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Summary of
Anneli Luhtala
On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic
Ch.5 The Stoics
5.5 Stoic Logic
5.5.2
The Components of Expression (Σημαίνοντα) and Meaning (Σημαινόμενα)
Brief summary:
Stoic dialectic has two parts. Generally speaking, there is a part that lies on the level of language itself and a part that deals more with the conceptual meanings the language expresses. Specifically, the two parts are: {1} “expression,” equivalent to σημαίνοντα (that which signifies), to φωναί (vocal sounds), and to λέξις (word), and {2} “meaning” or “sayables,” equivalent to σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning), and to λεκτά (sayables). The study of expression examines a heterogeneous set of related issues, including written utterances, parts of speech, poetry, definitions, and other various topics. The study of meaning, however, examines a more homogeneous set of logical sorts of issues, like propositions, sense (sayables), predicates, genera and species, arguments, and states of affairs. With regard to expression, ὄνομα means ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα means ‘verb’. With regard to meaning, these terms correspond with πτῶσις (case) and κατηγόρημα (predicate), respectively. Simple parts of speech, like nouns or verbs alone, are not able to take on truth values. This is only possible for sayables, which can be articulated in a propositional formulation, and thus truth and falsity are also matters of syntax, which is the meaningful combination of parts of speech. So “Dion” does not express a sayable, and it cannot be either true or false; however, “Dion walks” does and can, because its syntax allows it to represent a state of affairs in the world. Regarding the articulation of meaning, we arrange the relevant concepts in an order going from the most to the least conforming to the rational organization of the world. The world itself operates rationally, on account of its rational principle, λόγος. States of affairs (πράγματα) in the world thus have a rational sense to them, which is their sayable (λεκτόν). The verbal articulation that can adequately express the λόγος of the λεκτόν and thus of the πράγματα is also called a λόγος, but this time meaning an intelligible, articulate sentence. A step down from that is a λέξις, which is an articulate sound that might not even be intelligible, as with the famous example of “blituri”. Next down is a φωνή, which is a sound that may not even be articulate (that is, might not even resemble a word with composite letters or phonetics). There are two related sorts of speech acts: προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables). As we noted, while λέξις can represent a word for a real thing, it lacks the syntactical powers to represent a state of affairs. This is because real situations in the world have certain ontological properties that require more sophisticated syntactical mechanisms to be expressed. For example, the relation between a thing and its properties cannot be represented simply in a word but rather requires a syntax with a subject-predicate structure. Now, the sense of a state of affairs as the sayable (λεκτόν) is something incorporeal. However, as soon as it is vocally articulated into a propositional sentence, it has thereby taken on a corporeal form, because speech is corporeal, as it produces effects in the world. There is still another terminological distinction that divides meaning and expression into three units: 1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) and is thus incorporeal, and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification and is thus corporeal.
Summary
5.5.2.1
[There are two parts of Stoic dialectic: {1} “expression,” which is equivalent to σημαίνοντα (that which signifies) / φωναί (vocal sounds) / λέξις (word), and {2} “meaning” or “sayables,” which is equivalent to σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning) / λεκτά (sayables)]
There are two parts of Stoic dialectic:
{1} σημαίνοντα / that which signifies (Diog. Laert. VII,62), also understood as φωναί / vocal sounds (Diog. Laert. VII,43); and
{2} σημαινόμενα / that which is signified (Diog. Laert. VII,62), also understood with the same Greek term, σημαινόμενα, but with the sense, ‘meaning’, when related to φωναί / vocal sounds (Diog. Laert. VII,43) (70).
Note that σημαινόμενον (that which is signified) is equivalent to λεκτόν (sayable) (70). We also note that sometimes the term λέξις (word) is used as a synonym for φωνή (vocal sound). [Later we see a more precise way to differentiate them.] With this in mind, Luhtala makes the following terminological distinction:
{a} “expression” = σημαίνοντα (that which signifies) / φωναί (vocal sounds) / λέξις (word)
{b} “meaning” or “sayables” = σημαινόμενα (that which is signified, meaning) / λεκτά (sayables) (70).
5.5.2.2
[The study of expression examines a heterogeneous set of related issues, including written utterances, parts of speach, poetry, definitions, and others. The study of meaning examines more logical sorts of matters, like propostions, sense (sayables), predicates, genera and species, arguments, states of affairs, and others.]
For Diogenes Laertius, expression is a matter of written utterances, parts of speech, and other elements of language, including poetry, euphony, definitions, and other matters (see p.70). [Meaning, however, is a matter of logical structures that can be expressed linguistically.]
According to Diogenes Laertius, the study of expression covered
written utterance and what the parts of language are, dealing also with solecisms and barbarisms, poetry, ambiguity, euphony, music, and, according to some Stoics, definitions, divisions and expressions.112
The component of meaning comprised
impressions and derivatively subsistent sayables – propositions, complete sayables, predicates and similar actives and passives, genera and species, along with also arguments, argument modes and syllogisms, and sophisms which depend on utterance and on states of affairs. (Diog. Laert. VII,43-44 , tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 183)113
112. Εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. [See Perseus 44]
113. καὶ τὸν μὲν τῶν σημαινομένων εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν ἀξιωμάτων καὶ αὐτοτελῶν καὶ κατηγορημάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὀρθῶν καὶ ὑπτίων καὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λόγων καὶ τρόπων καὶ συλλογισμῶν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰ πράγματα σοφισμάτων. [See Perseus 43]
(70)
[Recall from above that the study of expression covers “written utterance and what the parts of language are, dealing also with solecisms and barbarisms, poetry, ambiguity, euphony, music, and, according to some Stoics, definitions, divisions and expressions”. Luhtala’s next point might be that this is a very odd heterogeneous combination of things to group under one study.]
The classification of topics under these two components of dialectic by the Stoics differs considerably from the modern understanding of the divisions of disciplines and it requires a special effort to appreciate the genuinely Stoic interpretation of these topics. It is particularly difficult to get to grips with the strikingly heterogeneous contents of the component of expression. It is probably best understood in terms of its composite nature, as has been suggested by Frede.
(71)
5.5.2.3
[The components of meaning are more homogeneous and are related to logical structures, like subject and predicate, but for the Stoics, the syntactical analysis is more sophisticated than with Aristotle.]
The expression can be analyzed structurally into its component parts of speech, which were likely studied for the sake of propositional analysis. [We noted before that the study of expression involves a heterogeneous set of topics.] “The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is much more homogeneous, including only philosophically relevant items, such as propositions and predicates” (71). [Luhtala in the previous chapters examined syntactical studies by Plato and Aristotle. The study of parts of speech in expression will derive from naming, while the components of meaning will come from the parts of statement making. Aristotle’s study of propositions was limited to simply subjects and verbs, but the Stoics had a much more sophistical analysis.]
The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is much more homogeneous, including only philosophically relevant items, such as propositions and predicates. I will view this division of topics as a development of the linguistic analysis initiated by Plato and Aristotle, so that the treatment of the parts of speech in the component of expression roughly derives from the non-syntactical level of naming (ὀνομάζειν) and the component of meaning from the syntactical level of statement-making (λέγειν). In such a comparison we must keep in mind the provisional nature of the Peri hermeneias as opposed to the elaborate system of the Stoics, to whom linguistic questions were of much more importance. Aristotle merely sketched the two constituents of the proposition, ὄνομα (‘noun’ / ‘subject’) and ῥῆμα (‘verb’ / ‘predicate’), and their combination into a statement without a careful analysis of the different levels involved in statement-making. The Stoics developed an elaborate system with a highly specialized vocabulary for each level of description.
(71)
5.5.2.4
[In their analysis of expression, ὄνομα means ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα means ‘verb’. In their analysis of meaning, these terms correspond with case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα), respectively.]
[The next point might be the following, but please check the quotation. In their analysis of expression, the Stoics considered ὄνομα to mean ‘noun’ and ῥῆμα to mean ‘verb’. In their analysis of meaning, ὄνομα corresponds to case (πτῶσις) and ῥῆμα corresponds with predicate (κατηγόρημα). This distinction is seen already in Aristotle, but the Stoics introduce additional terminology.]
While items of both levels were named ὄνομα and ῥῆμα by Aristotle, the Stoics posited a systematic terminological distinction to label the items of the two distinct levels. The Stoics maintained the well-established vocabulary of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα to refer to the noun and the verb as items of the component of expression (σημαίνοντα). I will view them as non-syntactical linguistic units in accordance with the level of naming (ὀνομάζειν) in the Peri hermeneias. Within the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα), the same items are known as case (πτῶσις) and predicate (κατηγόρημα). Both of these terms can be derived from Peripatetic usage. But the Stoics introduced many other terms into their component of meaning (σημαινόμενα), such as σύμβαμα (‘congruity’) and λεκτόν (‘sayable’), which attest to the versatility of the Stoic approach.
(72)
5.5.2.5
[Truth and falsity are not matters of grammatical parts of speech but rather of sayables and thus of syntax, which is the meaningful combination of parts of speech.]
The truth and falsity of statements lies in the component of meaning (σημαινόμενα). But the parts of statements, namely, cases and predicates, are not sufficient on their own to carry truth or falsity. [I am not sure about the next point. It might be the following. To combine a noun and a verb is not enough to make a statement. Perhaps it is enough to make a sentence. But what is needed are units of meaning, namely, case and predicate. She says that parts of speech do not have “syntactic force”, but I do not know what that means. Yet, given that it is needed for statements and thus for truth and falsity, syntax pertains to sayables or meaning. I do not understand how syntax is distinguishable from a study of parts of speech. Perhaps the difference is that an analysis of parts of speech is a matter of finding different grammatically categorizable parts, but syntax is more a matter of determining rules or patterns for how these parts can be arranged and interrelated so to form meaningful sentences. From page 26:
Syntactical analysis, when included in ancient grammars, amounts to the combination of the parts of speech, as based on their morphological characteristics, which were known as ‘accidents’. Ancient grammar adheres to a hierarchical principle according to which elements (στοιχεῖα) of each level are combined in order to form units of a higher level: combinations of letters form syllables, those of syllables words, words are combined to form sentences (e.g. Holtz 1981: 60-61 and Baratin 1989: 9, and note 16).
This hierarchical viewpoint is present in the earliest linguistic speculation when pursued within dialectic. ‘Syntax’ represents the highest level in this hierarchy, that is the level of speaking (λέγειν) defined by Plato and Aristotle as that in which it is possible to assert something. Two items were recognized by them on the previous level, that of naming (ὀνομάζειν), namely noun/subject (ὄνομα) and verb/predicate (ῥῆμα)
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]
The component of meaning (σημαινόμενα) is where true and false statements are made. The constituents of statements, cases and predicates, are deficient sayables. As far as I can see, in the Stoic system one cannot combine the noun and the verb, i.e. items of the component of expression (φωvαί), to effect statement-making because the parts of speech as such do not have syntactic force. Units of meaning (σημαινόμενα) are combined, that is cases and predicates. That truth and falsehood do not pertain to individual words (φωναί) but to their combination is a conclusion which the Stoics would seem to share with Plato and Aristotle. I am thus inclined to think that syntax, just like the question of truth and falsehood, pertained solely to the component of sayables (λεχτά) or meaning for the Stoics.
(72)
5.5.2.6
[A λόγος (speech, sentence) is an intelligible, articulate utterance. A λέξις is an articulate sound that may not be intelligible. And a φωνή is a sound that may not even be articulate. There are two related sorts of speech acts: {1} προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables).]
Luhtala next examines the relation between the notions of λεκτόν (sayable) and λόγος (speech or sentence) (72). [The concepts here seem to be organized in the following way. We begin with the least rational or logically structured thing and move toward the most. The first is φωνή (voice). It can be simply noise or it can be a sound with linguistic significance. Next is λέξις (articulate sound), which, like φωνή (voice) is composed of sounds, but it is unlike φωνή in that λέξις is articulate (which I think means it forms sounds which are language-like or which at least are candidates for carriers of significance.) The next is λόγος (speech, sentence), which is like λέξις in that both are articulate sounds, but the difference is that a λόγος has a certain meaning, while a λέξις might be unintelligible, as in the example of blituri. (See this entry on Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII,57). We now stop with this hierarchy, and we consider two sorts of speech acts, which are involved in the prior classifications: {1} προφέρεσθαι (uttering), which is associated with the linguistic item φωναί (vocal sounds), and {2} λέγειν (speaking), which is assocated with πράγματα (states of affairs) and thus also with λεκτά (sayables).]
The concept of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’) occurs in the following hierarchy of linguistic expressions reported by Diogenes Laertius (VII,56-57):
Φωνή (‘voice’) differs from λέξις (‘articulated sound’). Because, while the former may include mere noise, the latter is always articulate. Λέξις (‘articulate sound’) again differs from λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’) because the latter always signifies something, whereas a λέξις (‘articulated sound’), as for example blituri, may be unintelligible, which a λόγος never is. And speaking/saying (λέγειν) is different from uttering (προφέρεσθαι); for while | vocal sounds (φωναί) are uttered, states of affairs (πράγματα) are said, and sayables pertain to states of affairs.116
A distinction is drawn here between two kinds of speech acts, that of uttering (προφέρεσθαι) and that of speaking (λέγειν), which are associated with two kinds of linguistic items, vocal sounds (φωναί) and states of affairs (πράγματα), respectively. Furthermore, sayables (λεκτά) are said to pertain to states of affairs (πράγματα). This idea of two kinds of speech acts would seem to correspond closely to the distinction between the two components of dialectic. We know that vocal/articulate sounds belong to the component of expression and states of affairs/sayables to the component of meaning.
116. διαφέρει δὲ φωνὴ καὶ λέξις, ὅτι φωνὴ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἦχός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ τὸ ἔναρθρον μόνον. λέξις δὲ λόγου διαφέρει, ὅτι λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστι, λέξις δὲ καὶ ἄσημος, ὡς ἡ βλίτυρι, λόγος δὲ οὐδαμῶς. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν τοῦ προφέρεσθαι: προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα, ἃ δὴ καὶ λεκτὰ τυγχάνει.. [See Perseus 57] See Long/Sedley: Most editors accept Casaubon’s supplement, οἶον ἡμέρα ἐστί, after ἐκπεμπομένη. This may be right, but there is no reason to think that a λόγος has to be a complete sayable (1987 II:197 n. 2). I am inclined to accept Casaubon’s supplement.
(72-73)
5.5.2.7
[λόγος can take the form of speech. Since meaningful speech comes from the throat, which is near the heart, Diogenes of Babylon thought that the mind is in the heart and not the head.]
[The “syntactical nature of the notion of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’)” seems to be the fact that conceptualizable things about the world have a rational structure that is paralleled by the relation between parts of propositions, as for example the way that a thing and its properties is represented in the subject-predicate structure.] In the next paragraph we will see a quote by Diogenes of Babylon. His point will correspond with our understanding of the “syntactical nature of the notion of λόγος (‘speech’, ‘sentence’)” (73). For, while λέξις is a vocal sound that can be written as a word, λόγος instead is a “meaningful vocal sound that issues from the mind” and which takes the form of a proposition, like, “It is day” (73, citing Diog. Laert. VII,55-56). [The next point seems to be the following. We have made a linguistic point by distinguishing mere vocalized signification, which will take the form of simple terms, and conceptualized signification, which can also be vocalized in the form of propositions. The realm of mere vocalization lacks the rational component of logical syntax. But the Stoics make this distinction between vocal speech (φωνή) and meaningful speech (λόγος) for another purpose, “namely to show that the source of thinking and speaking is the same” (74). The idea in this latter half of this paragraph and in the next might be the following, but please see pages 73-74 to be sure. We begin by assuming that we do not know where in our anatomy our mind is located. For example, it could be in the head or it could be in the heart. The next assumption we make is that wherever is the source from which rational articulations arise is the place where the mind is. We then observe that both mere speech and meaningful articulate speech are sent out from the throat region. Next we note that this region is physiologically near to the heart, and more distant from the head. Thus, the mind is located in the heart.]
5.5.2.8
[This notion of the rational thought being expressible through vocalization reflects the dichotomy between {a} λόγος as rational thought or meaningful speech and {b} λέξις or φωναί as mere speech that does not necessarily express a propositionally structurable thought.]
Luhtala then quotes Diogenes of Babylon, making this point we noted above, that since meaningful speech comes from the throat, which is near the heart, the mind is in the heart and not the head. Following this is a quote from Chrysippus that makes the same point (74, quoting: [Chrysippus maybe or perhaps Galen] De Plac. II 5, 18-20, tr. De Lacy 1978: 131). Luhtala then relates Chrysippus’ notion with Plato’s “twofold description of speech, thought and spoken, in the Sophist.” [Here the idea seems to be that speech in thought, which is silent, has another side to it when it is articulated into vocalized speech. See p.75.]
5.5.2.9
[The Stoic notion of sayables is like Plato’s notion of internal speech, however, for the Stoics, when the sayable is given vocal utterance, it becomes corporeal speech (λόγῳ).]
Luhtala then compares the Stoic notion of sayables with Plato’s notion of internal speech, “which precedes the actual enunciation of spoken words;” for, “Sayables would thus literally be something that could be uttered but actually need not be uttered” (75). [However, one difference is that for the Stoics, as soon as the sayable is uttered, it becomes corporeal speech (λόγῳ).
This is in accordance with what we know of the relationship between speech and thought in the Stoic theory: the rational impression (φαντασία) comes first, then thought which is able to speak (διάνοια εχλαλητιχή) expresses its experience by means of speech (λόγῳ) (Diog. Laert. VII,49).
(75)
5.5.2.10
[The λόγος of meaningful articulate speech is incorporeal, but the speech as mere vocal sounds φωναί is corporeal, because it has an effect.]
For the Stoics, meaningful articulate speech as λόγος [or as sayable] occupies the incorporeal ontological sphere. However, the parts of speech as vocal sounds (φωναί) lie in the corporeal ontological sphere, because they have an effect:
For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect for whatever produces an effect is corporeal. Voice, as it proceeds from those | who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect. (Diog. Laert. VII,55 = SVF 2.140, tr. R.H. Hicks; cf. Aet. Plac. IV,20,2 = SVF 2.387 and Suda s.v. σῶμα.)120
120. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι: ποιεῖ δὲ ἡ φωνὴ προσιοῦσα τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων. [Following Perseus]
(75-76)
[Note, in my version of the Hick’s translation, the quote does not have this redundancy in its formulation. It reads simply as one sentence: “For whatever produces an effect is body; and voice, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect.” See 56 at Perseus.]
5.5.2.11
[The Stoic theory of meaning and expression distinguishes three units: {1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) and is thus incorporeal, and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification, and is thus corporeal.]
The Stoic theory [of meaning] has three units: {1} a corporeal sound (φωνήν), which is a signifier (σημαῖνον) {2} the corporeal sound’s ‘signification’ (σημαινόμενον), which lies in the intellect and is a matter of the sayable (λεκτόν) [when it is formulated propositionally such that it could be either true or false], [also, it might be a matter of the motion of thought (κινήσει τῆς διανοίας)] and {3} the referent (τυγχάνον), which is the physical object in the world corresponding to the signification (76). The corporeal sound and its signfication lie in the realm of dialectic. The referent, however, is a matter of physics. Luhtala notes that Sextus may have misrepresented the theory by portraying the signification as a term, which cannot be true or false. Instead of it being the notion of “Dion”, it should rather be a proposition like “Dion walks” [See these entries on that topic.]
It is customary to view the Stoic theory as involving three units, a corporeal sound, its ‘signification’ and the referent. Two of them belong to the domain of dialectic whereas the third component, the object in the external world, which activates the impression, belongs to the physical theory. The Stoic theory is generally illustrated with a passage from Sextus Empiricus, who records the Stoic position in the course of his exposition of a controversy concerning the sphere of truth in the doctrines of the various philosophical schools (see e.g. Müller 1978: 7; Graeser 1978: 78):
The Stoics defended the first opinion (according to which true and false is a question of the signification), saying that three things are linked together, ‘the signification’, ‘the signifier’, and ‘the name-bearer’. The signifier is an utterance, for instance ‘Dion’; the signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies – the utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal – the state of affairs signified and sayable, which is true or false. (Adv. math. VIII, 11-13, tr. Long/Sedley 1987: 195)121
121. Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πρώτη περὶ τἀληθοῦς διαφωνία τοιαύτη τις ὑπῆρχεν. ἦν δὲ καί ἄλλη τις παpὰ τούτοις διάστασις, καθ᾽ ἣν οἱ μὲν πεpὶ τῷ σημαινομὲνῳ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἷον τὴν Δίων, σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς δηλούμενον καὶ οὗ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμένου διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐπαΐουσι καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες, τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Δίων. τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἓν δὲ ἀσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτόν ὅπερ ἀληθές τε γίνεται ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ τοῦτο οὐ κοινῶς πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐλλιπές τὸ δὲ αὐτοτελές. The ‘name-bearer’ appears to be an infelicitous translation for τυγχάνον because this text has to do with statement-making rather than name-giving. Ι have replaced it by ‘case-bearer’ which Long and Sedley use elsewhere (1987: 201).
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[For an online transcription: 8.11; 8.12. Below is an image of a text for reference.
Here is another translation:
11. ... And there was yet another quarrel among the dogmatists; for some located the true and false in the thing signified, some located it in the utterance, and some in the motion of the intellect. And the Stoics championed the first view, saying that three things are linked with one another: the thing signified, the signifier, and the object. 12. Of these, the signifier is the utterance, for example, ‘Dion’. The thing signified is the thing indicated by the utterance and which we grasp when it subsists in our intellect and which foreigners do not understand although they hear the utterance. The object is the external existent, for example, Dion himself. Two of these are bodies, the utterance and the object, and one incorporeal, the signified thing, i.e., the thing said [lekton] which is true or false. This last point is not of unrestricted application, but some lekta are incomplete and some complete. One kind of complete lekton is the so-called proposition, which they describe thus: a proposition is that which is true or false.
(Stoic Reader 89)
]
5.5.2.12
[We are concerned with the propositions resulting from rational impressions, which correspond to sayables. We are not concerned with other sorts of sentences.]
[In addition to issues of syntax,] Luhtala will also be examining “the propositions resulting from rational impressions which are the essential subject matter of the theory of sayables (λεχτά)” (77), and she will exclude any non-propositional sorts of formulations (77-78). Matters of expression will only interest us insofar as they are “relevant to the syntax of deficient and complete sayables” (77).
5.5.2.13
[Our concern is not with name-giving or etymology.]
Luhtala is also not concerned with “name-giving and the etymological procedures” (78).
From:
Luhtala, Anneli. 2000. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus.
Other texts, cited by Luhtala:
[Note, for “Aet. Plac.” I did not see something for it in the Bibliography, but perhaps it is Aetius’s Placita Philosophorum.]
[Note, for Chrysippus or Galen De Plac. II 5, 18-20, tr. De Lacy 1978, I could not find either in the Bibliography. Perhaps it is Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. And perhaps for the translation: Galenus / Phillip Howard De Lacy. Galeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis = Galen on the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. Berlin [-Ost] : Akademie-Verlag, 1978-1984. Worldcat link.]
Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers. Translated by Robert D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann / Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1950.
The Perseus Greek page for the Diogenes’ passages:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0257%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1
The Perseus English page for the Diogenes’ passages:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1
Graeser, Andrea. 1978. “The Stoic Theory of Meaning”. Rist (1978: 77-100).
Müller, Ian. 1978 “An Introduction to Stoic Logic”. Rist (1978: 1-26).
Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos I-XI. Ed. with an English translation by Robert G. Bury. 4 vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1949.
Suda ( = Suida). Suidae Lexicon. Ed. by Ada Adler. Leipzig: Teubner 1931.
SVF: Stoicorum veterum fragmenta I-III. Ed. Iohannes von Arnim. Leipzig: Teubner 1905-24.
Texts I cite:
Sextus Empiricus. 1914. Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. 2, Adversus Dogmaticos, libros quinque (Adv. Mathem. VII-XI) continens, edited by Hermannus Mutschmann. Lipsiae [Leipzig]: Teubneri [Teubner]. Available online:
https://archive.org/details/sextiempiriciope12sext
Online text transcription at:
http://socratics.daphnet.org
[specifically here]
2008. The Stoic Reader. Selected Writings and Testimonia. Translated by Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson. Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett.
This entry redoes the one here, made a while ago:
http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/04/stoic-logic-and-semantics-components-of.html
.
