Meaning & Difference [Beginning Deleuze Logic Series]

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Logic & Semantics, Entry Directory]
[Deleuze Entry Directory]
[Other Entries in the Deleuze's Logic Series]

Meaning & Difference

Deleuze considered himself a pure metaphysician. As we work through Deleuze's writings, might we find him to be foremost a logician? This is not merely because he wrote two 'logic' books. But also, could not difference itself serve as a logical principle?

This entry will begin a series exploring this question. In logic we often speak of truth-values. Let's first deal with meaning values. Imagine that we look at the sky, and we see it is raining. Then we say to ourselves, 'it is raining'. What is the value of this statement's meaning to us? It is superfluous to what we already know, to what the sky itself already means or says to us when its appearance tells us it is raining. But what if it were right on the verge of stopping to rain? What if we feel that dramatic moment when just a moment later it will not be raining? So we feel that instant when there is no time extending between this instant and the next when it will stop. If no time extends between those states, then in a way it is virtually not raining, because its status as not raining is immediately upon us now, even though in actuality it still rains. We see this sort of thinking for example in differential calculus. Note around the beginning of David Jerison's MIT calculus 2nd lecture, for example, when he speaks of the pumpkin falling from a building top [beginning around 5 minutes, see especially 11 minutes into the lecture]. Just as the pumpkin hits the ground, it is still moving, it has a velocity, although what we find is its instantaneous velocity. The pumpkin was both moving while also being right up against the ground, both at the same time. So perhaps when we feel that dramatic moment when the sky still rains but is on the limit of stopping, we can say that it is both true that it is raining and it is not raining.

In the first case, we looked at the sky in the middle of its raining. Here there was no value to the meaning of 'it is raining', even though it is true. We concluded this, because the meaning was superfluous to the meaning given to us in the appearance of the sky. But in the second case, we say 'it is raining' but it was also true that 'it is not raining', on account of it virtually not raining. Here there is a value to the meaning of the statement. It is saying more than what is already said. We feel as though by saying this that we are expressing something profound. This meaning, based on the difference between incompatible truths, expresses the drama of the situation.

But what about the person inside we are communicating with? She cannot see the sky like we can. So we tell her, 'it is raining'. But for her, what is already given to her senses and understanding is nothing indicating to her that it is raining, in fact, the lack of evidence puts her in the mindset where she assumes it is not raining. For her, in a way, our statement to her that 'it is raining' will also accompany the meaning 'it is not raining'. If instead she knew already that it was raining from the sounds she hears, then there is no value to us telling her this. But she will care if already she assumes that it is not raining. When the logical incompatibility of 'it is not raining' and 'it is raining' hits her, that is when the meaning of the statement has a real value to her.

This example might help us understand a possible basic principle of Deleuze's logic. Conventional logic is based on the principle of identity, which says something is identical to itself, that A is A or A = A. We might even say that this is incoherent already. We are saying on the one hand that there is a self-same thing, but on the other hand it is relating to itself. Is there such a thing as a relation between one thing? Are there not two A's in 'A = A'? But the formula is trying to show the exact opposite, that there is only one A, which is no more than itself.

So as we turn to Deleuze's first principle of logic, we should not worry if at first it seems incoherent, because even normal coherent logic is basic on a fundamental incoherence anyway. For Deleuze, the first principle of logic would perhaps be the principle of difference. In this case, we have A and not-A, both co-posited and yet logically exclusive to one another. This might be like his synthetic exclusive disjunction. It is an exclusive disjunction, because A and not-A are incompatible. They are incoherent with one another. However, there will be no sense, no meaning, unless the two are taken together with one another, as we saw in the case of 'it is raining' and 'it is not raining'. The conditions of meaning in Deleuze could very well be logical incoherence, based on the logical principle of difference.