Pirates & Revolutionaries: Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Introduction

by Corry Shores
[Search Blog Here. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]

[Central Entry Directory]
[Hume, Entry Directory]
[Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Entry Directory]

[The following is summary, up to the end where I reproduce this section in full. My commentary is in brackets.]

David Hume

A Treatise of Human Nature

Introduction

§1

Sometimes philosophers think they discover something new. And when they do, often they advance their own theories by diminishing all preceding ones. But even the most prominent philosophical systems are sure always to have such shortcomings as:

a) ungrounded founding principles,

b) conclusions "lamely" deduced from them,

c) a general lack of coherence between the system's parts, and

d) a lack of supporting evidence for much of the whole system.

Really, any learned person can critique these old revered systems. So one does not need a new idea to do so. (xvii b.d)

§2

In fact, just about anyone can detect the fundamental problems in the way we conduct the sciences.

even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. (xvii - xviii)

All theories are open to debate. Even their most trivial aspects remain undecided.

Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. (xviii .a)

The debates' winners are usually the most eloquent, not those with the best arguments.

The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army. (xviii .b)

§3

And, these philosophical systems tend to be difficult to comprehend, because they require much attention and concentration. We spend much time to understand them, only to find that they are doomed to be uncertain and undecidable. So whenever we encounter difficult philosophies, we tend to reject them from the beginning under the prejudice that giving them any effort will bear no fruit anyway. Instead, we think that if we will subject ourselves to such errors and delusions, they at least should be enjoyable.

However, uncovering the truth will nonetheless involve such incredible difficulties.

For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. (xviii - xix)

Hume does not pretend to be more capable than the greatest geniuses who might be more capable of understanding philosophical problems. So his philosophy will be more difficult to comprehend. The common prejudice we noted was that difficult philosophies are not worth our effort to understand. Hume says that if his philosophy was easy and obvious, that would more certainly be reason to ignore it.

§4

Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion are all products of human thought, and they are evaluated by our powers and faculties of judgment. So even if they seem to run away from humanity, "they still return back by one passage or another."

Consider if we ever came to fully grasp the "extent and force of human understanding," and if we could explain the nature of our ideas and rational operations. Perhaps this knowledge could cause unforeseeable changes and improvements in these sciences. Clearly our abilities to do math and science will benefit from such knowledge. But human beings are usually not the objects of those studies. However, through natural religion, we learn about the ways we should act. So in that case we are both the ones studying, and the ones studied. (xix b.c)

§5

Still, of all the sciences, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion depend least on our knowledge of human beings. The other sciences, however, have a greater dependence on such a knowledge. So probably they will benefit even more. More specifically, Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics are sure to advance from a deeper knowledge of human understanding. As well, if we improve human thinking, we could further these pursuits.

§6

Given the benefits of such an endeavor, we should turn our focus directly to human understanding.

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity. (xx b)

All important questions must be decided by the science of man.

In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. (xx c)

§7

Natural Science begins with Thales. The Science of Man begins with Socrates. The difference between them is about 100 years. Similarly, there is about a 100 years between Francis Bacon's application of experimental philosophy to natural sciences, and John Locke's application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects. Locke, along with his contemporaries, "put the science of man on a new footing."

§8

England has earned high esteem from its developments in natural philosophy. Hume claims it will obtain "greater glory" from its advances in the science of man.

The natural sciences study external bodies. The nature of these objects is quite unknown to us. So our best means to study them is through empirical observation and experimentation.

Now, since the human mind is equally unknown to us, we should as well employ these empirical methods to study it. We aim to obtain general principles concerning the mind. Despite this generality we seek, we must only use empirical methods.

And though we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. (xxi b.c)

§9

We often find ourselves desiring many extraordinary things. Not having them makes us discontent. But when we learn it is certain we could never obtain them by any means anyway, the desire and discontent fade-away. So here at the beginning, Hume wants us to understand something. His project will allow us to experience the reality of the "most general and most refined principles" of human reasoning. However, it is not realistic to expect we will also posses the reasons for these principles.

And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy. (xxii)

§10

In fact, there is no field of science or art that is able to explain ultimate principles. So we should think no less of the science of man.

None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority. (xxii d)

In the natural sciences, when we do not understand the effects of one body upon another in a given situation, we need only place that body in that situation and observe it. However, for moral questions, we can only imagine ourselves in certain situations. And because it is ourselves we imagine, we will not always be able to objectively apply our natural principles.

We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension. (xxiii)

[Next entry in this series.]

From the original text:

Introduction
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.
Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.
From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious.
It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since the lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.
And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, etc.] in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.
Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.
I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.
But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider, it is evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension.