Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, §8 War does not Consist of a Single Instantaneous Blow

by Corry Shores
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Clausewitz, On War

Book I "On the Nature of War"

Chapter I "What is War?"

§8 War does not Consist of a Single Instantaneous Blow

Previously Clausewitz claimed that war will occur according to our abstract conceptions only under three conditions. The first was that the war must be an isolated act. But we discovered it never is. The second is that the war must be limited to either a single solution or to multiple simultaneous solutions. Clausewitz will now examine certain considerations which will show this never to be so.

If we made a mistake in conducting the war, then we would have to take an extra step to complete it. Or, if we did not put forth enough resources or go to the proper extremes, we also would need additional actions to resolve the conflict. Hence for wars to end in a single solution or in many simultaneous ones, all preparations would need to be taken to extreme extents. All we would then need is information of the enemy's preparations, so that we may out-prepare them. In this way, the war might proceed in the way we pre-conceive it abstractly, [as though dominoes were to fall as planned.]

However, if the war's solution requires a series of steps, then we learn how to proceed based on changing conditions, "and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme."

Now, if we commit one act, this will consume resources. Then, if we need to make another action, we will have diminished means to do so. But, if both sides raised all resources at once, and expended them all at once, then the war would be decided in one single solution or through the sum of many simultaneous ones.

However, we found that war is always a matter of escalation. So real wars will not play-out as they might in our abstract conceptions. And the real world prevents war resources to be instantly raised and deployed.

It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time. These forces are THE ARMIES ACTUALLY ON FOOT, THE COUNTRY, with its superficial extent and its population, AND THE ALLIES.

Also, the country's land and people are themselves essential war resources. They provide "either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same."

A country may mobilize all its military forces at once. However, it cannot instantaneously place into action all its fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, and so on. Also, allies need to be persuaded to join the war, and usually they do not enter until after the war has begun.

We often neglect the importance of allied forces in deciding wars. Clausewitz will explain their role later. For now "it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of War."

So we cannot begin and finish a war all at once. Rather, we must take a series of steps. But, the first action often decides many factors which condition the following steps. So we should not neglect the importance of making the first action as effective as possible.

Yet, men are disinclined to make unnecessary efforts. So they tend not to put forth enough force at the outset. But if one chooses to restrain his efforts, then the other side might choose to do the same in order to conserve resources, "and thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale."

Original text from the translation:

8. WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS BLOW.

The second point gives rise to the following considerations:—

If War ended in a single solution, or a number of simultaneous ones, then naturally all the preparations for the same would have a tendency to the extreme, for an omission could not in any way be repaired; the utmost, then, that the world of reality could furnish as a guide for us would be the preparations of the enemy, as far as they are known to us; all the rest would fall into the domain of the abstract. But if the result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme.

Yet every War would necessarily resolve itself into a single solution, or a sum of simultaneous results, if all the means required for the struggle were raised at once, or could be at once raised; for as one adverse result necessarily diminishes the means, then if all the means have been applied in the first, a second cannot properly be supposed. All hostile acts which might follow would belong essentially to the first, and form, in reality only its duration.

But we have already seen that even in the preparation for War the real world steps into the place of mere abstract conception—a material standard into the place of the hypotheses of an extreme: that therefore in that way both parties, by the influence of the mutual reaction, remain below the line of extreme effort, and therefore all forces are not at once brought forward.

It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time. These forces are THE ARMIES ACTUALLY ON FOOT, THE COUNTRY, with its superficial extent and its population, AND THE ALLIES.

In point of fact, the country, with its superficial area and the population, besides being the source of all military force, constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities in War, providing either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same.

Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, &c.—in short, not the whole country, unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the War. Further, the co-operation of allies does not depend on the Will of the belligerents; and from the nature of the political relations of states to each other, this co-operation is frequently not afforded until after the War has commenced, or it may be increased to restore the balance of power.

That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot at once be brought into activity, in many cases, is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power, seriously affected by the great force of the first decision, will be more fully shown hereafter. Here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of War.

Now this, in itself, furnishes no ground for relaxing our efforts to accumulate strength to gain the first result, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would purposely expose himself, and also because the first decision, although not the only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events, the greater it is in itself.

But the possibility of gaining a later result causes men to take refuge in that expectation, owing to the repugnance in the human mind to making excessive efforts; and therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are not taken for the first decision with that energy which would otherwise be used. Whatever one belligerent omits from weakness, becomes to the other a real objective ground for limiting his own efforts, and thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Vol.1. Transl. J.J. Graham.

Text available online at:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm