions to the same problem/Idea of Difference, they are all the same in this other sense. The final sentences seem fairly straightforward. Since the faculty of thinking deals with Ideas, it has a special place among the faculties, which also deal with Ideas but perhaps in a less explicit way. Those final sentences might be making another point, but I am not sure.]

Citations from:

Somers-Hall, Henry. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2013.

Or if otherwise noted:

DR:
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994/London: Continuum, 2004.

Bergson, Henri (1998), Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Image credits:

Thesis Eleven.
<https://thesiseleven.wordpress.com/philosophy/platos-republic/simile-of-the-divided-line/ >

<https://osopher.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/plato-divided-line.gif?w=504&h=360>.