Determining the Parts of a Self TF§99 Associationism Involves a Defective Conception of the Self. Bergson. Time and Free Will

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary; my commentary is in brackets.]

Determining the Parts of a Self

Henri Bergson

Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness

Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

Ch.III

The Organization of Conscious States; Free Will

De l'organization des états de conscience: la liberté

Part XXXI: Psychological Determinism

In the previous section we discussed deliberation. Sometimes when we make a decision, we first undertake a series of considerations. Then we decide. So it seems that our final action was determined by the preceding series of mental states. Bergson points-out however that all throughout the deliberation we knew in the backs of our mind what we were going to do. This is our free will. In order to produce a conceptual rational for what the will is going to choose on its own, the mind intentionally deliberates to defend its role in the decision.

§99 Associationism Involves a Defective Conception of the Self

Bergson will now examine associationist determinism. It views the self as being a collection of psychic states. One among them will have a prevailing influence on the others. Bergson then cites John Stuart Mill to show that associationist determinists sharply distinguish co-existing psychic phenomena [footnote 1, reference to be added later]. So we might at the same time be tempted to commit murder while also feel an aversion to the crime and a dread for its consequences. If the temptation outweighs the resistance, than we will commit murder. Both mental phenomena, dread and temptation, coexist for Mill, while yet because they are opposed, they are as well sharply distinguished.

Then Mill will connect these states to the self. When doing so, he extends the distinctions. So when experiencing the conflict of temptation, we have a conflict between two selves, the me desiring pleasure and the me dreading self-reproach. Similarly, Bain considers there to be a wide variety of distinct sorts of pleasure and pain that may exist all on their own [footnote 2, reference to be added later]. Even opponents of determinism will often speak of associations of ideas and conflicts of motives. For example, Alfred Fouillée argues for freedom, but makes freedom a motive that may be counterbalanced by others [footnote 1, reference to be added later].

Bergson ends by saying the root of this mistake lies in the limitations of language.

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Images of the pages summarized above, from the English translation [click to enlarge]:

Images of the pages summarized above, from the original French [click to enlarge]:

Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Transl. F.L. Pogson. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/timeandfreewill00pogsgoog

Bergson, Henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Originally published, Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1888. Available online at:http://www.archive.org/details/essaisurlesdonn00berguoft