by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary. It redoes this entry. All boldface and bracketed commentary are my own. Paragraph enumerations are also my own, but they follow the paragraph breaks in the text. Please forgive my distracting typos, as proofreading is incomplete.]
Summary of
Anneli Luhtala
On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic
Ch.5 The Stoics
5.5 Stoic Logic
5.5.3
Parts of Speech
Brief summary:
The Stoic’s identified five parts of speech: {1} ὄνομα (proper noun), {2} προσηγορία (common noun), {3} ῥῆμα (verb), {4} σύνδεσμος (conjunction), and {5} ἄρθρον (pronoun). By distinguishing proper noun, common noun, and pronoun, the Stoics were able to analyze propositions in terms of degrees of definiteness of the reference to the subject. A name or proper noun (ὄνομα) signifies an individual quality, for example, “Diogenes,” “Socrates.” A common noun (προσηγορία) signifies a common quality, for example “man” and “horse.” A verb (ῥῆμα) signifies a simple predicate attaching to a subject, for example, “I write” and “I speak”. And a pronoun points out a mere substance. The definition of the verb is special among the parts of speech, because it refers to the syntactical role the part plays. [The nominal parts make no reference to how that part relates to the other parts so to form a larger sentential unit with complex meaning, while the verb does do that, because it is said to attach to a subject.] For the subject to play a syntactical role and not just a grammatical one, that is, for it to designate a part of the proposition rather than simply a part of speech, it needs to be inflected, and thus its syntactical role is a matter of case (πτῶσις). Since the nominal parts refer to physical things in the world, they have a corporeal reference, but since verbs do not refer to physical things, they have an incorporeal reference. Substances and qualities belong to the four Stoic categories or genera: {1} ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate), {2} ποιόν (quality / qualified), {3} πως ἔχον (disposition / disposed), and {4} πρός τί πως ἔχον (relative disposition / relatively disposed). For something to belong to the first Stoic category, ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate) simply means for it to have the attribute of existing as a material object, without mention of its own qualities. Substance mixes with qualities, which are air currents and which, as corporeal, affect the substance. There are two stages to a substance being qualified: commonly and peculiarly. Commonly qualified substance corresponds to the common noun, peculiarly qualified substance corresponds to the proper noun, and mere (unqualified) substance, although an impossibility in actuality, corresponds to the pronoun. Some confusions can result from the Stoic’s notion of the corporeality of verbal expressions. Since as expression as physical event is corporeal, and since what it stands for is corporeal, we might regard the two corporeal bodies as the same thing, as with Chrysippus’s claim that when we say “wagon,” an actual wagon passes through our lips. Parts of speech serve their representational function either by pointing out or showing their reference (δηλοῦν) or by signifying it (σημαίνειν). Verbs signify either their predicate or something about the subject. Proper nouns and pronouns point out an individual quality. However, common nouns signify common qualities. They do not point out their reference, like proper nouns and pronouns do, because common nouns are not specific like these others are. Nouns and verbs, in their raw form [undeclined and infinitive] are mere parts of speech, and they do not refer to components of meaning in a proposition. However, when they are combined and modified such that the nouns have case and the verbs have finite conjugation, then they have syntactical relations and thus can refer to parts of a proposition’s meaning. Nouns, when declined, refer both to a corporeal reality, namely, the substance or quality, and to an incorporeal reality, namely, the specific subject of a proposition. Verbs, however, do not refer to any corporeal reality but only to the incorporeal meaning or sayable of the proposition’s predicate.
Summary
5.5.3.1
[The Stoic’s major contribution to the doctrine of parts of speech is to have identified the following five: {1} ὄνομα (proper noun),{2} προσηγορία (common noun), {3} ῥῆμα (verb), {4} σύνδεσμος (conjunction), and {5} ἄρθρον (pronoun)]
There are five parts of speech for the Stoics: {1} ὄνομα (proper noun),{2} προσηγορία (common noun), {3} ῥῆμα (verb), {4} σύνδεσμος (conjunction), and {5} ἄρθρον (pronoun), with a possible sixth one, μεσότης (adverb) (78). “Five parts figure standardly as the Stoics’ contribution to the development of the doctrine of the parts | of speech in later accounts in which Aristotle is said to have established two parts, noun and verb (e.g. GL II: 54,5-9)” (78-79).
5.5.3.2
[The distinction of the proper noun (ὄνομα) from the common noun (προσηγορία) and from the pronoun (ἄρθρον) enabled an analysis of propositions based on degrees of definiteness of the reference to the subject.]
“The Stoics distinguished the proper noun (ὄνομα) from the common noun (προσηγορία) and established the pronoun (ἄρθρον) as a separate part of speech (79). [Note, given the above division into five, the idea here seems to be that the proper noun, the common noun, as well as the pronoun are all different parts of speech, and not that proper and common nouns are two varieties of the same part of speech.] Luhtala then explains how these particular distinctions were useful for propositional analysis:
These distinctions have obvious relevance for propositional analysis: by means of the three nominal parts of speech the Stoics were able to distinguish between more and less highly referential subjects and, consequently, different kinds of propositions in terms of their varying degrees of definiteness. The nominal parts can thus be related to the needs of propositional analysis.
(79)
5.5.3.3
[A name or proper noun (ὄνομα) signifies an individual quality, for example, “Diogenes,” “Socrates.” A common noun (προσηγορία) signifies a common quality, for example “man,” “horse.” A verb (ῥῆμα) signifies a simple predicate attaching to a subject, for example, “I write,” “I speak”. And a pronoun points out a mere substance.]
Diogenes Laertius provides definitions for four parts of speech, which he attributes to Diogenes of Babylon. A common noun (προσηγορία) is a part of speech that “signifies a common quality,” with such examples as “man” and “horse”. A name (proper noun / ὄνομα) is a part of speech that “points out an individual quality,” with such examples as “Diogenes” and Socrates”. A verb (ῥῆμα) is a part of speech that “signifies a simple predicate or [...] an uninflected element of a sentence signfiying something that can be attached to one or more (subjects),” with such examples as “I write” and “I speak”. A conjunction is “an uninflected part of speech uniting parts of speech” (79, quoting Diogenes Laertius VII,58). What is missing here of course is the definition of pronoun (ἄρθρον). It probably comes after Diogenes of Babylon, but Apollonius Dyscolus likely preserved it: a “pronoun points out mere substance” (οὀσίαν τε μόνον δηλοῦσιν) (80, citing, GG II.1: 9,9; see Pinborg1975: 99 and p. 114-115).
5.5.3.4
[The definition of the verb is special among the others, because it refers to the syntactical role the part plays.]
Luhtala then notes a crucial difference in how a verb is defined compared to the other parts of speech. In the definitions of all the nominal parts, there is no reference to the syntactical role the part plays in the sentence. In the verb’s definition, however, the part is understood in terms of its syntactical role as the predicate. [The difference might be the following. The nominal parts make no reference to how that part relates to the other parts so to form a larger sentential unit with complex meaning, while the verb does.] As we saw, the verb is defined in two ways: {1} as a simple predicate, and {2} “as something that can be construed with one or more subjects. The latter definition can be associated with the definition of the predicate according to which the predicate signifes a state of affairs (πρᾶγμα) which occurs in a construction about one or more subjects” (80).
5.5.3.5
[In Stoic logic, the notion of subject refers to nominal inflection, even though we would normally consider this a grammatical issue.]
There is a debate regarding how the subject operates in Stoic logic [as opposed to just Stoic grammar], but it “is generally taken to be represented by case (πτῶσις). Luhtala will return to this matter later, but she for now states that subject refers to nominal inflection. While nominal inflection might seem to be merely a grammatical issue, it in fact belongs to the sphere of meaning (σημαινόμενα) (80).
5.5.3.6
[Nominal parts of speech have a corporeal reference, verbs an incorporeal reference.]
Since nominal parts of speech are defined without reference to syntactical features, but verbs are, that must mean that they signify ontologically different items (80-81). Since the nominal parts refer to physical things in the world, they have a corporeal reference, but since verbs do not refer to physical things, they have an incorporeal reference.
The difference between the descriptions of the verb and the nominal parts of speech – with the presence or absence of ‘syntactical’ features in their respective definitions – must somehow reflect the fact that they | signify ontologically different items respectively. Nouns and pronouns are related to bodies (σώματα) in the material world, whereas there is nothing in the material world that corresponds to the contents of the verb. According to Stoic physics, only bodies really exist; both substances and qualities were understood by the Stoics as corporeal. What the verb stands for pertains solely to the sphere of thinking and speaking, that is to the component of meaning (σημαινόμενον, λεκτόν). The essence of the verb is its syntactico-semantic role, which is to say something about bodies. The distinction between the nominal parts of speech and the verb would seem to reflect the division of Stoic ontology so that the nominal parts of speech stand for corporeality (σώματα) in the ontological scheme, while the verb stands for the incorporeal items (ἀσώματα). The sayable (λεκτόν) is one of the four incorporeals posited by the Stoics (see p. 117) .
(80-81)
5.5.3.7
[Substances and qualities belong to the four Stoic categories or genera: {1} ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate), {2} ποιόν (quality / qualified), {3} πως ἔχοv (disposition / disposed), and {4} πρός τί πως ἔχον (relative disposition / relatively disposed). ]
[I am not exactly sure what Luhtala means in the following:] “But the exact status of substances and qualities, in terms of which the nominal parts are defined, is unclear” (81). Nonetheless, we at least know about the Stoic categories or genera that substances and qualities belong to: {1} ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate), {2} ποιόν (quality / qualified), {3} πως ἔχοv (disposition / disposed), and {4} πρός τί πως ἔχον (relative disposition / relatively disposed). Luhtala
will now briefly introduce the first two categories following closely their description by Long and Sedley, according to whom “the four genera are a classification of the metaphysical aspects under which a body can be viewed.”133
133. They were actually never called ‘categories’ in our sources a Long and Sedley observe. They prefer to use the term genera (Long/Sedley 1987: 165, and 172-174).
(81)
5.5.3.8
[For something to belong to the first Stoic category, ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate) simply means for it to have the attribute of existing as a material object, without mention of its own qualities. Substance mixes with qualities, which are air currents and which, as corporeal, affect the substance. There are two stages to a substance being qualified: commonly and peculiarly.]
[The first category is ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate)]. To belong to the first category means that we are simply “attributing existence to a material object without mentioning its qualities;” as such, “it can be described as a substance, primary matter or ‘substrate’ (ὀυσία, ὑποχείμενον)” (81). [Recall some related notions from Sambursky’s Physics of the Stoics. (From section 1.1:) The Stoics held that the cosmos is a continuous whole surrounded by a void. The continuity of the whole is a dynamic continuity resulting from a cohering activity of a very rarified substrate called pneuma. (From section 1.2:) Pneuma’s function is two-fold: it both coheres the parts of a thing and it also serves as a field carrying the properties of the thing. ... Hexis is what organizes the parts of inorganic objects, like physis for plants and psyche for animals. Here the units of the thing are not merely the parts but rather the different properties of the thing, which interpenetrate such that a change in one leads to a change in the others, as a result of the “sympathy” holding between the properties. But if it is the same thing, namely, pneuma, that carries the properties of various things, then how do we explain why different things have different properties? In Sambursky’s interpretation, a hexis of a thing is composed of many pneumata, one for each property. What differentiates the pneumata is that they have their own compositional ratio of mixture of Air and Fire. All such pneumata are combined in the thing but without each losing its own identity, hence their particular properties are expressed. But these pneumata are connected as well such that a change in one creates a change in the others. (From section 1.3:) Pneumata combine with substantial parts, binding them together, to compose whole things and to provide them with their qualities. We can characterize the sort of mixture pneumata make with physical parts as being a special kind of mixture that the Stoics invented. ... (namely) Mixtures proper (krasis for liquids and mixis for non-liquids), where the components interpenetrate entirely and thoroughly such that there is no mosaic-like distribution on the smallest scale. Yet somehow despite this constituent homogeneity, each part retains its own properties and can be separated out again. This is the sort of mixture pneumata make with the other physical parts of a thing so to form its hexis. (From section 1.4:) The Stoics held that all things can be metaphysically classified under four hierarchical categories, all of which fall under the concept of the something. In their consecutive order they are: substratum, quality, state, and relative state. The fourth category is divided into two subcategories. {a} A relative state, which is defined by something outside it, like the father-son relation. And {b} a relative, which is something capable of undergoing change between states by matters of degree that are measure by comparing the two states, like being at a level of two degrees of sweetness compared to bitterness. A hexis is an example of a relative, because it is comprised of pneumata that each express a quality such that a continuous variation in the composition of the pneuma will result in a continuous variation in its quality. The four categories fit within the Stoic theory of the dynamic continuum. The substratum is the pneuma which binds the parts of all things and which endows them with qualities. The qualities are determined by the (physical) states of the pneuma, which are always in relative states, given that they are constantly under variation as their pneumata alter their compositions.] [A thing’s qualities are also corporeal, as they are constituted by pneuma or “currents of air”. These corporeal qualities mix with the substance. In Sambursky’s account, given above, the idea is that the qualities are constituted by pneuma, which is composed of a mixture of Air and Fire. Depending on the ratio of Air to Fire (the active elements), a particular quality will be constituted. As well as expressing this quality, the pneuma mixture also performs a binding action, cohering the substantial parts of the object, which are composed of units of Earth and Water (the passive elements). So we can say that an individual thing consists of two corporeal substrates: {1} substance (composed of Earth and Water) and quality (composed of pneuma, which is Air and Fire). Luhtala furthermore says that neither substrate nor quality can exist in isolation, but I am not sure why. Perhaps it is because the pneuma would dissipate if it did not have substantial parts to cohere, and the substantial parts would dissipate if they did not have pneuma to cohere them. That is a guess. She lastly says that qualified substance has two stages: commonly qualified and peculiarly qualified. This is elaborated in the next paragraph.]
Belonging to the first category means that we are attributing existence to a material object without mentioning its qualities; it can be described as a substance, primary matter or ‘substrate’ (ὀuσία, ὑποχείμενον). It necessarily mixes with qualities, which being corporeal (see, e.g. Simpl. In Ar. cat. 217,32-218, 1 = SVF 2 .389 and In Ar. cat. 271,20-2 = SVF 2.383), are able to affect it causally. Qualities were generally understood by the Stoics as currents of air shaping the substance.134 Α qualifed substance is, for instance, a prudent individual (φρόνιμος) (Simpl. In Ar. cat. 212,12-213,1 = SVF 2.390). It is thus that the Stoics understood an in- | dividual as consisting of two substrates, substance and quality (see Plut. Comm. not. 1083Α-1084Α and Porph. ap. Simpl. In Ar. cat. 48, 11-16), which were both corporeal. Any individual object is a mixture of substance and quality, neither of which can exist in isolation. Moreover, the characteristic of being a qualified substance exhibits two stages, namely commonly and peculiarly qualified.
134. This is, according to Simplicius, Chrysippus’s view (In Ar. cat. 217,32-218,1 = SVF 2.389).
(81-82)
5.5.3.9
[Commonly qualified substance corresponds to the common noun, peculiarly qualified substance corresponds to the proper noun, and mere (unqualified) substance, although an impossibility in actuality, corresponds to the pronoun.]
[The first category is ὑποχείμενον (substance / substrate) and the second is ποιόν (quality / qualified).] There are linguistic equivalents for the first two categories. [Recall that substances have two stages of qualification, common and peculiar.] The common noun corresponds with commonly qualified substance, and the proper noun with peculiarly qualified substance. Now, although substances cannot exist apart from qualities, pure substance can still be designated with the pronoun.
The linguistic equivalents of the two first categories are quite clear: they are represented by the three nominal parts of speech.135 The common noun signifies ‘commonly qualified’, the proper noun ‘peculiarly qualified’ and the pronoun expresses pure ‘substance’. Curiously, although substances cannot exist in the real world separately from qualities, it seems to be possible to separate these aspects linguistically and point, by means of the pronoun, to a mere substance.
[Footnote 135 is about the possibility of relating “disposition (or disposed) (πως έχον) and relative disposition (or relatively disposed) (rφός τί πως έχον) to linguistic description, namely to ‘intransitive’ and ‘transitive’ verbs respectively” (82).]
(82)
5.5.3.10
[Insofar as a part of speech is given as a verbal expression, it is corporeal (because it is physically spoken), and at the same time, it represents a corporeal thing too. This leads to confusions when we take the corporeal expression itself to be the same as the corporeal thing it represents. Also, anything that can be a noun is corporeal.]
Luhtala will now make some comments on the Stoic parts of speech. {1} The parts of speech [as verbal expressions] are corporeal. Additionally, what they represent are corporeal things too. [It seems that one confusion this can create is that since both the signifier and the signified are corporeal, and since they both correspond directly with or actually are some given thing, then we might confuse the corporeal expression for a thing with the corporeal thing itself, as in Chrysippus’ example of saying “wagon” and thereby an actual wagon passes through your lips.]
The Stoic parts of speech call forth a number o f comments. There is a curious ambivalence in the corporeality of the nominal parts of speech in that they are, as such, corporeal expressions and they signify something that is corporeal, substances and qualities. This ambivalence has probably given rise to some sophisms.136
136. For instance, εἴ τι λαλεῖς, τοῦτο διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται: ἅμαξαν δὲ λαλεῖς. ἅμαξα ἄρα διὰ τοῦ στόματός σου διέρχεται (“Ίf you say something, it passes through your lips: now you say ‘wagon’, consequently a wagon passes through your lips” Diog. Laert. VII,187); cf. Clemens (Strom. VIII,9,26,5, p. 97,3-7). For sophisms, see Ebbesen (1981: 23 f.).
(82)
{2} It would seem then that anything which takes the form of a noun was understood by the Stoics as corporeal. However, we have a different concept of nounness today (82-83).
5.5.3.11
[Parts of speech serve their representational function either by pointing out or showing their reference (δηλοῦν) or by signifying it (σημαίνειν). Verbs signify either their predicate or something about the subject. Proper nouns and pronouns point out an individual quality. However, common nouns signify common qualities. They do not point out their reference, like proper nouns and pronouns do, because common nouns are not specific like these others are.]
The parts of speech serve some representative function. There are two verbs for this function: {1} δηλοῦν, “to point out” or “to show”, and {2} σημαίνειν, “to signify” (83). The different parts of speech are said to refer in accordance with this distinction. Proper nouns point out (δηλοῦν) an individual quality and pronouns point out (δηλοῦν) a mere substance. Common nouns signify (σημαίνειν) common qualities. Verbs signify (σημαίνειν) either the predicate or “something that is construed around one or more subjects” (83). [The next idea seems to be that the reason common nouns signify while proper nouns and pronouns point out or show their referents is that in propositions, proper nouns and pronouns specify some particular thing while common nouns are not specific.] (83)
Concerning their terminology, a question arises, whether the Stoics differentiated their use of the verbs δηλοῦν (‘to point out’, ‘to show’) and σημαίνειν (‘to signify’) in defining the parts of speech. The proper noun and the pronoun are said to point out (δηλοῦν) individual quality and mere substance respectively, whereas the common noun is said to signify (σημαίνειν) common quality. The verb is said to signify (σημαίνειν) the predicate or something that is construed around one or more subjects. The use of δηλοῦν in the case of proper nouns and pronouns could be due to the fact that subjects are normally represented by these items in the Stoic propositions. The ‘meaning’ of these parts is thus different in that it immediately reveals the definite referent of the proposition. Such common nouns as ‘man’ and ‘horse’ as well as verbs do not reveal anything that is so clearly identifiable. Common nouns thus do not figure prominently in the Stoic propositional analysis in which statements are made about definite individuals.139
139 The role played by universals (represented by common nouns such a ‘man’ and ‘horse’) in the Stoic proposition remains obscure to me. According to Zeno, they are nonexistent (ἀνυτάρκτους, SVF 1.65); they are neither corporeals nor incorporeals in the Stoic ontological scheme. According to Long & Sedley, talk of universals like ‘man’, though legitimate, must be understood a being reducible to talk of token men (1987: 164). Accordingly, the definition “man is a rational mortal animal” (ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν was analyzed by the Stoics as “If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal” (Adv. math. ΧΙ,8-11 = S VF 2.224). See also Ebbesen (1988: 27-28).
But according to Sextus Empiricus, ‘man’ and ‘horse’ represent corporeal things which can affect the commanding-faculty (ἡγεμονικὸν) just like other bodies (Adv. math. VIII,409 = SVF 2.85). According to Plutarch, too, they are bodies, together with heaven, earth and stones (Plut. De comm. not. 1073D).
Common nouns (e.g. ‘man’) appear in sophisms, a quoted by Galen, for instance (De soph. 4 = S VF 2.153).
5.5.3.12
[Nouns as simple parts of speech are not syntactical units (that is, they do not contribute directly to the meaning of a proposition) until they are modified by case.]
[Luhtala returns to the notion of “syntactical force”. This was something we examined in section 5.5.2.5. I was not sure then what this term means, and I am still not sure. What we said before was that it might have something to do with the fact that you can have parts of speech that when taken in their raw form and then combined, like a noun and a verb, may form a sentence on the level of expression but they do not form a proposition on the level of meaning. Perhaps what is required are modifications in the noun’s case for example, which would designate certain conceptual relations that would help form a propositional concept. I am guessing.]
I have viewed the parts of speech as non-syntactical units in the component of expression (σημαίνοντα) claiming that syntactic force is assigned to them only in the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα). There is surely a problem in presenting nouns and verbs without syntactical force. The problem is less marked in the description of the noun and the pronoun: the examples are given in the nominative case which is readily understood as the most neutral form although a nominal in the nominative case is a syntactically valid item as such. But it is difficult to see how the problem could have been solved without resorting to abstract forms of representation, which the Stoics did not do. There is, however, some evidence that the noun as such was understood as a generic noun, that is without case, in which its syntactical force resides. This evidence, which is provided by Apollonius Dyscolus, will be discussed below (see p. 105-106).
(84)
5.5.3.13
[The infinitive form of the verb is the non-syntactical part of speech, while its finite declension stands for the predicate of a sayable.]
[The verb in its infinitive form would also be a non-syntactical part of speech, while its modified finite version could adequately stand for a predicate of a sayable. Please consult the quotation to follow to be sure.]
As to the verb, one could argue that the infinitive should adequately represent the verb (ῥῆμα) as a non-syntactical part of speech, while the finite verb would properly stand for the predicate in the component of sayables.140 What we find is that the verb is defined as a predicate and the examples are given in the finite form or in the infinitive. But again Apollonius Dyscolus fulfils my expectation in saying that the infinitives were called verbs (ῥῆματα) by the Stoics while such indicative forms as περιπατεῑ (‘walks’) and γράφει (‘writes’) were regarded as predicates (κατηγόρηματα or σύμβαματα GG IL: 43,15-16).141
140. Cf. Schmidt (1979: 69): “Rhema, jedes Verbum, insofern es für sich betrachtet wird und aus allem Satzzusammenhang herausgenommen ist. Obgleich diese Bezeichnung mehr ... für Infinitiv geeignet.”
141. Evidence to the contrary would seem to be provided by Ammonius, according to whom the Stoics called all the various inflectional forms of the verb ‘verbs’/’predicates’ (ῥήματα) (In de int. CAG IV,5: 45,6). This is only an apparent contradiction. Ammonius is using Peripatetic vocabulary: what was ῥῆμα for Aristotle was κατηγόρημα for the Stoics. Cf. Hülser and Egli in Schmidt (1979: 133).
(84)
[The nouns of course stand for something corporeal. The verb, I suppose in its finite form only, stands for something incorporeal, namely, the predicate or sayable. Luhtala then notes another distinction, which I do not follow. It seems to be the following, but please consult the quotation and diagram to follow. The verb is understood as involving just one sort of relationship, namely, the relationship between the verb (as part of speech or element of expression) and predicate (as sayable or component of meaning). Nouns also have a similar such part of speech/syntax relation, namely that between noun or pronoun and case. However, the nominal parts of speech involve an additional relation, namely, that between quality or substance and noun or pronoun. (Specifically, proper and common nouns signify a quality, while the pronoun signifies a pure substance.) (I am not certain, but perhaps the nominal parts signify a corporeal reality and an incorporeal sense, while the verbs only signify incorporeal senses. I am guessing.]
The three nominal parts of speech signify corporeal items, whereas the verb stands for something that is incorporeal, the predicate, or the sayable. There is a crucial difference in the description of the nominal parts of speech as opposed to the verb, such that the former involves two relationships (quality/substance – noun/pronoun – case) whereas the latter only one (verb – predicate).
(85)
From:
Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.
Other texts, cited by Luhtala:
Ammonius: In Aristotelis De Interpretatione commentarius. CAG IV.5. Ed. by Adolf Busse. B erlin: Reimer 1897.
Clemens Alexandrinus: Stromata. Ed. by Otto Stählin. Die Griechischen Christlichen Schrifsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte II-III. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1960- 70.
Ebbesen, Sten. 1981. Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi. A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies. 1. The Greek Tradition. Leiden: Brill.
[Note, I could not find the text for Ebbesen 1988 in the bibliography.]
[Note, I did not see Galen’s De Soph. in the Bibliography list. Perhaps it is a part of the text that is listed:
Galen. Gelaeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. Edition, translation and Commentary by Phillip de Lacy. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum. V.4.1.2. Berlin: Academie-Verlag 1978-80.
]
GG: Grammatici Graeci . Ed. by Heinrich Schneider and Gustav Uhlig. Leipzig: Teubner (repr 1965 Hildesheim: Olms).
GL: Grammatici Latini . Ed by Heinrich Keil. Leipzig: Teubner 1855-80.
Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pinborg, Jan. 1975. “Classical Antiquity: Greece”. Seboek (1975: 69-126).
Plutarch: De virtute morali in Plutarchi Moralia III. Ed. by W.R. Paton, M. Pohlenz and W. Sieveking. Leipzig: Teubner 1972.
Plutarch: De Stoicis repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos in Plutarchi Moralia V.1 .2. Ed. by Ma Pohlenz. Leipzig: Teubner 1972.
Schmidt, Rudolf Τ . 1979. Stoicorum grammatica. Halle 1839. (Reprinted Amsterdam: Hakkert 1967 = Die Grammatik der Stoiker. Einführung, Übersetzung und Bearbeitung von Karlheinz Hίlser, Urs Egli, Braunschweig, Wiesbaden 1979.].
Simplicius: In Arstotelis Categoras Commentarium. CAG VIII. Ed. by Carl Kalbfleisch. Berlin: Reimer 1907.
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Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N. 1987. The Hellenistic philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.
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This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:
http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-parts-of.html
.
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