Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. summary

by Corry Shores
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[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
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[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Very, Very, Very  Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s subrepresentational self-differentiation is superior to Hegel’s infinite representational self-differentiation in solving the problems that self-identity causes in Kant’s and Aristotle’s (likewise Russell’s) representational systems.

 

Very, Very Brief Summary:

Self-identity in representational systems leads to problems in explaining the highest part, the lowest part, and the compositional principle of Kant’s, Aristotle’s (and Russell’s) representational systems. Hegel’s and Deleuze’s principles  of self-difference can solve them. Hegel’s productive self-contradiction and sublation suffices logically but not in application to evolution. Deleuze’s non-oppositional subrepresentational difference however does suffice in this regard.

Very Brief Summary:

A strict view of logical identity leads to problems in Kant’s and Aristotle’s representational systems. The unities of and between concept and intuition that enable our subject-predicate judgments of the world for Kant are based on the unity of a transcendental self. But Sartre shows this is merely a convenient assumption, because for him the unity of consciousness of the object is based on the continuous unity of the object’s givenness. For Deleuze the grounds for our judgments are based on neither the unity of the subject, of the concept, nor of the object, but rather on the unity of incompossible undetermined predicates implying a subject with virtual variations. As it is made of the integration of incompossibilities, it lacks the coherence of self-unity necessary for representation. Another question regards the representational nature of the categories we use for judgment. Aristotle and Russell have hierarchies, but because they exclude self-reference and excluded middle, the very foundations (largest parts), compositions of individuals (smallest parts), and method of composition (division/class inclusion) of their representational systems are problematic and unrepresentable within the systems themselves. Hegel and Deleuze have different ways of solving this by incorporating self-difference into their systems. Hegel’s productive self-opposition creates a genetic line of sublated categories. Deleuze’s Bergsonian continuously integrated heterogeneous multiplicity allows a plurality of differentially related incompossible actualizations to coexist virtually. Hegel’s and Deleuze’s interpretations of differential calculus show us that for Hegel there are ultimately determinate parts that are not finite but make finite values when differentially related; where for Deleuze there are ultimate undetermined parts that are nonetheless determinable as extensive finite values when differentially related. For Hegel the unconditioned (dialectic) and the conditioned (categories it creates) are on the same ontological plane, but for Deleuze the unconditioned (genesis of virtual differentials) and the conditioned (actualization of extensities) are on two different planes, the virtual and the actual, so they cannot succumb to Hegel’s system by being sublated. However, Hegel’s dialectic can be seen within Deleuze’s system as a secondary movement to the genesis of difference. Hegel’s theory cannot explain the creation of variation needed in evolutionary theory, but Deleuze’s can.

Brief Summary:

Deleuze and Hegel offer solutions to the problems of representational systems, which are philosophical systems based on self-unity, identity, and the law of excluded middle. For Kant, our judgments of things have a subject-predicate structure that is parallel to the subject-predicate structure of concepts and intuitive objects (having the subject-property structure). What unifies each themselves and all with each other is the a priori unity of a transcendental self. Sartre thinks the unity of objects precedes that of the self. Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism posits neither the unity of the self nor of the object; things obtain something like a subject-predicate form from incompossibilities being various and indeterminate, but the thing taking these possible predicates is the subject of the judgments. A strict adherence to the principle of identity and the law of excluded middle causes problems in Aristotle’s and Russell’s logical systems of classification. For Aristotle, the highest genus is being or unity. But, as it has no genus above it, it cannot be defined according to the structure of this system of division (the problem of the large) and yet all beings under it are characterized by this unrepresentable classification. The species gives the essence, and under the species is the individual, which is distinguished from other individuals not by essential but by accidental traits. But in moments of change, something with one essence has contradictory accidents, and also we don’t know until after the change what was essential and what was accidental. So the individual cannot be represented properly in this system (the problem of the small). Also there are cases in the natural world, ring species, which cannot be classified using Aristotle’s system of division (the problem of division). Russell also has the problem of the large. He must ban self-reference from his system of set classifications so to avoid the paradox of the set of all non-self-including sets. Yet self-reference is needed to establish identity. Hegel’s dialectic and Deleuze’s philosophy of difference are competing solutions to these problems with representational systems. Deleuze’s system is based on Bergson’s continuously integrated heterogeneous multiplicity. We can understand it using Riemann topographical space. Deleuze’s virtual/actual relation is like topographical phase space portraits, where we can see all possible actual ways a system can behave. All the incompossible actualizations are differentially related yet are continuously integrated. Hegel’s internal dialectic makes use of productive contradiction: from out of a concept arises its contradiction, and from out of that opposition arises a new concept not implied in the first ones. So contraries are located within one another, and there is a genetic chain of production of the categories of understanding. Finite thought like that used in Kant’s and Aristotle’s systems would find such contradiction unthinkable, but Hegel’s infinite thought can think these contradictions. Hegel’s and Deleuze’s interpretations of the differential calculus help us elaborate their positions. For Hegel, the differential is a relation between vanishing values, they are caught in the act of the sublation of the finite and infinite: the values are vanishing and hence are not finite, but their differential ratio is a finite value; and each is constitutive of the other. For Deleuze, the differential values are not determinate, yet they are determinable in differential relation to one another. For, they are subrepresentational, meaning that they are on a level where parts are not externally exclusive like in extensity, so they are not self-identifiable. The important distinction is that for Hegel the terms are representable and determinate, but are only thinkable using infinite thought. In examining Kant’s antimony of the beginning or beginningless of the world, we see that for Kant, we have this antinomy because we mistakenly think the unconditioned is among the conditioned, when in fact it is noumenal; for Hegel the antinomy indicates the sublation of finite (the necessity for a limit) and infinite (the necessity for all limits to be surpassed), and for him the conditioned and unconditioned are on the same level; yet for Deleuze, the conditioned (actual) is on a different level than the unconditioned (virtual) but the virtual is not outside our knowledge, rather it is only knowable outside representational thinking. Hegel could subsume Deleuze’s virtual and actual by sublating them, but that would fail since they are two tendencies of the real and are not really opposites. Deleuze could subsume Hegel’s dialectic by saying it is a secondary movement to genesis of pure difference that happens on the level of actuality and representation. But Hegel could say that from the perspective of logic there is no such thing as Deleuze’s difference. So we test them by seeing how their theories of the composition of the organism suffice in evolutionary theory. Hegel is like Cuvier in thinking that the organism’s parts are matters of how they function in service of the whole (teleological); organ and organism, individual and species are like sublated opposing terms. But this means that deformations are deteriorations in structure and thus cause deficiencies in functionality. But evolutionary theory depends on a positive account of anatomical variations; natural selection needs to pick the best from a variety of mutations. Geoffroy’ s and Deleuze’s view sees variations as different actualizations of a transcendental model, so their view is more compatible with evolutionary theory. Because Hegel’s anatomy is representational, we can see one superiority in Deleuze’s subrepresentational response to representational philosophies as opposed to Hegel’s infinite representational approach.

 

Summary

Henry Somers-Hall will examine how Deleuze and Hegel respond to the shared problematic of representation in philosophy. He then pits them against one another, and applies them to the role of the structure of the organism in evolution, to evaluate them with respect to one another.

 

In the first part, we begin by seeing how the history of philosophy contains tendencies toward building theories and systems on the basis of representation. This means that they make use of principles of self-unity, identity, and the law of excluded middle. There are problems with these approaches. Deleuze and Hegel offer solutions. There are two cases under investigation. The first is the transcendental grounds of our knowledge, specifically, what principle allows us to make judgments of the world? Kant offers a representational theory. It is representational, because it is based on a self-identical a priori unified self that is represented in all inner acts, in their accompanying ‘I think’. This unity unifies the empirical world into things with a subject-property structure, it unifies our concepts into subject-predicate structure, and it unifies our concepts and our intuitions into representable judgments with the subject-predicate structure. Sartre’s critical stance would say that it is really the unity of objects, and not subjects, that comes first and the unity of the self comes secondly. For Deleuze, a unity neither of consciousness, of self, nor of the objects, is what grounds our subject-predicate knowledge of things. Rather, each moment, events can go many different ways, so the same subject now has many various undetermined predicates, and they are incompossible. Because they are contradictory, the predication of a subject is not representable, even though the subject-predicate structure is there. This is Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism. Another case of representation in the history of philosophy is the use of the principle of identity and excluded middle in Aristotle’s and Russell’s theories of classification. For Aristotle, we define species on the basis of their differences. But the highest genus, being or unity, has nothing to differentiate from, no genus above it or species beside it, so it is indeterminate. However, it is the basic principle saying that all beings are self-unified and have identities (and thus also the system is thoroughly representational). The very representational basis of his system is not itself representational. Russell’s theory of class inclusion is also representational. Things are strictly categorized and defined by their groupings. There cannot be contradiction in the system, or instances when something’s identity contradicts its classification. So it cannot have the paradoxical class of all non-self-inclusive classes. Such a class is meaningless, it cannot be represented in the system. And yet, such a class is based on the same notion of inclusion as all the others. Hence class inclusion, as a universal concept that forms the basis of all instances of classification in his system, is not representable in this system. So somehow the nature of inclusion for each level is distinguishable, when in fact it is the same sort of inclusion each time. Also, identities and essences are representable, but moments of self-contradiction do not fit into such representable systems. This means that when something is changing, we cannot represent what is happening in the phase of transition when contradictory properties are coincident (like being both wood and fire in the action of ignition). Hegel’s solution is to make contradiction productive, using internal dialectic, where some concept brings about its own self-contradiction, and out of it comes a new concept not implied in the first. For Deleuze, this solution still has the problems of representation, as we will later see. Deleuze’s solution is a non-oppositional concept of difference.

 

 

In the second part, we formulate Deleuze’s and Hegel’s alternate proposals. Deleuze’s is based on Bergson’s duration, which is a continuously-integrated heterogeneous multiplicity, unlike the discrete multiplicity of externally related extensive parts characterizing homogeneous space. Bergson’s heterogeneous multiplicity better explains living systems.

Deleuze then uses Bergson’s continuously integrated heterogeneous multiplicity to characterize the Idea, the problem, and the concept. In all cases, they are terrains of virtual differential incompossibly-actualizeable paths of developmental explication. We can understand them with the model of topographical phase space portraits. They indicate all the tendencies for a system’s development using terrain features. This describes the system’s behavior on a whole, but in each instantiation only one possible line of development indicated in the map is actualized, because all the lines are incompossible yet coincident in this virtual form. They explicate into extensity. And any one actualization implicates the totality of the whole ‘problematic’.

Hegel’s dialectical movement brings contraries within one another, and also unites them on the basis of their genetic productions of one another. This allows him to go beyond Kant’s finite thought, and also to have totality to his system and an account of change, which is lacking in Aristotle’s system.  Kant cannot go beyond finite thought, because it cannot think contraries together, like Hegel’s infinite thought can. And because Hegel’s concepts are united genetically, differences are inherently linked, and thus he can have totality to a system of differences without the need of some generic category to encompass them all, which was a source of a problem for Aristotle. Rather, their genetic process of unfolding is the glue uniting the differences. Thus Hegel can also explain the process of change, as he has accounted for the process that generates and unites the diverse contradictory changes when something alters.

 

Now in this final part, we examine how Deleuze and Hegel propose theories that try to overcome the problems of representational theories like the ones we saw in the first part, and we pit the theories against one another and apply them to evolution so to better evaluation them. First we examined how Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to classical representationalist philosophical can be compared on the basis of their different interpretations of differential calculus and Kant’s antinomies. We found that for Deleuze we have an unconditioned ground of sensible and intelligible things that is subrepresentational, and for Hegel it is representable, using infinite thought. The calculus differential determines the varying relation between variables that vary with respect to one another. Leibniz saw it as the relation between infinitesimal magnitudes but there are formal problems with this. Newton saw it in terms of vanishing values. Hegel regards the vanishing values as being determinate values that combine finite and infinite, and being and nothingness. This contradiction is only thinkable with infinite thought. For Deleuze the terms of the differential relation are undetermined and subrepresentational, but they are determinable in relation to one another and are the unconditioned condition of conditioned actual determinations. Kant thinks we arrive at antinomous theories regarding whether there is a temporal beginning to the world because our understanding is unable to grasp the unconditioned, the thing in itself, with its categories. Hegel thinks the antinomies go together. Together they express the genuine infinite, because they affirm both that there is a limit and also that it is surpassed. For Hegel the unconditioned, the dialectical contradiction, is representable with infinite thought. Deleuze thinks that the unconditioned is thinkable but not using representational thought but rather using the logic of incompossibility.

We then saw how Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is more resilient to attack than Hegel’s, when both are pitted against one another. If Hegel wanted to critique Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, he would show how Deleuze’s virtual and actual as contraries dialectically sublate, which collapses the basic distinction of Deleuze’s ontology. However, because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not contraries, such a Hegelian critique would not hold. From a Deleuzean perspective, Hegel’s dialectic could be viewed as a false movement, with Deleuze’s genesis of difference being the real movement. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist.

So we then applied Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to representation to evolutionary theory to see which one is more compatible and also to see if Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel still hold: [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic does not provide enough precision for characterizing the world. For Hegel, nature is the one totality and it externalizes into multiplicity, but these form unified systems where parts and their whole are reciprocally determining. Hegel’s dialectic is  not temporal, so it does not describe an evolutionary progress through time. The structure of the organism is the reciprocally determining relation between organism and organs, which are opposing dialectical pairs like the one and the many. Individuals and species bear this organ/organism relation too for Hegel. Hegel’s structure of the organism is more closely tied to Cuvier’s anatomy, which is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes. Geoffroy’s homological theory of the unity of composition does not identify anatomical parts on the basis of their functions. Rather, he looks to see if the relations between the parts are isomorphic to a transcendental model which is so abstract that it can actualize in a wide variety of forms, such that a fin can be identified with an arm. This is compatible with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and theory of the virtual, which sees there being a transcendental level that is actualized in various ways. Cuvier’s and Hegel’s theories, as teleological, regard deformations or mutations in negative terms, as degradations of the organism’s structure and thus functioning as well. But evolutionary theory needs a positive view of aberrations. Geoffrey’s and Deleuze’s theories see variation positively, because variations are considered novel actualizations of the virtual model. Thus Deleuze’s response to the problems of representational theories is better than Hegel’s at least with regard to its application in evolutionary theory. We also see that Deleuze’s three criticism’s hold, because [1] Hegel’s movement is a matter of (infinite) representation, but because it cannot explain novel evolutionary variations, there is no real evolutionary movement involved. [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough. Because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Conclusion. Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Conclusion’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Conclusion

Very Brief Summary:

We have seen how Deleuze and Hegel respond to the problems of representational systems, namely, Aristotle’s and Kant’s. They do so with a new understanding of difference. For Hegel it is sublating oppositions; for Deleuze it is integrative non-oppositional difference. We might further wonder about anti-representationalism in later phenomenology and Sartre.

Brief Summary:

Deleuze and Hegel are both in the post-Kantian tradition and the both respond to the problem of representational systems such as Kant’s and Aristotle’s (along with Russell). The question is primarily, how do the philosophies treat the relation between identity and difference? The classical representational systems see difference subordinated to identity. Hegel sees them as contrary but dialectically combinable, and Deleuze subordinates identity to difference. And we ask is, how do we obtain the categories of representational thought used for judging? Aristotle and Kant obtain them through classic representational logic, Hegel through infinite thought/representation, and Deleuze through sub representation. For Aristotle, we obtain the categories for beings (on the basis of which we judge what things are and make propositional judgments about the world) though division from highest to lowest. For Kant, we use a transcendental deduction, based on the workings and categories of formal logic, to obtain the categories of judgment.  For Hegel we obtain the categories through the dialectical movement. For Deleuze identities that our judgment uses are generated on a subrepresentational level through indefinite yet determinable differences that are virtual yet are given immediately in empirical experience. The problem in Aristotle’s system was defining the highest category, explaining the lowest level individual’s accidental changes, and finding a rigorous principle for division (as certain cases are resistant to divisional categorization). For Hegel, the dialectic explains the highest category as the beginning place of the genetic sequence of new categories. The individual’s becoming already combines essence and appearing. And division is a matter of the self-given logic of dialectical self-contradiction. For Deleuze the categories of our understanding would be generated on the level of representational actuality. As there are no identities on the virtual level, no exclusive oppositional differences, we do not have the problems of the highest, lowest, and of division. These obtain only when difference takes on traits of identity in actuality that we have these problems. Hegel would critique Deleuze by saying that his actual and virtual dialectically sublate, collapses the basic ontological distinction in Deleuze’s theory. But Deleuze would respond that it is not using an oppositional sense for the virtual and actual, but they are not opposed. Deleuze’s critique of Hegel is that infinite thought is still representational and thus does no give us access to level of pure differential genesis, like we see in evolution. Hence we saw how Deleuze’s philosophy better explains the anatomical principles involved in evolution than Hegel’s does. We  might push this investigation further. We might wonder if Deleuze’s critique of phenomenology as being based on the representational level holds, when Merleau-Ponty looks to a prerepresentational level as the basis of experience. We  might also pursue Sartre’s view that there is representation but existence always escapes it.

 

Summary

Hegel’s position in Deleuze’s philosophy is anomalous. Sartre, Bergson, and Kant play important roles in Deleuze’s Koalitionssystem. Yet

While Hegel remains largely absent from this list, Hegel develops much the same problematic as Deleuze, and Deleuze, in developing his own solution to what he terms "representation," engages directly with structural elements in Hegel's own thought. (239)

Both Hegel and Deleuze are situated within the history of post-Kantian philosophy. In this final section Somers-Hall (SH) will “draw together the results of our discussion and point toward some of the questions this work leaves unanswered.” (239)

[1] We find the problems of representation when analyzing it. We find internal tensions in its organizational structure. The problem of the large for Aristotle is defining “an overarching whole when definition only comes about through division, within the structure of judgment” (239) The problem of the small is relating “the transient and singular determinations of the sensible to the purely universal terms of the structure of judgment.” (239) [because judgment is in terms of subject predicate.] There is also the problem of establishing a rigorous principle of division in the system of classification. These limitations are in any “system that relies on judgment and its concomitant subordination of difference to identity.” (239) So we were not interested in the products of representation but rather with the categories of representational thought [for, they are the source of our problems.]

As we saw in chapter 7, for instance, the notion of the inverted world emerges for Hegel due to the Understanding's inability to think through the unity of opposites. For Deleuze, it is a matter of developing a new mode of thinking that goes beyond the traditional image of thought. (240)

 

The metaphysics in Deleuze’s early and later works both begin with a critique of representation. The rhizome is an alternative to the binary logic of Aristotle’s divisions. Hegel rejects finite thought/representation in favor of infinite thought.

Kant, Hegel, and Deleuze all see the problems with representation and “in each of these cases their responses lead not to a straightforward rejection of representation but to a desire to incorporate representation into a broader schema that will fundamentally alter its significance.” (240) Hegel infinitizes judgment’s structure.

But for Deleuze, “judgment is to be supplemented by a dimension of virtuality”. (241) We cannot solve the problem of judgment on its own basis; we need rather to introduce extrinsic criteria for judging representation, and here is where Hegel and Deleuze diverge.

For Hegel, this involves a claim that judgment is taken as the primary moment of representation only through a failure to recognize the function of reason, while Deleuze argues for the need to invert the traditional hierarchy of identity and difference. A schism thus emerges between the immanent problematic from which these philosophies emerge and the diagnosis of the cause of this problematic, which drives their positive accounts. (241)

For Hegel, “the categories of judgment could only be properly developed by a process of showing how these categories immanently sublated themselves. He achieves this by elevating contradiction to the highest principle of his system.” (241) By introducing productive contradiction into the system, not only is the highest genus no longer a problem, it is “motor that drives the dialectic forward.” (241) The problem of the small involved a problem with reconciling an individual’s continuously changing appearance with its essence, but Hegel solves this “by a reconception of appearance as the movement of essence itself, which attempts to reconcile the ontological split between the two categories”. (241) For Hegel, division is an immanent movement where contradictions flow from prior terms, so there is no need to introduce and external principle to govern it. Hegel combines judgments of identity and judgments of difference, as seen in speculative propositions (God is being), where infinite thought is needed to think them together. “Hegel therefore resolves the problem of identity and difference by attempting to show that at the limit of contradiction, identity and difference mutually imply one another.” (242)

Deleuze also aims to “overturn the structure of judgment and with it the set of problems outlined above.” (242) For Deleuze, there is a domain of representation, pure actuality. This “representational actuality requires the supplement of a nonrepresentational moment, the virtual.” (242) “The limitations of judgment therefore point to the necessity of a moment that cannot be captured by the structure of judgment” (242) [Judgment is based on identities and subject-predicate form. But the genesis of what is being judged is not understandable under this form of judgment]. “Without a recognition of a moment outside of representation, we are forced to conceive of difference in terms of the negation of a certain structure of judgment, for instance, rather than as a positive term in its own right.” (242) [The problems of the large and the small result from difference understood negatively, thus] “The moment of virtuality thus allows us to understand why representation cannot solve the problems of the Large and the Small”. (242) Also, “representation's genetic conditions are subrepresentational,” so we would not be able to specify a principle of division for it, because that would involve representational structures, negative difference, etc. But “Rather than reconciling these two moments on the same ontological plane through a notion of contradiction, however, Deleuze separates difference and identity by making difference a transcendental condition of identity itself. Identity is grounded in the nonidentical.” (242)

But Hegel and Deleuze could on the basis of their own theories critique one another. Even though Hegel is not using finite representation, he is using infinite representation, which still prioritizes identity, because it depends on primary unity. Deleuze needs to show that the prioritization of identity is responsible for the problems of representation. There are also objections to Deleuze form Hegel’s perspective. If ‘Deleuze’s transcendental mirrors the structure of the empirical, it is redundant and has no explanatory value, but if it is opposed, it will not provide a true explanation. For Deleuze, the problem with this critique is that it reduces difference to a form of opposition.

If difference is not taken to the extreme of opposition, it provides the possibility of a transcendental explanation that is different in kind from the empirical without falling into pure inversion. (242)

 

We see their divergences when we turn to the empirical. For Hegel the organism is unified, it is a “whole grounded in the reciprocal determination of the parts. The relation of the parts to one another is in tum grounded in the purposive nature of the whole.” (242) But then

the failure of a part to fulfill its function can only be understood negatively, as a lack. Hegel takes up Cuvier's account of the organism, and it is this implication that led Cuvier to reject the idea of the transformation of species. Hegel's speculative logic therefore implies a model of the organism as incapable of evolving. (242)

Deleuze’s support for Geoffrey’s transcendental anatomy, however, lends  more to Darwin’s evolutionary theory.

It is here, therefore, in the application of these two images of thought to the world, that we find a criterion for determining the adequacy of the two approaches. The ultimate question is how well each image traces the articulations of the world, and on this point, Deleuze's philosophy surpasses that of Hegel. While Hegel searches for reason in nature, he fails to realize that the moment of contingency is not the impotence of nature but, precisely, its power. (243)

Deleuze rejects Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, but does Deleuze see phenomenology as a form of representation or a response to it? (244) Heidegger’s notion of being seems not not be representational, because it cannot be conceived of as an entity. And the question of representation is at the heart of later phenomenology.

Merleau-Ponty's working notes for his unfinished Visible and the Invisible provide a series of critiques that could have been proposed by Deleuze himself. Merleau-Ponty writes, for instance, of Husserl's eidetic reduction that it "moves from one intelligible nucleus to the next in a way that is not belied by experience but gives us only its universal contours. It therefore by principle leaves untouched the twofold problem of the genesis of the existent world and of the genesis of the idealization performed by reflection." Merleau-Ponty's point is that Husserl's search for the intelligible nuclei of experience, in the form of essences, begins at too advanced a stratum of constitution and therefore is incapable of grounding an enquiry into the genesis of these intelligible moments itself. It fails even as a propaedeutic to a proper study of experience. (244)

Merleau-Ponty sees two intertwined problems: “the problem of the emergence of the existent world and the problem of the emergence of reflection itself”. (244) Deleuze solves this problem by turning to “a moment prior to the constitution of the subject and the object: a field of pure difference from which both representation and that which is to be represented emerge.” (244) So in Logic of Sense Deleuze describes the twofold genesis as “sense as sensation and sense as the meaning of sensation.” (244) Merleau-Ponty seeks a phenomenal relation to the world that precedes the foundations of judgment, which are the universal and the particular; he seeks the moment where Deleuze’s two senses are intertwined. This is the flesh, which has a prerepresentational logic. [Phenomenology presupposes there is a first doctrine of experience (an experience can be grounded in a description by means of the method of epoche). However, phenomenology needs art in order to more properly perform the epoche (since in art we are given not just phenomenal experience but an inside look at its workings). But this means that phenomenology alone cannot reach that core of differentiation at the heart of experience. But it could be that the Urdoxa can given an account of the genesis of representation.]

Deleuze's criticisms in What Is Philosophy, that his phenomenology simply presupposes an Urdoxa of lived experience, and that it is parasitic on art in order to carry the epoche into this new domain, amount once again to the claim that phenomenology is unable to truly think the preindividual and to develop a pure concept of difference. Neither of these criticisms rests on the immanent 'catastrophes' of representation themselves, however, but instead on Deleuze's diagnosis of the source of these catastrophes. The question is therefore still open as to whether the Urdoxai of phenomenology can provide the ground for an account of the genesis of representation or occur only when its fundamental structures have already crystallized. (244)

We noted how Deleuze thinks the Sartrean project fails [because he still grounds experience in consciousness even if without a unified transcendental ego.] Also, like how Hegel does, Sartre develops his critique of representation by “refusing the possibility of a transcendental ground as an explanatory principle of the empirical”. (245) For Sartre, transcendental principles cannot explain particular events in the world. In his ontology there are two incommunicable levels: knowledge and being. Even though we need representation and judgment to relate to the world, there are still catastrophes of representation.

The reflexive relation of the self leads not to understanding, but to bad faith. The other appears to us not as an object of knowledge but precisely as a moment of the disruption of our representations, the locus of a field of distances that are not our own. (245)

So Hegel offered a model of infinite representation, and Deleuze offers the model of the nonrepresentational thought. Sartre offers an option between them: thinking is inherently tied to representation, but existence escapes representation at every turn.”  (246) [Deleuze has a philosophy of immanence where transcendental is immanent to empirical, but it is not representation which is the basis for this connection (the structure of judgment being the same on both levels like Kant) but rather there is a nonrepresentational incompossible logic of virtual explicating into actual. But perhaps we still need nonrepresentation to guarantee this connection. This might be what Somers-Hall is saying in the following:]

Sartre's philosophy is therefore in line with Nietzsche's assertion that "we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar." The grammar of representation remains, but without the benevolence of God to guarantee its application to the world, faith in it is lost. For Sartre, therefore, the philosophy of immanence, as exemplified by Deleuze, would instead be a return to the idea of such a benevolent God, albeit a nonrepresentational God. Sartre's attempt to produce a consistent atheism thus leads to a philosophy that revels in the catastrophes of representation. (246)

 

But perhaps there is yet another response to representation.

Recognizing the centrality of the question of judgment gives us the means to relate such disparate thinkers as Hegel and Deleuze, by tracing the genesis of their philosophies as responses to representation. While the catastrophes of representation emerge immanently, the diagnosis of the causes of these catastrophes varies. Deleuze provides a response that opens up a series of difficulties in Hegel's philosophy. While Hegel might succumb to these difficulties, it is not at all clear whether Deleuze provides the only possible response to representation. The question is still open, therefore, whether an alternative diagnosis of the problem of representation can be given. (246)

 

 

 

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Beyond Representation.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Very, Very Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s and Hegel’s interpretations of differential calculus tell us that for Deleuze the given world is made of indefinite yet reciprocally determinable parts and also that there is another transcendental plane, and for Hegel it is a matter of determinate parts and a single plane.  Hegel goes beyond representational systems with his dialectic, but it is reducible within Deleuze’s philosophy and it is inadequate in application to evolution. Deleuze’s approach can subsume dialectic and also it better explains the genesis of variation in evolution.


Very Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s and Hegel’s alternative solutions to problems in classical representationalist systems can be compared first by seeing their interpretations of the calculus, next by seeing how successfully one theory can subsume the other, and finally by applying theories to anatomy’s role in evolutionary theory to see which one is more compatible with it. We find that Deleuze’s calculus differential reveals that for Deleuze there are two onological planes, virtual and actual, but for Hegel infinite thought keeps the dialectical process and its products on the same level. We also see that basic things in the given world for Deleuze are determinable in differential relations but indeterminate on their own, where for Hegel they are determinate on their own. Because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are not opposites, they cannot be subsumed into Hegel’s system through sublation; however Hegel’s dialectical movement can be seen as a false secondary movement to Deleuze’s genesis of difference. We also find that Deleuze’s theory of anatomy better explains variations that evolution requires, but Hegel’s teleological account does not.

Brief Summary:

Deleuze and Hegel offer theories that respond to the problems of representation. We can better make a comparison by first seeing their different interpretations of differential calculus. Hegel regards the differentials as vanishing values which are determinate values that combine finite and infinite, and being and nothingness. This contradiction is only thinkable with infinite thought. For Deleuze the terms of the differential relation are undetermined and subrepresentational, but they are determinable in relation to one another and are the unconditioned condition of all (conditioned) actual determinations. Kant has an antimony about whether or not the world has a finite beginning. For him, the unconditioned cannot be in the series of moments of the world; it is rather outside it as the thing-in-itself. For Hegel, the antinomy shows the sublation of finite and infinite, because one side argues that there must be a limit and the other side argues every limit is surpassed. For Hegel, the unconditioned, the dialectic, is in fact on the same ontological plane as the conditioned. For Deleuze, the unconditioned is on a different plane, the transcendental, but unlike for Kant, Deleuze thinks it is not indeterminable, because it is determinable as differential relations. If Hegel were to critique Deleuze, he would try to collapse Deleuze’s virtual/actual distinction on which Deleuze’s anti-Hegelian ontology is built. But since virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not opposites, such a critique would not hold. However, Deleuze could include Hegel’s dialectic into his own philosophy by seeing it as a false movement that is secondary to the real movement, the genesis of difference. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist. So we find a common application, the structure of the organism and its role in evolution, to compare them. Deleuze’s response to representational philosophy, and not Hegel’s, is compatible with evolutionary theory. For, Deleuze’s virtual explains novel variation in the organism’s structure, but Hegel’s dialectic does not. Also, Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel exhibit themselves when we relate Hegel’s ideas to evolution: [1] dialectical movement would halt evolutionary movement, [2] Hegel’s logic circles around a center, the sublation of organ and organism, which blocks evolutionary progress, and [3] Hegel’s account misses the ambiguities and variations that are vital to evolution.

 

Summary

In the previous part we saw how Deleuze and Hegel propose alternative theories to overcome problems in the representational systems of Aristotle, Kant, and Russell. Both proposals revolve around a concept of unifying difference. Deleuze takes up Bergson’s continuously-integrated heterogeneous multiplicity, which considers terms as intrinsically and inseparably related. Hegel’s dialectic also conceives of terms being both different yet intrinsically and inseparably related, but in his case because of a process of productive negation that unites the terms in their genetic sequence.

Now in this final part, we examine how Deleuze and Hegel propose theories that try to overcome the problems of representational theories like the ones we saw in the first part, and we pit the theories against one another and apply them to evolution so to better evaluation them. First we examined how Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to classical representationalist philosophical can be compared on the basis of their different interpretations of differential calculus and Kant’s antinomies. We found that for Deleuze we have an unconditioned ground of sensible and intelligible things that is subrepresentational, and for Hegel it is representable, using infinite thought. The calculus differential determines the varying relation between variables that vary with respect to one another. Leibniz saw it as the relation between infinitesimal magnitudes but there are formal problems with this. Newton saw it in terms of vanishing values. Hegel regards the vanishing values as being determinate values that combine finite and infinite, and being and nothingness. This contradiction is only thinkable with infinite thought. For Deleuze the terms of the differential relation are undetermined and subrepresentational, but they are determinable in relation to one another and are the unconditioned condition of conditioned actual determinations. Kant thinks we arrive at antinomous theories regarding whether there is a temporal beginning to the world because our understanding is unable to grasp the unconditioned, the thing in itself, with its categories. Hegel thinks the antinomies go together. Together they express the genuine infinite, because they affirm both that there is a limit and also that it is surpassed. For Hegel the unconditioned, the dialectical contradiction, is representable with infinite thought. Deleuze thinks that the unconditioned is thinkable but not using representational thought but rather using the logic of incompossibility.

We then saw how Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is more resilient to attack than Hegel’s, when both are pitted against one another. If Hegel wanted to critique Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, he would show how Deleuze’s virtual and actual as contraries dialectically sublate, which collapses the basic distinction of Deleuze’s ontology. However, because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not contraries, such a Hegelian critique would not hold. From a Deleuzean perspective, Hegel’s dialectic could be viewed as a false movement, with Deleuze’s genesis of difference being the real movement. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist.

So we then applied Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to representation to evolutionary theory to see which one is more compatible and also to see if Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel still hold: [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic does not provide enough precision for characterizing the world. For Hegel, nature is the one totality and it externalizes into multiplicity, but these form unified systems where parts and their whole are reciprocally determining. Hegel’s dialectic is  not temporal, so it does not describe an evolutionary progress through time. The structure of the organism is the reciprocally determining relation between organism and organs, which are opposing dialectical pairs like the one and the many. Individuals and species bear this organ/organism relation too for Hegel. Hegel’s structure of the organism is more closely tied to Cuvier’s anatomy, which is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes. Geoffroy’s homological theory of the unity of composition does not identify anatomical parts on the basis of their functions. Rather, he looks to see if the relations between the parts are isomorphic to a transcendental model which is so abstract that it can actualize in a wide variety of forms, such that a fin can be identified with an arm. This is compatible with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and theory of the virtual, which sees there being a transcendental level that is actualized in various ways. Cuvier’s and Hegel’s theories, as teleological, regard deformations or mutations in negative terms, as degradations of the organism’s structure and thus functioning as well. But evolutionary theory needs a positive view of aberrations. Geoffrey’s and Deleuze’s theories see variation positively, because variations are considered novel actualizations of the virtual model. Thus Deleuze’s response to the problems of representational theories is better than Hegel’s at least with regard to its application in evolutionary theory. We also see that Deleuze’s three criticism’s hold, because [1] Hegel’s movement is a matter of (infinite) representation, but because it cannot explain novel evolutionary variations, there is no real evolutionary movement involved. [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough. Because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism.’ summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 8: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Very Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s response to representational philosophy, and not Hegel’s, is compatible with evolutionary theory. For, Deleuze’s virtual explains novel variation in the organism’s structure, but Hegel’s dialectic does not. Also, Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel exhibit themselves when we relate Hegel’s ideas to evolution: [1] dialectical movement would halt evolutionary movement, [2] Hegel’s logic circles around a center, the sublation of organ and organism, which blocks evolutionary progress, and [3] Hegel’s account misses the ambiguities and variations that are vital to evolution.

Brief Summary:

We will apply Deleuze’s and Hegel’s responses to representation to evolutionary theory to see which one is more compatible and also to see if Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel still hold: [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic does not provide enough precision for characterizing the world. For Hegel, nature is the one totality and it externalizes into multiplicity, but these form unified systems where parts and their whole are reciprocally determining. Hegel’s dialectic is  not temporal, so it does not describe an evolutionary progress through time. The structure of the organism is the reciprocally determining relation between organism and organs, which are opposing dialectical pairs like the one and the many. Individuals and species bear this organ/organism relation too for Hegel. Hegel’s structure of the organism is more closely tied to Cuvier’s anatomy, which is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes. Geoffroy’s homological theory of the unity of composition does not identify anatomical parts on the basis of their functions. Rather, he looks to see if the relations between the parts are isomorphic to a transcendental model which is so abstract that it can actualize in a wide variety of forms, such that a fin can be identified with an arm. This is compatible with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and theory of the virtual, which sees there being a transcendental level that is actualized in various ways. Cuvier’s and Hegel’s theories, as teleological, regard deformations or mutations in negative terms, as degradations of the organism’s structure and thus functioning as well. But evolutionary theory needs a positive view of aberrations. Geoffrey’s and Deleuze’s theories see variation positively, because variations are considered novel actualizations of the virtual model. Thus Deleuze’s response to the problems of representational theories is better than Hegel’s at least with regard to its application in evolutionary theory. We also see that Deleuze’s three criticism’s hold, because [1] Hegel’s movement is a matter of (infinite) representation, but because it cannot explain novel evolutionary variations, there is no real evolutionary movement involved. [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough. Because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.

 

Summary

Previously we saw that if Hegel wanted to critique Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, he would show how Deleuze’s virtual and actual as contraries dialectically sublate, which collapses the basic distinction of Deleuze’s ontology. However, because Deleuze’s virtual and actual are two tendencies of the real and not contraries, such a Hegelian critique would not hold. From a Deleuzean perspective, Hegel’s dialectic could be viewed as a false movement, with Deleuze’s genesis of difference being the real movement. Yet Hegel purely from a logical standpoint might say that Deleuze’s difference does not exist.

So in this chapter we will apply their theories to a field outside logic, something that is a real phenomenon in the world, evolution. This is the chapter’s aim, and also to see if in this application Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel hold: [1] Hegel’s is a false movement, [2] Hegel’s logic revolves around a single center, and [3] Hegel’s dialectic provides enough precision for characterizing the world.

We then saw that for Hegel, the Idea is The One Totality and it is self-determining reason. This totality is nature, but it becomes other to itself as externality and multiplicity. Nature is rational. The movement in nature involves the identity of difference and identity. So while there are multiplicities of bodies, they form whole systems. In physics bodies form indifferent relations to one another. In chemistry chemicals combine and transform, but their processes are not self-perpetuation. They are however in organic life. Here we have unity and difference in the form of the unity of the organism being constituted through the differences of its organs, and its processes are self-perpetuated.

Now, Hegel’s ideas on the dialectical movement in nature might suggest a compatibility with evolutionary theory, even though Hegel’s thinking precedes Darwin. However, evolution as a theory precedes Hegel. For Hegel, the dialectical movement in nature is not to be seen as something unfolding in time. So Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not easily seen as compatible with evolutionary theory.

However, we can still examine his philosophy of the structure of the organism, which is based on his dialectic, to see if it is compatible with evolutionary theory. For Hegel, we cannot understand the organism as a mechanically related set of indifferent material parts, because it maintains a characteristic unity and acts spontaneously. Instead the organism is structured on the integration of unity and multiplicity, identity and difference, part and whole, one and many; for, it is organ and organism, with the two mutually dependent on each other [each organ is reciprocally determinate with the others, but also the organism and its organs are reciprocally determining]. The best model for the structure of the organism would be one with the greatest differentiation that is still unified. Plants can be divided and the parts regenerate new plants, so they were not organs so much. Animals go up a scale of differentiation, with humans at the top, because they also have the greatest sense of how each individual is an organ in a social body.

 

We will compare and contrast by relating Hegel’s and Deleuze’s ideas on the organism’s structure to Cuvier and Geoffrey. Cuvier, like Hegel, thinks that animals should not be classified in terms of differences of degree. Unlike Hegel, he uses a non-unified system, one with four branches. Nonetheless, like Hegel, Cuvier’s system is functional and teleological, meaning that organisms’ anatomical structures can be understood in terms of their functional purposes.

Geoffroy, on the contrary, offers a theory of anatomy based on homology. There is a transcendental unity of parts to which actual empirical cases correspond isomorphically. The theory was most demonstrable in application to embryonic forms. Thus both fish and human embryonic skeleton’s share a one-to-one correspondence to a transcendental arrangement of parts. This goes against Cuvier’s anatomy, and Hegel’s as well, because for them, anatomical parts are understood teleologically, in terms of their purposes or functions for the organism. So a fin and arm in Cuvier’s and Hegel’s approaches would not share the same designation, because their functions are different, however in Geoffrey’s they will. The relation between transcendental and empirical resonates with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism.

We then noted that Geoffroy’s homological theory provides an account of the variations in anatomy, which becomes central to the theory of evolution. For Darwin different species have homologous forms on account of common ancestors. And anatomical parts can evolve according to how their functions alter. Cuvier's teleological theory of anatomy is not compatible with evolution, [because were a part’s function to change, it is no longer the same part, and thus such an evolutionary connection cannot be observed using this approach.] Also, Geoffrey’s homology or unity of composition is like Deleuze’s Idea.

 

We then saw how these theories of the structure of the organism apply in evolutionary theory. To explain evolution, we need an account of accidental, contingent variations. These can be seen either positively or negatively. A theory of anatomy like Cuvier’s or Hegel’s is teleological, meaning that it identifies anatomical parts in terms of their functionality, their purpose in the function of the organism. This means that if there were to be a deviation, a slight mutation, then this changes the structure of the organism’s functioning and thus degrades its functioning. Geoffrey’s homological theory of anatomy does not regard anatomical parts in terms of their purposes but rather in terms of how their interrelations correspond isomorphically to an abstract or transcendental model. This means that parts can change both form and function so long as their structural relations match the mold. A deformity then is the model expressing itself in another way, so this would be a positive account of variation rather than a negative one. This notion of homologous variation is central to evolution which is a process of the natural selection from a pool of variations.

 

So Deleuze’s ideas are more compatible than Hegel’s for explaining evolution. Deleuze’s three criticisms also hold in this context of evolution. [1] Hegel’s movement is created with words and representations, so nothing follows. [The movement of evolution cannot be explained with the infinite representation of the contraries organ and organism, individual and species being thought together.] [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough. [Because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.]

 

 

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb9 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Conclusion’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 8: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 9: Conclusion

Brief Summary:

Deleuze’s response to representational philosophy, and not Hegel’s, is compatible with evolutionary theory. For, Deleuze’s virtual explains novel variation in the organism’s structure, but Hegel’s dialectic does not.

Explanatory Summary:

Hegel’s theory of the organism’s structure is based on the dialectical relation between part and whole, that is, between organ and organisms (and individual and species). It is a teleological view, like with Cuvier, that regards the structure as being divided according to the functioning of the parts. But this means that a deformity would be understood negatively, as  a degradation of the structure and thus functioning of the organism. Evolutionary theory, however, presupposes a positive view of anatomical variation. It would see mutations as novelties from which natural selection can chose the most adapted. This positive view of evolutionary theory we see in Geoffroy’s homological theory of anatomy, the unity of composition. Here we can consider functionally different parts between different species as expressing the same part in an abstract, transcendental, unrepresentable model. For Cuvier and thus also for Hegel, a human leg and a dog leg can have the same name because they have the same function. Not so for an arm and a fin. But for Geoffroy, we see how the arm relates to the rest of the parts in its body, and how the fin relates to the rest of the parts in its body, and see if both of them can related to a third abstract model which is not expressed or drawn but merely implied in unifiability of the relational structures between the different species. So we might imagine a mutation in the fish where the fins take on the shape of arms, and allow the fish to craw on surfaces. This is just another expression of the same representable blue print. [However if the fish’s fins removed from their locations and reappeared inserted themselves in very different places, this would not be a homology, because it is no longer isomorphic with the abstract arrangement.] So because Hegel’s theory of the structure of the organism is dialectic, that makes it teleological, and that makes aberrations degradations rather than potentially useful novelties. Thus Hegel’s dialectic was a response to the problems of traditional representational systems, so his response to representational systems does not apply to a real world phenomenon, evolution. However, Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism functions like Geoffroy’s homology. For Deleuze, actuality is one explicit expression from a field of differentially related incompossible virtual possibilities. All the different ways a pendulum actually might swing are homologous to the phase portrait which depicts all possibilities in a non-representational form. So for Deleuze, organisms also express a certain unity of composition, as they are expression of the Idea, so Deleuze’s response to representational systems, the subrepresentationality of virtuality, does in fact apply to the real world phenomenon of evolution. Hence Deleuze’s response to representational systems is superior to Hegel’s.

Summary

The previous chapter discussed Deleuze’s three main criticisms of Hegel’s philosophy:

[1] its reliance on false movement,

[2] its focus on movement around a center, and

[3] its use of concepts that are too general to capture the particularity of the world.

We saw that if remained on merely the logical level, Hegel’s infinite representation, his solution to the problems of representation, remains consistent. So we needed to apply Deleuze’s and Hegel’s philosophies to a subject outside logic to better see if Deleuze’s criticisms hold, and in this chapter we applied them to theories of the structure of the organism. For Hegel, organs can only exist in their relation to the whole [and vice versa.] This is the movement of the infinite [because it is a sublation of contraries.] But this part/whole relation is still representable, even if with infinite thought/representation. Deleuze instead prefers to see the structure of the organism in terms of homology and the unity of composition. It escapes representation [because it is not a matter of identifying parts between species more rather a matter of saying that the relations between parts in organisms of different species is isomorphic to an abstract model that must remain unrepresented, because it can only manifest in its various actualizations.]

Just as with the calculus, the accounts of the organism offered by Hegel and Deleuze provided concrete exemplars of their logical positions. Thus, for Hegel, the organism represents the movement of the infinite, or of contradiction, with the particular organs only existing within the relationship to the whole. For Deleuze, what is required to explain the organism is the moment that escapes representation, the unity of composition that functions as a transcendental condition for the organism. Thus, for him, the virtual/actual distinction is vital to our understanding of the organism. (237)

So these accounts are implied in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s different responses to the problems of representation. And there are problems with Hegel’s account. Hegel himself rejects an evolutionary theory. But this evolutionary theory he describes can be seen merely as a description of the structure of organisms and not of their temporal genesis (there is an increasing scale of perfection). But, we still cannot resolve the conflict between Hegel’s dialectic, which is teleological, and teratology, which is a precondition of evolution; it is the study of variations, and under the teleological account, these variations are degradations in functioning  rather than evolutionary improvements. Evolutionary theory needs an account of variations leading to novel structures that can be naturally selected, so we need a positive account of aberration. Teratology tells us about the organism’s development and thus also about its structure. So we return to Deleuze’s three criticisms of Hegel now in this context of the organism’s structure. [1] Hegel’s movement is created with words and representations, so nothing follows. [Hegel’s movement of the infinite sees the dialectical relation between organ and organism, individual and species. However, these relations are representable. The structure of the specie’s anatomy is representable. But this is on account of the teleology, the purpose of the parts in the functioning of the whole. This cannot explain evolution, we noted, so Hegel’s infinite movement leads to a false movement and not the true movement of evolution.] [2] Hegel’s structure of the organism has a teleological unity, and so there is a ‘monocentering of circles’ [around the organic unity of the organism.] However, it cannot explain the evolutionary development that builds from aberrations. The individual itself, were it to vary from the species, would be [a non-functional monstrosity,] a “failure to embody the Idea in nature.” (237) Also, for Hegel, the boundary between the organism and the world is “too effective,” and so he cannot explain the transversal relations between organisms that brings about the variations that provide the novelty for natural selection to choose from. [3] Hegel’s account is not precise enough.

"Oppositions are roughly cut from a delicate milieu of overlapping perspectives, of communicating distances, divergences and disparities, of heterogeneous potentials and intensities" (DR, 50). In this sense, what Hegel calls the "impotence of nature" could be characterized by the Deleuzian as the impotence of dialectic itself, since it is unable to explain positively the contingency of nature, which is vital to our modern understanding of the world. (238)

[So because it understands the differentiation in the natural world in terms of determinate oppositions, Hegel’s dialectic too strongly divides the world rather than seeing the blurrings of boundary that allow for evolutionary variation.]

We cannot, therefore, follow the strategy of some Hegelian commentators of accepting the weakness of Hegel's position on evolution, before isolating this position from the rest of Hegel's philosophy. Instead, the limitations of Hegel's account of the organism must be seen as stemming from limitations of the more abstract metaphysical categories discussed in the preceding chapters of this book. (238)

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.

Pt3.Ch8.Sb8 Somers-Hall’s Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. ‘Contingency in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature’. summary

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Henry Somers-Hall, Entry Directory]
[Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, Entry Directory]

[Note: All boldface and underlining is my own. It is intended for skimming purposes. Bracketed comments are also my own explanations or interpretations.]

 

Henry Somers-Hall

 

Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation.

Dialectics of Negation and Difference

 

Part 3: Beyond Representation

Chapter 7: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Structure of the Organism

Subdivision 8: Contingency in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature

Brief Summary:

To explain evolution, we need an account of accidental, contingent variations. These can be seen either positively or negatively. A theory of anatomy like Cuvier’s or Hegel’s is teleological, meaning that it identifies anatomical parts in terms of their functionality, their purpose in the function of the organism. This means that if there were to be a deviation, a slight mutation, then this changes the structure of the organism’s functioning and thus degrades its functioning. Geoffrey’s homological theory of anatomy does not regard anatomical parts in terms of their purposes but rather in terms of how their interrelations correspond isomorphically to an abstract or transcendental model. This means that parts can change both form and function so long as their structural relations match the mold. A deformity then is the model expressing itself in another way, so this would be a positive account of variation rather than a negative one. This notion of homologous variation is central to evolution which is a process of the natural selection from a pool of variations.

Summary

Previously we saw how Geoffroy’s homology theory of anatomy, or unity of composition, is central to the development of evolution theory, and it is also like Deleuze’s Idea. Cuvier’s teleological theory of anatomy however, is antithetical to evolutionary theory.

 

This is partly because Cuvier’s theory does not allow for contingent, accidental traits to appear. A slight change in one anatomical part changes the structure of functional relations of all parts, which would too radically change the organism’s overall functioning. Hegel’ position is not as extreme.

Hegel writes that "nature everywhere blurs the essential limits of species and genera by intermediate and defective forms, which continually furnish counter examples to every fixed distinction" (PN, § 250, Rem.) [233]

Also, humans have organs that are remnants of earlier forms, and Hegel thought “less differentiated forms can contain organs belonging to higher species, as for instance snakes are characterized by Hegel as possessing vestigial legs.” (233) But Hegel understands these variations in negative terms.

"In order to be able to consider such forms [of monstrous birth] as defective, imperfect, and deformed, one must presuppose a fixed, invariable type" (PN, § 250, Rem.) [233]

But, Hegel notes, these deviations could be positively a difference in organization rather than an impotence of nature. But if we are using a teleological theory, this means that if structure changes, then functionality reduces.

As Darwin notes, such a view is not possible on a teleological account, as the correlation of structure to purpose means that a reduction in the purposive role is correlated to a degradation in structure. (233)

And, if an organic structure is dialectically intelligible, it is understood teleologically. But as we saw, teleology cannot explain homology, thus Hegel’s notion of the contingency of deformation does not make his theory compatible with homology and thus also with evolution.

Further, while Hegel may give greater latitude than Cuvier to contingency, it is still the case that insofar as an organic structure is dialectically intelligible, it is understood in terms of the teleological account. Thus, while it may be possible to explain deformations on Hegel's account, the homology, a correspondence vital to the evolutionary account, cannot be explained dialectically. (233)

Thus we cannot have a positive study of deviations and aberrations in Hegel, a science of teratology; and yet, teratology is a necessary precondition for evolutionary theory. (233-234) Thus Somers-Hall concludes:

Ultimately, I believe, the idea of a compatibilism between evolutionary theory and Hegelian dialectic therefore fails. (234a)

 

Note also the relation of part whole in terms of individual and species. In order for the Notion to become present for itself, the animal's singular finite existence must be connected with its species, the universal. This involves the finite passing into the infinite, and the relation can be seen as between bad and true infinite. First consider the spurious infinite in the relation between species and individual: the genus maintains itself because individuals continually reproduce and repeat the form. Species is here understood as the repetition of the individual (234-235) But, as we examine increasingly differentiated species, we get the sense that the species is the animal’s essential determination. More differentiated species [more advanced/complex species] have the feeling of unity with the genus/species. Thus mammals have breasts [to link up and sustain other members of the species] and they look after their young. This feeling of unity increases with differentiation.  Then in human beings, the feeling of unity is replaces with the universality of thought itself. (234) “It is thus in man that the Notion truly becomes aware of itself as the unity of finite subject and infinite, universal, species.” (234) [The individual has a finite life span the but the species itself continues with reproduction.]

Deleuze’s problem with Hegel’s notion of the individual species relation, according to Somers-Hall, is that it sees organism as a closed unity. For Deleuze, the species is a transcendental illusion, and we should focus instead on the genesis of the individual. The organism is open. [Perhaps this is saying that the individual does not repeat a form; it is free to be whatever it evolves into, and a ‘species’ is merely a categorizing designation given after the genesis of the individual. Or the organism is not a self-contained system. I’m missing the point here, so I will just quote it.]

While Hegel ultimately sees in the structure of the species the structure of the infinite, Deleuze once again introduces the concept of a transcendental illusion: "It is not the individual which is an illusion in relation to the species, but the species which is an illusion--inevitable and well founded, it is true--in relation to the play of the individual and individuation" (DR, 250). Deleuze's point here, I take it, is that just as the homology requires reference to a moment of virtuality, a focus on the actual species ignores the importance of the dynamic generation of the organism. As Ansell Pearson notes, if we take as central the organization of the organism, we tend to be led to a conception of the organism as a closed unity. In contrast to this approach, Deleuze brings in the possibility of seeing the organism as essentially open when he argues that the species is ultimately a transcendental illusion and focusing on the conditions of genesis of the individual itself. Ansell Pearson addresses these points in relation to the theory of autopoiesis, which attempts to reintroduce a notion of teleological unity into modern conceptions of the organism as a counterweight to mechanistic conceptions of Darwinism:

Although autopoiesis grants a high degree of autonomy to a living system it ultimately posits systems that are entropically and informationally closed. In defining what constitutes the system as 'open' by placing the stress on operational closure, which can only conserve the boundaries of the organism, it blocks off access to an appreciation of the dynamical and processual character of machinic evolution and is led to present a stark choice between either entropy | or maximum performance. In placing the emphasis on living systems as guided solely by concerns with survival and self-maintenance, even though these are to be understood as endogenously driven and monitored, the theory of autopoiesis too much resembles the theory it seeks to supersede, namely orthodox Darwinism with its focus on discrete units of selection. (235-236)

We now turn to Deleuze and Guattari and transversal moments in the genesis of the organism. [Autopoiesis is the theory that organisms are systems that produce the materials and structures that support themselves, like how cells work. but] Autopoiesis  does not explain how different types of systems serve each other, their symbiosis. So for example, although the mitochondria are organelles that produces materials for the cell, they were originally separates cells that later came to be incorporated into a larger cell structure. Also [we cannot say that organisms are self-contained and not transversally related to other organisms because] bacteria often exchange genetic material and “bacterial DNA forms a substantial part of the genetic code of higher organisms.” (236) [Organisms affect and alter one another, and coevolve symbiotically. We need this concepts for explaining the generation of variety that can be selected from in evolutionary development.]

Through these transversal connections, an element of variability is introduced into the organism. This element of variability is essential to an evolutionary account, since we need to be able to explain not only selection from a variety of organisms, but also the generation of this variety in the first instance. (236)

So we also need an account of how organism's boundaries become disintegrated in order to explain evolution. We need both virtual and actual [because actualization only explains how structures are as they are, but virtuality explains how they can become other than they are. I’m not sure if this is right, because this is all Somers-Hall says.]

These examples point to the need not only to recognize the relative integrity of the organism but also that the disintegration of the boundaries of the organism is an essential moment in the formation of organisms and species. Deleuze argues that it is only with an account that incorporates both virtual and actual moments that we are able to achieve this. (236)

 

Somers-Hall, Henry (2012) Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of Negation and Difference. Albany: SUNY.