by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]
[Victor Goldschmidt, entry directory]
[Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien, entry directory]
[The following is summary. Bracketed commentary is my own, as is any boldface. Proofreading is incomplete, which means typos are present, especially in the quotations. So consult the original text. Also, I welcome corrections to my interpretations, because I am not good enough with French or Greek to make accurate translations of the texts.]
Summary of
Victor Goldschmidt
Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps
Deuxième partie:
(2)
Aspects temporels de la morale stoïcienne
A
(2.1)
La Connaissance
Chapitre IV
(2.1.4)
L’interprétation des événements
II
(2.1.4.2)
Finalité et causalité
40
(2.1.4.2.40)
La cause efficiente
Brief summary:
(2.1.4.2.40.1) In the Stoic system, the events of the world are organized in accordance with God’s rational, providential wisdom, and this means that there is both final purpose but also causal destiny. [In other words, on account of the overarching rational order of the world and also because of God’s good and wise intentions, things happen both because they must happen in order to arrive upon a pre-established purpose or end, and also things happen on account of everything up until now causing that outcome.] But, given the limitations of our human understanding, we are more equipped to understand causality than finality. (2.1.4.2.40.2) Unlike Plato and Aristotle, who favored final cause or Forms as the primary causality, for the Stoics, efficient causality is more primary. (2.1.4.2.40.3) The Stoics have a more straightforward notion of cause as being the acting party in causality, and thus God is understood as the primary acting cause. (2.1.4.2.40.4) The Stoics primary cause is active and efficient. It thus can be seen as a motor cause. And while in its actualization it expresses final and formal causality, these are secondary byproducts of its more primary efficient causal nature.
[Providence, Destiny, Causality, and Finality]
[The Stoics and Efficient Causality over Formal or Final Causality]
[Causal Activity and God]
[Stoic Motor Causality]
Summary
2.1.4.2
Finalité et causalité
2.1.4.2.40
La cause efficiente
[Providence, Destiny, Causality, and Finality]
(p.91: “Il est vrai que providence et destin …”)
[In sum: In the Stoic system, the events of the world are organized in accordance with God’s rational, providential wisdom, and this means that there is both final purpose but also causal destiny. (In other words, on account of the overarching rational order of the world and also because of God’s good and wise intentions, things happen both because they must happen in order to arrive upon a pre-established purpose or end, and also things happen on account of everything happening up until now causing that outcome.) But, given the limitations of our human understanding, we are more equipped to understand causality than finality.]
While it is true that finality (final purpose or end) and destiny are identical and also that the notion of providence seems to imply an intention that becomes realized, this intention and its manners of realization are not always apparent to us. We get the sense then that divine providence is more easily grasped in terms of the causality of destiny than in providential finalism. And in fact, Stoic providence exceeds all final purposivity.
40. Il est vrai que providence et destin sont identiques. Il est vrai également que l’idée de providence semble impliquer une intention qui se réalise. Mais cette intention et ses voies de réalisation ne sont pas toujours, pour nous, transparentes ; tout se passe comme si, pour nous, la providence divine était moins adéquatement saisie dans un finalisme selon le mode humain, que dans la causalité du destin. Il faut même dire que la providence stoïcienne dépasse toute finalité.
(91)
[The Stoics and Efficient Causality over Formal or Final Causality]
(p.91: “ Il importe d’écarter, sur ce point …”)
[In sum: Unlike Plato and Aristotle, who favored final cause or Forms as the primary causality, for the Stoics, efficient causality is more primary.]
[We now take a moment to argue against a popular misinterpretation of the Stoics. We know that divination is one of the proofs that are used to argue for providentialism. (The next idea is important but I might get it wrong. For me to maybe get some of it right, we need to look at the source, Seneca, Natural Questions, Book 2, section 32 (part):
(32.1) What do you make of the fact that lightning-bolts indicate the future, and do not give signs of just one or two events, but often predict a long, connected series of fated events, and do so with plain indications, much clearer than if they were written down? (2) There is this difference between us and the Etruscans, who have the greatest expertise in the investigation of lightning-flashes: we think that lightning-bolts are emitted because clouds collide; they think that clouds collide in order that lightning-bolts may be emitted. For since they ascribe everything to god, they are of the opinion that they do not indicate the future because they have occurred, but they occur because they are intended to indicate the future. But they occur in the same manner whether indicating the future is their purpose or just a consequence. (3) “So how do they indicate the future if they are not sent for that very purpose?” Just as birds do not move in order to be seen by us, yet they produce favorable or unfavorable auspices. “They too are set in motion by god,” someone objects. But you make him into somebody with too much time on his hands, a servant performing a very trivial task, if he arranges omens for some people and entrails for others.(4) They are just as much the results of divine agency if birds’ wings are not guided by god, and the entrails of cattle are not formed under the very axe. The sequence of fated events unfolds in a different way, sending out signs of the future at every point, some of them familiar to us, some unknown. Everything that happens is a sign of some future event. Chance events and purposeless, chaotic ones do not admit of divination; where there is order, there is also predictive force. (5) “So why is the eagle granted the honor of giving auspices of important events, or the raven and a tiny number of other birds, while the voices of the rest lack prophetic power?” | Because some things have not yet been incorporated into the system, and some never could be, because our acquaintance with them is too remote. However, there is no living creature that does not foretell something by its movement and by an encounter with us. But, to be sure, not everything gets noticed.
(Seneca 2010: 179-179)
The basic idea here might be that we have two different views on how omens work. One view says that an omen was set in place to announce the future. The other view says that an omen is simply a sign for a current cause which will have some effected outcome in the future. So for the Stoics, the omen is not a sign whose “meaning” is the future event which is the cause of the existence of current forewarning of that event (in other words, the omen does not have its meaning because the future endows it with that meaning, as if time worked backwards); rather, the omen’s meaning is simply the causality that it is bound up with and whose effects in the future can be discerned from it. In this way, the Stoic theory of causality goes against the causal primacy that Plato and Aristotle gave to the end and the form. Thus we see a focus on efficient causality in the Stoics. The following is from Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 3, line 14:
14. […] In the broad sense, a Cause would seem to be, according to them, “That by whose energizing the effect comes about”; as, for example, the sun or the sun’s heat is the cause of the wax being melted or of the melting of the wax.
(Sextus Empiricus 1933: 335)
And to draw the contrast with Aristotle and Plato, the following comes from Seneca’s letters, Letter 65:
4. The Stoics hold that there is just one cause, that which acts. Aristotle’s view is that the word “cause” is used in three ways. “The first cause,” he says, “is the material itself, without which nothing can be created; the second is the artisan; the third is the form that is imposed upon each and every work, just as it is upon the statue.” This is what Aristotle calls the eidos. “There is also a fourth cause,” he says, “in addition to these, namely, the purpose of the work as a whole.” 5. I will explain what that is. Bronze is the first cause of the statue, for it would never have been made if that from which it was cast or forged had not existed. The second cause is the craftsman, for the bronze could not have been worked into the shape of a statue if his skilled hand had not been added. The third cause is the form, for that statue would not be called a “spear bearer” or “youth tying a headband” if that appearance had not been imposed upon it. The fourth cause is the purpose of making it; for if this had not been there, it would not have been made. 6. What is the purpose? It is what motivated the craftsman, what he was after in making it. Either it was money, if he crafted it to sell; or reputation, if he wanted to make a name for himself; or reverence, if he fashioned it as a gift for a temple. Therefore this too is a cause for its being made—or don’t you agree that something without which a thing would not have been made should be counted as one of its causes?
7. To these causes Plato adds a fifth, the model, which he calls the Idea. This is what the craftsman had in view when he made what he intended to make. It does not matter whether he has an external model to cast his eyes upon, or an internal one that he himself has conceived and set up within. These, the models of all things, God holds within himself, and encompasses in his mind the numbers and measures of everything that is to be achieved. He is full of those shapes that Plato calls Ideas—deathless, changeless, tireless. Thus while human beings indeed perish, humanity itself, according [186|187] to which a human being is molded, remains; and although human beings suffer and die, humanity is unaffected.
8. There are, then, five causes on Plato’s account: that from which, that by which, that in which, that according to which, and that because of which. Last of all, there is that which comes of these. For instance, in a statue (to continue in my previous vein), that from which is the bronze, that by which is the craftsman, that in which is the form that is applied to it, that according to which is the model that the person who makes it is imitating, that because of which is the maker’s purpose, and that which comes of these is the statue itself. 9. By Plato’s account, the world too has all of these: the maker—this is God; that from which it is made—this is matter; the form—this is the condition and order of the world that we see; the model—which is to say, that according to which he made such a vast and supremely beautiful piece of work; the purpose—his aim in making it. What aim does God have, you ask? Goodness. That is definitely what Plato says: 10. “What was the cause of God’s making the world? He is good; one who is good is not parsimonious with any good; he made it, then, to be the best world he could make.”
You be the judge, then, and make your ruling. Whose account seems to you most likely to be true? Not who gives the truest account, for that is as far above us as truth itself.
11. This host of causes posited by Aristotle and by Plato encompasses either too many things or too few. For if their view is that whenever the removal of something would make it impossible for some item to be made, that thing is a cause of its making, then they have named too few things. They should count time as a cause, for nothing can be made without time. They should count place: if there is nowhere in which a thing can be made, once more it will not be made. They should count motion: without motion, nothing is either made or destroyed; without it, there is no craftsmanship and indeed no changing.
12. We, however, are looking now for the primary and generic cause. This must be simple, for matter too is simple. Are we asking what this cause is? Unquestionably, it is productive reason, that is, God. For all these things you have mentioned are not multiple individual causes but are dependent on one, the one that makes. 13. You [187|188] say that form is a cause? Form is what the craftsman imposes on his work; it is part of the cause but not the cause itself. The model is not the cause either but a necessary instrument of the cause. The model is necessary to the craftsman in the same way as the chisel and the pumice stone: without them his craft cannot go forward, and yet they are not parts of the craft, and neither are they causes. 14 Someone says, “The aim of the craftsman—the purpose for which he came to make something—is a cause.” Even supposing it is a cause, it is not the efficient cause but a supervenient cause. And such causes are innumerable; what we are looking for is the generic cause. As for their claim that the entire world in all its fullness is a cause, there they speak with less than their usual sophistication. For there is a big difference between a work and the cause of that work.
(Seneca 2015: 186-188)
And God is the one unique cause as the coalescence of all particular causes.]
Il importe d’écarter, sur ce point, une interprétation courante, populaire en quelque sorte, dont les Stoïciens, en partie, sont responsables eux-mêmes2, mais qui méconnaît l’intention véritable du système. – On sait que la divination est au nombre des preuves invoquées en faveur de la providence. Or, la signification des présages n’est pas la fin, en vue de laquelle ils se produiraient ; c’est, au contraire, à cause qu’ils se produisent que, par voie de conséquence, ils sont signifiants3. – Plus généralement, la théorie stoïcienne de la causalité conteste explicitement la primauté que Platon et Aristote avaient accordée à la fin et à la forme. Est cause uniquement « l’agent »4, c’est-à-dire, cet être seul réel, qu’est l’individu ; de même que tous les corps-individus sont unifiés dans le système du monde, de même toutes les causes agissantes se ramènent à Dieu, cause unique.
(91)
2. Cf. p. 86.
3. « Hoc inter nos et Tuscos, quibus summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia, interest : nos putamus, quia nubes collisae sunt, fulmina emitti; ipsi existimant nubes collidi ut fulmina emittantur; nam, cum omnia ad deum referent, in ea opinione sunt tamquam non, quia facta sunt, significent, sed quia significatura sunt, fiant. Eadem tamen ratione fiunt, siue illis significare propositum, siue consequens est » (Sén., Quest. Nat., II, XXXII, 2).
(91)
4 (Τοῦτο) δι’ ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα (Sext., Hypot., III, 14) ; τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν (Sext., math., IX, 11) ; « Stoicis placet unam causam esse, id quod facit » (Sén., Ep., 65, 4).
(91)
[Causal Activity and God]
(p.92: “ Cette causalité se suffit à elle-même …”)
[In sum: The Stoics have a more straightforward notion of cause as being the acting party in causality, and thus God is understood as the primary acting cause.]
[This causality is self-sufficient and finds its sole explanation it the nature of the agent. The Demiurge in the Timeus is not an efficient cause. But the Stoic God is more directly and purely a cause, as the one acting cause (see the Seneca material from Letter 65, which is here quoted.]
Cette causalité se suffit à elle-même et trouve sa seule explication dans la nature même de l’agent. Le Démiurge du Timée agit en vue d’une fin (étant bon et « exempt d’envie, il a voulu que toutes choses naquissent le plus possible semblables à lui »)1 et s’inspire d’un plan (du Paradigme éternel, au service duquel, malgré toute l’ingéniosité de ses calculs, il fait figure de simple exécutant)2. – Mais la fin, supposé qu’elle soit une cause, n’est nullement efficiente, mais seulement « accessoire ». « Vous dites que la Forme est cause ? – L’artisan l’imprime à son ouvrage : c’est une partie de la cause, non la cause même. Le Paradigme non plus n’est pas cause, mais instrument indispensable de la cause. Le paradigme est indispensable à l’artisan, au même titre que le ciseau ou que la lime »4. – Aussi bien le Dieu stoïcien répond-il exactement à la définition de la cause : « Vous voulez savoir ce qu’il faut entendre par cause ? – C’est la Raison qui agit, c’est – à-dire, Dieu. Tout ce que vous venez d’énumérer » (matière, modèle, fin) « ne constitue pas de multiples causes particulières, mais procède d’une seule : de la cause qui agit »5.
(92)
1. Tim., 29 e.
2. Cf. Le paradigme dans la théorie plat. de l’action, Rev. des Et. Gr., LVIII, 1945, § 10.
3. Sénèque, Ep., 65, 14 : (propositum) « ut sit causa, non est efficiens causa, sed superueniens » (cf, ibid., § 10).
4. Id., ibid., § 13: « Exemplar quoque non est causa, sed instrumentum causae necessarium. »
5. Id., ibid., § 12 : « Quaerimus quid sit causa ? – Ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus : ista enun, quaecumque rettulistis, non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea quae facit »
(92)
[Stoic Motor Causality]
(p.92-93: “ Cette cause efficiente n’est certes pas …”)
[In sum: The Stoics primary cause is active and efficient. It thus can be seen as a motor cause. And while in its actualization it expresses final and formal causality, these are secondary byproducts of its more primary efficient causal nature.]
This efficient cause of the Stoics is certainly not irrational. God is the acting Logos. [This would seem to imply a sort of finalism.] But what primarily defines this sort of Stoic divine causality is its action, which only as a byproduct of that action does it appear to involve primarily final or formal causality. Thus for the Stoics, the origin of all things is this motor cause, even though in its actual manifestation it secondarily expresses formality and finality.
Cette cause efficiente n’est certes pas irrationnelle ; Dieu est le Logos agissant. Mais c’est l’action qui dé finit essentiellement cette causalité divine ; c’est « accessoirement », par « dérivation »6, seulement, qu’elle paraît finale (ou formelle). On a pu soutenir que les philosophies de l’Idée du Bien ou de l’Idée de la Perfection n’appliquent jamais, quand il faut rendre compte des phénomènes, le principe du meilleur. Ayant placé la finalité au sommet des choses, elles se contentent d’expliquer ces choses mêmes par la nécessité, le déterminisme, le mécanisme7. Quoi qu’il en soit de la justesse de cette thèse8, il semble que le stoïcisme, à l’inverse, | attribue l’origine de toutes choses à la seule cause motrice, et que ce soit dans le détail des faits précisément, que cette cause se manifeste sous forme de finalité.
(92-93)
6. Cf. notes 3 et 5.
7. E. Goblot, La logique des jugements de valeur, Paris, 1927, pp. 15-18.
8. Cf. p. 35, n. 6.
From:
Goldschmidt, Victor. 1953. Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps. Paris: Vrin.
Otherwise:
Seneca. 2010. Natural Questions. English translation by Harry M. Hine. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Seneca. 2015. Letters on Ethics. To Lucilius. Translated by Margaret Graver and A.A. Long. Chicago and London: University of Chicago.
Sextus Empiricus. 1933. Sextus Empiricus in Three Volumes, Vol.1: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. English translation by R. G. Bury. London: William Heinemann. New York: G. P. Putman’s Sons.
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