Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 1, Sect 3, "Of the Ideas of the Memory and the Imagination"

by Corry Shores
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[The following is summary, up to the end where I reproduce this section in full. My commentary is in brackets. Paragraph headings are my own.]

David Hume

A Treatise of Human Nature

Book I: Of the Understanding

Part I: Of Ideas, their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction, etc.

Section III: Of the Ideas of the Memory and the Imagination

§24 [Note: there are more than one paragraph break, but only one paragraph number. This will be corrected later.]

Impressions cause ideas in two ways:

1) the idea retains a high degree of its initial vivacity, and for this reason it is somewhat between an impression and idea. Memory is the faculty that repeats these impressions.

2) the idea loses the impression's vivacity, and becomes a perfect idea. The faculty that repeats such impressions [perceptions?] is the imagination.

It would seem that ideas of memory are stronger and livelier than those of the imagination, because the memory "paints its objects in more distinct colours."

When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserved by the mind steady and uniform for any considerable time.

No ideas in either the memory or imagination can appear in the mind unless "their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them." However, the imagination has more liberty to alter the original impression. [Hume says precisely: "yet the imagination is not restrained to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tied down in that respect, without any power of variation."]

The memory preserves the impression in its original form.

The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position.

Hence our second principle: The imagination is at liberty to transpose and change its ideas.

[Hume writes: "The same evidence follows us in our second principle, OF THE LIBERTY OF THE IMAGINATION TO TRANSPOSE AND CHANGE ITS IDEAS."]

We see this often in fairly tails telling of winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants.

The strange combinations we find in the imagination, such as winged horses, can be explained by the fact that none of our impressions are perfectly separable from other ones. So because our ideas are copied from our impressions, it would follow that we might imagine things in these strange ways. Also, the imagination is free to separate-out simple ideas from complex ones. [We might consider Lewis Carroll's Cheshire Cat whose smile remains after its body fades away.]

[Next entry in this series.]

[The following provides the original text that is above summarized.]

SECT. III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.

We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea: or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. It is evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employed by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserved by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. But of this more fully hereafter.[Part II, Sect. 5.]

There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which:-s no less evident, namely that though neither the ideas, of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrained to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tied down in that respect, without any power of variation.

It is evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty. An historian may, perhaps, for the more convenient Carrying on of his narration, relate an event before another, to which it was in fact posterior; but then he takes notice of this disorder, if he be exact; and by that means replaces the idea in its due position. It is the same case in our recollection of those places and persons, with which we were formerly acquainted. The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. In short, this principle is supported by such a number of common and vulgar phaenomena, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of insisting on it any farther.

The same evidence follows us in our second principle, OF THE LIBERTY OF THE IMAGINATION TO TRANSPOSE AND CHANGE ITS IDEAS. The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this entirely out of the question. Nature there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned but winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants. Nor will this liberty of the fancy appear strange, when we consider, that all our ideas are copyed from our impressions, and that there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable. Not to mention, that this is an evident consequence of the division of ideas into simple and complex. Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation.

From:

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L.A Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

Text available online at:

http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92t/

PDF available at:

http://ia341013.us.archive.org/3/items/treatiseofhumann01humeuoft/treatiseofhumann01humeuoft.pdf

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