Pirates & Revolutionaries: Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 3, Sect 7 Of the Nature of the Idea Or Belief §§220-227

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary, up to the end where I reproduce this section in full. My commentary is in brackets. Paragraph headings are my own.]

David Hume

A Treatise of Human Nature

Book I: Of the Understanding

Part III: Of Knowledge and Probability

Section VII: Of the Nature of the Idea Or Belief

§220 We Believe in the Object's Idea

We may conceive many things. But we do not believe every conception. Yet, every belief we have involves some idea. Hence "the idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole." (94b)

§221 Arguing Ontological Beliefs

So we infer that effects will ensue from causes. In this way our reasoning terminates in us making a conclusion regarding the effect's existence or quality. We conclude some matter of fact. And we noted before that the idea of an object's existence is not different from our conception of that object [for more, see §§153-155.] So whenever we conceive something as existing, we are not really adding anything to the idea, or altering it in any way. So say we want to conceive of God's existence. All we need to do is conceive of God himself. [Hence the ontological argument.]

Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the existence, which we attribute to him, conceiv'd by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them. (94c)

Now in order to understand how belief relates to concepts of existence, let's consider three cases.

a) We think of God,

b) We think of God as existing,

c) We believe God to exist.

Throughout these instances, our idea of God neither increases nor diminishes. So we saw that the conception of an object's existence neither adds to its idea nor alters it in any way. Now we see as well that believing in some object's existence also does not add-to or alter its idea.

Yet we know still there is a great difference between simply conceiving some object's existence and believing. But we just discovered that this difference cannot lie in the parts or composition of the idea we are conceiving. Hence the difference must lie in the manner that we conceive it.

§222 The Absurdity of Belief

To grasp the relation between understanding and belief, consider someone tells us the following falsehoods:

1) Caesar died in his bed.

2) It is easier to liquefy and fuse lead than it is to liquefy and fuse silver.

3) Mercury is heavier than gold.

We do not believe his words. Nonetheless, we understand what this person is saying. "I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms." (95a)

Both we and he have the same imaginal and conceptual powers to grasp his meanings. "nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea, which I cannot conceive; nor conjoin any, which I cannot conjoin. " (95b)

So we both understand these ideas the same whether we believe them or not. But then what is the difference between believing and disbelieving any proposition?

[Consider two propositions: "Circles are round," and "Circles are rectilinear." We cannot possibly conceive a square circle. It's absurd. However, we cannot but imagine round circles. And what we cannot imagine is impossible. Though whatever we can imagine is possible. (see §73 for more on this principle.)]

Let's first address propositions that we prove by intuition or demonstration. When we disbelieve them, it's because they are inconceivable or absurd. And if a proposition has been demonstrated, we cannot imagine things being otherwise. Hence we believe demonstrated propositions. And we disbelieve absurd propositions.

Now let's consider instead reasoning from causation and reasonings regarding matters of fact. In these cases, the imagination is always able to conceive of things being otherwise. So we cannot be apodictically certain of these instances. But, it is still possible to conceive things one or the other way in such cases of causation and matters of fact. And in fact it is necessary that we do anyway. So we still do not know what the difference is between believing or disbelieving such reasonings.

§223 Belief under a New Light

Some might distinguish such beliefs and disbeliefs in the following manner:

1) We may conceive something one way, or conceive it another way.

2) We believe one of these ways. The other way we do not believe.

3) Someone else considers both ways of conceiving the idea.

4) He then believes the way we do not believe.

Hence some would argue that the difference between belief and disbelief in such reasonings lies in the difference in the manner of conceiving the object.

Before laying out his objection, Hume first agrees that yes we do consider both sides of the issue before dissenting with someone. But we end up believing only one of those two options. So first we consider both in the same light. Then we believe one of them. That means we come to see them in different lights after assenting or dissenting. So the theory given above only sees the first step, when we consider both ways of conceiving the idea. But it does not advance to the next step, where we consider each of them differently when believing one and disbelieving the other. As Hume explains, the above theory is not dissatisfactory because it contains a falsehood. Rather it is inadequate because it does not uncover all the truth of the matter:

We may mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways; but 'til there appears some principle, which fixes one of these different situations, we have in reality no opinion: And this principle, as it plainly makes no addition to our precedent ideas, can only change the manner of our conceiving them. (96a)

§224 When We Believe Something, It Becomes More Vividly Real in Our Minds

We noted at this book's beginning that there are two kinds of mental perceptions: impressions and ideas. They differ not qualitatively, but only quantitatively. For, impressions are merely more vivid perceptions than ideas are [see §§11-13.] Our ideas are just copied from impressions. And the ideas wholly represent all the impression's parts. For example, consider our idea that represents magenta.

Now, the image we conceive for this color can be more or less vivid in our imagination. So it may differ quantitatively without changing the fact that it is the idea of magenta.

However, consider that we vary the hue's qualitative value a little so to produce ruby red.

We see that our idea for this color is different from our idea for magenta. But our idea of ruby red can be more or less vivid in our minds while still being ruby red. So we may vary the quantitative values of ideas but not their qualitative values.

For, ideas wholly represent impressions. To vary any part or internal relation qualitatively would cause it to be a different idea altogether. So we can only increase or diminish the perception's force or vivacity. For, "if you make any other change on it, it represents a different object or impression." (96b)

Now, let's return to our question regarding belief and disbelief. Whether we believe or disbelieve an idea, it is still the same idea. However, our manner of conceiving that idea will be modified depending on whether we believe it or disbelieve it. Now, we saw with the example of color that we can only change the amount of vivacity of an idea. Otherwise we change the idea itself. We know that beliefs and disbeliefs cannot alter the qualitative features of the idea. Thus they must instead modify its vivacity in our mind.

So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION. (96c)

§225 A Belief is a Vivid Idea Inferred from a Present Impression

We know that to infer effects from causes, some object must be present to the memory or senses either immediately or else mediately through a chain of causes [see §193 for more.] But we know that we have no rational grounds to say that a cause necessarily implies its effect. Instead, the passage from cause to effect results by "custom or a principle of association." (97b)

These inferences form simple ideas. And we can only vary the vivacity of an idea. When we have a belief, we first have an impression. Then, in a causal-like inference, this impressions produces a "lively idea." So a belief is no more than our manner of producing a lively idea that relates to a present impression.

§226 Appendix Insertion C

The Feeling of Believing

So by some operation, our minds form beliefs of factual matters. But so far, this operation has remained one of philosophy's greatest mysteries. Hume admits that he is unable to explain this phenomenon himself. So he resorts to discussing the feeling we have when creating a belief. The believed idea is more vivacious and hence has a greater feeling of firmness or force.

An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. (629a)

But consider that the imagination is capable of joing, mixing, and varying ideas in all possible ways and at all possible places and times. And "it may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed." (629b) But this is not how we obtain beliefs. For, a belief does not consist in our ideas' nature and order. Rather, beliefs consist in our manner of conceiving the ideas, and in the feeling these ideas give our mind. So it is impossible that the imagination alone can produce beliefs.

And yet, Hume is not entirely able to explain this feeling involved in believing. Nonetheless, this feeling is common to all our daily lives.

And in philosophy we can go no farther, than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions. (629c)

§227 We Believe Our Histories More Than Our Romances

This definition of belief matches all our feelings and experiences on the matter.

Nothing is more evident, than that those ideas, to which we assent, are more strong, firm and vivid, than the loose reveries of a castle-builder. (97c)

Hume offers as illustration the difference between reading a romance and a history book. It's possible both texts place the same ideas in our minds. But the history book Hume claims causes us to have more lively conceptions. For we actually believe these events are real.

If one person sits down to read a book as a romance, and another as a true history, they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their author. His words produce the same ideas in both; though his testimony has not the same influence on them. The latter has a more lively conception of all the incidents. He enters deeper into the concerns of the persons: represents to himself their actions, and characters, and friendships, and enmities: He even goes so far as to form a notion of their features, and air, and person. While the former, who gives no credit to the testimony of the author, has a more faint and languid conception of all these particulars; and except on account of the style and ingenuity of the composition, can receive little entertainment from it. (97-98)

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From the original text:

Sect. vii. Of the Nature of the Idea Or Belief.
The idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole. We conceive many things, which we do not believe. In order then to discover more fully the nature of belief, or the qualities of those ideas we assent to, let us weigh the following considerations.
It is evident, that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions, concerning matter of fact; that is, concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities. It is also evident, that the idea, of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that when after the simple conception of any thing we would conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the existence, which we attribute to him, conceived by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them. But I go farther; and not content with asserting, that the conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it, I likewise maintain, that the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes. But as it is certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object, and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it.
Suppose a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, that Caesar dyed in his bed, that silver is more fusible, than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; it is evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms. My imagination is endowed with the same powers as his; nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea, which I cannot conceive; nor conjoin any, which I cannot conjoin. I therefore ask, Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? The answer is easy with regard to propositions, that are proved by intuition or demonstration. In that case, the person, who assents, not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determined to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas. Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive any thing contrary to a demonstration. But as in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question, I still ask, Wherein consists the deference betwixt incredulity and belief? since in both cases the conception of the idea is equally possible and requisite.
It will not be a satisfactory answer to say, that a person, who does not assent to a proposition you advance; after having conceived the object in the same manner with you; immediately conceives it in a different manner, and has different ideas of it. This answer is unsatisfactory; not because it contains any falshood, but because it discovers not all the truth. It is contest, that in all cases, wherein we dissent from any person, we conceive both sides of the question; but as we can believe only one, it evidently follows, that the belief must make some difference betwixt that conception to which we assent, and that from which we dissent. We may mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways; but until there appears some principle, which fixes one of these different situations, we have in reality no opinion: And this principle, as it plainly makes no addition to our precedent ideas, can only change the manner of our conceiving them.
All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas, which differ from each other only in their different degrees of force and vivacity. Our ideas are copyed from our impressions, and represent them in all their parts. When you would any way vary the idea of a particular object, you can only encrease or diminish its force and vivacity. If you make any other change on it, it represents a different object or impression. The case is the same as in colours. A particular shade of any colour may acquire a new degree of liveliness or brightness without any other variation. But when you produce any other variation, it is no longer the same shade or colour. So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defined, a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression.
We may here take occasion to observe a very remarkable error, which being frequently inculcated in the schools, has become a kind of establishd maxim, and is universally received by all logicians. This error consists in the vulgar division of the acts of the understanding, into CONCEPTION, JUDGMENT and REASONING, and in the definitions we give of them. Conception is defind to be the simple survey of one or more ideas: Judgment to be the separating or uniting of different ideas: Reasoning to be the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other. But these distinctions and definitions are faulty in very considerable articles. For FIRST, it is far from being true, that in every judgment, which we form, we unite two different ideas; since in that proposition, GOD IS, or indeed any other, which regards existence, the idea of existence is no distinct idea, which we unite with that of the object, and which is capable of forming a compound idea by the union. SECONDLY, As we can thus form a proposition, which contains only one idea, so we may exert our reason without employing more than two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to serve as a medium betwixt them. We infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others, and more convincing than when we interpose another idea to connect the two extremes. What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects. Whether we consider a single object, or several; whether we dwell on these objects, or run from them to others; and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception; and the only remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to the conception, and are persuaded of the truth of what we conceive. This act of the mind has never yet been explaind by any philosopher; and therefore I am at liberty to propose my hypothesis concerning it; which is, that it is only a strong and steady conception of any idea, and such as approaches in some measure to an immediate impression.⁵
⁵ Here are the heads of those arguments, which lead us to this conclusion. When we infer the existence of an object from that of others, some object must always be present either to the memory or senses, in order to be the foundation of our reasoning; since the mind cannot run up with its inferences IN INFINITUM. Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of any one object does ever imply that of another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another, we are not determined by reason, but by custom or a principle of association. But belief is somewhat more than a simple idea. It is a particular manner of forming an idea: And as the same idea can only be varyed by a variation of its degrees of force and vivacity; it follows upon the whole, that belief is a lively idea produced by a relation to a present impression, according to the foregoing definition.
This operation of the mind, which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; though no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it. For my part I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived. But when I would explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have recourse to every one’s feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind. An idea assented to FEELS different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or FIRMNESS, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a, manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible, that that faculty can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind. T confess, that it is impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther, than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.
This definition will also be found to be entirely conformable to every one’s feeling and experience. Nothing is more evident, than that those ideas, to which we assent, are more strong, firm and vivid, than the loose reveries of a castle-builder. If one person sits down to read a book as a romance, and another as a true history, they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their author. His words produce the same ideas in both; though his testimony has not the same influence on them. The latter has a more lively conception of all the incidents. He enters deeper into the concerns of the persons: represents to himself their actions, and characters, and friendships, and enmities: He even goes so far as to form a notion of their features, and air, and person. While the former, who gives no credit to the testimony of the author, has a more faint and languid conception of all these particulars; and except on account of the style and ingenuity of the composition, can receive little entertainment from it.