by Corry Shores
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[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]
Henry Somers-Hall
Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.
Dialectics of Negation and Difference
Part 3: Beyond Representation
Chapter 8: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism
Very Brief Summary:
Deleuze’s response to representational philosophy, and not Hegel’s, is compatible with evolutionary theory. For, Deleuze’s virtual explains novel variation in the organism’s structure, but Hegel’s dialectic does not. Also, Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel exhibit themselves when we relate Hegel’s ideas to evolution: [1] dialectical movement would halt evolutionary movement, [2] Hegel’s logic circles around a center, the sublation of organ and organism, which blocks evolutionary progress, and [3] Hegel’s account misses the ambiguities and variations that are vital to evolution.
Brief Summary:
We will apply Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to representation to evolutionary theory to see which one is more compatible and also to see if Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel still hold: [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic does not provide enough precision for characterizing the world. For Hegel, nature is the one totality and it externalizes into multiplicity, but these form unified systems where parts and their whole are reciprocally determining. Hegel’s dialectic is not temporal, so it does not describe an evolutionary progress through time. The structure of the organism is the reciprocally determining relation between organism and organs, which are opposing dialectical pairs like the one and the many. Individuals and species bear this organ/organism relation too for Hegel. Hegel’s structure of the organism is more closely tied to Cuvier’s anatomy, which is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes. Geoffroy’s homological theory of the unity of composition does not identify anatomical parts on the basis of their functions. Rather, he looks to see if the relations between the parts are isomorphic to a transcendental model which is so abstract that it can actualize in a wide variety of forms, such that a fin can be identified with an arm. This is compatible with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and theory of the virtual, which sees there being a transcendental level that is actualized in various ways. Cuvier’s and Hegel’s theories, as teleological, regard deformations or mutations in negative terms, as degradations of the organism’s structure and thus functioning as well. But evolutionary theory needs a positive view of aberrations. Geoffrey’s and Deleuze’s theories see variation positively, because variations are considered novel actualizations of the virtual model. Thus Deleuze’s response to the problems of representational theories is better than Hegel’s at least with regard to its application in evolutionary theory. We also see that Deleuze’s three criticism’s hold, because [1] Hegel’s movement is a matter of (infinite) representation, but because it cannot explain novel evolutionary variations, there is no real evolutionary movement involved. [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough. Because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.
Summary
Previously we saw that if Hegel wanted to critique Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, he would show how Deleuze’s virtual and actual as contraries dialectically sublate, which collapses the basic distinction of Deleuze’s ontology. However, because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not contraries, such a Hegelian critique would not hold. From a Deleuzean perspective, Hegel’s dialectic could be viewed as a false movement, with Deleuze’s genesis of difference being the real movement. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist.
So in this chapter we will apply their theories to a field outside logic, something that is a real phenomenon in the world, evolution. This is the chapter’s aim, and also to see if in this application Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel hold: [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic provides enough precision for characterizing the world.
We then saw that for Hegel, the Idea is The One Totality and it is self-determining reason. This totality is nature, but it becomes other to itself as externality and multiplicity. Nature is rational. The movement in nature involves the identity of difference and identity. So while there are multiplicities of bodies, they form whole systems. In physics bodies form indifferent relations to one another. In chemistry chemicals combine and transform, but their processes are not self-perpetuation. They are however in organic life. Here we have unity and difference in the form of the unity of the organism being constituted through the differences of its organs, and its processes are self-perpetuated.
Now, Hegel’s ideas on the dialectical movement in nature might suggest a compatibility with evolutionary theory, even though Hegel’s thinking precedes Darwin. However, evolution as a theory precedes Hegel. For Hegel, the dialectical movement in nature is not to be seen as something unfolding in time. So Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not easily seen as compatible with evolutionary theory.
However, we can still examine his philosophy of the structure of the organism, which is based on his dialectic, to see if it is compatible with evolutionary theory. For Hegel, we cannot understand the organism as a mechanically related set of indifferent material parts, because it maintains a characteristic unity and acts spontaneously. Instead the organism is structured on the integration of unity and multiplicity, identity and difference, part and whole, one and many; for, it is organ and organism, with the two mutually dependent on each other [each organ is reciprocally determinate with the others, but also the organism and its organs are reciprocally determining]. The best model for the structure of the organism would be one with the greatest differentiation that is still unified. Plants can be divided and the parts regenerate new plants, so they were not organs so much. Animals go up a scale of differentiation, with humans at the top, because they also have the greatest sense of how each individual is an organ in a social body.
We will compare and contrast by relating Hegel’s and Deleuze’s ideas on the organism’s structure to Cuvier and Geoffrey. Cuvier, like Hegel, thinks that animals should not be classified in terms of differences of degree. Unlike Hegel, he uses a non-unified system, one with four branches. Nonetheless, like Hegel, Cuvier’s system is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes.
Geoffroy, on the contrary, offers a theory of anatomy based on homology. There is a transcendental unity of parts to which actual empirical cases correspond isomorphically. The theory was most demonstrable in application to embryonic forms. Thus both fish and human embryonic skeleton’s share a one-to-one correspondence to a transcendental arrangement of parts. This goes against Cuvier’s anatomy, and Hegel’s as well, because for them, anatomical parts are understood teleologically, in terms of their purposes or functions for the organism. So a fin and arm in Cuvier’s and Hegel’s approaches would not share the same designation, because their functions are different, however in Geoffrey’s they will. The relation between transcendental and empirical resonates with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism.
We then noted that Geoffroy’s homological theory provides an account of the variations in anatomy, which becomes central to the theory of evolution. For Darwin different species have homologous forms on account of common ancestors. And anatomical parts can evolve according to how their functions alter. Cuvier's teleological theory of anatomy is not compatible with evolution, [because were a part’s function to change, it is no longer the same part, and thus such an evolutionary connection cannot be observed using this approach.] Also, Geoffrey’s homology or unity of composition is like Deleuze’s Idea.
We then saw how these theories of the structure of the organism apply in evolutionary theory. To explain evolution, we need an account of accidental, contingent variations. These can be seen either positively or negatively. A theory of anatomy like Cuvier’s or Hegel’s is teleological, meaning that it identifies anatomical parts in terms of their functionality, their purpose in the function of the organism. This means that if there were to be a deviation, a slight mutation, then this changes the structure of the organism’s functioning and thus degrades its functioning. Geoffrey’s homological theory of anatomy does not regard anatomical parts in terms of their purposes but rather in terms of how their interrelations correspond isomorphically to an abstract or transcendental model. This means that parts can change both form and function so long as their structural relations match the mold. A deformity then is the model expressing itself in another way, so this would be a positive account of variation rather than a negative one. This notion of homologous variation is central to evolution which is a process of the natural selection from a pool of variations.
So Deleuze’s ideas are more compatible than Hegel’s for explaining evolution. Deleuze’s three criticisms also hold in this context of evolution. [1] Hegel’s movement is created with words and representations, so nothing follows. [The movement of evolution cannot be explained with the infinite representation of the contraries organ and organism, individual and species being thought together.] [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough. [Because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.]
Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.
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