tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17039838630026520012024-03-13T10:31:20.214-07:00Pirates & Revolutionaries"if you think childlike, you'll stay young. If you keep your energy going, and do everything with a little flair, you're gunna stay young. But most people do things without energy, and they atrophy their mind as well as their body. you have to think young, you have to laugh a lot, and you have to have good feelings for everyone in the world, because if you don't, it's going to come inside, your own poison, and it's over" Jerry Lewis
"I don’t believe
in the irreversibility of situations" DeleuzeCorry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.comBlogger2537125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-78164813269013356502023-05-02T06:48:00.001-07:002023-05-02T07:28:14.075-07:00Shores. Jc Beall’s Current and Potential Impact on the Continental Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics (Author Manuscript)<p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/corry-shores-entry-directory.html">[Corry Shores, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">In accordance with the <a href="https://www.springernature.com/gp/open-research/policies/journal-policies">archiving and open access policies</a> of <em>Springer Nature</em>, I am making a PDF of the Author Manuscript (AM) available here on my personal website. </p> <p>This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: </p> <p><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5</a></p> <p>To access the final published version, please reach the publisher using that link or contact the author at corryshores@gmail.com or through <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370444805_Jc_Beall%27s_current_and_potential_impact_on_the_continental_philosophy_of_non-classical_logics_in_the_Asian_Journal_of_Philosophy">Research Gate</a>.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Corry Shores</p> <p align="center"> <br />Jc Beall’s Current and Potential Impact on the Continental Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KU_XVgSkSy9l9Sdgwe_GD_9EUPdTumDO/view?usp=sharing">PDF LINK</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><iframe src="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KU_XVgSkSy9l9Sdgwe_GD_9EUPdTumDO/preview" allow="autoplay"></iframe></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p>Shores, Corry. “Jc Beall’s Current and Potential Impact on the Continental Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics.” <i>Asian Journal of Philosophy</i> 2, no. 1 (2023): 1–12. doi:10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5.</p> <p><a title="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5" href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5">https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5</a></p> <p align="left"><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00071-5</a></p> <p align="left"> </p> <p align="left">Research Gate link:</p> <p align="left"><a title="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370444805_Jc_Beall%27s_current_and_potential_impact_on_the_continental_philosophy_of_non-classical_logics_in_the_Asian_Journal_of_Philosophy" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370444805_Jc_Beall%27s_current_and_potential_impact_on_the_continental_philosophy_of_non-classical_logics_in_the_Asian_Journal_of_Philosophy">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370444805_Jc_Beall%27s_current_and_potential_impact_on_the_continental_philosophy_of_non-classical_logics_in_the_Asian_Journal_of_Philosophy</a></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-68138223669081546132022-06-30T00:28:00.001-07:002022-06-30T00:29:36.886-07:00Shores. The Primacy of Falsity: Deviant Origins in Deleuze<p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/corry-shores-entry-directory.html">[Corry Shores, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">In accordance with the <a href="https://hiw.kuleuven.be/tijdschrift-voor-filosofie/louvain-journal-of-philosophy/submission">distribution provisions</a> of <em>Tijdschrift voor Filosofie: Louvain Journal of Philosophy</em>, I am making a PDF of the published article available on my personal website.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Corry Shores</p> <p align="center"> <br />The Primacy of Falsity: </p> <p align="center">Deviant Origins in Deleuze</p> <p align="center"><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gT0hFbj1mekLw9fsYeuEKc-DzwwiOkxd/view?usp=sharing">PDF LINK</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><iframe src="https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vTv9hgWoqlYUV0pZOwnCBo6WIcoGO1GncJOtPwHusBobc-IOXrzG18TVE0gBwH4gn0jGBak6q4reF4F/pub?embedded=true"></iframe></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="left">Shores, Corry. “The Primacy of Falsity: Deviant Origins in Deleuze.” <em>Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie</em> 81 (2019): 81–130.</p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-50266099110701702842021-12-22T00:05:00.001-08:002021-12-22T00:07:23.271-08:00"Every Typewriter is a Character." Clifford Duffy's "as a construct"<p> </p> <p>by <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/search/label/profile/10021754334885248079">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> <br />[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><b>Search Blog Here</b></a>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> <br /><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/literature-entry-directory.html">[Literature, Poetry, Drama, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/09/clifford-duffy-entry-directory.html">[Clifford Duffy Entry Directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center">Clifford Duffy</p> <p align="center">“as a construct”</p> <p align="center">[<a href="https://recalltopoetry.blogspot.com/2021/11/as-construct.html#more">link</a>]</p> <p> </p> <p>Clifford Duffy wrote another incredible poem recently on his <em>Recall to Poetry</em> site. Here is a screenshot of an especially striking part of it.</p> <p> </p> <p align="center"><a style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgEdFMrxpkgM01e5xCrWaw4vWGDIYJ46MkseCpst69GoNT0p6Zxola8WFLWFW-8fI8rGwyDCEIEUfJ_m_pjr-0sKFb5aNlGRjF78Eu2WmkdRwmmCFEgbC7Hmd2QZIcR6PouSdc56Co5sv4ypK9E7HjP4nACD3naVwB6UUcotnkXHjsW49eAztJopuSl=s875" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgEdFMrxpkgM01e5xCrWaw4vWGDIYJ46MkseCpst69GoNT0p6Zxola8WFLWFW-8fI8rGwyDCEIEUfJ_m_pjr-0sKFb5aNlGRjF78Eu2WmkdRwmmCFEgbC7Hmd2QZIcR6PouSdc56Co5sv4ypK9E7HjP4nACD3naVwB6UUcotnkXHjsW49eAztJopuSl=s320" width="426" height="309" data-original-height="634" data-original-width="875" /></a></p> <p align="center">(From <a href="https://recalltopoetry.blogspot.com/2021/11/as-construct.html#more">Duffy</a>)</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">As always, Duffy’s use of electronic typography and html coding give the poem sonic variations impossible with print, especially considering how the browser window sizing and scrolling affects the layout in his particular well-crafted way. The timing of each word, the speed, tone, and pacing of its delivery, all under high variation. Note for instance when we transition through the crossed out ‘she’, the sudden dips in tone and volume, or the gliding carriage return effect of the blank underlines in the ‘rising’ section, giving silence an affective sound. Duffy created a new artform many years ago and continues innovating it to this day, and he stands as one of the best and most original poets I have ever read.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>Duffy, Clifford. “as a construct”. <em>Recall to Poetry</em>:</p> <blockquote> <p><a title="https://recalltopoetry.blogspot.com/2021/11/as-construct.html#more" href="https://recalltopoetry.blogspot.com/2021/11/as-construct.html#more">https://recalltopoetry.blogspot.com/2021/11/as-construct.html#more</a></p> </blockquote> <p> </p> <p><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-69543016123417352442021-08-06T01:33:00.001-07:002021-08-07T00:30:59.613-07:00Breeur (3.0) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.3.0, “Introduction”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 2</p> <p align="center">Imposture</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.3 </p> <p align="center">The Imposter</p> <p> </p> <p align="center">3.0</p> <p align="center">“Introduction”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.1">3.0.1</a>) The common conception of an impostor is that they are “someone who invents a story that is not their own. He or she is trying to pretend to be someone else” (54). Yet, Breeur notes that imposture is a little more complex than this, because it also involves <strong>the impostor’s ability “to blur the lines that normally allow us to establish the difference between the true and the false</strong>” (54). (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.2">3.0.2</a>) Jean-Bertrand Pontalis defines the impostor as someone who “usurps an identity,” inventing for themself a story that is not their own but that they adhere to their identity, thereby effectively posing themselves as someone they are not (54). Breeur gives a couple examples. {1} “James Macpherson imposes himself as the one who discovered the Gaelic Iliad written by Ossian, whereas he himself was its author” (54). {2} Brigido Lara was a Mexican art forger. He forged “an unprecedented number of pre-Columbian artworks the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia” (54). In 1974, he was arrested for stealing many of them. To defend himself, he confessed that “these objects were all fakes and that he had made them” (54). Yet later he was hired by the “Museum of | Anthropology in Xalapa – as an expert in forgery, his work would consist in sorting through the national collections to keep only the real ones” (54). (Here the imposture both “worked” in its deceptive capacity and later it proved beneficial in working to prevent deception. (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.3">3.0.3</a>) Han Van Meegeren is another famous forger. He made fake Vermeers that both experts and the press were convinced were authentic. It was only a good while later that Meegeren’s deception was exposed. “So, it worked” (55). (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.4">3.0.4</a>) But sometimes attempts at imposture do not work: “Dimitri II, a false descendant of Ivan The Terrible who was proclaimed tsar on June 20, 1606, was unmasked and murdered a few months later. His body was butchered and his ashes sent back with cannons to Poland, his country of origin” (55). Normally when we catch impostors, the punishment is often severe: “As a rule, the recall, or the revenge, of reality is inexorable” (55). Why is this? Breeur doubts that it is because we cherish the truth so much. Rather, “As Deleuze once said, everyone knows very well that, in fact, we rarely seek the truth – our interests and also our stupidity keep us from the truth even more inveterately than do our mistakes” (55). Breeur says we punish caught impostors not for deceiving us, <em>but for getting caught</em>, for failing to deceive us. In fact, we would even celebrate impostors who were able to carry their deception to their death, only to be discovered afterward: “If we punish counterfeiters, it would be because they missed their objective, i.e. because they had failed. Had they been successful – though this evokes the paradoxical idea of a successful impostor, which may seem to be an oxymoron, there are those who are not unmasked until after their death, or those we do not dare to unmask, and therefore those who can, in a sense, be considered successes – we would have honored them” (55). This is because we are fascinated with and admire their ability to neutralize reality and make appearing coincide with being, which is a feat normally only accomplished by our dreams. (Perhaps, we admire them for overcoming reality with the power of appearances.) “I think that what fascinates us is the idea that their deception or deceit <i>had the power to neutralize reality</i>. Thus, and this is the central element of the idea which I would like to pursue, we admire or are ensorcelled by those who deceive us less for the content of what they make us believe than for the very fact of having deceived us, i.e. less for the exceptional life which they claim to have lived and more for the mediocrity of the one which they were able to eclipse. The life of a successful impostor is one in which<strong> <i>being</i> and <i>appearing</i> coincide at a point that is only achieved in the realm of dreams.</strong> Hence, the imposture fascinates, in as much as <strong>it looks like a dream made real</strong>” (55). The success of impostors also serves another purpose, namely, to “to deceive and convince themselves. […] We are the spectators who confirm and reinforce them in their game of concealment or dissimulation”  (55).</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.1">3.0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Imposture and Blurring the Lines Between True and False]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.2">3.0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The Impostor as One Who Lives an Alternate Identity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.3">3.0.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Van Meegeren’s Vermeer Forgeries]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#3.0.4">3.0.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Our Love of the Impostor’s Overcoming and Neutralizing of Reality by Making Appearing Coincide with Being, as with Dreams]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="3.0.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.0.1">3.0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Imposture and Blurring the Lines Between True and False]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The common conception of an impostor is that they are “someone who invents a story that is not their own. He or she is trying to pretend to be someone else” (54). Yet, Breeur notes that imposture is a little more complex than this, because it also involves <strong>the impostor’s ability “to blur the lines that normally allow us to establish the difference between the true and the false</strong>” (54).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p>The impostor is commonly described as someone who invents a story that is not their own. He or she is trying to pretend to be someone else. However, this attempt is very complex. Among other things, it only works to the extent that<strong> the impostor is able to blur the lines that normally allow us to establish the difference between the true and the false</strong>. That is what this chapter is all about.</p> <p>(54)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.0.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.0.2">3.0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The Impostor as One Who Lives an Alternate Identity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Jean-Bertrand Pontalis defines the impostor as someone who “usurps an identity,” inventing for themself a story that is not their own but that they adhere to their identity, thereby effectively posing themselves as someone they are not (54). Breeur gives a couple examples. {1} “James Macpherson imposes himself as the one who discovered the Gaelic Iliad written by Ossian, whereas he himself was its author” (54). {2} Brigido Lara was a Mexican art forger. He forged “an unprecedented number of pre-Columbian artworks the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia” (54). In 1974, he was arrested for stealing many of them. To defend himself, he confessed that “these objects were all fakes and that he had made them” (54). Yet later he was hired by the “Museum of | Anthropology in Xalapa – as an expert in forgery, his work would consist in sorting through the national collections to keep only the real ones” (54). (Here the imposture both “worked” in its deceptive capacity and later it proved beneficial in working to prevent deception.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">So, what is an impostor? Jean-Bertrand Pontalis gives the following definition: “The impostor [is] the one who usurps an identity, [who] invents for himself to the point of adhering to it a story that is not his own [and who] poses as someone else, and it works.”<sup>59 </sup>Thus, James Macpherson imposes himself as the one who discovered the Gaelic Iliad written by Ossian, whereas he himself was its author. Or Brigido Lara, arrested in 1974 by the Mexican police for “stealing” an unprecedented number of pre-Columbian artworks the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, who was forced, in order to defend himself, to admit that these objects were all fakes and that he had made them. Afterwards, he was hired at the Museum of | Anthropology in Xalapa – as an expert in forgery, his work would consist in sorting through the national collections to keep only the real ones. “It works,” in the sense that even a kind of reminder of reality is beneficial.</p> <p align="justify">(54-55)</p> <p align="justify">59. Pontalis quoted in Andree Bauduin, <i>Psychanalyse de l’imposture </i>(Paris: PUF, 2007), p. II.</p> <p align="justify">(54)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.0.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.0.3">3.0.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Van Meegeren’s Vermeer Forgeries]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Han Van Meegeren is another famous forger. He made fake Vermeers that both experts and the press were convinced were authentic. It was only a good while later that Meegeren’s deception was exposed. “So, it worked” (55).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Or let us take the exquisite example of the famous forger Han Van Meegeren, born in 1889, who put one over on the critics by making a dozen false Vermeers. The most eminent experts of that time, as well as the press, almost unanimously considered them to be masterpieces of the Delft master. It was not until the end of World War II, when the police seized Goering’s private collection and the painter was convicted of treason for selling a Vermeer to the Nazi Marshal, that the deception was exposed. So, it worked.<sup>60</sup></p> <p align="justify">(55)</p> <p align="justify">60. See Luigi Guarneri, <i>La double vie de Vermeer</i>, Trans. Marguerite Pozzoli (Aries: Actes Sud, 2007).</p> <p align="justify">(55)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.0.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.0.4">3.0.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Our Love of the Impostor’s Overcoming and Neutralizing of Reality by Making Appearing Coincide with Being, as with Dreams]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[But sometimes attempts at imposture do not work: “Dimitri II, a false descendant of Ivan The Terrible who was proclaimed tsar on June 20, 1606, was unmasked and murdered a few months later. His body was butchered and his ashes sent back with cannons to Poland, his country of origin” (55). Normally when we catch impostors, the punishment is often severe: “As a rule, the recall, or the revenge, of reality is inexorable” (55). Why is this? Breeur doubts that it is because we cherish the truth so much. Rather, “As Deleuze once said, everyone knows very well that, in fact, we rarely seek the truth – our interests and also our stupidity keep us from the truth even more inveterately than do our mistakes” (55). Breeur says we punish caught impostors not for deceiving us, <em>but for getting caught</em>, for failing to deceive us. In fact, we would even celebrate impostors who were able to carry their deception to their death, only to be discovered afterward: “If we punish counterfeiters, it would be because they missed their objective, i.e. because they had failed. Had they been successful – though this evokes the paradoxical idea of a successful impostor, which may seem to be an oxymoron, there are those who are not unmasked until after their death, or those we do not dare to unmask, and therefore those who can, in a sense, be considered successes – we would have honored them” (55). This is because we are fascinated with and admire their ability to neutralize reality and make appearing coincide with being, which is a feat normally only accomplished by our dreams. (Perhaps, we admire them for overcoming reality with the power of appearances.) “I think that what fascinates us is the idea that their deception or deceit <i>had the power to neutralize reality</i>. Thus, and this is the central element of the idea which I would like to pursue, we admire or are ensorcelled by those who deceive us less for the content of what they make us believe than for the very fact of having deceived us, i.e. less for the exceptional life which they claim to have lived and more for the mediocrity of the one which they were able to eclipse. The life of a successful impostor is one in which<strong> <i>being</i> and <i>appearing</i> coincide at a point that is only achieved in the realm of dreams.</strong> Hence, the imposture fascinates, in as much as <strong>it looks like a dream made real</strong>” (55). The success of impostors also serves another purpose, namely, to “to deceive and convince themselves. […] We are the spectators who confirm and reinforce them in their game of concealment or dissimulation”  (55).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">But does it always work? Of course not. Dimitri II, a false descendant of Ivan The Terrible who was proclaimed tsar on June 20, 1606, was unmasked and murdered a few months later. His body was butchered and his ashes sent back with cannons to Poland, his country of origin. As a rule, the recall, or the revenge, of reality is inexorable. Why? It would be too easy to say that, out of love for the truth, we do not like to be fooled. As Deleuze once said, everyone knows very well that, in fact, we rarely seek the truth – our interests and also our stupidity keep us from the truth even more inveterately than do our mistakes.<sup>61</sup> If we punish counterfeiters, it would be because they missed their objective, i.e. because they had failed. Had they been successful – though this evokes the paradoxical idea of a successful impostor, which may seem to be an oxymoron, there are those who are not unmasked until after their death, or those we do not dare to unmask, and therefore those who can, in a sense, be considered successes – we would have honored them. As a consequence, I do not think that in the fascination we feel for imposters of whatever stripe | we express above all an admiration for someone who seemed capable of giving what is false the appearances of the truth. Rather, I think that what fascinates us is the idea that their deception or deceit <i>had the power to neutralize reality</i>. Thus, and this is the central element of the idea which I would like to pursue, we admire or are ensorcelled by those who deceive us less for the content of what they make us believe than for the very fact of having deceived us, i.e. less for the exceptional life which they claim to have lived and more for the mediocrity of the one which they were able to eclipse. The life of a successful impostor is one in which <i>being</i> and <i>appearing</i> coincide at a point that is only achieved in the realm of dreams. Hence, the imposture fascinates, in as much as it looks like a dream made real. Also, it has an internal purpose: Accomplished counterfeiters (and they are rare, the majority being limited to the category of crooks who stop or are blocked halfway) seek less to deceive us than to deceive and convince themselves. We are the spectators who confirm and reinforce them in their game of concealment or dissimulation.</p> <p align="justify">(55-56)</p> <p align="justify">61. Gilles Deleuze, <i>Nietzsche et la philosophie</i> (Paris: PUF, I962), p. 108.</p> <p align="justify">(55)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.0.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p>The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page.</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-12091625263060657152021-08-05T02:57:00.001-07:002021-08-05T03:00:25.024-07:00Breeur (2.6) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.6, “Duchenne: Smile!”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 1</p> <p align="center">Lies and Stupidity</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.2 </p> <p align="center">Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity</p> <p> </p> <p align="center">2.6</p> <p align="center">“Duchenne: Smile!”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#2.6.1">2.6.1</a>) David Livingstone Smith provides an evolutionary account for self-deception. He begins by noting that it is “difficult to suppress the non-verbal signs that convey our inmost thoughts and feelings” (49). (Yet, it is to our advantage not to let other people always know our true thoughts, feelings, and intentions.) So we developed ways “to move through the world without broadcasting our inmost thoughts and feelings on every occasion,” which for Smith is lying (49). Yet, even with our best efforts to do so, often “our bodies betray and seem to sabotage our conscious mind’s efforts to deceive or conceal” (49). However, if we truly believe our own lies, or if we were made unaware that we were dissimulating, then we would not have contrary inner feelings that might inadvertently  indicate otherwise. Hence human self-deception: “We learned to lie without knowing doing so” (50). (<a href="#2.6.2">2.6.2</a>) Guillaume Duchenne “discovered the facial distinction between a true and a false smile. The true one involves more than just lip retraction: A real smile produces contractions around the eyes, causing wrinkles and narrowing the eyes” (50). Smith uses this term for a fake smile however. Yet the idea remains that there are two kinds of smiles: “The phony smile is the artificial one of ‘airplane personnel,’ smiles produced for cameras, for ‘public consumption’ (de Waal), etc., while the true smile is the direct expression of our deeper self, it ‘arises from a specific inner state, as sincere | reflections of enjoyment, happiness, or affection.’ True smiles are therefore ‘harder to feign’” (50-51). (<a href="#2.6.3">2.6.3</a>) Breeur notes some complications with this supposed clear-cut distinction between a fake and genuine smile. The smiles of airplane personnel are “not meant as an expression of one’s inmost thoughts and feelings, hence there is nothing deceptive about it,” so they are not simply false and deceptive (51). “Likewise, any variant of conventional social expressions of politeness are not necessarily, inherently, or irreducibly false or insincere” (51). In contrast to this sort of a polite, service smile, Breeur designates the “<em>real false smile</em>,” which “is not the phony one, but the imitation of the true one” (51). (While the service smile is made with both parties knowing it is done as a service to the other), the real false smile is “the smile of the <i>imposter</i>, i.e. someone that in a context of social smiles intends to convince the other that his or her smile is genuine and sincere, is true and not fake” (51). Also, the real false smile is, of course, not meant to express a feeling that the imposter genuinely has but rather to evoke a feeling in the receiver, which is “precisely what actors do. An imposter [...] is an actor off stage” (51). The imposter is so good at this sort of deception that they “can deliberately, fully, <i>self-consciously </i>neutralize the work of a lie detector” (51). For the lie to be effective, the liar needs this sort of “Absolute and total self-control” (51). Breeur notes that this sort of self-control is “what trained spies achieve when they | are submitted to lie detectors. They betray nothing because they are real fakes” rather than the “phony fakes” with service smiles (51-52). (<a href="#2.6.4">2.6.4</a>) (Recall from section <a href="https://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-13-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch13.html#1.3.5">1.3.5</a> that Augustine defines lying as having one thought in your head while expressing another thought instead, with the intention to deceive. In this way, the liar has a double heart and holds a double thought. Lying is an act of duplicity in which “<strong>You dissimulate what is true, and you simulate what is untrue</strong>” (19). (Augustine: “dissimulation is pretending not to be what one actually is, whereas simulation is pretending to be what one actually is not.”)) Breeur notes that often the “the problem of imposture is seen as a variant of lying, i.e. a tendency to combine forms of dissimulation and simulation” (52). (So, perhaps, it is not that we see imposture as a subcategory or subtheme of the topic lying.) Rather, “it is the other way around” (52). (Perhaps, lying is one of the tools the imposture uses in their overall deceptive, misleading behavior in which they craft a fake identity for themselves.) “As we saw, a liar is an actor. His or her play is not part of a deliberate tendency to lie. But his or her lying is integrated into a general strategy to seduce, to impose a<i> mise-en-scene</i> and to play a certain role, to incarnate a fake identity, to imitate a ‘real’ smile” (52).</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.1">2.6.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Self-Deception About Our Deception]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.2">2.6.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Fake Smiles]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.3">2.6.3</a></p> <p align="center">[The Real False Smile of the Self-Controlled Imposter]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.4">2.6.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Imposture and Lying]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.6.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.1">2.6.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Self-Deception About Our Deception]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[David Livingstone Smith provides an evolutionary account for self-deception. He begins by noting that it is “difficult to suppress the non-verbal signs that convey our inmost thoughts and feelings” (49). (Yet, it is to our advantage not to let other people always know our true thoughts, feelings, and intentions.) So we developed ways “to move through the world without broadcasting our inmost thoughts and feelings on every occasion,” which for Smith is lying (49). Yet, even with our best efforts to do so, often “our bodies betray and seem to sabotage our conscious mind’s efforts to deceive or conceal” (49). However, if we truly believe our own lies, or if we were made unaware that we were dissimulating, then we would not have contrary inner feelings that might inadvertently  indicate otherwise. Hence human self-deception: “We learned to lie without knowing doing so” (50).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In his captivating book on the motives for lying, David Livingstone Smith gives an evolutionary account of deception.<sup>51</sup> His claim is that deception and the unconscious are coextensive. Starting from the idea that it is difficult to suppress the non-verbal signs that convey our inmost thoughts and feelings, he suggests that nature moved human beings to develop systems to lie, i.e. to move through the world without broadcasting our inmost thoughts and feelings on every occasion. Even so, it often occurs that our bodies betray and seem to sabotage our conscious mind’s efforts to deceive or conceal; | indeed, we would lie far more effectively if only we could operate ignorant of our dissimulations or if we could make ourselves believe that we were not dissimulating. This is how Smith explains the evolutionary origin of self-deception: It “helps us to ensnare others more efficiently.” Deception often makes us “anxious, hesitant, nervous etc. The greater the risk, the more self-conscious we become”;<sup>52 </sup>hence the need of a strategy to neutralize our painful knowledge of our deception in order to avoid “betray[ing] our dishonesty accidentally” (blushing, perspire, etc.). We learned to lie without knowing doing so.</p> <p align="justify">(49-50)</p> <p align="justify">51. See his <i>Why We Lie: The Evolutionary Roots of Deception and the Unconscious Mind</i> (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004).</p> <p align="justify">(49)</p> <p>52. Smith, <i>Why We Lie</i>, p. 75.</p> <p>(50)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.6.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.2">2.6.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Fake Smiles]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Guillaume Duchenne “discovered the facial distinction between a true and a false smile. The true one involves more than just lip retraction: A real smile produces contractions around the eyes, causing wrinkles and narrowing the eyes” (50). Smith uses this term for a fake smile however. Yet the idea remains that there are two kinds of smiles: “The phony smile is the artificial one of ‘airplane personnel,’ smiles produced for cameras, for ‘public consumption’ (de Waal), etc., while the true smile is the direct expression of our deeper self, it ‘arises from a specific inner state, as sincere | reflections of enjoyment, happiness, or affection.’ True smiles are therefore ‘harder to feign’” (50-51).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">This claim, however, is built on a rather simplistic model of expression. As do many other scientists today who are interested in the bodily expression of emotion, Smith refers to the classic case of the so-called “Duchenne smile.”<sup>53 </sup>Guillaume Duchenne was a French neurologist who in his book<i> The Mechanisms of Human Facial Expressions</i> discovered the facial distinction between a true and a false smile. The true one involves more than just lip retraction: A real smile produces contractions around the eyes, causing wrinkles and narrowing the eyes. Funnily enough (or very symptomatically), Smith and Frans de Waal differ in the attribution of the term “Duchenne smile”: For Smith it refers to the phony smile<sup>54</sup> while for de Waal it refers to the true smile.<sup>55 </sup>But both converge in the determination of the nature of the distinction. The phony smile is the artificial one of “airplane personnel,” smiles produced for cameras, for “public consumption’’ (de Waal), etc., while the true smile is the direct expression of our deeper self, it “arises from a specific inner state, as sincere | reflections of enjoyment, happiness, or affection.” True smiles are therefore “harder to feign.”<sup>56</sup></p> <p align="justify">(50-51)</p> <p align="justify">53. See also Frans de Waal, <i>Mama ‘s Last Hug: Animal Emotions and What They Teach Us about Ourselves </i>(London: Granta, 2019), pp. 66-68.</p> <p align="justify">54. “The false, mouth-only ‘have a nice day’ kind of smile was named the ‘Duchenne smile’ in honor of its discoverer” (Smith, <i>Why We Lie</i>, p. 72).</p> <p align="justify">55. “Only the so-called Duchenne smile is a sincere expression of joy and positive feeling” (de Waal, <i>Mama’s Last Hug</i>, p. 66).</p> <p align="justify">(50)</p> <p align="justify">56. de Waal, <i>Mama’s Last Hug</i>, p. 67.</p> <p align="justify">(51)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.6.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.3">2.6.3</a></p> <p align="center">[The Real False Smile of the Self-Controlled Imposter]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Breeur notes some complications with this supposed clear-cut distinction between a fake and genuine smile. The smiles of airplane personnel are “not meant as an expression of one’s inmost thoughts and feelings, hence there is nothing deceptive about it,” so they are not simply false and deceptive (51). “Likewise, any variant of conventional social expressions of politeness are not necessarily, inherently, or irreducibly false or insincere” (51). In contrast to this sort of a polite, service smile, Breeur designates the “<em>real false smile</em>,” which “is not the phony one, but the imitation of the true one” (51). (While the service smile is made with both parties knowing it is done as a service to the other), the real false smile is “the smile of the <i>imposter</i>, i.e. someone that in a context of social smiles intends to convince the other that his or her smile is genuine and sincere, is true and not fake” (51). Also, the real false smile is, of course, not meant to express a feeling that the imposter genuinely has but rather to evoke a feeling in the receiver, which is “precisely what actors do. An imposter [...] is an actor off stage” (51). The imposter is so good at this sort of deception that they “can deliberately, fully, <i>self-consciously </i>neutralize the work of a lie detector” (51). For the lie to be effective, the liar needs this sort of “Absolute and total self-control” (51). Breeur notes that this sort of self-control is “what trained spies achieve when they | are submitted to lie detectors. They betray nothing because they are real fakes” rather than the “phony fakes” with service smiles (51-52).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">There are more than a few problems with these accounts. For starters, one would be justified in one’s skepticism regarding such simplistic models of “facial expression.” I would also like to know what kind of scientific evidence corroborates the claim that “our faces most of the time mirror true feelings.”<sup>57 </sup>But the more relevant issue is that I do not believe that the distinction between the public consumption smile and the genuine personal smile maps so neatly onto that of false and true respectively. The public smiles of “airplane personnel,” for example, are not simply false. Likewise, any variant of conventional social expressions of politeness are not necessarily, inherently, or irreducibly false or insincere. In the example of airplane personnel, a frequent flyer who frequently feels betrayed by the “phony” smiles of airplane personnel might very well be paranoiac. The key is that the airplane personnel smile is not meant as an expression of one’s inmost thoughts and feelings, hence there is nothing deceptive about it, unless one believes in the possible existence of a society based only on true smiles. What is false is not the socially adaptive face expression, the mask called persona: A<i> real false smile </i>is not the phony one, but the imitation of the true one. The latter is the smile of the <i>imposter</i>, i.e. someone that in a context of social smiles intends to convince the other that his or her smile is genuine and sincere, is true and not fake. The domain of the fake smile is that of evocation instead of expression. Evoking a feeling is precisely what actors do. An imposter, as we will see immediately, is an actor off stage. An imposter is someone who can deliberately, fully, <i>self-consciously </i>neutralize the work of a lie detector. This is the core of the effective lie: Absolute and total self-control. This is what Eichmann achieved during his trial. This is what trained spies achieve when they | are submitted to lie detectors.<sup>58</sup> They betray nothing because they are real fakes. Not phony fakes with an “airplane personnel smile”.</p> <p align="justify">(51-52)</p> <p align="justify">57. de Waal, <i>Mama’s Last Hug</i>, p. 67.</p> <p align="justify">(51)</p> <p align="justify">58. Cf. Bettina Stangneth, <i>Lügen lessen</i> (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2017).</p> <p align="justify">(52)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.6.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6.4">2.6.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Imposture and Lying]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[(Recall from section <a href="https://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-13-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch13.html#1.3.5">1.3.5</a> that Augustine defines lying as having one thought in your head while expressing another thought instead, with the intention to deceive. In this way, the liar has a double heart and holds a double thought. Lying is an act of duplicity in which “<strong>You dissimulate what is true, and you simulate what is untrue</strong>” (19). (Augustine: “dissimulation is pretending not to be what one actually is, whereas simulation is pretending to be what one actually is not.”)) Breeur notes that often the “the problem of imposture is seen as a variant of lying, i.e. a tendency to combine forms of dissimulation and simulation” (52). (So, perhaps, it is not that we see imposture as a subcategory or subtheme of the topic lying.) Rather, “it is the other way around” (52). (Perhaps, lying is one of the tools the imposture uses in their overall deceptive, misleading behavior in which they craft a fake identity for themselves.) “As we saw, a liar is an actor. His or her play is not part of a deliberate tendency to lie. But his or her lying is integrated into a general strategy to seduce, to impose a<i> mise-en-scene</i> and to play a certain role, to incarnate a fake identity, to imitate a ‘real’ smile” (52).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Very often the problem of imposture is seen as a variant of lying, i.e. a tendency to combine forms of dissimulation and simulation. But it is the other way around. As we saw, a liar is an actor. His or her play is not part of a deliberate tendency to lie. But his or her lying is integrated into a general strategy to seduce, to impose a<i> mise-en-scene</i> and to play a certain role, to incarnate a fake identity, to imitate a “real” smile.</p> <p align="justify">(52)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.6.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p>The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page.</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-23771596223497193552021-08-04T05:28:00.001-07:002021-08-04T05:29:53.391-07:00Breeur (2.5) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.5, “Reduction to Simplicity”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 1</p> <p align="center">Lies and Stupidity</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.2 </p> <p align="center">Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity</p> <p> </p> <p align="center">2.5</p> <p align="center">“Reduction to Simplicity”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.1">2.5.1</a>) (Recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/breeur-24-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch24.html">2.4</a> how industries, in the face of a preponderance of scientific findings that threaten their profits, might fund their own counter-research efforts. The purpose is to fabricate a “scientifically legitimized” opposing view, so to hinder adverse public policy and public opinion.) In response to industry’s clouding of scientific debate, one response is to insist on the better, more factual truth. But this would only work if the industry-funded scientists were simply lying. Instead, their efforts to cloud the debate only create “a context in which truth ceases to be of value” (46). (Perhaps the idea is the following. When both sides are given equal weight in the public discourse, all while only one is based in a genuine effort to conduct unbiased scientific research, then both true and false statements, or both good and bad scientific research, is regarded equivalently. As such, the true and good knowledge is lowered to the level of an alternative opinion or view or interpretation of the data, rather than being something with special merit.) This, then, involves the “reduction to stupidity” (see section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/12/breeur-22-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch22.html#2.2.5">2.2.5</a>, and summary at section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/03/breeur-23-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch23.html#2.3.1">2.3.1</a>) (where discourse is “reduced to hot air” on account of people holding on to inferior views,) which prevents the superior ones from promulgating and having persuasive effect. (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.2">2.5.2</a>) This strategy often involves efforts to fight the bad, false and misleading industry funded research by replacing it with good, true research. Breeur calls this “stupidity as disproportion.” Yet, the reason so many people disbelieve good science (as for example the overwhelming scientific evidence for human-caused climate change) has to do with what they are willing to believe. Many people simply do not want to believe the truth. For instance, they may fall victim to confirmation bias: “i.e. people’s tendency to believe and value above all facts and information that confirm their cherished premises and presuppositions – or, negatively put, people’s unwillingness to accept facts and evidence that contradict their cherished premises and presuppositions” (46). (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.3">2.5.3</a>) There are a number of cognitive phenomena that might explain why people tend toward such irrational thinking: “In the case of the backfire effect, a person will not only refuse to accept the evidence challenging his or her beliefs, they will even feel strengthened in their beliefs by evidence to the contrary, ‘doubling down’’ on their cherished beliefs. In the case of the Dunning-Kruger effect, also known as the ‘too stupid to know they’re stupid’ effect, people referred to as ‘low-ability subjects’ fail to recognize their own intellectual deficiencies” (47). (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.4">2.5.4</a> Some (including Lee McIntyre) use such cognitive phenomena to explain post-truth phenomena. What is puzzling is that the tendency to believe truth rather than these falsehoods should increase our survival chances. So (from an evolutionary standpoint) it is unclear why these cognitive biases are so prevalent. It is also found that conservatives tend to exhibit the “negativity bias,” as they “seem more inclined to believe threatening falsehoods than liberals” (47). McIntyre speculates that this may be explained by the fact that conservatives tend to have larger amygdalae. (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.5">2.5.5</a>) Breeur notes that even McIntye’s thinking has its own biases. For instance, it is “politically polarized vis-a-vis the Democratic left versus the Republican right” (48). Also, “McIntyre’s reference to this mysterious amygdala – which is part of the so-called ‘limbic system’’ – is as perplexing as that of Descartes’s references to the pineal gland” (48). On the one hand, McIntyre aims to be scientifically rigorous in order to unearth the causes for why we are unwilling to accept inconvenient yet scientifically verified truths; while on the other hand, the scientific research he uses, although ingenious and inventive, nonetheless finds just trivial, banal truths. There is a striking discrepancy between these two factors (which demonstrates the futility of McIntyre’s approach). Yet, “It is on the basis of such banalities that a whole discourse has been created, which from the Olympian altitude of its ‘objective facts’ and ‘experimental evidence’ valiantly commits itself to fight against the impostors in power” (48). (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.6">2.5.6</a>) Because this scientific response is so “full of clichés or simplifications,” it can be perplexing and in the end prove futile, weak, and stupid in the face of the “proliferation of alternative facts” (49). The problem with this approach is that it does not realize that not all truths have the same values, as some prove to be too simplistic or banal to have any real weight or effect. “This is the reduction to simplicity: Regardless of their truth status, the value of truth claims can be (if they are not often) so simplistic, so banal, so trivial, etc., that it is difficult to understand how anyone could believe in their efficacy. The anthropological and metaphysical models at the core of many theories and programs are so simplistic and vain that one cannot see how they could be invoked to fight against the indifference to truth that permeates contemporary society” (49).</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.1">2.5.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Failure to Combat Industry Misinformation Campaigns by Insisting on Better Science]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.2">2.5.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Confirmation Bias]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.3">2.5.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Some Cognitive Phenomena Involved in Science Denial]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.4">2.5.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Negativity Bias of Conservatives]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.5">2.5.5</a></p> <p align="center">[The Banality of Science Insistence]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#2.5.6">2.5.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Reduction to Simplicity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.5.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5.1">2.5.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Failure to Combat Industry Misinformation Campaigns by Insisting on Better Science]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[(Recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/breeur-24-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch24.html">2.4</a> how industries, in the face of a preponderance of scientific findings that threaten their profits, might fund their own counter-research efforts. The purpose is to fabricate a “scientifically legitimized” opposing view, so to hinder adverse public policy and public opinion.) In response to industry’s clouding of scientific debate, one response is to insist on the better, more factual truth. But this would only work if the industry-funded scientists were simply lying. Instead, their efforts to cloud the debate only create “a context in which truth ceases to be of value” (46). (Perhaps the idea is the following. When both sides are given equal weight in the public discourse, all while only one is based in a genuine effort to conduct unbiased scientific research, then both true and false statements, or both good and bad scientific research, is regarded equivalently. As such, the true and good knowledge is lowered to the level of an alternative opinion or view or interpretation of the data, rather than being something with special merit.) This, then, involves the “reduction to stupidity” (see section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/12/breeur-22-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch22.html#2.2.5">2.2.5</a>, and summary at section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/03/breeur-23-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch23.html#2.3.1">2.3.1</a>) (where discourse is “reduced to hot air” on account of people holding on to inferior views,) which prevents the superior ones from promulgating and having persuasive effect.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>(Recall the “reduction to stupidity” from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/12/breeur-22-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch22.html#2.2.5">2.2.5</a>. Breeur was discussing how one’s insistence on their opinions is an instance of stupidity, because they persist with their faulty views even when confronted by superior ones. It would be better to have flexibility and drop bad judgements in favor of more informed and considered ones, and then to espouse the better ones instead. This would facilitate the flow and prosperity of truth, which involves development, refinement, adaptation, and so forth. When instead that flow is blocked because some people insist on keeping their faulty opinions in the face of other people’s better ones, this depletes those superior ones of their power to flow, promulgate, and have influence on other people’s minds. In that way, the better views are “reduced to hot air” so to speak, and overall it reduces the general discourse to inferior judgments. This reduction of the truth-flow power of evolving judgments is the “reduction to stupidity”.]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">How to react against these forms of strategic and structural castings of doubt and confusion? There is a tendency, shared by McIntyre, to focus and remain fixated on the problem of truth. Indeed, what these fake experts do is create fake information – that is, they lie. But on such a socially extended and structurally implemented level, the reclaiming of truth seems | at best misguided, for these fake experts actually do not lie – they merely create a context in which truth ceases to be of value. Hence the<i> reduction to stupidity</i>.</p> <p align="justify">(45-46)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.5.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5.2">2.5.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Confirmation Bias]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[This strategy often involves efforts to fight the bad, false and misleading industry funded research by replacing it with good, true research. Breeur calls this “stupidity as disproportion.” Yet, the reason so many people disbelieve good science (as for example the overwhelming scientific evidence for human-caused climate change) has to do with what they are willing to believe. Many people simply do not want to believe the truth. For instance, they may fall victim to confirmation bias: “i.e. people’s tendency to believe and value above all facts and information that confirm their cherished premises and presuppositions – or, negatively put, people’s unwillingness to accept facts and evidence that contradict their cherished premises and presuppositions” (46).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">As a reaction to this reduction, however, a new form of stupidity emerges in the form of the aforementioned misguided and inappropriate emphasis on truth. This is what happens when media outlets stress the importance of “fact checking” in a domain where, as a matter of fact, facts do not matter. What McIntyre does is a bit different. He endeavors to fight bad research with good research, i.e. to replace the false with the true. In this process is generated a new form of stupidity which could be termed<i> stupidity as disproportion.</i> By way of a beginning, consider the following urgent question: Why are so many people blind to the truth? Why, for example, do so many people go around denying climate change? Why do they refuse to listen to reason? Why do they reject out of hand the wise, well-intentioned, and edifying sermons of the scientists? Here, McIntyre appeals to the study of psychological mechanisms as they have recently been investigated by cognitive and behavioral psychologists. The basic idea is simple: The explanation is that many people do not want the truth. One can circumvent this essentially tautological formulation with reference to the notion of “confirmation bias,” i.e. people’s tendency to believe and value above all facts and information that confirm their cherished premises and presuppositions – or, negatively put, people’s unwillingness to accept facts and evidence that contradict their cherished premises and presuppositions.</p> <p align="justify">(46)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.5.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5.3">2.5.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Some Cognitive Phenomena Involved in Science Denial]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There are a number of cognitive phenomena that might explain why people tend toward such irrational thinking: “In the case of the backfire effect, a person will not only refuse to accept the evidence challenging his or her beliefs, they will even feel strengthened in their beliefs by evidence to the contrary, ‘doubling down’’ on their cherished beliefs. In the case of the Dunning-Kruger effect, also known as the ‘too stupid to know they’re stupid’ effect, people referred to as ‘low-ability subjects’ fail to recognize their own intellectual deficiencies” (47).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Intellectuals, for instance, claim truth in the name of reason and science in their fight against all forms of “beliefs” nourished by emotions or feelings (i.e. the subjective), and they call upon science (in McIntyre’s case, upon cognitive psychology) to understand the mechanisms of the brain that explain tendencies towards “irrationality.” McIntyre himself, in an effort to understand the current electorate’s lack of rationality, refers to a number of tests carried out by psychologists that |reveal myriad “fascinating cognitive biases” from the “backfire effect” to the “Dunning-Kruger effect.” In the case of the backfire effect, a person will not only refuse to accept the evidence challenging his or her beliefs, they will even feel strengthened in their beliefs by evidence to the contrary, “doubling down’’ on their cherished beliefs. In the case of the Dunning-Kruger effect, also known as the “too stupid to know they’re stupid” effect, people referred to as “low-ability subjects” fail to recognize their own intellectual deficiencies.<sup>46</sup></p> <p align="justify">(46-47)</p> <p>46. McIntyre, <i>Post-Truth</i>, pp. 48-51.</p> <p>(47)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.5.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5.4">2.5.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Negativity Bias of Conservatives]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Some (including Lee McIntyre) use such cognitive phenomena to explain post-truth phenomena. What is puzzling is that the tendency to believe truth rather than these falsehoods should increase our survival chances. So (from an evolutionary standpoint) it is unclear why these cognitive biases are so prevalent. It is also found that conservatives tend to exhibit the “negativity bias,” as they “seem more inclined to believe threatening falsehoods than liberals” (47). McIntyre speculates that this may be explained by the fact that conservatives tend to have larger amygdalae.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">These mechanisms and effects have led McIntyre (among others) to attempt to connect them with, or use them to explain, the post-truth phenomenon. Basically, the hope is to find some answer for the consternating fact that we (rational animals) cannot see that “believing the truth increase[s] our chances for survival. “What are the mental constraints that rob our brain of the ability to think clearly? That is, why are people irrational? McIntyre does not offer any answers; he simply concludes, on a dour note of resignation, that, “for whatever reason, we must recognize that a plethora of cognitive biases are just part of the way our brains are wired.”<sup>47</sup> Rather than try to “solve” the “mystery” of irrationality, McIntyre explores its vicissitudes, though always with reference to the science of the brain. Some cognitive biases, McIntyre teaches us, function differently depending on our political beliefs. With reference to the work of anthropologist Daniel Fessler, who investigated what may be referred to as “negativity bias,”<sup>48</sup> in order to demonstrate why conservatives seem more inclined to believe threatening falsehoods than liberals, McIntyre contends that this phenomenon is explicable when one considers the “experimental evidence” which indicates | that the “fear-based amygdala tends to be larger in conservatives than in liberals.”<sup>49</sup></p> <p align="justify">(47-48)</p> <p align="justify">47. McIntyre, <i>Post-Truth</i>, pp. 48-51.</p> <p align="justify">48. McIntyre, <i>Post-Truth</i>, p. 57.</p> <p align="justify">(47)</p> <p align="justify">49. McIntyre, <i>Post-Truth</i>, p. 58. Research on the so-called “partisan brain” is clearly in vogue at the moment. See, for example, the research conducted by Andrea Pereira and Jay Van Bavel (“The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief,” <i>Trends in Cognitive Science</i> 22.3 (2018), 213-224), or Jordan B. Peterson’s (<i>et alii</i>) recent papers (to quote one of them: Shona Tritt, Michael Inzlicht, & Jordan Peterson, “Preliminary Support for a Generalized Arousal Model of Political Conservatism”, PloS one. 8. e83333.10.1371/journal.pone.0083333.)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.5.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5.5">2.5.5</a></p> <p align="center">[The Banality of Science Insistence]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Breeur notes that even McIntye’s thinking has its own biases. For instance, it is “politically polarized vis-a-vis the Democratic left versus the Republican right” (48). Also, “McIntyre’s reference to this mysterious amygdala – which is part of the so-called ‘limbic system’’ – is as perplexing as that of Descartes’s references to the pineal gland” (48). On the one hand, McIntyre aims to be scientifically rigorous in order to unearth the causes for why we are unwilling to accept inconvenient yet scientifically verified truths; while on the other hand, the scientific research he uses, although ingenious and inventive, nonetheless finds just trivial, banal truths. There is a striking discrepancy between these two factors (which demonstrates the futility of McIntyre’s approach). Yet, “It is on the basis of such banalities that a whole discourse has been created, which from the Olympian altitude of its ‘objective facts’ and ‘experimental evidence’ valiantly commits itself to fight against the impostors in power” (48).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">One may wonder to what kind of cognitive bias this kind of philosophical thinking, which encourages us to exercise our “critical” minds, has succumbed.<sup>50</sup> First and foremost, McIntyre’s entire discourse (symptomatic of virtually all debates in the United States) is politically polarized vis-a-vis the Democratic left versus the Republican right. Second, for a philosopher claiming the almost absolute value of “facts validated by science,” McIntyre’s reference to this mysterious amygdala – which is part of the so-called “limbic system’’ – is as perplexing as that of Descartes’s references to the pineal gland. To my mind, the most disconcerting aspect of McIntyre’s discourse is the disproportion that appears between the proclaimed aims and ambitions of his reflections (namely, our inability or unwillingness to accept inconvenient truths) and the kind of explanations supposed to explain this anomalous irrationality (namely, scientific explanations, and specifically explanations for which the ingenuity or inventiveness of the “experiments” seems· to mask the banality, even the triviality, of the truths investigated). It is on the basis of such banalities that a whole discourse has been created, which from the Olympian altitude of its “objective facts” and “experimental evidence” valiantly commits itself to fight against the impostors in power.</p> <p align="justify">(48)</p> <p align="justify">50. <i>Cf. Ibidem</i>, p.57.</p> <p align="justify">(48)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.5.6"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5.6">2.5.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Reduction to Simplicity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Because this scientific response is so “full of clichés or simplifications,” it can be perplexing and in the end prove futile, weak, and stupid in the face of the “proliferation of alternative facts” (49). The problem with this approach is that it does not realize that not all truths have the same values, as some prove to be too simplistic or banal to have any real weight or effect. “This is the reduction to simplicity: Regardless of their truth status, the value of truth claims can be (if they are not often) so simplistic, so banal, so trivial, etc., that it is difficult to understand how anyone could believe in their efficacy. The anthropological and metaphysical models at the core of many theories and programs are so simplistic and vain that one cannot see how they could be invoked to fight against the indifference to truth that permeates contemporary society” (49).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The potential “eugenic” implications notwithstanding vis-a-vis McIntyre’s emphasis on neurology and the amygdalae of conservatives, there is an imbalance between the urgency and the complexity of the problems identified |and the response provided. This response – shared by the well-meaning academic majority of “defenders of the Enlightenment” – is full of clichés or simplifications that would leave any more or less assiduous reader perplexed, so that, whether or not there is scientific validity in the experiments adduced by McIntyre, the posturing in opposition to the proliferation of alternative facts is futile, weak – in a word, stupid. This position is predicated on the belief that truth is a value powerful enough to eradicate the false and the fake, but this position betrays a misconception, for truth is not a value “in itself”; rather, “value” is a criterion to which “truth’’ must be submitted. This is the reduction to simplicity: Regardless of their truth status, the value of truth claims can be (if they are not often) so simplistic, so banal, so trivial, etc., that it is difficult to understand how anyone could believe in their efficacy. The anthropological and metaphysical models at the core of many theories and programs are so simplistic and vain that one cannot see how they could be invoked to fight against the indifference to truth that permeates contemporary society.</p> <p align="justify">(48-49)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p>The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page.</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-41749208642834854982021-08-02T06:40:00.001-07:002021-08-02T06:40:27.548-07:00Breeur (2.4) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.4, “Strategic Stupidity”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 1</p> <p align="center">Lies and Stupidity</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.2 </p> <p align="center">Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity</p> <p> </p> <p align="center">2.4</p> <p align="center">“Strategic Stupidity”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#2.4.1">2.4.1</a>) There are recent efforts to promulgate falsehoods under the guise of an appeal to reason and science, and thus certain “contemporary defenses of Enlightenment values” seem to play a role “in the proliferation of stupidity.” One example is found in the climate change “debate.” In fact, scientifically speaking, there is little left to debate regarding the rising temperatures and the role human activity has played in that increase. Nonetheless, the news media (perhaps on account of a financial interest in creating controversy) present the discussion as if “there are still scientific debates being had and to be had,” which of course is “fake news.” Yet, often these same people who argue that the science of climate change is not yet settled also “claim that the post-truth era is the result of (comparatively recent) intellectual movements which are predicated on questioning the value/validity of science, objectivity, and the like.” (They furthermore seem to assume that before the post-truth era, human culture and politics were guided by scientific factual knowledge rather than by emotion and personal belief, and they seem to be unaware that past election campaigns were not based on “the dissemination of scientifically validated facts” (43).) (<a href="#2.4.2">2.4.2</a>) Studies have shown how corporate interests have contaminated the science in public discourse on such matters as climate change, immigration, abortion, and nationalism: “Scientifically validated facts are frequently denied on non-scientific grounds, and more often than not such denials are motivated by ideological and/or economic interests. Scientific evidence is deliberately refuted and challenged by “experts” subsidized by companies in order to produce fake research and to generate general confusion via the media” (44). The benefactors are a political class that gains by ignoring the problems. Because the media are the ones disseminating this misinformation, they become “a tool used to call into question whatever truths are deemed inconvenient (and unprofitable), the result being nothing more than fraud” (44). (<a href="#2.4.3">2.4.3</a>) For example, in 1953, tobacco companies met and decided that rather than “fighting among themselves, trying to find out which brand is less harmful” they would instead unite to fight the science that demonstrates how tobacco is unhealthy. They formed the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) to “convince the public that there was no evidence that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and that previous studies claiming otherwise had been challenged by ‘numerous scientists’” (45). (<a href="#2.4.4">2.4.4</a>) The TIRC’s efforts were successful, and it operated in fact for four decades (1953-1998). It succeeded by {1} funding its own experts, {2} feeding those paid, biased findings/opinions to the media so that they feel compelled to present the issue as having two opposing, scientifically legitimized sides, {3} promoting the tobacco industry’s side of the “debate” through lobbying and public relations, and {4} exploiting the confusion that resulted in the public’s mind. This same strategy has been applied for many other issues, including global warming, the ozone layer, and acid rain. The overall goal is to convince the public that existing scientific findings have come into question by other findings and so to no longer regard them as scientifically verified facts.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4.1">2.4.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Science and Political Naivety]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4.2">2.4.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Corporate Contamination of Science]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4.4">2.4.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Success of the Tobacco Industry’s Misinformation Campaign]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.4.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4.1">2.4.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Science and Political Naivety]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There are recent efforts to promulgate falsehoods under the guise of an appeal to reason and science, and thus certain “contemporary defenses of Enlightenment values” seem to play a role “in the proliferation of stupidity.” One example is found in the climate change “debate.” In fact, scientifically speaking, there is little left to debate regarding the rising temperatures and the role human activity has played in that increase. Nonetheless, the news media (perhaps on account of a financial interest in creating controversy) present the discussion as if “there are still scientific debates being had and to be had,” which of course is “fake news.” Yet, often these same people who argue that the science of climate change is not yet settled also “claim that the post-truth era is the result of (comparatively recent) intellectual movements which are predicated on questioning the value/validity of science, objectivity, and the like.” (They furthermore seem to assume that before the post-truth era, human culture and politics were guided by scientific factual knowledge rather than by emotion and personal belief, and they seem to be unaware that past election campaigns were not based on “the dissemination of scientifically validated facts” (43).)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>Note, regarding the observation that “those who propagate the idea that the science is not yet in on climate change are often those who at the same time rail against post-truth era attacks on Enlightenment values,” I wonder if Ben Shapiro would be such a case. (<a href="https://medium.com/climate-conscious/ben-shapiros-bad-faith-stance-on-climate-change-c00e8039d0c0">Here</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/s/story/conservatives-hate-post-modernism-and-liberals-dont-understand-why-7ba19eecab4d">Here</a>).]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In a related vein, it is worth asking if contemporary defenses of Enlightenment values, i.e. reason and science, do not have | a role to play in the proliferation of stupidity. Consider, for instance, certain strategic and cynical appeals to science. As the story goes, in recent decades, scientific methods and results have been reduced in the same manner as facts were reduced to opinions. By extension, science has been used to support both truths and falsehoods. For a present-day example, consider the status of climate change. Although there is no scientific debate concerning the fact that global temperatures are rising because of human actions, the media has propagated the idea that there are still scientific debates being had and to be had. This, <em>sensu stricto</em>, is fake news. This is a fake controversy produced by fake researchers with ideological and/or economic motivations who are “cashing in’’ on the zeitgeist. Yet, those who propagate the idea that the science is not yet in on climate change are often those who at the same time rail against post-truth era attacks on Enlightenment values. Often, these are the people who claim that the post-truth era is the result of (comparatively recent) intellectual movements which are predicated on questioning the value/validity of science, objectivity, and the like. This is the context of science-denial, post-truth and neo-enlightenment. It is clear that in debates concerning “fighting post-truth,” the aspect of ambiguity or the duplicity of meaning proper to facts that we explored in the first chapter, is most of the time ignored. Not in the least because authors, in their analysis, neglect the impact of fake news on the factual dimensions that make up the social and historical fabric in favor of scientific truths. This offers these authors the arrogance to claim that the Post-Truth era is the result of intellectual movements that questioned the value of objective and scientific truths. These doubts, as we will see, would have created circumstances in which objective facts, are henceforth considered to be less important for shaping public opinion than emotions and personal beliefs. As if it has ever been different. And as if in the past all election campaigns were based solely on the dissemination of scientifically validated facts.</p> <p align="justify">(42-43)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.4.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4.2">2.4.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Corporate Contamination of Science]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Studies have shown how corporate interests have contaminated the science in public discourse on such matters as climate change, immigration, abortion, and nationalism: “Scientifically validated facts are frequently denied on non-scientific grounds, and more often than not such denials are motivated by ideological and/or economic interests. Scientific evidence is deliberately refuted and challenged by “experts” subsidized by companies in order to produce fake research and to generate general confusion via the media” (44). The benefactors are a political class that gains by ignoring the problems. Because the media are the ones disseminating this misinformation, they become “a tool used to call into question whatever truths are deemed inconvenient (and unprofitable), the result being nothing more than fraud” (44).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">But let’s first summarize the strategic production of doubt by corporate-funded lobbying in domains that were keen to influence political positions on climate change, immigration, abortion, nationalism, etc. In his recent book on the post-truth era, Lee McIntyre offers a clear image of such cynical strategies, using the fascinating and at the same time distressing analyses of Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway and of Ari Rabin-Havt.<sup>42</sup> Scientifically validated facts are frequently denied on non-scientific grounds, and more often than not such denials are motivated by ideological and/or economic interests. Scientific evidence is deliberately refuted and challenged by “experts” subsidized by companies in order to produce fake research and to generate general confusion via the media. This confusion naturally benefits a political class which, thanks to the doubt manufactured, can deploy a program “ignoring” the problems and facts for which their opponents were trying to find government-wide solutions. Thus, the media becomes a tool used to call into question whatever truths are deemed inconvenient (and unprofitable), the result being nothing more than fraud.</p> <p align="justify">(44)</p> <p align="justify">42. See Oreskes and Conway, <i>Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming</i> (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), and Rabin-Havt, <i>Lies, Incorporated: The World of Post- Truth Politics</i> (New York: Anchor Books, 2016).</p> <p align="justify">(44)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.4.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4.3">2.4.3</a></p> <p align="center">[The Disinformation Campaign of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[For example, in 1953, tobacco companies met and decided that rather than “fighting among themselves, trying to find out which brand is less harmful” they would instead unite to fight the science that demonstrates how tobacco is unhealthy. They formed the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) to “convince the public that there was no evidence that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and that previous studies claiming otherwise had been challenged by ‘numerous scientists’” (45). ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">For a historical example, we can follow McIntyre back to 1953 – specifically, to the Plaza Hotel in New York. It was there and then that the heads of the major tobacco companies met to determine the best strategy to deal with a disturbing article that had just been published linking cigarette tar and cancer. John Hill, a leading figure in public relations at the time, proposed a global plan for tobacco companies to stop fighting among themselves, trying to find out which brand is less harmful, and to adopt a united front to fight the cigarette science. This plan would be supported with additional “research’’ to combat the “bad” science. Thus, the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) was created. Its mission was | mainly to convince the public that there was no evidence that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and that previous studies claiming otherwise had been challenged by “numerous scientists.”<sup>43</sup></p> <p align="justify">(44-45)</p> <p align="justify">43 Lee McIntyre, <i>Post-Truth</i> (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2018), p. 22 sq.</p> <p align="justify">(45)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.4.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4.4">2.4.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Success of the Tobacco Industry’s Misinformation Campaign]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The TIRC’s efforts were successful, and it operated in fact for four decades (1953-1998). It succeeded by {1} funding its own experts, {2} feeding those paid, biased findings/opinions to the media so that they feel compelled to present the issue as having two opposing, scientifically legitimized sides, {3} promoting the tobacco industry’s side of the “debate” through lobbying and public relations, and {4} exploiting the confusion that resulted in the public’s mind. This same strategy has been applied for many other issues, including global warming, the ozone layer, and acid rain. The overall goal is to convince the public that existing scientific findings have come into question by other findings and so to no longer regard them as scientifically verified facts.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Guess what: It worked! The immediate effect was the creation of confusion – no doubt its purpose. And this program was in operation for four decades, all the way up until 1998. The TIRC strategy can be summarized as follows: “Find and fund your own experts, use this to suggest to the media that there are two sides to the story, push your side through public relations and governmental lobbying, and capitalize on the resulting public confusion to question whatever scientific result you wish to dispute.”<sup>44</sup> Given its effectiveness, this strategy has been adopted by others in other cases; it is this strategy that has been widely implemented in other scientific “disputes” and “controversies” such as those related to holes in the ozone layer, acid rain, and global warming, among others.<sup>45</sup> The goal in these cases is not even to establish alternative facts – to make the public believe that the facts already validated and widely accepted have been the subject of new research and have been widely questioned.</p> <p align="justify">(45)</p> <p align="justify">44. McIntyre, <i>Post-Truth</i>, pp. 24-25.</p> <p align="justify">45. It is therefore not surprising to see that the “experts” of the Heartland Institute, responsible for casting doubt on the results of scientific research related to global warming, were financed by Philip Morris among others.</p> <p align="justify">(45)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p>The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page.</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-484178911871594872021-08-02T04:37:00.001-07:002021-08-02T04:38:31.290-07:00[Labels continuation for entry: Quine “On What There Is,” summary]<p> <br /></p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-entry-directory.html">[Quine, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p>This entry continues the list of labels for the entry:  </p> <h5><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/quine-on-what-there-is-summary.html">Quine “On What There Is,” summary</a></h5> <p> </p> <p><a title="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/quine-on-what-there-is-summary.html" href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/quine-on-what-there-is-summary.html">http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/quine-on-what-there-is-summary.html</a></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-54870833986775613622021-08-02T04:21:00.001-07:002021-08-02T04:37:00.930-07:00Quine “On What There Is,” summary<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-entry-directory.html">[Quine, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of the text. More analysis is still needed and will be updated when conducted. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive all my various mistakes.<strong> Texts were copied from </strong><a href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_What_There_Is"><strong>wikisource</strong></a><strong>  but were not checked against the original, cited text for accuracy. <u>There are differences between these two versions,</u> but we do not attend to them here. </strong>(In other words, page citations are for the cited text, but quoted material is from wikisource.)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">W. V. Quine</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“On What There Is”</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (simply collecting those written below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#1">1</a>) The ontological problem can be stated simply with the question: “What is there?” An easy and broadly acceptable answer could be “everything,” in other words, “there is what there is.” Yet, despite the simplicity, of the question and answer, there has been a lot of debate over certain cases regarding whether they can be included among things that exist. (<a href="#2">2</a>) Quine notes a problem in particular for ontological debates. We suppose two philosophers, McX and Quine himself. As we noted, people may differ as what should be considered an existing entity or not. We suppose then that McX believes some certain thing is an existing entity, while Quine does not believe there is such an entity. We first take McX’s point of view. They can summarize their disagreement thusly: McX thinks that this entity exists, and yet Quine refuses to acknowledge its existence. But how would Quine summarize his disagreement? Quine would say that it is not a matter of him failing to recognize a particular entity, because there is no such entity in the first place to recognize. Regardless of disagreement about how to formulate the incompatibility of their views, the real disagreement is between their ontologies. (<a href="#3">3</a>) The problem for Quine in this scenario is that he might be helpless to argue against McX. Suppose Quine tells McX that that these entities in question do not exist. This might be like first positing their existence, then secondly denying it. But that would involve starting off by acknowledging their existence, which Quine is not willing to do in the first place. (<a href="#4">4</a>) Since those taking a negative view about the existence of an entity cannot formulate the disagreement without first acknowledging there is such an entity in the first place, that means “in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him” (21). (<a href="#5">5</a>) Quine notes this problem goes back to Plato: Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? He calls this “tangled” doctrine “Plato’s Beard”, and he says that throughout history, it has frequently dulled “the edge of Occam’s razor.” (<a href="#6">6</a>) We see a similar sort of thinking in McX’s view. McX might say that if we are able to talk about something like Pegasus, how could it not exist? “If Pegasus <i>were</i> not, McX argues, we should not be talking about anything when we use the word; therefore it would be nonsense to say even that Pegasus is not. Thinking to show thus that the denial of Pegasus cannot be coherently maintained, he concludes that Pegasus is” (21). (<a href="#7">7</a>) But there seems to be a confusion in McX’s claim. When McX says that Pegasus exists (because we can think it and speak about it), the entity McX has in mind is an idea in our minds, and not an actual, living, breathing animal out in the world around us. However, “this mental entity is not what people are talking about when they deny Pegasus” (22). (<a href="#8">8</a>) It is odd that McX falls victim to this confusion, because “McX never confuses the Parthenon with the Parthenon-idea. The Parthenon is physical; the Parthenon-idea is mental” (22). “But when we shift from the Parthenon to Pegasus, the confusion sets in—for no other reason than that McX would sooner be deceived by the crudest and most flagrant counterfeit than grant the nonbeing of Pegasus” (22). (<a href="#9">9</a>) Another supposed person with a view on the matter (whom we call “Wyman”) might also allege that Pegasus has being, but they might say that Pegasus has its “being as an unactualized possible. When we say of Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more precisely, that Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality” (22). (<a href="#10">10</a>) Quine notes that Wyman has spoiled the word “exists” in this way (by distinguishing {1} an entity that has being but does not exist from {2} an entity that has being but does exist). This ruins the word “exists,” because normally it is not limited in this way to spatio-temporal manifestation. Usually when we say “Pegasus does not exist” we mean there is no such entity. It just happens that Pegasus is a spatio-temporal being. However, we might want to say that the cube root of 27 exists, even though it lacks spatio-temporal presentation. Wyman wants to find a way to accommodate our position as best they can into their ontology, so they change the meaning of “exist” to always refer to spatio-temporal manifestation, leaving “is” for the non-spatio-temporal being of a non-actualized (potential) spatio-temporal entity. “Wyman, in an ill-conceived effort to appear agreeable, genially grants us the nonexistence of Pegasus and then, contrary to what <i>we</i> meant by nonexistence of Pegasus, insists that Pegasus <i>is</i>. Existence is one thing, he says, and subsistence is another” (23). So we are left with holding onto the word “is” for this notion we once had for “exists”. (<a href="#11">11</a>) Wyman’s view that there are non-actualized (possible) beings (that have being but not existence) creates so many difficult to answer questions, that it is best not to get entangled in the ramifications of this view: “Wyman’s slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them one?” [etc.] (23). (<a href="#12">12</a>) While we might deal with the notion of possibility by using a modality operating on a whole statement (as with the adverb “possibly”), we gain little by applying this technique to render possible entities. (<a href="#13">13</a>) There is another problem with Wyman’s notion of unactualized possibility. We are supposing Wyman’s view that it is nonsense to say that Pegasus is not. What about the Round Square Cupola on Berkeley College? Using the same reasoning, would we say it is unactualized? But as an impossible object, would we have to say it is an unactualized impossible? That would create a dilemma for Wyman. If Wyman says that the Round Square Cupola on Berkeley College has being, then Wyman becomes trapped in contradictions. Quine tells us that instead Wyman takes the other strategy, and “concedes that it is nonsense to say that the round square cupola on Berkeley College is not. He says that the phrase ‘round square cupola’ is meaningless” (24). (Perhaps the claim here is that ‘round square cupola’ is a sequence of words that refers to nothing in the first place, so there is no entity in question that can be said to exist or not. Or, as we see in the next section, perhaps the idea is that impossible objects are always non-referring.) (<a href="#14">14</a>) There is a history to Wyman’s approach of asserting the meaninglessness of contradictions. Some even go as far as to challenge <em>reductio ad absurdum </em>arguments. (<a href="#15">15</a>) Also, if we adopt this doctrine of the meaninglessness of contradictions, we lose the ability to test whether a formulation is meaningful or not. “For it follows from a discovery in mathematical logic, due to Church, that there can be no generally applicable test of contradictoriness” (25). (<a href="#16">16</a>) We move now to finding ways of dealing with the so-called Plato’s Beard problem (see section <a href="#5">5</a>). (<a href="#17">17</a>) Using definite descriptions, Russell devised a way to evaluate non-referring or contradictory descriptive names, like “the present King of France”: “The author of <i>Waverley</i> was a poet’, for example, is explained as a whole as meaning ‘Someone (better: something) wrote <i>Waverley</i> and was a poet, and nothing else wrote <i>Waverley</i>’. (The point of this added clause is to affirm the uniqueness which is implicit in the word ‘the’, in ‘<i>the</i> author of <i>Waverley</i>’.)” And another example: “‘The round square cupola on Berkeley College is pink’ is explained as ‘Something is round and square and is a cupola on Berkeley College and is pink, and nothing else is round and square and a cupola on Berkeley College’”  (25). (<a href="#18">18</a>) This allows the sentence containing that descriptive name to be evaluable as true or false. (<a href="#19">19</a>) In “Something wrote <i>Waverley</i> and was a poet and nothing else wrote <i>Waverley</i>’” we are using a quantifier “something”, which, like other quantifiers such as “nothing” and “everything”, are bound variables, and they do not presuppose the existence of the quantified thing: “the burden of objective reference which had been put upon the descriptive phrase is now taken over by words of the kind that logicians call bound variables, variables of quantification, namely, words like ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’. These words, far from purporting to be names specifically of the author of <i>Waverley</i>, do not purport to be names at all; they refer to entities generally, with a kind of studied ambiguity peculiar to themselves. These quantificational words or bound variables are, of course a basic part of language, and their meaningfulness, at least in context, is not to be challenged. But their meaningfulness in no way presupposes there being either the author of <i>Waverley</i> or the round square cupola on Berkeley College or any other specifically preassigned objects” (26). (<a href="#20">20</a>) Being can be affirmed or denied using this definite description method. For instance, if we are affirming that “There <i>is</i> the author of <em>Waverley</em>,” we might then say, “Someone (or, more strictly, something) wrote <i>Waverley</i> and nothing else wrote <em>Waverley</em>.” We can also express that there is no author of <em>Waverley</em>: “‘The author of <i>Waverley</i> is not’ is explained, correspondingly, as the alternation ‘Either each thing failed to write <i>Waverley</i> or two or more things wrote <i>Waverley</i>’.” (If there is no author of <em>Waverly</em>, that could be because there are numerous authors and not just one author or because every existing thing is not the author. As we can see, there is no mention of non-beings here.) Both of these are false, but they are meaningful. This also works for contradictory impossible objects, like “The round square cupola on Berkeley College is not” (26). Thus statements of non-being in this way will not entail an affirmation of their being. (<a href="#21">21</a>) In order to apply this technique to Pegasus, we will need to render it into a descriptive name, such as “the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon” (26). (<a href="#22">22</a>) Quine next addresses the possibility that were Pegasus “so obscure or so basic no pat translation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along familiar lines,” still we can provide a description.<strong> We can appeal “to the <i>ex hypothesi</i> unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of <i>being Pegasus</i>, adopting, for its expression, the verb ‘is-Pegasus’, or ‘<u>pegasizes’</u></strong>” (27, boldface and underlining are mine). This way “The noun ‘Pegasus’ itself could then be treated as derivative, and identified after all with a description: ‘the thing that is-Pegasus’, <strong>‘<u>the thing that pegasizes</u></strong>’ (27, boldface and underlining are mine). (<a href="#23">23</a>) Here, we are assuming that there is an attribute of pegasizing. It would be either something like a form or universal in Plato’s realm of forms or in our minds. And with it, we can use Russell’s descriptions to predicate Pegasus without attributing existence to it. (<a href="#24">24</a>) Thus we need not accept McX’s and Wyman’s contention that “we could not meaningfully affirm a statement of the form ‘So-and-so is not’, with a simple or descriptive singular noun in place of ‘so-and-so’, unless so-and-so is” (28). (<a href="#25">25</a>) By saying that Pegasus is, that commits us to an ontology that contains Pegasus. But when we say Pegasus is not, this does not thereby include it in our ontology. (<a href="#26">26</a>) The meanings of names are different than the named object, as we see clearly with “The Evening Star” and “The Morning Star.” (For, knowing the meaning of Evening Star is not enough to establish its identity with Morning Star. (<a href="#27">27</a>) McX confused meaning and naming. “The structure of his confusion is as follows. He confused the alleged <i>named object</i> Pegasus with the <i>meaning</i> of the word ‘Pegasus’, therefore concluding that Pegasus must be in order that the word have meaning” (28). We might also wonder what meanings are. Suppose they are ideas in the mind. When we name Pegasus, it has a meaning (“the thing that pegasizes”), this meaning is an idea (yet it is not what is being named), so we might confuse the two and wrongly conclude that Pegasus is an idea (or that it names an idea). (<a href="#28">28</a>) Quine now turns “the ontological problem of universals: the question whether there are such entities as attributes, relations, classes, numbers, functions” (29). In McX’s ontology, they may note that “There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets,” and they may furthermore reason that “These houses, roses, and sunsets, then, have something in common; and this which they have in common is all I mean by the attribute of redness” (29). (<a href="#29">29</a>) An alternate view could be that even though we have a number of different things to which it is appropriate to attribute “red,” that does not mean we also believe there is an entity that is named by “redness” over and above these things. “That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that McX is no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits under such names as ‘redness’” (30). (<a href="#30">30</a>) Given our work with definite descriptions, we no longer feel any compulsion at all to infer that there is some entity being named by “red” or “is red” just because it has a meaning. In fact, even by describing Pegasus as that which pegasizes does not commit us to positing that there is such an attribute as pegasizing. (<a href="#31">31</a>) Yet, McX might still persist. They might say that our position still commits us to positing the meaning “pegasizes” and that any such meanings will have to be universals and maybe then attributes. (<a href="#32">32</a>) Quine responds to this challenge by suggestion that meanings either do not exist or at least they do not have the nature conceived here. He might for instance say that a linguistic utterance can be meaningful (or better, significant) not because it has a meaning, but simply because its significance is an “ultimate and irreducible matter of fact.” Or he might, rather than equating utterances with a stated meaning, instead “analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it” (32). (<a href="#33">33</a>) Quine thinks that normally we talk about two things regarding meanings. {1} “the <i>having</i> of meanings, which is significance,” and {2} “<i>sameness</i> of meaning, or synonymy.” When we give the meaning of something, we are in fact supplying a synonym that is “couched, ordinarily, in clearer language than the original” (31). Quine thinks that we can still speak of significance and synonymy without positing an entity called a meaning. For him, it would be done in terms of behavior. (<a href="#34">34</a>) Quine (after summarizing our findings so far) says that “At this point McX begins to wonder whether there is any limit at all to our ontological immunity. Does <i>nothing</i> we may say commit us to the assumption of universals or other entities which we may find unwelcome?” (31). (<a href="#35">35</a>) The only way this can be, he says, is with bound variables or variables of quantification, like “there is something (bound variable) which red houses and sunsets have in common” (31). But naming does not ontologically commit us, because as we saw, we can convert them to definite descriptions that imply no existence. Quine continues: “To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable. In terms of the categories of traditional grammar, this amounts roughly to saying that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun. Pronouns are the basic media of reference; nouns might better have been named propronouns. The variables of quantification, ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’, range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true” (32). (<a href="#36">36</a>) When we say “some dogs are white,” (we might be asserting that there are dogs (and they are white), but) we are not committing ourselves to the existence of doghood or whiteness. Or if we say, “some zoological species are cross-fertile,” “we are committing ourselves to recognizing as entities the several species themselves” (32). (<a href="#37">37</a>) This means that mathematics for example is committed to “an ontology of abstract entities;” for, “a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true” (32). “Thus it is that the great mediaeval controversy over universals has flared up anew in the modern philosophy of mathematics” (32). (<a href="#38">38</a>) Only more recently were these matters of ontological presupposition clarified, so many modern philosophical mathematicians were really debating the problem of universals that have been around for long: “the fundamental cleavages among modern points of view on foundations of mathematics do come down pretty explicitly to disagreements as to the range of entities to which the bound variables should be permitted to refer” (33). (<a href="#39">39</a>) There are 3 parallels on these debates on universals between Medieval and Modern times: {1} Realism & Logicism, {2} Conceptualism & Intuitionalism, {3} Nominalism & Formalism. (<a href="#40">40</a>) Medieval <em>realism</em> holds that “the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them” (33). (Thus this view takes universals as preexisting their conception and as being real.) Similarly, “<i>Logicism</i>, represented by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Church, and Carnap, condones the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities known and unknown, specifiable and unspecifiable, indiscriminately” (33). (<a href="#41">41</a>) Medieval “<i>Conceptualism</i> holds that there are universals but they are mind-made,” while Modern “<i>Intuitionism</i>, espoused in modern times in one form or another by Poincaré, Brouwer, Weyl, and others, countenances the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities only when those entities are capable of being cooked up individually from ingredients specified in advance” (33). (So in both cases, universals are not taken as real in themselves and as preexisting their conception, but rather coming into being only through their conception.) “As Fraenkel has put it, logicism holds that classes are discovered while intuitionism holds that they are invented” (33). This distinction has great consequences in mathematical systems, especially with regard to infinity. (<a href="#42">42</a>) Like intuitionism, modern <em>formalism </em>is against logicism’s “recourse to universals” (34). But formalists may differ from intuitionists in one of two ways. {1} They might be averse to how intuitionism cripples classical mathematics. {2} They “might, like the <i>nominalists</i> of old, object to admitting abstract entities at all, even in the restrained sense of mind-made entities” (34). Yet, all formalists “keeps classical mathematics as a play of insignificant notations”. This play can still be useful in different ways, as seen for instance in its application in physics and technology. Yet, “utility need not imply significance, in any literal linguistic sense” (34). What also does not necessarily imply significance is the success within mathematics itself in generating new theorems and “in finding objective bases for agreement with one another’s results” (33). “For an adequate basis for agreement among mathematicians can be found simply in the rules which govern the manipulation of the notations—these syntactical rules being, unlike the notations themselves, quite significant and intelligible” (33). (<a href="#43">43</a>) Yet, our claim that “To be is to be the value of a variable” does not tell us which ontologies are better, it only tests “the conformity of a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological | standard” (34-35). In other words, “We look to bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else’s, <i>says</i> there is; and this much is quite properly a problem involving language. But what there is is another question” (35). (<a href="#44">44</a>) Quine says that there is reason for us to conduct our debates about what is on a semantic level. One reason for this is that it allows someone taking Quine’s position to articulate their disagreement over certain entities that are in McX’s ontology but not in Quine’s: “So long as I adhere to my ontology, as opposed to McX’s, I cannot allow my bound variables to refer to entities which belong to McX’s ontology and not to mine. I can, however, consistently describe our disagreement by characterizing the statements which McX affirms” (35). (<a href="#45">45</a>) Another reason to keep the debate on the semantic level is that it allows McX and Quine to be able to communicate their different ontologies to one another in a way that fairly represents each to the other. (<a href="#46">46</a>) Yet, just because we can translate these ontological views into language does not mean they are nothing more than linguistic issues: “Translatability of a question into semantical terms is no indication that the question is linguistic. To see Naples is to bear a name which, when prefixed to the words ‘sees Naples’, yields a true sentence; still there is nothing linguistic about seeing Naples” (35). (<a href="#47">47</a>) Quine next addresses the criteria for adopting one particular ontology. He says that it is based on it being “the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered frag-| ments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged” (35-36) (and that whatever considerations we apply to constructing part of that overall conceptual scheme that will accommodate all science applies to the part in the same way it does the whole). (<a href="#48">48</a>) The process of choosing a conceptual scheme is not always straightforward. We might for instance consider a set of  “play-by-play reporting of immediate experience” composed of “individual subjective events of sensation or reflection” (36). (Under Quine’s mode of formalization, these entities would be the “the values of bound variables”). (So already with regard to what exists, under this scheme we are saying that the subjective events of sensation or reflection are the entities that exist in our ontology. Also note that there will be very many. Consider for instance looking at an object before you, for instance, a coffee cup. However, under this mode of analysis, there is no existing being “coffee cup”. There are just the beings which are the very many experiences of roundness, whiteness, etc. that otherwise would be features of a coffee cup.) Yet, this complex of sense impressions can be efficiently organized if we adopt a “physicalistic conceptual scheme”: “By bringing together scattered sense events and treating them as perceptions of one object, we reduce the complexity of our stream of experience to a manageable conceptual simplicity” (36). (<a href="#49">49</a>) Both the phenomenalist and physicalist schemes have their own advantages. Both have their own sort of simplicity and fundamentality, “though in different senses: the one is epistemologically, the other physically, fundamental” (36). (<a href="#50">50</a>) “The physical conceptual scheme simplifies our account of experience because of the way myriad scattered sense events come to be associated with single so-called objects” (36). However, we cannot be sure that there will be a way to translate each sentence about such physical objects into the language of the phenomenalistic scheme. (Perhaps the difficulty would be something like going from a third to a first person orientation. See Nagel’s “<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2016/11/nagel-what-is-it-like-to-be-bat-summary.html">What Is It Like To Be a Bat</a>?”) This notion of physical objects simplifies “our account of the flux of experience” in a manner that is analogous to how “the introduction of irrational numbers simplifies laws of arithmetic” (37). “From the point of view of the conceptual scheme of the elementary arithmetic of rational numbers alone, the broader arithmetic of rational and irrational numbers would have the status of a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth (namely, the arithmetic of rationals) and yet, containing that literal truth as a scattered part. Similarly, from a phenomenalistic point, of view, the conceptual scheme of physical objects is a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth and yet containing that literal truth as a scattered part” (37). (<a href="#51">51</a>) (We may further our mythologizing by introducing a platonistic ontology of classes or attributes of physical objects, which will further simplify our account of physics. Math is a part of this higher myth, which makes it suitable for physics. And, “an attitude of formalism may with equal justice be adopted toward the physical conceptual scheme, in turn, by the pure aesthete or phenomenalist” (37).) (<a href="#52">52</a>) (There are parallels in the mythmaking between mathematics and physics. At the turn of the 20th century, there was a crisis in the foundations of mathematics with “the discovery of Russell’s paradox and other antinomies of set theory. These contradictions had to be obviated by unintuitive, <i>ad hoc</i> devices; our mathematical myth-making became deliberate and evident to all” (37). Similarly, “An antinomy arose between the undular and the corpuscular accounts of light” (37). And also, “the second great modern crisis in the foundations of mathematics—precipitated in 1931 by Gödel’s proof  that there are bound to be undecidable statements in arithmetic—has its companion piece in physics in Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle” (38). (<a href="#53">53</a>) All these options should be pursued. (<a href="#54">54</a>) However, Quine claims that among these different conceptual schemes, the phenomenalistic one “claims epistemological priority. Viewed from within the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme, the ontologies of physical objects and mathematical objects are myths. The quality of myth, however, is relative; relative, in this case, to the epistemological point of view. This point of view is one among various, corresponding to one among our various interests and purposes” (38).</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1">1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Ontological Problem (What is There?) and Debate Over What Can Be Included]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2">2</a></p> <p align="center">[Supposing One Person (McX) Claims an Entity Exists and Another (Quine) Does Not]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3">3</a></p> <p align="center">[Asymmetry in the Arguments: Quine’s Disadvantage]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#4">4</a></p> <p align="center">[Negative Arguer as Unable to Even Note They Are in Disagreement]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#5">5</a></p> <p align="center">[The Puzzle of the Being of Non-Being (“Plato’s Beard”)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#6">6</a></p> <p align="center">[Pegasus as a Thinkable Thus Existing Being]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#7">7</a></p> <p align="center">[McX’s Confusion Between Pegasus the Idea and Pegasus the Thing]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#8">8</a></p> <p align="center">[McX’s Inconsistency: Otherwise Distinguishing Thing from Idea]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#9">9</a></p> <p align="center">[Supposed Wyman’s View: Pegasus Exists but as Unactualized]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#10">10</a></p> <p align="center">[“Exist” Vs. “Is”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#11">11</a></p> <p align="center">[Complications with Wyman’s View]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#12">12</a></p> <p align="center">[The Insufficiency of Using Modal the Operator “Possible/Possibly” for Entities]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#13">13</a></p> <p align="center">[The Round Square Cupola on Berkeley College: The Question of Whether Contradictory Entities Can Have Being or If Such Names are Non-Referring]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#14">14</a></p> <p align="center">[History of the Notion That Contradictions Are Meaningless]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#15">15</a></p> <p align="center">[Losing the Ability to Test for Meaning by Adopting the Doctrine of the Meaninglessness of Contradictions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#16">16</a></p> <p align="center">[Moving on to Plato’s Beard Solutions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#17">17</a></p> <p align="center">[Using Russell’s Definite Descriptions to Handle Non-Referring or Contradictory Descriptive Names]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#18">18</a></p> <p align="center">[Evaluating Sentences with Descriptive Names]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#19">19</a></p> <p align="center">[Quantification in Descriptive Name Formulations]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#20">20</a></p> <p align="center">[Using Definite Descriptions to Describe Non-Existing Entities Without Implying Their Being]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#21">21</a></p> <p align="center">[Formulating a Description for Pegasus]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#22">22</a></p> <p align="center">[“Pegasizing” and “Being-Pegasus” as Descriptions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#23">23</a></p> <p align="center">[The Pegasizing Attribute as Universal Form]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#24">24</a></p> <p align="center">[Avoiding Plato’s Beard, 1]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#25">25</a></p> <p align="center">[Avoiding Plato’s Beard, 2]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#26">26</a></p> <p align="center">[The Difference Between Meaning and Names]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#27">27</a></p> <p align="center">[Confusing Meaning and the Named Object]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#28">28</a></p> <p align="center">[Turning to the Ontological Problem of Universals]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#29">29</a></p> <p align="center">[An Alternate Ontology: Red Things Without Redness]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#30">30</a></p> <p align="center">[Not Committing to Pegasizing]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#31">31</a></p> <p align="center">[The Suggestion that Meanings are Universals]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#32">32</a></p> <p align="center">[Denying the Being of Meaning]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#33">33</a></p> <p align="center">[The Non-Necessity of Positing the Entity of Meaning]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#34">34</a></p> <p align="center">[Turning to the Question of Commitments to Universals]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#35">35</a></p> <p align="center">[Bound Variables and Ontological Commitments]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#36">36</a></p> <p align="center">[“Some” and Existence Commitment]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#37">37</a></p> <p align="center">[Ontological Commitments Resulting from the Reference of Bound Variables (in Math, etc.)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#38">38</a></p> <p align="center">[Modern Mathematical Philosophical Debates as Being About Quantification Issues]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#39">39</a></p> <p align="center">[Three Parallel Debates Between Medieval and Modern Times]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#40">40</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Debates {1}: Realism & Logicism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#41">41</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Debates {2}: Conceptualism & Intuitionalism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#42">42</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Debates {3}: Nominalism & Formalism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#43">43</a></p> <p align="center">[The Issue of Evaluating Ontologies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#44">44</a></p> <p align="center">[One Reason for Keeping the Debate on the Semantic Level: Articulating the Disagreement]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#45">45</a></p> <p align="center">[Another Reason for Keeping the Debate on the Semantic Level: Mutual Communication]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#46">46</a></p> <p align="center">[Linguistically Articulated Ontological Views as Not Necessarily Linguistic Issues]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#47">47</a></p> <p align="center">[How We Adopt Ontologies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#48">48</a></p> <p align="center">[Simplifying Sensory Beings with Physicalism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#49">49</a></p> <p align="center">[Advantages of Each Scheme]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#50">50</a></p> <p align="center">[Physical Objects as Convenient Myths]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#51">51</a></p> <p align="center">[Myths in Physics]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#52">52</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Mythmaking in Math and Physics]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#53">53</a></p> <p align="center">[Summary. Pursuing All Options.]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#54">54</a></p> <p align="center">[The Epistemological Priority of the Phenomenalistic Scheme]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1">1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Ontological Problem (What is There?) and Debate Over What Can Be Included]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The ontological problem can be stated simply with the question: “What is there?” An easy and broadly acceptable answer could be “everything,” in other words, “there is what there is.” Yet, despite the simplicity, of the question and answer, there has been a lot of debate over certain cases regarding whether they can be included among things that exist.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a word—‘Everything’—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is merely to say that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases; and so the issue has stayed alive down the centuries. </p> <p align="justify">(21)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2">2</a></p> <p align="center">[Supposing One Person (McX) Claims an Entity Exists and Another (Quine) Does Not]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine notes a problem in particular for ontological debates. We suppose two philosophers, McX and Quine himself. As we noted, people may differ as what should be considered an existing entity or not. We suppose then that McX believes some certain thing is an existing entity, while Quine does not believe there is such an entity. We first take McX’s point of view. They can summarize their disagreement thusly: McX thinks that this entity exists, and yet Quine refuses to acknowledge its existence. But how would Quine summarize his disagreement? Quine would say that it is not a matter of him failing to recognize a particular entity, because there is no such entity in the first place to recognize. Regardless of disagreement about how to formulate the incompatibility of their views, the real disagreement is between their ontologies.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Suppose now that two philosophers, McX and I, differ over ontology. Suppose McX maintains there is something which I maintain there is not. McX can, quite consistently with his own point of view, describe our difference of opinion by saying that I refuse to recognize certain entities. I should protest, of course, that he is wrong in his formulation of our disagreement, for I maintain that there are no entities, of the kind which he alleges, <em>for</em> me to recognize; but my finding him wrong in his formulation of our disagreement is unimportant, for I am committed to considering him wrong in his ontology anyway. </p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3">3</a></p> <p align="center">[Asymmetry in the Arguments: Quine’s Disadvantage]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The problem for Quine in this scenario is that he might be helpless to argue against McX. Suppose Quine tells McX that that these entities in question do not exist. This might be like first positing their existence, then secondly denying it. But that would involve starting off by acknowledging their existence, which Quine is not willing to do in the first place.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">When <i>I</i> try to formulate our difference of opinion, on the other hand, I seem to be in a predicament. I cannot admit that there are some things which McX countenances and I do not, for in admitting that there are such things I should be contradicting my own rejection of them. </p> <p align="justify">(21)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#4">4</a></p> <p align="center">[Negative Arguer as Unable to Even Note They Are in Disagreement]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Since those taking a negative view about the existence of an entity cannot formulate the disagreement without first acknowledging there is such an entity in the first place, that means “in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him” (21).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">It would appear, if this reasoning were sound, that in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him. </p> <p align="justify">(21)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#5">5</a></p> <p align="center">[The Puzzle of the Being of Non-Being (“Plato’s Beard”)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine notes this problem goes back to Plato: Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? He calls this “tangled” doctrine “Plato’s Beard”, and he says that throughout history, it has frequently dulled “the edge of Occam’s razor.”]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>Note: Quine does not explain why he calls it “Plato’s Beard.” I am not sure if the example of a beard comes up in Plato’s discussion of this issue. If not, I wonder if it gets that name because of the metaphor of Occam’s “razor”, combined with how it challenges that idea (maybe because a simpler answer is to say that being is simply not) and with the fact that it is “tangled” like a beard (it seems paradoxical and self-contradictory), and also with the fact that shaving a beard can eventually dull a razor. ]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed <i>Plato’s beard</i>; historically it has proved tough, frequently dulling the edge of Occam’s razor. </p> <p align="justify">(21)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="6"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#6">6</a></p> <p align="center">[Pegasus as a Thinkable Thus Existing Being]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[We see a similar sort of thinking in McX’s view. McX might say that if we are able to talk about something like Pegasus, how could it not exist? “If Pegasus <i>were</i> not, McX argues, we should not be talking about anything when we use the word; therefore it would be nonsense to say even that Pegasus is not. Thinking to show thus that the denial of Pegasus cannot be coherently maintained, he concludes that Pegasus is” (21).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">It is some such line of thought that leads philosophers like McX to impute being where they might otherwise be quite content to recognize that there is nothing. Thus, take Pegasus. If Pegasus <i>were</i> not, McX argues, we should not be talking about anything when we use the word; therefore it would be nonsense to say even that Pegasus is not. Thinking to show thus that the denial of Pegasus cannot be coherently maintained, he concludes that Pegasus is. </p> <p align="justify">(22)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="7"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#7">7</a></p> <p align="center">[McX’s Confusion Between Pegasus the Idea and Pegasus the Thing]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[But there seems to be a confusion in McX’s claim. When McX says that Pegasus exists (because we can think it and speak about it), the entity McX has in mind is an idea in our minds, and not an actual, living, breathing animal out in the world around us. However, “this mental entity is not what people are talking about when they deny Pegasus” (22). ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">McX cannot, indeed, quite persuade himself that any region of space-time, near or remote, contains a flying horse of flesh and blood. Pressed for further details on Pegasus, then, he says that Pegasus is an idea in men’s minds. Here, however, a confusion begins to be apparent. We may for the sake of argument concede that there is an entity, and even a unique entity (though this is rather implausible), which is the mental Pegasus-idea; but this mental entity is not what people are talking about when they deny Pegasus. </p> <p align="justify">(22)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="8"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#8">8</a></p> <p align="center">[McX’s Inconsistency: Otherwise Distinguishing Thing from Idea]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[It is odd that McX falls victim to this confusion, because “McX never confuses the Parthenon with the Parthenon-idea. The Parthenon is physical; the Parthenon-idea is mental” (22). “But when we shift from the Parthenon to Pegasus, the confusion sets in—for no other reason than that McX would sooner be deceived by the crudest and most flagrant counterfeit than grant the nonbeing of Pegasus” (22).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">McX never confuses the Parthenon with the Parthenon-idea. The Parthenon is physical; the Parthenon-idea is mental (according anyway to McX’s version of ideas, and I have no better to offer). The Parthenon is visible; the Parthenon-idea is invisible. We cannot easily imagine two things more unlike, and less liable to confusion, than the Parthenon and the Parthenon-idea. But when we shift from the Parthenon to Pegasus, the confusion sets in—for no other reason than that McX would sooner be deceived by the crudest and most flagrant counterfeit than grant the nonbeing of Pegasus. </p> <p align="justify">(22)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="9"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#9">9</a></p> <p align="center">[Supposed Wyman’s View: Pegasus Exists but as Unactualized]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Another supposed person with a view on the matter (whom we call “Wyman”) might also allege that Pegasus has being, but they might say that Pegasus has its “being as an unactualized possible. When we say of Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more precisely, that Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality” (22).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The notion that Pegasus must be, because it would otherwise be nonsense to say even that Pegasus is not, has been seen to lead McX into an elementary confusion. Subtler minds, taking the same precept as their starting point, come out with theories of Pegasus which are less patently misguided than McX’s, and correspondingly more difficult to eradicate. One of these subtler minds is named, let us say, Wyman. Pegasus, Wyman maintains, has his being as an unactualized possible. When we say of Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more precisely, that Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality. Saying that Pegasus is not actual is on a par, logically, with saying that the Parthenon is not red; in | either case we are saying something about an entity whose being is unquestioned. </p> <p align="justify">(22-23)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="10"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#10">10</a></p> <p align="center">[“Exist” Vs. “Is”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine notes that Wyman has spoiled the word “exists” in this way (by distinguishing {1} an entity that has being but does not exist from {2} an entity that has being but does exist). This ruins the word “exists,” because normally it is not limited in this way to spatio-temporal manifestation. Usually when we say “Pegasus does not exist” we mean there is no such entity. It just happens that Pegasus is a spatio-temporal being. However, we might want to say that the cube root of 27 exists, even though it lacks spatio-temporal presentation. Wyman wants to find a way to accommodate our position as best they can into their ontology, so they change the meaning of “exist” to always refer to spatio-temporal manifestation, leaving “is” for the non-spatio-temporal being of a non-actualized (potential) spatio-temporal entity. “Wyman, in an ill-conceived effort to appear agreeable, genially grants us the nonexistence of Pegasus and then, contrary to what <i>we</i> meant by nonexistence of Pegasus, insists that Pegasus <i>is</i>. Existence is one thing, he says, and subsistence is another” (23). So we are left with holding onto the word “is” for this notion we once had for “exists”.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Wyman, by the way, is one of those philosophers who have united in ruining the good old word ‘exist’. Despite his espousal of unactualized possibles, he limits the word ‘existence’ to actuality—thus preserving an illusion of ontological agreement between himself and us who repudiate the rest of his bloated universe. We have all been prone to say, in our common-sense usage of ‘exist’, that Pegasus does not exist, meaning simply that there is no such entity at all. If Pegasus existed he would indeed be in space and time, but only because the word ‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not because ‘exists’ has spatio-temporal connotations. If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 27, this is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing, and not because we are being ambiguous in our use of ‘exist’. However, Wyman, in an ill-conceived effort to appear agreeable, genially grants us the nonexistence of Pegasus and then, contrary to what <i>we</i> meant by nonexistence of Pegasus, insists that Pegasus <i>is</i>. Existence is one thing, he says, and subsistence is another. The only way I know of coping with this obfuscation of issues is to give Wyman the word ‘exist’. I’ll try not to use it again; I still have ‘is’. So much for lexicography; let’s get back to Wyman’s ontology. </p> <p align="justify">(23)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="11"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#11">11</a></p> <p align="center">[Complications with Wyman’s View]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Wyman’s view that there are non-actualized (possible) beings (that have being but not existence) creates so many difficult to answer questions, that it is best not to get entangled in the ramifications of this view: “Wyman’s slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them one?” [etc.] (23).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Wyman’s overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is not the worst of it. Wyman’s slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this the same as saying that it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of entities | which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another? These elements are well-nigh incorrigible. By a Fregean therapy of individual concepts, some effort might be made at rehabilitation; but I feel we’d do better simply to clear Wyman’s slum and be done with it. </p> <p align="justify">(23-24)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="12"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#12">12</a></p> <p align="center">[The Insufficiency of Using Modal the Operator “Possible/Possibly” for Entities]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[While we might deal with the notion of possibility by using a modality operating on a whole statement (as with the adverb “possibly”), we gain little by applying this technique to render possible entities.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Possibility, along with the other modalities of necessity and impossibility and contingency, raises problems upon which I do not mean to imply that we should turn our backs. But we can at least limit modalities to whole statements. We may impose the adverb ‘possibly’ upon a statement as a whole, and we may well worry about the semantical analysis of such usage; but little real advance in such analysis is to be hoped for in expanding our universe to include so-called <i>possible entities</i>. I suspect that the main motive for this expansion is simply the old notion that Pegasus, for example, must be because otherwise it would be nonsense to say even that he is not. </p> <p align="justify">(24)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="13"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#13">13</a></p> <p align="center">[The Round Square Cupola on Berkeley College: The Question of Whether Contradictory Entities Can Have Being or If Such Names are Non-Referring]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There is another problem with Wyman’s notion of unactualized possibility. We are supposing Wyman’s view that it is nonsense to say that Pegasus is not. What about the Round Square Cupola on Berkeley College? Using the same reasoning, would we say it is unactualized? But as an impossible object, would we have to say it is an unactualized impossible? That would create a dilemma for Wyman. If Wyman says that the Round Square Cupola on Berkeley College has being, then Wyman becomes trapped in contradictions. Quine tells us that instead Wyman takes the other strategy, and “concedes that it is nonsense to say that the round square cupola on Berkeley College is not. He says that the phrase ‘round square cupola’ is meaningless” (24). (Perhaps the claim here is that ‘round square cupola’ is a sequence of words that refers to nothing in the first place, so there is no entity in question that can be said to exist or not. Or, as we see in the next section, perhaps the idea is that impossible objects are always non-referring.)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Still, all the rank luxuriance of Wyman’s universe of possibles would seem to come to naught when we make a slight change in the example and speak not of Pegasus but of the round square cupola on Berkeley College. If, unless Pegasus were, it would be nonsense to say that he is not, then by the same token, unless the round square cupola on Berkeley College were, it would be nonsense to say that it is not. But, unlike Pegasus, the round square cupola on Berkeley College cannot be admitted even as an unactualized <i>possible</i>. Can we drive Wyman now to admitting also a realm of unactualizable impossibles? If so, a good many embarrassing questions could be asked about them. We might hope even to trap Wyman in contradictions, by getting him to admit that certain of these entities are at once round and square. But the wily Wyman chooses the other horn of the dilemma and concedes that it is nonsense to say that the round square cupola on Berkeley College is not. He says that the phrase ‘round square cupola’ is meaningless. </p> <p align="justify">(24)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="14"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#14">14</a></p> <p align="center">[History of the Notion That Contradictions Are Meaningless]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There is a history to Wyman’s approach of asserting the meaninglessness of contradictions. Some even go as far as to challenge <em>reductio ad absurdum </em>arguments.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>Note, I am not at all certain, but I wonder if Quine means that by rendering contradictions meaningless, that might prevent one from articulating a refutation that finds contradictions, as they cannot be be said to have any significance in the first place.]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Wyman was not the first to embrace this alternative. The doctrine of the meaninglessness of contradictions runs away back. The tradition survives, moreover, in writers who seem to share none of Wyman’s motivations. | Still, I wonder whether the first temptation to such a doctrine may not have been substantially the motivation which we have observed in Wyman. Certainly the doctrine has no intrinsic appeal; and it has led its devotees to such quixotic extremes as that of challenging the method of proof by <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>—a challenge in which I sense a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> of the doctrine itself. </p> <p align="justify">(24-25)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="15"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#15">15</a></p> <p align="center">[Losing the Ability to Test for Meaning by Adopting the Doctrine of the Meaninglessness of Contradictions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Also, if we adopt this doctrine of the meaninglessness of contradictions, we lose the ability to test whether a formulation is meaningful or not. “For it follows from a discovery in mathematical logic, due to Church, that there can be no generally applicable test of contradictoriness” (25).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>. Note: I am not sure what this is in reference to, and I am not sure the relevance of Church’s findings. My guess is the following. Those taking this doctrine will need to determine which formulations are meaningful (as they lack contraction) and which are not meaningful (as they involve contradiction). But if there is no method to make such a determination, there will be no way to decide which formulas are meaning of not. ]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Moreover, the doctrine of meaninglessness of contradictions has the severe methodological drawback that it makes it impossible, in principle, ever to devise an effective test of what is meaningful and what is not. It would be forever impossible for us to devise systematic ways of deciding whether a string of signs made sense—even to us individually, let alone other people—or not. For it follows from a discovery in mathematical logic, due to Church, that there can be no generally applicable test of contradictoriness. </p> <p align="justify">(25)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="16"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#16">16</a></p> <p align="center">[Moving on to Plato’s Beard Solutions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[We move now to finding ways of dealing with the so-called Plato’s Beard problem (see section <a href="#5">5</a>).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">I have spoken disparagingly of Plato’s beard, and hinted that it is tangled. I have dwelt at length on the inconveniences of putting up with it. It is time to think about taking steps.</p> <p align="justify">(25)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="17"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#17">17</a></p> <p align="center">[Using Russell’s Definite Descriptions to Handle Non-Referring or Contradictory Descriptive Names]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Using definite descriptions, Russell devised a way to evaluate non-referring or contradictory descriptive names, like “the present King of France”: “The author of <i>Waverley</i> was a poet’, for example, is explained as a whole as meaning ‘Someone (better: something) wrote <i>Waverley</i> and was a poet, and nothing else wrote <i>Waverley</i>’. (The point of this added clause is to affirm the uniqueness which is implicit in the word ‘the’, in ‘<i>the</i> author of <i>Waverley</i>’.)” And another example: “‘The round square cupola on Berkeley College is pink’ is explained as ‘Something is round and square and is a cupola on Berkeley College and is pink, and nothing else is round and square and a cupola on Berkeley College’”  (25).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>. Note: Graham Priest discusses definite descriptions <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2015/10/priest-ch4-of-logic-very-short.html">here</a>.]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Russell, in his theory of so-called singular descriptions, showed clearly how we might meaningfully use seeming names without supposing that there be the entities allegedly named. The names to which Russell’s theory directly applies are complex descriptive names such as ‘the author of <i>Waverley</i>’, ‘the present King of France’, ‘the round square cupola on Berkeley College’. Russell analyzes such phrases systematically as fragments of the whole sentences in which they occur. The sentence “The author of <i>Waverley</i> was a poet’, for example, is explained as a whole as meaning ‘Someone (better: something) wrote <i>Waverley</i> and was a poet, and nothing else wrote <i>Waverley</i>’. (The point of this added clause is to affirm the uniqueness which is implicit in the word ‘the’, in ‘<i>the</i> author of <i>Waverley</i>’.) The sentence ‘The round square cupola on Berkeley College is pink’ is explained as ‘Something is round and square and is a cupola on Berkeley College and is pink, and nothing else is round and square and a cupola on Berkeley College’</p> <p align="justify">(25)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="18"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#18">18</a></p> <p align="center">[Evaluating Sentences with Descriptive Names]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[This allows the sentence containing that descriptive name to be evaluable as true or false.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The virtue of this analysis is that the seeming name, a descriptive phrase, is paraphrased <i>in context</i> as a so-called incomplete symbol. No unified expression is offered as an analysis | of the descriptive phrase, but the statement as a whole which was the context of that phrase still gets its full quota of meaning—whether true or false. </p> <p align="justify">(25-26)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="19"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#19">19</a></p> <p align="center">[Quantification in Descriptive Name Formulations]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[In “Something wrote <i>Waverley</i> and was a poet and nothing else wrote <i>Waverley</i>’” we are using a quantifier “something”, which, like other quantifiers such as “nothing” and “everything”, are bound variables, and they do not presuppose the existence of the quantified thing: “the burden of objective reference which had been put upon the descriptive phrase is now taken over by words of the kind that logicians call bound variables, variables of quantification, namely, words like ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’. These words, far from purporting to be names specifically of the author of <i>Waverley</i>, do not purport to be names at all; they refer to entities generally, with a kind of studied ambiguity peculiar to themselves. These quantificational words or bound variables are, of course a basic part of language, and their meaningfulness, at least in context, is not to be challenged. But their meaningfulness in no way presupposes there being either the author of <i>Waverley</i> or the round square cupola on Berkeley College or any other specifically preassigned objects” (26).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>. Note: One thing I did not grasp is why the existential quantifier would not imply existence, with “something” maybe functioning as such (see the next section), unless it is not included here.]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The unanalyzed statement ‘The author of <i>Waverley</i> was a poet’ contains a part, ‘the author of <i>Waverley</i>’, which is wrongly supposed by McX and Wyman to demand objective reference in order to be meaningful at all. But in Russell’s translation, ‘Something wrote <i>Waverley</i> and was a poet and nothing else wrote <i>Waverley</i>’, the burden of objective reference which had been put upon the descriptive phrase is now taken over by words of the kind that logicians call bound variables, variables of quantification, namely, words like ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’. These words, far from purporting to be names specifically of the author of <i>Waverley</i>, do not purport to be names at all; they refer to entities generally, with a kind of studied ambiguity peculiar to themselves. These quantificational words or bound variables are, of course a basic part of language, and their meaningfulness, at least in context, is not to be challenged. But their meaningfulness in no way presupposes there being either the author of <i>Waverley</i> or the round square cupola on Berkeley College or any other specifically preassigned objects. </p> <p align="justify">(26)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="20"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#20">20</a></p> <p align="center">[Using Definite Descriptions to Describe Non-Existing Entities Without Implying Their Being]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Being can be affirmed or denied using this definite description method. For instance, if we are affirming that “There <i>is</i> the author of <em>Waverley</em>,” we might then say, “Someone (or, more strictly, something) wrote <i>Waverley</i> and nothing else wrote <em>Waverley</em>.” We can also express that there is no author of <em>Waverley</em>: “‘The author of <i>Waverley</i> is not’ is explained, correspondingly, as the alternation ‘Either each thing failed to write <i>Waverley</i> or two or more things wrote <i>Waverley</i>’.” (If there is no author of <em>Waverly</em>, that could be because there are numerous authors and not just one author or because every existing thing is not the author. As we can see, there is no mention of non-beings here.) Both of these are false, but they are meaningful. This also works for contradictory impossible objects, like “The round square cupola on Berkeley College is not” (26). Thus statements of non-being in this way will not entail an affirmation of their being.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Where descriptions are concerned, there is no longer any difficulty in affirming or denying being. ‘There <i>is</i> the author of <i>Waverley</i>’ is explained by Russell as meaning ‘Someone (or, more strictly, something) wrote <i>Waverley</i> and nothing else wrote <i>Waverley</i>’. ‘The author of <i>Waverley</i> is not’ is explained, correspondingly, as the alternation ‘Either each thing failed to write <i>Waverley</i> or two or more things wrote <i>Waverley</i>’. This alternation is false, but meaningful; and it contains no expression purporting to name the author of <i>Waverley</i>. The statement ‘The round square cupola on Berkeley College is not’ is analyzed in similar fashion. So the old notion that statements of nonbeing defeat themselves goes by the board. When a statement of being or nonbeing is analyzed by Russell’s theory of descriptions, it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity whose being is in question, so that the meaningfulness of the statement no longer can be thought to presuppose that there be such an entity. </p> <p align="justify">(26)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="21"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#21">21</a></p> <p align="center">[Formulating a Description for Pegasus]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[In order to apply this technique to Pegasus, we will need to render it into a descriptive name, such as “the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon” (26).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Now what of ‘Pegasus’? This being a word rather than a descriptive phrase, Russell’s argument does not immediately apply to it. However, it can easily be made to apply. We have only to rephrase ‘Pegasus’ as a description, in any way that seems adequately to single out our idea; say, ‘the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon’. Substituting such a phrase for ‘Pegasus’, we can then proceed to analyze the statement ‘Pegasus is’, or ‘Pegasus is not’, precisely on the analogy of Russell’s analysis of ‘The author of <i>Waverley</i> is’ and ‘The author of <i>Waverley</i> is not’. </p> <p align="justify">(27)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="22"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#22">22</a></p> <p align="center">[“Pegasizing” and “Being-Pegasus” as Descriptions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine next addresses the possibility that were Pegasus “so obscure or so basic no pat translation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along familiar lines,” still we can provide a description.<strong> We can appeal “to the <i>ex hypothesi</i> unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of <i>being Pegasus</i>, adopting, for its expression, the verb ‘is-Pegasus’, or ‘<u>pegasizes’</u></strong>” (27, boldface and underlining are mine). This way “The noun ‘Pegasus’ itself could then be treated as derivative, and identified after all with a description: ‘the thing that is-Pegasus’, <strong>‘<u>the thing that pegasizes</u></strong>’ (27, boldface and underlining are mine).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In order thus to subsume a one-word name or alleged name such as ‘Pegasus’ under Russell’s theory of description, we must, of course, be able first to translate the word into a description. But this is no real restriction. If the notion of Pegasus had been so obscure or so basic a one that no pat translation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along familiar lines, we could still have availed ourselves of the following artificial and trivial-seeming device: we could have appealed to the <i>ex hypothesi</i> unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of <i>being Pegasus</i>, adopting, for its expression, the verb ‘is-Pegasus’, or ‘pegasizes’. The noun ‘Pegasus’ itself could then be treated as derivative, and identified after all with a description: ‘the thing that is-Pegasus’, ‘the thing that pegasizes’.</p> <p align="justify">(27)<sup></sup></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="23"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#23">23</a></p> <p align="center">[The Pegasizing Attribute as Universal Form]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Here, we are assuming that there is an attribute of pegasizing. It would be either something like a form or universal in Plato’s realm of forms or in our minds. And with it, we can use Russell’s descriptions to predicate Pegasus without attributing existence to it.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">If the importing of such a predicate as ‘pegasizes’ seems to commit us to recognizing that there is a corresponding attribute, pegasizing, in Plato’s heaven or in the minds of men, well and good. Neither we nor Wyman nor McX have been contending, thus far, about the being or nonbeing of universals, but rather about that of Pegasus. If in terms of pegasizing we can interpret the noun ‘Pegasus’ as a description subject to Russell’s theory of descriptions, then we have disposed of the old notion that Pegasus cannot be said not to be without presupposing that in some sense Pegasus is. </p> <p align="justify">(27)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="24"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#24">24</a></p> <p align="center">[Avoiding Plato’s Beard, 1]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Thus we need not accept McX’s and Wyman’s contention that “we could not meaningfully affirm a statement of the form ‘So-and-so is not’, with a simple or descriptive singular noun in place of ‘so-and-so’, unless so-and-so is” (28).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Our argument is now quite general. McX and Wyman supposed that we could not meaningfully affirm a statement of the form ‘So-and-so is not’, with a simple or descriptive singular noun in place of ‘so-and-so’, unless so-and-so is. This supposition is now seen to be quite generally groundless, since the singular noun in question can always be expanded into a | singular description, trivially or otherwise, and then analyzed out <i>à la</i> Russell. </p> <p align="justify">(27-28)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="25"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#25">25</a></p> <p align="center">[Avoiding Plato’s Beard, 2]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[By saying that Pegasus is, that commits us to an ontology that contains Pegasus. But when we say Pegasus is not, this does not thereby include it in our ontology.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">We commit ourselves to an ontology containing numbers when we say there are prime numbers larger than a million; we commit ourselves to an ontology containing centaurs when we say there are centaurs; and we commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus when we say Pegasus is. But we do not commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus or the author of <i>Waverley</i> or the round square cupola on Berkeley College when we say that Pegasus or the author of <i>Waverley</i> or the cupola in question is <i>not</i>. We need no longer labor under the delusion that the meaningfulness of a statement containing a singular term presupposes an entity named by the term. A singular term need not name to be significant.</p> <p align="justify">(28. NOTE: <strong>There is a discrepancy between the cited version and the wikisource version in this paragraph</strong>.)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="26"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#26">26</a></p> <p align="center">[The Difference Between Meaning and Names]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The meanings of names are different than the named object, as we see clearly with “The Evening Star” and “The Morning Star.” (For, knowing the meaning of Evening Star is not enough to establish its identity with Morning Star.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">An inkling of this might have dawned on Wyman and McX even without benefit of Russell if they had only noticed—as so few of us do—that there is a gulf between <i>meaning</i> and <i>naming</i> even in the case of a singular term which is genuinely a name of an object. The following example from Frege will serve. The phrase ‘Evening Star’ names a certain large physical object of spherical form, which is hurtling through space some scores of millions of miles from here. The phrase ‘Morning Star’ names the same thing, as was probably first established by some observant Babylonian. But the two phrases cannot be regarded as having the same meaning; otherwise that Babylonian could have dispensed with his observations and contented himself with reflecting on the meanings of his words. The meanings, then, being different from one another, must be other than the named object, which is one and the same in both cases. </p> <p align="justify">(28)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="27"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#27">27</a></p> <p align="center">[Confusing Meaning and the Named Object]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[McX confused meaning and naming. “The structure of his confusion is as follows. He confused the alleged <i>named object</i> Pegasus with the <i>meaning</i> of the word ‘Pegasus’, therefore concluding that Pegasus must be in order that the word have meaning” (28). We might also wonder what meanings are. Suppose they are ideas in the mind. When we name Pegasus, it has a meaning (“the thing that pegasizes”), this meaning is an idea (yet it is not what is being named), so we might confuse the two and wrongly conclude that Pegasus is an idea (or that it names an idea). ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>Note: I am not entirely sure how McX confuses meaning and naming. My current guess is that McX is aware that Pegasus means the thing that Pegasizes, but because McX confuses meaning and naming, they think that it also names the entity that pegasizes, even though such a being does not exist.]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Confusion of meaning with naming not only made McX think he could not meaningfully repudiate Pegasus; a continuing confusion of meaning with naming no doubt helped engender his absurd notion that Pegasus is an idea, a mental entity. The structure of his confusion is as follows. He confused the alleged <i>named object</i> Pegasus with the <i>meaning</i> of the word ‘Pegasus’, therefore concluding that Pegasus must be in order that the word have meaning. But what sorts of things are | meanings? This is a moot point; however, one might quite plausibly explain meanings as ideas in the mind, supposing we can make clear sense in turn of the idea of ideas in the mind. Therefore Pegasus, initially confused with a meaning, ends up as an idea in the mind. It is the more remarkable that Wyman, subject to the same initial motivation as McX, should have avoided this particular blunder and wound up with unactualized possibles instead. </p> <p align="justify">(28-29)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="28"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#28">28</a></p> <p align="center">[Turning to the Ontological Problem of Universals]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine now turns “the ontological problem of universals: the question whether there are such entities as attributes, relations, classes, numbers, functions” (29). In McX’s ontology, they may note that “There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets,” and they may furthermore reason that “These houses, roses, and sunsets, then, have something in common; and this which they have in common is all I mean by the attribute of redness” (29).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Now let us turn to the ontological problem of universals: the question whether there are such entities as attributes, relations, classes, numbers, functions. McX, characteristically enough, thinks there are. Speaking of attributes, he says: “There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; this much is prephilosophical common sense in which we must all agree. These houses, roses, and sunsets, then, have something in common; and this which they have in common is all I mean by the attribute of redness.” For McX, thus, there being attributes is even more obvious and trivial than the obvious and trivial fact of there being red houses, roses, and sunsets. This, I think, is characteristic of metaphysics, or at least of that part of metaphysics called ontology: one who regards a statement on this subject as true at all must regard it as trivially true. One’s ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace ones. Judged within some particular conceptual scheme—and how else is judgment possible?—an ontological statement goes without saying, standing in need of no separate justification at all. Ontological statements follow immediately from all manner of casual statements of commonplace fact, just as—from the point of view, anyway, of McX’s conceptual scheme—‘There is an attribute’ follows from ‘There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets’. </p> <p align="justify">(29)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="29"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#29">29</a></p> <p align="center">[An Alternate Ontology: Red Things Without Redness]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[An alternate view could be that even though we have a number of different things to which it is appropriate to attribute “red,” that does not mean we also believe there is an entity that is named by “redness” over and above these things. “That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that McX is no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits under such names as ‘redness’” (30).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Judged in another conceptual scheme, an ontological statement which is axiomatic to McX’s mind may, with equal immediacy and triviality, be adjudged false. One may admit that there are red houses, roses, and sunsets, but deny, except as a popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in common. The words ‘houses’, ‘roses’, and ‘sunsets’ are true of sundry individual entities which are houses and | roses and sunsets, and the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word ‘redness’, nor, for that matter, by the word ‘househood’, ‘rosehood’, ‘sunsethood’. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that McX is no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits under such names as ‘redness’. </p> <p align="justify">(29-30)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="30"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#30">30</a></p> <p align="center">[Not Committing to Pegasizing]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Given our work with definite descriptions, we no longer feel any compulsion at all to infer that there is some entity being named by “red” or “is red” just because it has a meaning. In fact, even by describing Pegasus as that which pegasizes does not commit us to positing that there is such an attribute as pegasizing.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">One means by which McX might naturally have tried to impose his ontology of universals on us was already removed before we turned to the problem of universals. McX cannot argue that predicates such as ‘red’ or ‘is-red’, which we all concur in using, must be regarded as names each of a single universal entity in order that they be meaningful at all. For we have seen that being a name of something is a much more special feature than being meaningful. He cannot even charge us—at least not by <i>that</i> argument—with having posited an attribute of pegasizing by our adoption of the predicate ‘pegasizes’. </p> <p align="justify">(30)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="31"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#31">31</a></p> <p align="center">[The Suggestion that Meanings are Universals]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Yet, McX might still persist. They might say that our position still commits us to positing the meaning “pegasizes” and that any such meanings will have to be universals and maybe then attributes.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">However, McX hits upon a different strategem. “Let us grant,” he says, “this distinction between meaning and naming of which you make so much. Let us even grant that ‘is red’, ‘pegasizes’, etc., are not names of attributes. Still, you admit they have meanings. But these <i>meanings</i>, whether they are <i>named</i> or not, are still universals, and I venture to say that some of them might even be the very things that I call attributes, or something to much the same purpose in the end.” </p> <p align="justify">(30)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="32"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#32">32</a></p> <p align="center">[Denying the Being of Meaning]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine responds to this challenge by suggestion that meanings either do not exist or at least they do not have the nature conceived here. He might for instance say that a linguistic utterance can be meaningful (or better, significant) not because it has a meaning, but simply because its significance is an “ultimate and irreducible matter of fact.” Or he might, rather than equating utterances with a stated meaning, instead “analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it” (32).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>Note, it is not clear to me how a linguistic utterance bears its significance as an “ultimate and irreducible matter of fact.” I have this uncertainty, because I am not sure if it matters that a linguistic utterance can have a significance that is determined by the conventions of a linguistic system. In other words, there may be utterances that sound nearly the same in two different languages but have different meanings in each. This is not a counter-example, but I mention it to clarify my confusion.]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">For McX, this is an unusually penetrating speech; and the only way I know to counter it is by refusing to admit meanings. However, I feel no reluctance toward refusing to admit meanings, for I do not thereby deny that words and statements are meaningful. McX and I may agree to the letter in our classification of linguistic forms into the meaningful and the meaningless, even though McX construes meaningfulness as the <i>having</i> (in some sense of ‘having’) of some abstract entity which he calls a meaning, whereas I do not. I remain free to maintain that the fact that a given linguistic utterance is mean-| ingful (or <i>significant</i>, as I prefer to say so as not to invite hypostasis of meanings as entities) is an ultimate and irreducible matter of fact; or, I may undertake to analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it. </p> <p align="justify">(31-32)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="33"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#33">33</a></p> <p align="center">[The Non-Necessity of Positing the Entity of Meaning]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine thinks that normally we talk about two things regarding meanings. {1} “the <i>having</i> of meanings, which is significance,” and {2} “<i>sameness</i> of meaning, or synonymy.” When we give the meaning of something, we are in fact supplying a synonym that is “couched, ordinarily, in clearer language than the original” (31). Quine thinks that we can still speak of significance and synonymy without positing an entity called a meaning. For him, it would be done in terms of behavior.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The useful ways in which people ordinarily talk or seem to talk about meanings boil down to two: the <i>having</i> of meanings, which is significance, and <i>sameness</i> of meaning, or synonymy. What is called <i>giving</i> the meaning of an utterance is simply the uttering of a synonym, couched, ordinarily, in clearer language than the original. If we are allergic to meanings as such, we can speak directly of utterances as significant or insignificant, and as synonymous or heteronymous one with another. The problem of explaining these adjectives ‘significant’ and ‘synonymous’ with some degree of clarity and rigor—preferably, as I see it, in terms of behavior—is as difficult as it is important. But the explanatory value of special and irreducible intermediary entities called meanings is surely illusory. </p> <p align="justify">(31)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="34"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#34">34</a></p> <p align="center">[Turning to the Question of Commitments to Universals]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine (after summarizing our findings so far) says that “At this point McX begins to wonder whether there is any limit at all to our ontological immunity. Does <i>nothing</i> we may say commit us to the assumption of universals or other entities which we may find unwelcome?” (31).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Up to now I have argued that we can use singular terms significantly in sentences without presupposing that there are the entities which those terms purport to name. I have argued further that we can use general terms, for example, predicates, without conceding them to be names of abstract entities. I have argued further that we can view utterances as significant, and as synonymous or heteronymous with one another, without countenancing a realm of entities called meanings. At this point McX begins to wonder whether there is any limit at all to our ontological immunity. Does <i>nothing</i> we may say commit us to the assumption of universals or other entities which we may find unwelcome? </p> <p align="justify">(31)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="35"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#35">35</a></p> <p align="center">[Bound Variables and Ontological Commitments]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The only way this can be, he says, is with bound variables or variables of quantification, like “there is something (bound variable) which red houses and sunsets have in common” (31). But naming does not ontologically commit us, because as we saw, we can convert them to definite descriptions that imply no existence. Quine continues: “To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable. In terms of the categories of traditional grammar, this amounts roughly to saying that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun. Pronouns are the basic media of reference; nouns might better have been named propronouns. The variables of quantification, ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’, range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true” (32).]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>. Note: there is such a long quote above because I do not grasp it sufficiently to summarize it. My guess is the following. We consider again “there is something (bound variable) which red houses and sunsets have in common.” Here we have a bound variable of quantification, “(there is) something...,” and that something is what “red houses and sunsets have in common.” The something here would seem to be something like “redness.” I am guessing, but maybe Quine’s point is the following. If we say this statement, and we deem it true, that means there is something like a “redness” that is shared by red houses and sunsets. Quine seems to be saying that such a use of bound variables is the only way our language can involve us with ontological commitments about the existence of things. Merely mentioning them does not. I also did not understand the idea about pronouns and nouns. Would not nouns be more basic media of reference than pronouns, as they are more specific? Or is he referring to demonstrative pronouns here, which may be even more specific than nouns?]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">I have already suggested a negative answer to this question, in speaking of bound variables, or variables of quantification, in connection with Russell’s theory of descriptions. We can very easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by saying, for example, that <i>there is something</i> (bound variable) which red houses and sunsets have in common; or that <i>there is something</i> which is a prime number larger than a million. But, this is, essentially, the <i>only</i> way we can involve ourselves in | ontological commitments: by our use of bound variables. The use of alleged names is no criterion, for we can repudiate their namehood at the drop of a hat unless the assumption of a corresponding entity can be spotted in the things we affirm in terms of bound variables. Names are, in fact, altogether immaterial to the ontological issue, for I have shown, in connection with ‘Pegasus’ and ‘pegasize’, that names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell has shown that descriptions can be eliminated. Whatever we say with the help of names can be said in a language which shuns names altogether. To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable. In terms of the categories of traditional grammar, this amounts roughly to saying that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun. Pronouns are the basic media of reference; nouns might better have been named propronouns. The variables of quantification, ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’, range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true. </p> <p align="justify">(31-32. NOTE: there are discrepancies here between the cited and wikisource texts here.)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="36"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#36">36</a></p> <p align="center">[“Some” and Existence Commitment]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[When we say “some dogs are white,” (we might be asserting that there are dogs (and they are white), but) we are not committing ourselves to the existence of doghood or whiteness. Or if we say, “some zoological species are cross-fertile,” “we are committing ourselves to recognizing as entities the several species themselves” (32). ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">We may say, for example, that some dogs are white and not thereby commit ourselves to recognizing either doghood or whiteness as entities. ‘Some dogs are white’ says that some things that are dogs are white; and, in order that this statement be true, the things over which the bound variable ‘something’ ranges must include some white dogs, but need not include doghood or whiteness. On the other hand, when we say that some zoological species are cross-fertile we are committing ourselves to recognizing as entities the several species themselves, abstract though they are. We remain so committed at least until we devise some way of so paraphrasing the statement as to show that the seeming reference to species on the part of our bound variable was an avoidable manner of speaking.</p> <p align="justify">(32)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="37"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#37">37</a></p> <p align="center">[Ontological Commitments Resulting from the Reference of Bound Variables (in Math, etc.)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[This means that mathematics for example is committed to “an ontology of abstract entities;” for, “a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true” (32). “Thus it is that the great mediaeval controversy over universals has flared up anew in the modern philosophy of mathematics” (32).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Classical mathematics, as the example of primes larger than a million clearly illustrates, is up to its neck in commitments to an ontology of abstract entities. Thus it is that the great mediaeval controversy over universals has flared up anew in the modern philosophy of mathematics. The issue is clearer now than of old, because we now have a more explicit standard whereby to decide what ontology a given theory or form of discourse is committed to: a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true. </p> <p align="justify">(32-33. NOTE: There are discrepancies between the texts.)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="38"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#38">38</a></p> <p align="center">[Modern Mathematical Philosophical Debates as Being About Quantification Issues]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Only more recently were these matters of ontological presupposition clarified, so many modern philosophical mathematicians were really debating the problem of universals that has been around for long: “the fundamental cleavages among modern points of view on foundations of mathematics do come down pretty explicitly to disagreements as to the range of entities to which the bound variables should be permitted to refer” (33).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Because this standard of ontological presupposition did not emerge clearly in the philosophical tradition, the modern philosophical mathematicians have not on the whole recognized that they were debating the same old problem of universals in a newly clarified form. But the fundamental cleavages among modern points of view on foundations of mathematics do come down pretty explicitly to disagreements as to the range of entities to which the bound variables should be permitted to refer. </p> <p align="justify">(33)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="39"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#39">39</a></p> <p align="center">[Three Parallel Debates Between Medieval and Modern Times]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There are 3 parallels on these debates on universals between Medieval and Modern times: {1} Realism & Logicism, {2} Conceptualism & Intuitionalism, {3} Nominalism & Formalism]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The three main mediaeval points of view regarding universals are designated by historians as <i>realism</i>, <i>conceptualism</i>, and <i>nominalism</i>. Essentially these same three doctrines reappear in twentieth-century surveys of the philosophy of mathematics under the new names <i>logicism</i>, <i>intuitionism</i>, and <i>formalism</i>. </p> <p align="justify">(33)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="40"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#40">40</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Debates {1}: Realism & Logicism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Medieval <em>realism</em> holds that “the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them” (33). (Thus this view takes universals as preexisting their conception and as being real.) Similarly, “<i>Logicism</i>, represented by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Church, and Carnap, condones the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities known and unknown, specifiable and unspecifiable, indiscriminately” (33).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"><i>Realism</i>, as the word is used in connection with the mediaeval controversy over universals, is the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them. <i>Logicism</i>, represented by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Church, and Carnap, condones the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities known and unknown, specifiable and unspecifiable, indiscriminately. </p> <p align="justify">(33)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="41"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#41">41</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Debates {2}: Conceptualism & Intuitionalism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Medieval “<i>Conceptualism</i> holds that there are universals but they are mind-made,” while Modern “<i>Intuitionism</i>, espoused in modern times in one form or another by Poincaré, Brouwer, Weyl, and others, countenances the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities only when those entities are capable of being cooked up individually from ingredients specified in advance” (33). (So in both cases, universals are not taken as real in themselves and as preexisting their conception, but rather coming into being only through their conception.) “As Fraenkel has put it, logicism holds that classes are discovered while intuitionism holds that they are invented” (33). This distinction has great consequences in mathematical systems, especially with regard to infinity.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"><i>Conceptualism</i> holds that there are universals but they are mind-made. <i>Intuitionism</i>, espoused in modern times in one form or another by Poincaré, Brouwer, Weyl, and others, countenances the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities only when those entities are capable of being cooked up individually from ingredients specified in advance. As Fraenkel has put it, logicism holds that classes are discovered while intuitionism holds that they are invented—a fair statement indeed of the old opposition between realism and con-| ceptualism. This opposition is no mere quibble; it makes an essential difference in the amount of classical mathematics to which one is willing to subscribe. Logicists, or realists, are able on their assumptions to get Cantor’s ascending orders of infinity; intuitionists are compelled to stop with the lowest order of infinity, and, as an indirect consequence, to abandon even some of the classical laws of real numbers. The modern controversy between logicism and intuitionism arose, in fact, from disagreements over infinity.</p> <p align="justify">(33-34)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="42"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#42">42</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Debates {3}: Nominalism & Formalism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Like intuitionism, modern <em>formalism </em>is against logicism’s “recourse to universals” (34). But formalists may differ from intuitionists in one of two ways. {1} They might be averse to how intuitionism cripples classical mathematics. {2} They “might, like the <i>nominalists</i> of old, object to admitting abstract entities at all, even in the restrained sense of mind-made entities” (34). Yet, all formalists “keeps classical mathematics as a play of insignificant notations”. This play can still be useful in different ways, as seen for instance in its application in physics and technology. Yet, “utility need not imply significance, in any literal linguistic sense” (34). What also does not necessarily imply significance is the success within mathematics itself in generating new theorems and “in finding objective bases for agreement with one another’s results” (33). “For an adequate basis for agreement among mathematicians can be found simply in the rules which govern the manipulation of the notations—these syntactical rules being, unlike the notations themselves, quite significant and intelligible” (33).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"><i>Formalism</i>, associated with the name of Hilbert, echoes intuitionism in deploring the logicist’s unbridled recourse to universals. But formalism also finds intuitionism unsatisfactory. This could happen for either of two opposite reasons. The formalist might, like the logicist, object to the crippling of classical mathematics; or he might, like the <i>nominalists</i> of old, object to admitting abstract entities at all, even in the restrained sense of mind-made entities. The upshot is the same: the formalist keeps classical mathematics as a play of insignificant notations. This play of notations can still be of utility—whatever utility it has already shown itself to have as a crutch for physicists and technologists. But utility need not imply significance, in any literal linguistic sense. Nor need the marked success of mathematicians in spinning out theorems, and in finding objective bases for agreement with one another’s results, imply significance. For an adequate basis for agreement among mathematicians can be found simply in the rules which govern the manipulation of the notations—these syntactical rules being, unlike the notations themselves, quite significant and intelligible.</p> <p align="justify">(34)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="43"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#43">43</a></p> <p align="center">[The Issue of Evaluating Ontologies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Yet, our claim that “To be is to be the value of a variable” does not tell us which ontologies are better, it only tests “the conformity of a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological | standard” (34-35). In other words, “We look to bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else’s, <i>says</i> there is; and this much is quite properly a problem involving language. But what there is is another question” (35).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">I have argued that the sort of ontology we adopt can be consequential—notably in connection with mathematics, although this is only an example. Now how are we to adjudicate among rival ontologies? Certainly the answer is not provided by the semantical formula “To be is to be the value of a variable”; this formula serves rather, conversely, in testing the conformity of a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological | standard. We look to bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else’s, <i>says</i> there is; and this much is quite properly a problem involving language. But what there is is another question. </p> <p align="justify">(34-35)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="44"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#44">44</a></p> <p align="center">[One Reason for Keeping the Debate on the Semantic Level: Articulating the Disagreement]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine says that there is reason for us to conduct our debates about what is on a semantic level. One reason for this is that it allows someone taking Quine’s position to articulate their disagreement over certain entities that are in McX’s ontology but not in Quine’s: “So long as I adhere to my ontology, as opposed to McX’s, I cannot allow my bound variables to refer to entities which belong to McX’s ontology and not to mine. I can, however, consistently describe our disagreement by characterizing the statements which McX affirms” (35).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In debating over what there is, there are still reasons for operating on a semantical plane. One reason is to escape from the predicament noted at the beginning of this essay: the predicament of my not being able to admit that there are things which McX countenances and I do not. So long as I adhere to my ontology, as opposed to McX’s, I cannot allow my bound variables to refer to entities which belong to McX’s ontology and not to mine. I can, however, consistently describe our disagreement by characterizing the statements which McX affirms. Provided merely that my ontology countenances linguistic forms, or at least concrete inscriptions and utterances, I can talk about McX’s sentences. </p> <p align="justify">(35)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="45"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#45">45</a></p> <p align="center">[Another Reason for Keeping the Debate on the Semantic Level: Mutual Communication]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Another reason to keep the debate on the semantic level is that it allows McX and Quine to be able to communicate their different ontologies to one another in a way that fairly represents each to the other.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Another reason for withdrawing to a semantical plane is to find common ground on which to argue. Disagreement, in ontology involves basic disagreement in conceptual schemes; yet McX and I, despite these basic disagreements, find that our conceptual schemes converge sufficiently in their intermediate and upper ramifications to enable us to communicate successfully on such topics as politics, weather, and, in particular, language. In so far as our basic controversy over ontology can be translated upward into a semantical controversy about words and what to do with them, the collapse of the controversy into question-begging may be delayed. </p> <p align="justify">(35)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="46"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#46">46</a></p> <p align="center">[Linguistically Articulated Ontological Views as Not Necessarily Linguistic Issues]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Yet, just because we can translate these ontological views into language does not mean they are nothing more than linguistic issues: “Translatability of a question into semantical terms is no indication that the question is linguistic. To see Naples is to bear a name which, when prefixed to the words ‘sees Naples’, yields a true sentence; still there is nothing linguistic about seeing Naples” (35).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">It is no wonder, then, that ontological controversy should tend into controversy over language. But we must not jump to the conclusion that what there is depends on words. Translatability of a question into semantical terms is no indication that the question is linguistic. To see Naples is to bear a name which, when prefixed to the words ‘sees Naples’, yields a true sentence; still there is nothing linguistic about seeing Naples. </p> <p align="justify">(35)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="47"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#47">47</a></p> <p align="center">[How We Adopt Ontologies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine next addresses the criteria for adopting one particular ontology. He says that it is based on it being “the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered frag-| ments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged” (35-36) (and that whatever considerations we apply to constructing part of that overall conceptual scheme that will accommodate all science applies to the part in the same way it does the whole).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered frag-| ments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged. Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual scheme which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense; and the considerations which determine a reasonable construction of any part of that conceptual scheme, for example, the biological or the physical part, are not different in kind from the considerations which determine a reasonable construction of the whole. To whatever extent the adoption of any system of scientific theory may be said to be a matter of language, the same—but no more—may be said of the adoption of an ontology. </p> <p align="justify">(35-36)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="48"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#48">48</a></p> <p align="center">[Simplifying Sensory Beings with Physicalism]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The process of choosing a conceptual scheme is not always straightforward. We might for instance consider a set of  “play-by-play reporting of immediate experience” composed of “individual subjective events of sensation or reflection” (36). (Under Quine’s mode of formalization, these entities would be the “the values of bound variables”). (So already with regard to what exists, under this scheme we are saying that the subjective events of sensation or reflection are the entities that exist in our ontology. Also note that there will be very many. Consider for instance looking at an object before you, for instance, a coffee cup. However, under this mode of analysis, there is no existing being “coffee cup”. There are just the beings which are the very many experiences of roundness, whiteness, etc. that otherwise would be features of a coffee cup.) Yet, this complex of sense impressions can be efficiently organized if we adopt a “physicalistic conceptual scheme”: “By bringing together scattered sense events and treating them as perceptions of one object, we reduce the complexity of our stream of experience to a manageable conceptual simplicity” (36).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">But simplicity, as a guiding principle in constructing conceptual schemes, is not a clear and unambiguous idea; and it is quite capable of presenting a double or multiple standard. Imagine, for example, that we have devised the most economical set of concepts adequate to the play-by-play reporting of immediate experience. The entities under this scheme—the values of bound variables—are, let us suppose, individual subjective events of sensation or reflection. We should still find, no doubt, that a physicalistic conceptual scheme, purporting to talk about external objects, offers great advantages in simplifying our over-all reports. By bringing together scattered sense events and treating them as perceptions of one object, we reduce the complexity of our stream of experience to a manageable conceptual simplicity. The rule of simplicity is indeed our guiding maxim in assigning sense data to objects: we associate an earlier and a later round sensum with the same so-called penny, or with two different so-called pennies, in obedience to the demands of maximum simplicity in our total world-picture. </p> <p align="justify">(36)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="49"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#49">49</a></p> <p align="center">[Advantages of Each Scheme]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Both the phenomenalist and physicalist schemes have their own advantages. Both have their own sort of simplicity and fundamentality, “though in different senses: the one is epistemologically, the other physically, fundamental” (36). ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Here we have two competing conceptual schemes, a phenomenalistic one and a physicalistic one. Which should prevail? Each has its advantages; each has its special simplicity in its own way. Each, I suggest, deserves to be developed. Each may be said, indeed, to be the more fundamental, though in different senses: the one is epistemologically, the other physically, fundamental. </p> <p align="justify">(36)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="50"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#50">50</a></p> <p align="center">[Physical Objects as Convenient Myths]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[“The physical conceptual scheme simplifies our account of experience because of the way myriad scattered sense events come to be associated with single so-called objects” (36). However, we cannot be sure that there will be a way to translate each sentence about such physical objects into the language of the phenomenalistic scheme. (Perhaps the difficulty would be something like going from a third to a first person orientation. See Nagel’s “<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2016/11/nagel-what-is-it-like-to-be-bat-summary.html">What Is It Like To Be a Bat</a>?”) This notion of physical objects simplifies “our account of the flux of experience” in a manner that is analogous to how “the introduction of irrational numbers simplifies laws of arithmetic” (37). “From the point of view of the conceptual scheme of the elementary arithmetic of rational numbers alone, the broader arithmetic of rational and irrational numbers would have the status of a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth (namely, the arithmetic of rationals) and yet, containing that literal truth as a scattered part. Similarly, from a phenomenalistic point, of view, the conceptual scheme of physical objects is a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth and yet containing that literal truth as a scattered part” (37).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The physical conceptual scheme simplifies our account of experience because of the way myriad scattered sense events come to be associated with single so-called objects; still there | is no likelihood that each sentence about physical objects can actually be translated, however deviously and complexly, into the phenomenalistic language. Physical objects are postulated entities which round out, and simplify our account of the flux of experience, just, as the introduction of irrational numbers simplifies laws of arithmetic. From the point of view of the conceptual scheme of the elementary arithmetic of rational numbers alone, the broader arithmetic of rational and irrational numbers would have the status of a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth (namely, the arithmetic of rationals) and yet, containing that literal truth as a scattered part. Similarly, from a phenomenalistic point, of view, the conceptual scheme of physical objects is a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth and yet containing that literal truth as a scattered part.</p> <p align="justify">(36-37)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="51"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#51">51</a></p> <p align="center">[Myths in Physics]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[(We may further our mythologizing by introducing a platonistic ontology of classes or attributes of physical objects, which will further simplify our account of physics. Math is a part of this higher myth, which makes it suitable for physics. And, “an attitude of formalism may with equal justice be adopted toward the physical conceptual scheme, in turn, by the pure aesthete or phenomenalist” (37).)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Now what of classes or attributes of physical objects, in turn? A platonistic ontology of this sort is, from the point of view of a strictly physicalistic conceptual scheme, as much a myth as that physicalistic conceptual scheme itself is for phenomenalism. This higher myth is a good and useful one, in turn, in so far as it simplifies our account of physics. Since mathematics is an integral part of this higher myth, the utility of this myth for physical science is evident enough. In speaking of it nevertheless as a myth, I echo that philosophy of mathematics to which I alluded earlier under the name of formalism. But an attitude of formalism may with equal justice be adopted toward the physical conceptual scheme, in turn, by the pure aesthete or phenomenalist. </p> <p align="justify">(37)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="52"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#52">52</a></p> <p align="center">[Parallel Mythmaking in Math and Physics]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[(There are parallels in the mythmaking between mathematics and physics. At the turn of the 20th century, there was a crisis in the foundations of mathematics with “the discovery of Russell’s paradox and other antinomies of set theory. These contradictions had to be obviated by unintuitive, <i>ad hoc</i> devices; our mathematical myth-making became deliberate and evident to all” (37). Similarly, “An antinomy arose between the undular and the corpuscular accounts of light” (37). And also, “the second great modern crisis in the foundations of mathematics—precipitated in 1931 by Gödel’s proof  that there are bound to be undecidable statements in arithmetic—has its companion piece in physics in Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle” (38).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The analogy between the myth of mathematics and the myth of physics is, in some additional and perhaps fortuitous ways, strikingly close. Consider, for example, the crisis which was precipitated in the foundations of mathematics, at the turn of the century, by the discovery of Russell’s paradox and other antinomies of set theory. These contradictions had to be obviated by unintuitive, <i>ad hoc</i> devices; our mathematical myth-making became deliberate and evident to all. But what of physics? An antinomy arose between the undular and the corpuscular accounts of light; and if this was not as out-and-out a contradiction as Russell’s paradox, I suspect that the reason is that physics is not as out-and-out as mathematics. | Again, the second great modern crisis in the foundations of mathematics—precipitated in 1931 by Gödel’s proof  that there are bound to be undecidable statements in arithmetic—has its companion piece in physics in Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle.</p> <p align="justify">(37-38)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="53"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#53">53</a></p> <p align="center">[Summary. Pursuing All Options.]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[All these options should be pursued.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In earlier pages I undertook to show that some common arguments in favor of certain ontologies are fallacious. Further, I advanced an explicit standard whereby to decide what the ontological commitments of a theory are. But the question what ontology actually to adopt still stands open, and the obvious counsel is tolerance and an experimental spirit. Let us by all means see how much of the physicalistic conceptual scheme can be reduced to a phenomenalistic one; still, physics also naturally demands pursuing, irreducible <i>in toto</i> though it be. Let us see how, or to what degree, natural science may be rendered independent of platonistic mathematics; but let us also pursue mathematics and delve into its platonistic foundations. </p> <p align="justify">(38)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="54"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#54">54</a></p> <p align="center">[The Epistemological Priority of the Phenomenalistic Scheme]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[However, Quine claims that among these different conceptual schemes, the phenomenalistic one “claims epistemological priority. Viewed from within the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme, the ontologies of physical objects and mathematical objects are myths. The quality of myth, however, is relative; relative, in this case, to the epistemological point of view. This point of view is one among various, corresponding to one among our various interests and purposes” (38).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">From among the various conceptual schemes best suited to these various pursuits, one—the phenomenalistic—claims epistemological priority. Viewed from within the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme, the ontologies of physical objects and mathematical objects are myths. The quality of myth, however, is relative; relative, in this case, to the epistemological point of view. This point of view is one among various, corresponding to one among our various interests and purposes. </p> <p align="justify">(38)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="54"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Quine, W. V. “On What There Is.” <i>The Review of Metaphysics</i> 2, no. 5 (1948): 21–38.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Text copied from:</p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_What_There_Is" href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_What_There_Is">https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_What_There_Is</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-55919610606722582812021-07-25T04:37:00.001-07:002021-07-25T04:37:11.487-07:00Quine (3) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, section 3, “Interchangeability”, summary<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-entry-directory.html">[Quine, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-ed-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-entry.html">[Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of the text. More analysis is still needed and will be updated when conducted. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive all my various mistakes. Material between brackets or between parentheses within brackets is my own and should not be trusted over the quotations, which themselves may contain typographical errors from their transcription. Please consult the original text in any case.]</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">W. V. Quine</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">3</p> <p align="center">Interchangeability</p> <p> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#3.1">3.1</a>) (Recall that in this paper, Quine is addressing two dogmas of empiricism, namely the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism (see <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-0-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 0</a>). We are now looking for a way ground analyticity. We found in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 1</a> that we cannot use the Kantian notion that it is based on meanings. We next looked at a formal grounding for it with a class of analytic statements where it can be formally defined as the denial rendering a self-contradiction, like “No unmarried man is married.” The problem was that there is another class of analytic sentences, like “No bachelor is married,” where its denial does not render an obvious self-contradiction. However, it is thought to be translatable into the first class by means of a synonymy of the terms “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” So we sought a way to ground this synonymy, so to ground all analytic statements of any kind. We found in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-2-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#Bibliography">section 2</a> that definitions will not suffice, because rather than establishing synonymies, they instead employ pre-existing ones. So) we are currently considering another way to ground synonymy, namely, “their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value; interchangeability, in Leibniz’s phrase, <em>salva veritate</em>” (27). This can even work for vague terms, so long as that vagueness matches in each context. (<a href="#3.2">3.2</a>) Yet, this does not work for “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” For instance, we cannot substitute “unmarried man” in for “bachelor,” in the phrase “bachelor of arts” or in the sentence “‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.” One solution for these cases is to treat them as longer forms constituting one word and stipulating that they cannot be broken down and have their parts be substituted. The problem with this approach is that it presupposes a conception of word, but we will put that issue aside for the moment. (<a href="#3.3">3.3</a>) What we need to now determine is how sufficient interchangeability <em>salva veritate</em> is to define synonymy. It would be insufficient if there are cases of nonsynonymous words that still fulfill the requirements for interchangeability <em>salva veritate</em> (interchangeable in all contexts without change of truth value). Quine notes that the synonymy in question here does not mean that when interchanged it has identical mental associations or poetic qualities. For, in fact, we will never find such cases of synonymy anyway. More precisely, the kind of synonymy we have in mind is <em>cognitive synonymy</em>. It will be more fully explicated throughout the essay. It is the sort of synonymy that allows an analytic statement (like “All Bachelors are unmarried men”) to be converted into logical truths (like “Unmarried men are unmarried men”) by means substituting synonyms. If we assume what analyticity is (even though in fact we are trying to ground it), we can define the cognitive synonymy of “bachelor” and “unmarried man” with the statement: (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic. (Perhaps the idea here is that all cases of one are cases of the other, so nothing will be lost or gained by substituting them.) (<a href="#3.4">3.4</a>) We need still a definition of cognitive synonymy that does not presuppose analyticity, and we are currently considering as a possible candidate interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i>. To see that it works, recall first (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men.” We next consider (4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.” This is self-evidently true (if it were false, it would be a contradiction, perhaps). Next, we suppose that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable <em>salva veritate</em>, and by making the substitutions, we obtain (5) “Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men.” If we say that this is true, then we are saying that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous, and thus that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic (perhaps because by means of an acceptable substitution, it can be rendered into the analytically true “All bachelors are bachelors” or “All unmarried men are unmarried men.” (<a href="#3.5">3.5</a>) Something that makes this proposal tricky is that it regards(4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors” as analytic on account of the use of “necessarily”. (Perhaps this is because when it is necessary, it is impossible to not be so. Thus it fulfills the formal criterion of analyticity as its denial being a contradiction.) This means that we are dangerously close to circularity. We want to define analyticity, but we assume it with our use of “necessarily.” So is this a straightforward case of circularity? (<a href="#3.6">3.6</a>) Quine claims that it is not entirely circular but can be thought more of as “a closed curve in space” (29). (<a href="#3.7">3.7</a>) We need to specify the parameters of a language before we can adequately see interchangeability <em>salva veritate</em> operating in it. Quine stipulates a language with atomic sentences composed of predicates and variables and with rules to build up complex sentences using truth functions (truth functional connectives maybe) and quantification (among other features). This language can handle descriptions, class names, and singular terms. This sort of a language will be “<em>extensional</em>” because in it, “any two predicates which <em>agree extensionally</em> (i.e., are true of the same objects) are interchangeable <em>salva veritate</em>” (29). (<a href="#3.8">3.8</a>) (Recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#1.6">1.6</a> the example of predicates, “creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney”. They might be alike in extension, but they are not alike in meaning. Quine now seems to say that these predicates are also not cases of <em>cognitive synonymy</em>. Thus we might gather that <em>cognitive synonymy </em>requires a similarity in meaning, which may not have been noted back in section <a href="#3.3">3.3</a> when he was first discussing it.) In an extensional language, we can interchange <i>salva veritate</i> ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ , because they extensionally refer to exactly the same class of entities. But we can do the same for ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’. Thus, interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> in an extensional language does not give us cognitive synonymy, which we need for grounding analyticity. It only can tell us that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true. (<a href="#3.9">3.9</a>) But as we saw in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 1</a>, we need to equate the cognitive synonymy between words like ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ with the analyticity of (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” and not merely with its truth, which is all that extensionality can accomplish. (<a href="#3.10">3.10</a>) So we see that “interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i>, if construed in relation to an extensional language, is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy” (30). And previously we saw that “If a language contains an intensional adverb ‘necessarily’ [...], then interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such a language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in advance” (30) (<a href="#3.11">3.11</a>) So we cannot first formally establish cognitive synonymy to then secondly ground analyticity, like we set out to do. Supposing we could firstly ground analyticity, then we could define cognitive synonymy fairly easily, however: “Singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the statement of identity formed by putting ‘=’ between them is analytic. Statements may be said simply to be cognitively synonymous when their biconditional (the result of joining them by ‘if and only if’) is analytic” (31). Furthermore, “we can describe any two linguistic forms as cognitively synonymous when the two forms are interchangeable (apart from occurrences within ‘words’) <i>salva</i> (no longer <em>veritate</em> but) <em>analyticitate</em>” (31). So let us return now to the problem of analyticity.</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.1">3.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Interchangeability Without Loss of Truth as Potential Ground for Synonymy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.2">3.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The Need to Define “Word”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.3">3.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Cognitive Synonymy as Fulfilling the Requirements for Interchangeability <em>Salva veritate</em>]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.4">3.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Using “Necessarily” to Define Synonymy Indirectly in Terms of Analyticity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.5">3.5</a></p> <p align="center">[The Potential Circularity of Using “Necessarily” to Function for Analyticity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.6">3.6</a></p> <p align="center">[The Solution as Not Entirely Circular]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.7">3.7</a></p> <p align="center">[Extensionality (in a Logically Formulated Language) as Interchangeability <em>Salva veritate</em>]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.8">3.8</a></p> <p align="center">[Extensional Languages as Not Ensuring Cognitive Synonymy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.9">3.9</a></p> <p align="center">[Extensional Synonymy as Not Being Cognitive Synonymy and as Being Unable to Ground Analyticity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.10">3.10</a></p> <p align="center">[The Problems with Extensional Interchangeability <em>Salva veritate </em>and with “Necessarily”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.11">3.11</a></p> <p align="center">[Grounding Analyticity First as a Better Strategy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="3.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.1">3.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Interchangeability Without Loss of Truth as Potential Ground for Synonymy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[(Recall that in this paper, Quine is addressing two dogmas of empiricism, namely the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism (see <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-0-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 0</a>). We are now looking for a way ground analyticity. We found in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 1</a> that we cannot use the Kantian notion that it is based on meanings. We next looked at a formal grounding for it with a class of analytic statements where it can be formally defined as the denial rendering a self-contradiction, like “No unmarried man is married.” The problem was that there is another class of analytic sentences, like “No bachelor is married,” where its denial does not render an obvious self-contradiction. However, it is thought to be translatable into the first class by means of a synonymy of the terms “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” So we sought a way to ground this synonymy, so to ground all analytic statements of any kind. We found in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-2-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#Bibliography">section 2</a> that definitions will not suffice, because rather than establishing synonymies, they instead employ pre-existing ones. So) we are currently considering another way to ground synonymy, namely, “their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value; interchangeability, in Leibniz’s phrase, <em>salva veritate</em>” (27). This can even work for vague terms, so long as that vagueness matches in each context.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">A natural suggestion, deserving close examination, is that the synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value; interchangeability, in Leibniz’s phrase, <i>salva veritate</i>. Note that synonyms so conceived need not even be free from vagueness, as long as the vaguenesses match.</p> <p align="justify">(27)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.2">3.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The Need to Define “Word”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Yet, this does not work for “bachelor” and “unmarried man.” For instance, we cannot substitute “unmarried man” in for “bachelor,” in the phrase “bachelor of arts” or in the sentence “‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.” One solution for these cases is to treat them as longer forms constituting one word and stipulating that they cannot be broken down and have their parts be substituted. The problem with this approach is that it presupposes a conception of word, but we will put that issue aside for the moment.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">But it is not quite true that the synonyms ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are everywhere interchangeable <i>salva veritate</i>. Truths which become false under substitution of ‘unmarried man’ for ‘bachelor’ are easily constructed with help of ‘bachelor of arts’ or ‘bachelor’s buttons’. Also with help of quotation, thus:</p> <p align="justify">‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.</p> <p align="justify">Such counterinstances can, however, perhaps be set aside by treating the phrases ‘bachelor of arts’ and ‘bachelor’s buttons’ and the quotation ‘ ‘bachelor’ ‘ each as a single indivisible word and then stipulating that the interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> which is to be the touchstone of synonymy is not supposed to apply to fragmentary oc-|currences inside of a word. This account of synonymy, supposing it acceptable on other counts, has indeed the drawback of appealing to a prior conception of “word” which can be counted on to present difficulties of formulation in its turn. Nevertheless some progress might be claimed in having reduced the problem of synonymy to a problem of wordhood. Let us pursue this line a bit, taking “word” for granted. </p> <p align="justify">(27-28)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.3">3.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Cognitive Synonymy as Fulfilling the Requirements for Interchangeability <em>Salva veritate</em>]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[What we need to now determine is how sufficient interchangeability <em>salva veritate</em> is to define synonymy. It would be insufficient if there are cases of nonsynonymous words that still fulfill the requirements for interchangeability <em>salva veritate</em> (interchangeable in all contexts without change of truth value). Quine notes that the synonymy in question here does not mean that when interchanged it has identical mental associations or poetic qualities. For, in fact, we will never find such cases of synonymy anyway. More precisely, the kind of synonymy we have in mind is <em>cognitive synonymy</em>. It will be more fully explicated throughout the essay. It is the sort of synonymy that allows an analytic statement (like “All Bachelors are unmarried men”) to be converted into logical truths (like “Unmarried men are unmarried men”) by means substituting synonyms. If we assume what analyticity is (even though in fact we are trying to ground it), we can define the cognitive synonymy of “bachelor” and “unmarried man” with the statement: (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic. (Perhaps the idea here is that all cases of one are cases of the other, so nothing will be lost or gained by substituting them.)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The question remains whether interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> (apart from occurrences within words) is a strong enough condition for synonymy, or whether, on the contrary, some nonsynonymous expressions might be thus interchangeable. Now let us be clear that we are not concerned here with synonymy in the sense of complete identity in psychological associations or poetic quality; indeed no two expressions are synonymous in such a sense. We are concerned only with what may be called <i>cognitive synonymy</i>. Just what this is cannot be said without successfully finishing the present study; but we know something about it from the need which arose for it in connection with analyticity in Section I. The sort of synonymy needed there was merely such that any analytic statement could be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. Turning the tables and assuming analyticity, indeed, we could explain cognitive synonymy of terms as follows (keeping to the familiar example): to say that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are cognitively synonymous is to say no more nor less than that the statement:</p> <p align="justify">(3) All and only bachelors are unmarried men </p> <p align="justify">is analytic.<sup>4</sup></p> <p align="justify">(28)</p> <p align="justify">4. This is cognitive synonymy in a primary, broad sense. Carnap (<i>Meaning and Necessity</i>, pp. 56ff.) and Lewis (<i>Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation</i> [La Salle, Ill., 1946], pp. 83ff.) have suggested how, once this notion is at hand, a narrower sense of cognitive synonymy which is preferable for some purposes can in turn be derived. But this special ramification of concept-building lies aside from the present purposes and must not be confused with the broad sort of cognitive synonymy here concerned.</p> <p align="justify">(28)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.4">3.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Using “Necessarily” to Define Synonymy Indirectly in Terms of Analyticity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[We need still a definition of cognitive synonymy that does not presuppose analyticity, and we are currently considering as a possible candidate interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i>. To see that it works, recall first (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men.” We next consider (4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors.” This is self-evidently true (if it were false, it would be a contradiction, perhaps). Next, we suppose that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable <em>salva veritate</em>, and by making the substitutions, we obtain (5) “Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men.” If we say that this is true, then we are saying that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous, and thus that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic (perhaps because by means of an acceptable substitution, it can be rendered into the analytically true “All bachelors are bachelors” or “All unmarried men are unmarried men.”]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">What we need is an account of cognitive synonymy not presupposing analyticity – if we are to explain analyticity conversely with help of cognitive synonymy as undertaken in Section I. And indeed such an independent account of cognitive synonymy is at present up for consideration, viz., interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> everywhere except within words. The question before us, to resume the thread at last, is whether such interchangeability is a sufficient condition for | cognitive synonymy. We can quickly assure ourselves that it is, by examples of the following sort. The statement:</p> <p align="justify">(4) Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors</p> <p align="justify">is evidently true, even supposing ‘necessarily’ so narrowly construed as to be truly applicable only to analytic statements. Then, if ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable <i>salva veritate</i>, the result</p> <p align="justify">(5) Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men</p> <p align="justify">of putting ‘unmarried man’ for an occurrence of ‘bachelor’ in (4) must, like (4), be true. But to say that (5) is true is to say that (3) is analytic, and hence that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried men’ are cognitively synonymous.</p> <p align="justify">(28-29)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.5">3.5</a></p> <p align="center">[The Potential Circularity of Using “Necessarily” to Function for Analyticity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Something that makes this proposal tricky is that it regards(4) “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors” as analytic on account of the use of “necessarily”. (Perhaps this is because when it is necessary, it is impossible to not be so. Thus it fulfills the formal criterion of analyticity as its denial being a contradiction.) This means that we are dangerously close to circularity. We want to define analyticity, but we assume it with our use of “necessarily.” So is this a straightforward case of circularity?]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Let us see what there is about the above argument that gives it its air of hocus-pocus. The condition of interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> varies in its force with variations in the richness of the language at hand. The above argument supposes we are working with a language rich enough to contain the adverb ‘necessarily’, this adverb being so construed as to yield truth when and only when applied to an analytic statement. But can we condone a language which contains such an adverb? Does the adverb really make sense? To suppose that it does is to suppose that we have already made satisfactory sense of ‘analytic’. Then what are we so hard at work on right now?</p> <p align="justify">(29)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.6"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.6">3.6</a></p> <p align="center">[The Solution as Not Entirely Circular]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine claims that it is not entirely circular but can be thought more of as “a closed curve in space” (29).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Our argument is not flatly circular, but something like it. It has the form, figuratively speaking, of a closed curve in space.</p> <p align="justify">(29)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.7"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.7">3.7</a></p> <p align="center">[Extensionality (in a Logically Formulated Language) as Interchangeability <em>Salva veritate</em>]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[We need to specify the parameters of a language before we can adequately see interchangeability <em>salva veritate</em> operating in it. Quine stipulates a language with atomic sentences composed of predicates and variables and with rules to build up complex sentences using truth functions (truth functional connectives maybe) and quantification (among other features). This language can handle descriptions, class names, and singular terms. This sort of a language will be “<em>extensional</em>” because in it, “any two predicates which <em>agree extensionally</em> (i.e., are true of the same objects) are interchangeable <em>salva veritate</em>” (29).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> is meaningless until relativized to a language whose extent is specified in relevant respects. Suppose now we consider a language containing just the following materials. There is an indefinitely large stock of one- and many-place predicates, mostly having to do with extralogical subject matter. The rest of the language is logical. The atomic sentences consist each of a predicate followed by one or more variables; and the complex sentences are built up of atomic ones by truth functions and quantification. In effect such a language enjoys the benefits also of descriptions and class names and indeed singular terms generally, these being contextually definable in known ways.<sup>5</sup> Such a language can be adequate to classical mathematics and indeed to scientific discourse generally, except | in so far as the latter involves debatable devices such as modal adverbs and contrary-to-fact conditionals. Now a language of this type is <em>extensional</em>, in this sense: any two predicates which <em>agree extensionally</em> (i.e., are true of the same objects) are interchangeable <i>salva veritate</i>.</p> <p align="justify">(29-30)</p> <p>5. See, e.g., my <i>Mathematical Logic </i>(New York, 1940; Cambridge, Mass., 1947), sec. 24, 26, 27; or <i>Methods of Logic</i> (New York, 1950), sec. 37ff.</p> <p>(29)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.8"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.8">3.8</a></p> <p align="center">[Extensional Languages as Not Ensuring Cognitive Synonymy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[(Recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#1.6">1.6</a> the example of predicates, “creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney”. They might be alike in extension, but they are not alike in meaning. Quine now seems to say that these predicates are also not cases of <em>cognitive synonymy</em>. Thus we might gather that <em>cognitive synonymy </em>requires a similarity in meaning, which may not have been noted back in section <a href="#3.3">3.3</a> when he was first discussing it.) In an extensional language, we can interchange <i>salva veritate</i> ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ , because they extensionally refer to exactly the same class of entities. But we can do the same for ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’. Thus, interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> in an extensional language does not give us cognitive synonymy, which we need for grounding analyticity. It only can tell us that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In an extensional language, therefore, interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> is no assurance of cognitive synonymy of the desired type. That ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable <i>salva veritate</i> in an extensional language assures us of no more than that (3) is true. There is no assurance here that the extensional agreement of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ rests on meaning rather than merely on accidental matters of fact, as does extensional agreement of ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a kidney’.</p> <p align="justify">(30)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.9"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.9">3.9</a></p> <p align="center">[Extensional Synonymy as Not Being Cognitive Synonymy and as Being Unable to Ground Analyticity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[But as we saw in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 1</a>, we need to equate the cognitive synonymy between words like ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ with the analyticity of (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” and not merely with its truth, which is all that extensionality can accomplish.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>(Perhaps the idea is the following, but I am not sure. For a sentence to be true, it need not be analytically true. To be analytically true, the sentence either has to either be one whose denial presents a self-contradiction, or be a sentence that can be rendered as such by substituting cognitively synonymous terms. In an extensional language, we can use substitutions and reference to extensions to demonstrate that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ can be interchanged without loss of logical truth and that (3) “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true. However, we have not established that (3) is analytic. I am not certain why. By substitution, we can render it “All and only unmarried men are unmarried men.” Perhaps we should consider a sentence like “Creatures with a heart are ones that (thereby) pump their blood through their circulatory system.” that experience stress when the heartrate goes above a certain threshold.” If we substitute “creatures with a kidney”, that might still be a true sentence, but we might not get an analytically true statement, (“Creatures with a kidney are ones that (thereby) pump their blood through their circulatory system.”) And maybe this will be because there is nothing about the kidney itself that directly suggests blood pumping, although the heart rather does, and also although the kidney is normally needed when pumping blood. If so, Quine’s notion of analyticity might be built on a notion of cognitive synonymy where the synonymous terms are ones that directly implicated, such that from the one we can directly derive the other, and not just indirectly by checking their extensions. As Quine noted before, the sameness of extensions can be for accidental reasons. This suggests possibly he still has intensional meaning in mind for cognitive synonymy, but we will  have to see.]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">For most purposes extensional agreement is the nearest approximation to synonymy we need care about. But the fact remains that extensional agreement falls far short of cognitive synonymy of the type required for explaining analyticity in the manner of Section I. The type of cognitive synonymy required there is such as to equate the synonymy of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ with the analyticity of (3), not merely with the truth of (3).</p> <p align="justify">(30)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.10"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.10">3.10</a></p> <p align="center">[The Problems with Extensional Interchangeability <em>Salva veritate </em>and with “Necessarily”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[So we see that “interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i>, if construed in relation to an extensional language, is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy” (30). And previously we saw that “If a language contains an intensional adverb ‘necessarily’ [...], then interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such a language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in advance” (30) ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">So we must recognize that interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i>, if construed in relation to an extensional language, is not a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense needed for deriving analyticity in the manner of Section I. If a language contains an intensional adverb ‘necessarily’ in the sense lately noted, or other particles to the same effect, then interchangeability <i>salva veritate</i> in such a language does afford a sufficient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such a language is intelligible only if the notion of analyticity is already clearly understood in advance.</p> <p align="justify">(30)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.11"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#3.11">3.11</a></p> <p align="center">[Grounding Analyticity First as a Better Strategy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[So we cannot first formally establish cognitive synonymy to then secondly ground analyticity, like we set out to do. Supposing we could firstly ground analyticity, then we could define cognitive synonymy fairly easily, however: “Singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the statement of identity formed by putting ‘=’ between them is analytic. Statements may be said simply to be cognitively synonymous when their biconditional (the result of joining them by ‘if and only if’) is analytic” (31). Furthermore, “we can describe any two linguistic forms as cognitively synonymous when the two forms are interchangeable (apart from occurrences within ‘words’) <i>salva</i> (no longer <em>veritate</em> but) <em>analyticitate</em>” (31). So let us return now to the problem of analyticity.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The effort to explain cognitive synonymy first, for the sake of deriving analyticity from it afterward as in Section I, is perhaps the wrong approach. Instead we might try explaining analyticity somehow without appeal to cognitive synonymy. Afterward we could doubtless derive cognitive synonymy from analyticity satisfactorily enough if desired. We have seen that cognitive synonymy of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ can be explained as analyticity of (3). The same explanation works for any pair of one-place predicates, of course, and it can be extended in obvious fashion to many-place predicates. Other | syntactical categories can also be accommodated in fairly parallel fashion. Singular terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous when the statement of identity formed by putting ‘=’ between them is analytic. Statements may be said simply to be cognitively synonymous when their biconditional (the result of joining them by ‘if and only if’) is analytic.<sup>6</sup> If we care to lump all categories into a single formulation, at the expense of assuming again the notion of “word” which was appealed to early in this section, we can describe any two linguistic forms as cognitively synonymous when the two forms are interchangeable (apart from occurrences within “words”) <i>salva</i> (no longer <em>veritate</em> but) <i>analyticitate</i>. Certain technical questions arise, indeed, over cases of ambiguity or homonymy; let us not pause for them, however, for we are already digressing. Let us rather tum our backs on the problem of synonymy and address ourselves anew to that of analyticity.</p> <p align="justify">(30-31)</p> <p align="justify">6. The ‘if and only if’ itself is intended in the truth functional sense. See Carnap, <em>Meaning and Necessity</em>, p. 14.</p> <p align="justify">(31)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="3.12"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p>Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” <i>The Philosophical Review</i> 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-34060095214728100932021-07-25T01:43:00.001-07:002021-07-25T01:47:32.038-07:00Quine (2) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, section 2, “Definition”, summary<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-entry-directory.html">[Quine, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-ed-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-entry.html">[Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of the text. More analysis is still needed and will be updated when conducted. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive all my various mistakes. Material between brackets or between parentheses within brackets is my own and should not be trusted over the quotations, which themselves may contain typographical errors from their transcription. Please consult the original text in any case.]</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">W. V. Quine</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">2</p> <p align="center">Definition</p> <p> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#2.1">2.1</a>) (Recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#1.12">1.12</a> that there is a first class of analytic statements that are “logically true”, because their denial presents a formal contradiction, as with “No unmarried man is married.” And recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#1.13">1.13</a> that there is a second class of statements that are thought to be analytic, because they can be rendered into logically true ones by means of a substitution of synonyms, as “No bachelor is married” can be rendered “No unmarried man is married” but substituting the synonyms “bachelor” and “unmarried man”.) Some feel that analytic statements of the second class can reduce into the first class by means of definition. For example, “bachelor” is defined as an “unmarried man,” thus we can thereby transform “No bachelor is married” to “No unmarried man is married.” Quine then wonders, on what basis can we establish such definitional equivalences? If our answer is, the dictionary, then we have a problem. The dictionary does not establish the equivalences. It only describes equivalences that are already found to be operable in a language. We still need to account for how these equivalences are established within linguistic behavior, independently of the lexicographer’s descriptions of it. (<a href="#2.2">2.2</a>) Even when other fields define terms, they often similarly do it by “affirming a relationship of synonymy antecedent to the exposition in hand” (25). (<a href="#2.3">2.3</a>) Normally synonymy is grounded in usage, and thus “Definitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come then as reports upon usage” (25). (<a href="#2.4">2.4</a>) Carnap however discusses a definitional activity, called <em>explication</em>, that is not merely a lexicographical reporting of pre-existing synonymies. When we explicate a term, we do not simply give a synonymous meaning to the term being defined (that is, to the “definiendum”). We instead improve upon it “by refining or supplementing its meaning” (25). However, even though this is not a report of a pre-existing synonymy, still, Quine argues, explication rests upon other pre-existing synonymies. (<a href="#2.5">2.5</a>) Even in cases where we have two alternative, non-synonymous definientia that are equally appropriate for explicating a given term (they may be interchangeable in one context but not in others) and where we choose one over the other and thus where we have by fiat (rather than by observation) a relation of synonymy that did not hold before, still this uses pre-existing synonymies. (<a href="#2.6">2.6</a>) Quine notes one example of definition not based on prior synonymies, namely, when we introduce “novel notations for purposes of sheer abbreviation. Here the definiendum becomes synonymous with the definiens simply because it has been created expressly for the purpose of being synonymous with the definiens” (26). Quine seems to suggest, however, that this meager instance is the only exception. (<a href="#2.7">2.7</a>) There are two kinds of economy in mathematical and logical systems. The nature of each counteracts the other. {1} Economy of practical expression. Here there are “distinctive concise notations for a wealth of concepts,” and it strives for “ease and brevity in the statement of multifarious relationships” (26). {2} Economy of grammar and vocabulary. Here what is first determined is a minimum of basic concepts. Then, a distinctive notation is assigned to them. On that basis, other more complex concepts can be formulated by combining the basic notations. In this case, because the basic elements are minimized, “it greatly simplifies theoretical discourse <em>about</em> the language, through minimizing the terms and the forms of construction wherein the language consists” (26). But it also has the impractical feature of requiring the more complex formulations to be rendered less economically. (Presumably in the first case, there are many more notations, which allow for the more complex ones to be rendered more economically. (<a href="#2.8">2.8</a>) To get the best of both economies, often they are combined as two related languages. The more “inclusive” one has complex grammar and vocabulary, but shorter messages, while the other, called “primitive notation” is more efficient with grammar and vocabulary. There are then rules to translate the formulations of the inclusive language into complexes of primitive notation. “These rules of translation are the so-|called <i>definitions</i> which appear in formalized systems. They are best viewed not as adjuncts to one language but as correlations between two languages, the one a part of the other” (26-27). (I wonder if it is something similar to object language and metalanguage. See <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2014/12/tarski-9-of-semantic-conception-of.html">Tarski</a>.) (<a href="#2.9">2.9</a>) The relation that the definitions create between definiendum and definiens can be one of three sorts: {1} the definiens may paraphrase the definiendum in a way that preserves “a direct synonymy as of antecedent usage”; {2} the definiens may explicate the definiendum, thereby improving upon its antecedent usage; or {3} the definiendum may be a newly established notation therewith endowed with its own meaning. (<a href="#2.10">2.10</a>) Thus we see that with one rare exception (the introduction of new notation), definition depends upon prior synonymy when used in both formal and informal languages. (Recall that our present concern is grounding analyticity. We found in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 1</a> that under Kant’s conception, it means the sentence is true by meaning and independent of fact. Then we found that the notion of meaning was elusive and superfluous when considering extension. We next noted that while we have a formal way to define analyticity when the denial of the sentence presents an obvious self contradiction, like “No unmarried man is married,” we do not have such a formal grounding for converting other kinds of analytic statements into ones of that form, for example, “No bachelors are married.” We know that it has to do with synonymy. And we need a formal means to ground it. But as we have seen in this section, using definitions is not viable, because instead of being responsible for establishing synonymies, they instead are based on pre-existing synonymies. Thus we must look elsewhere for a way to ground synonymy.)</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1">2.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Unfeasibility of Grounding the Transformability of Sentences into Logically True Ones in Dictionary Entries]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2">2.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Other Fields’ Definitions as Doing the Same]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3">2.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Synonymy as Found in Usage]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4">2.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Carnap’s Explication as Also Being Based in Pre-Existing Synonymies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5">2.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Cases of Selected Alternative Explications as Also Involving Pre-Existing Synonymies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6">2.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Exception: Novel Abbreviatory Notations]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.7">2.7</a></p> <p align="center">[Two Kinds of Economy in Mathematical and Logical Systems: Economy of Practical Expression and Economy of Grammar and Vocabulary]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.8">2.8</a></p> <p align="center">[Coordinating Two Languages of Each Economy Using Definitions for Translation]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.9">2.9</a></p> <p align="center">[Three Relations Between Definiendum and Definiens]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1">2.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Unfeasibility of Grounding the Transformability of Sentences into Logically True Ones in Dictionary Entries]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[<em></em>(Recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#1.12">1.12</a> that there is a first class of analytic statements that are “logically true”, because their denial presents a formal contradiction, as with “No unmarried man is married.” And recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html#1.13">1.13</a> that there is a second class of statements that are thought to be analytic, because they can be rendered into logically true ones by means of a substitution of synonyms, as “No bachelor is married” can be rendered “No unmarried man is married” but substituting the synonyms “bachelor” and “unmarried man”.) Some feel that analytic statements of the second class can reduce into the first class by means of definition. For example, “bachelor” is defined as an “unmarried man,” thus we can thereby transform “No bachelor is married” to “No unmarried man is married.” Quine then wonders, on what basis can we establish such definitional equivalences? If our answer is, the dictionary, then we have a problem. The dictionary does not establish the equivalences. It only describes equivalences that are already found to be operable in a language. We still need to account for how these equivalences are established within linguistic behavior, independently of the lexicographer’s descriptions of it.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto.</em> ]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">There are those who find it soothing to say that the analytic statements of the second class reduce to those of the first class, the logical truths, by <i>definition</i>; ‘bachelor’, e.g., is <i>defined</i> as ‘unmarried man’. But how do we find that ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried man’? Who defined it thus, and when? Are we to appeal to the nearest dictionary, and accept the lexicographer’s formulation as law? Clearly this would be to put the cart before the horse. The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is the recording of antecedent facts; and if he glosses ‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried man’ it is because of his belief that there is a relation of synonymy between these forms, implicit in general or preferred usage prior to his own work. The notion of synonymy presupposed here has still to be clarified, presumably in terms relating to linguistic behavior. Certainly the “definition” which is the lexicographer’s report of an observed synonymy cannot be taken as the ground of the synonymy.</p> <p align="justify">(24)</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2">2.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Other Fields’ Definitions as Doing the Same]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Even when other fields define terms, they often similarly do it by “affirming a relationship of synonymy antecedent to the exposition in hand” (25).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Definition is not, indeed, an activity exclusively of philologists. Philosophers and scientists frequently have occasion to “define” a | recondite term by paraphrasing it into terms of a more familiar vocabulary. But ordinarily such a definition, like the philologist’s, is pure lexicography, affirming a relationship of synonymy antecedent to the exposition in hand.</p> <p align="justify">(24-25)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3">2.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Synonymy as Found in Usage]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Normally synonymy is grounded in usage, and thus “Definitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come then as reports upon usage” (25). ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Just what it means to affirm synonymy, just what the interconnections may be which are necessary and sufficient in order that two linguistic forms be properly describable as synonymous, is far from clear; but, whatever these interconnections may be, ordinarily they are grounded in usage. Definitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come then as reports upon usage.</p> <p align="justify">(25)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.4">2.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Carnap’s Explication as Also Being Based in Pre-Existing Synonymies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Carnap however discusses a definitional activity, called <em>explication</em>, that is not merely a lexicographical reporting of pre-existing synonymies. When we explicate a term, we do not simply give a synonymous meaning to the term being defined (that is, to the “definiendum”). We instead improve upon it “by refining or supplementing its meaning” (25). However, even though this is not a report of a pre-existing synonymy, still, Quine argues, explication rests upon other pre-existing synonymies.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>. Here by the way are some relevant passages by Carnap.</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, | or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks of logical analysis and logical construction. We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an <em><strong>explication</strong></em> for, the earlier concept; this earlier concept, or sometimes the term used for it, is called the <em><strong>explicandum</strong></em>; and the new concept, or its term, is called an <em><strong>explicatum</strong></em> of the old one.  Thus, for instance, Frege and, later, Russell took as explicandum the term ‘two’ in the not quite exact meaning in which it is used in everyday life and in applied mathematics; they proposed as an explicatum for it an exactly defined concept, namely, the class of pair-classes [...] Many concepts now defined in semantics are meant as explicata for concepts earlier used in everyday language or in logic. For instance, the semantical concept of truth has as its explicandum the concept of truth as used in everyday language (if applied to declarative sentences) and in all of traditional and modern logic. [...] Generally speaking, it is not required that an explicatum have, as nearly as possible, the same meaning as the explicandum; it should, however, correspond to the explicandum in such a way that it can be used instead of the latter. </p> <p align="justify">(Carnap 7-8)</p> </blockquote> <p align="justify">(Note: I was not able to summarize Quine’s reasoning for his critical comments, because I am not sure what he means by “contexts.” But we can still work through it as best we can, just to start somewhere. And we can go line by line. “Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as wholes, are clear and precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of explication is to preserve the usage of these favored contexts while sharpening the usage of other contexts.” Suppose we have a term we want to explicate. Let’s say it is “analog” maybe. Suppose we have a mathematically precise notion of the continuum of variables that compose something that is analog (see for instance <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2008/11/continuous-discrete-forms-and-digital.html">Trask</a>.) Perhaps Quine is saying that we have this context where the notion is precise, and then we want to achieve a similar level of precision in another context, for instance, when discussing the analog features of record albums (see for instance <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/01/deleuzes-analog-and-digital.html">this entry</a>). Next: “In order that a given definition be suitable for purposes of explication, therefore, what is required is not that the definiendum in its antecedent usage be synonymous with the definiens, but just that each of these favored contexts of the definiendum, taken as a whole in its antecedent usage, be synonymous with the corresponding context of the definiens.” Here I am really unsure what Quine means, but this is my guess. In the case of the analog contexts, we begin in the mathematical context which understands analog as a perfectly dense continuum of quantitative variation. Suppose we want to be sure that it is not understood like Russell’s continuum, which is made of an infinity of discrete parts, but rather we want it to be more like a Bergsonian sort of continuum (as with Duration), where it is made never of discrete parts but rather always with movements or transitions. Then, we explicate the notion of analog by placing it into the context of movements that are continuously variable, like the needle moving along the record groove. Perhaps, (and quite likely not, but I have no other guesses), Quine is saying that the contexts are synonymous, in the sense that it is the notion of the continuity of variation that makes analog, rather than being a composition of infinitely many static points all densely packed together. Thus perhaps (and again, probably not) Quine is saying that there is still a pre-existing synonymy between analog as a mathematical continuum of variation and as a mechanical continuous motion, because both were already thought to be equivalent, only now, the features of the mechanical context are brought to light in order to highlight certain features in the mathematical context.)]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">There is also, however, a variant type of definitional activity which does not limit itself to the reporting of pre-existing synonymies. I have in mind what Carnap calls <i>explication</i> – an activity to which philosophers are given, and scientists also in their more philosophical moments. In explication the purpose is not merely to paraphrase the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually to improve upon the definiendum by refining or supplementing its meaning. But even explication, though not merely reporting a pre-existing synonymy between definiendum and definiens, does rest nevertheless on <i>other</i> pre-existing synonymies. The matter may be viewed as follows. Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as wholes, are clear and precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of explication is to preserve the usage of these favored contexts while sharpening the usage of other contexts. In order that a given definition be suitable for purposes of explication, therefore, what is required is not that the definiendum in its antecedent usage be synonymous with the definiens, but just that each of these favored contexts of the definiendum, taken as a whole in its antecedent usage, be synonymous with the corresponding context of the definiens.</p> <p align="justify">(25)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.5">2.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Cases of Selected Alternative Explications as Also Involving Pre-Existing Synonymies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Even in cases where we have two alternative, non-synonymous definientia that are equally appropriate for explicating a given term (they may be interchangeable in one context but not in others) and where we choose one over the other and thus where we have by fiat (rather than by observation) a relation of synonymy that did not hold before, still this uses pre-existing synonymies.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto. </em>(Note: I again cannot explain this meaning, as I do not have a precise conception of what he means by the synonymy of contexts.)]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Two alternative definientia may be equally appropriate for the purposes of a given task of explication and yet not be synonymous with each other; for they may serve interchangeably within the favored contexts but diverge elsewhere. By cleaving to one of these definientia rather than the other, a definition of explicative kind generates, by fiat, a relationship of synonymy between definiendum and definiens which did not hold before. But such a definition still owes its explicative function, as seen, to pre-existing synonymies.</p> <p align="justify">(25)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.6"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.6">2.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Exception: Novel Abbreviatory Notations]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine notes one example of definition not based on prior synonymies, namely, when we introduce “novel notations for purposes of sheer abbreviation. Here the definiendum becomes synonymous with the definiens simply because it has been created expressly for the purpose of being synonymous with the definiens” (26). Quine seems to suggest, however, that this meager instance is the only exception.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">There does, however, remain still an extreme sort of definition which does not hark back to prior synonymies at all; viz., the explicitly conventional introduction of novel notations for purposes of sheer abbreviation. Here the definiendum becomes synonymous with the definiens simply because it has been created expressly for the purpose of being synonymous with the definiens. Here we have a really transparent case of synonymy created by definition; would that all species of synonymy were as intelligible. For the rest, definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it.</p> <p align="justify">(26)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.7"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.7">2.7</a></p> <p align="center">[Two Kinds of Economy in Mathematical and Logical Systems: Economy of Practical Expression and Economy of Grammar and Vocabulary]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There are two kinds of economy in mathematical and logical systems. The nature of each counteracts the other. {1} Economy of practical expression. Here there are “distinctive concise notations for a wealth of concepts,” and it strives for “ease and brevity in the statement of multifarious relationships” (26). {2} Economy of grammar and vocabulary. Here what is first determined is a minimum of basic concepts. Then, a distinctive notation is assigned to them. On that basis, other more complex concepts can be formulated by combining the basic notations. In this case, because the basic elements are minimized, “it greatly simplifies theoretical discourse <em>about</em> the language, through minimizing the terms and the forms of construction wherein the language consists” (26). But it also has the impractical feature of requiring the more complex formulations to be rendered less economically. (Presumably in the first case, there are many more notations, which allow for the more complex ones to be rendered more economically.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In logical and mathematical systems either of two mutually antagonistic types of economy may be striven for, and each has its peculiar practical utility. On the one hand we may seek economy of practical expression: ease and brevity in the statement of multifarious relationships. This sort of economy calls usually for distinctive concise notations for a wealth of concepts. Second, however, and oppositely, we may seek economy in grammar and vocabulary; we may try to find a minimum of basic concepts such that, once a distinctive notation has been appropriated to each of them, it becomes possible to express any desired further concept by mere combination and iteration of our basic notations. This second sort of economy is impractical in one way, since a poverty in basic idioms tends to a necessary lengthening of discourse. But it is practical in another way: it greatly simplifies theoretical discourse <em>about</em> the language, through minimizing the terms and the forms of construction wherein the language consists.</p> <p align="justify">(26)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.8"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.8">2.8</a></p> <p align="center">[Coordinating Two Languages of Each Economy Using Definitions for Translation]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[To get the best of both economies, often they are combined as two related languages. The more “inclusive” one has complex grammar and vocabulary, but shorter messages, while the other, called “primitive notation” is more efficient with grammar and vocabulary. There are then rules to translate the formulations of the inclusive language into complexes of primitive notation. “These rules of translation are the so-|called <i>definitions</i> which appear in formalized systems. They are best viewed not as adjuncts to one language but as correlations between two languages, the one a part of the other” (26-27). (I wonder if it is something similar to object language and metalanguage. See <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2014/12/tarski-9-of-semantic-conception-of.html">Tarski</a>.)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Both sorts of economy, though prima facie incompatible, are valuable in their separate ways. The custom has consequently arisen of combining both sorts of economy by forging in effect two languages, the one a part of the other. The inclusive language though redundant in grammar and vocabulary, is economical in message lengths, while the part, called <i>primitive notation</i>, is economical in grammar and vocabulary. Whole and part are correlated by rules of translation whereby each idiom not in primitive notation is equated to some complex built up of primitive notation. These rules of translation are the so-|called <i>definitions</i> which appear in formalized systems. They are best viewed not as adjuncts to one language but as correlations between two languages, the one a part of the other.</p> <p align="justify">(26-27)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.9"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.9">2.9</a></p> <p align="center">[Three Relations Between Definiendum and Definiens]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The relation that the definitions create between definiendum and definiens can be one of three sorts: {1} the definiens may paraphrase the definiendum in a way that preserves “a direct synonymy as of antecedent usage”; {2} the definiens may explicate the definiendum, thereby improving upon its antecedent usage; or {3} the definiendum may be a newly established notation therewith endowed with its own meaning.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">But these correlations are not arbitrary. They are supposed to show how the primitive notations can accomplish all purposes, save brevity and convenience, of the redundant language. Hence the definiendum and its definiens may be expected, in each case, to be related in one or another of the three ways lately noted. The definiens may be a faithful paraphrase of the definiendum into the narrower notation, preserving a direct synonymy as of antecedent usage; or the definiens may, in the spirit of explication, improve upon the antecedent usage of the definiendum; or finally, the definiendum may be a newly created notation, newly endowed with meaning here and now.</p> <p align="justify">(27)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.10"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.10">2.10</a></p> <p align="center">[The Conclusion Being That Definitions Are Inadequate to Ground Synonymy (And Thus Analyticity)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Thus we see that with one rare exception (the introduction of new notation), definition depends upon prior synonymy when used in both formal and informal languages. (Recall that our present concern is grounding analyticity. We found in <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">section 1</a> that under Kant’s conception, it means the sentence is true by meaning and independent of fact. Then we found that the notion of meaning was elusive and superfluous when considering extension. We next noted that while we have a formal way to define analyticity when the denial of the sentence presents an obvious self contradiction, like “No unmarried man is married,” we do not have such a formal grounding for converting other kinds of analytic statements into ones of that form, for example, “No bachelors are married.” We know that it has to do with synonymy. And we need a formal means to ground it. But as we have seen in this section, using definitions is not viable, because instead of being responsible for establishing synonymies, they instead are based on pre-existing synonymies. Thus we must look elsewhere for a way to ground synonymy.)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In formal and informal work alike, thus, we find that definition – except in the extreme case of the explicitly conventional introduction of new notations – hinges on prior relationships of synonymy. Recognizing then that the notion of definition does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity, let us look further into synonymy and say no more of definition.</p> <p align="justify">(27)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p>Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” <i>The Philosophical Review</i> 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>Carnap, Rudolf. <i>Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic</i>. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1947.</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-18055016132172827342021-07-24T07:07:00.001-07:002021-07-25T01:43:26.663-07:00Quine (1) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, section 1, “Background for Anayticity”, summary<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-entry-directory.html">[Quine, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-ed-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-entry.html">[Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of the text. More analysis is still needed and will be updated when conducted. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive all my various mistakes. Material between brackets or between parentheses within brackets is my own and should not be trusted over the quotations, which themselves may contain typographical errors from their transcription. Please consult the original text in any case.]</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">W. V. Quine</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">1</p> <p align="center">“Background for Anayticity”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#1.1">1.1</a>) There are forerunners to Kant’s analytic/synthetic judgment distinction. {1a} Hume’s relations of ideas, which are logically certain (because their contraries imply contradictions), as for example mathematical equations, and {1b} matters of fact, which are probable, because their contraries are not contradictions, as for example ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’. (<em>Enquiry</em> <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2017/04/hume-42-enquiry-concerning-human.html">4.2</a>) {2a}  Leibniz’ truths of reason, which are necessary because their opposite is impossible, and {2b} truths of fact, which are contingent, because their opposite is possible. (<em>Monadology</em> 33, <em>Philosophical Texts</em> p.272) Morton White shows that the definition of analyticity as “Analytic statements are those whose denials are self-contradictory” is insufficient, because there are cases of denials that render contradictions, but it is not a syntactical case of “<em>A </em>and not-<em>A;</em>” for instance “All men are rational animals” would be denied as “It is not the case that all men are rational animals” (or “Some men are not rational animals”). (<a href="#1.2">1.2</a>) For Kant, an analytic statement is one that “attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject. (20) Quine notes two problems with this definition: {1} it is limited only to statements in a subject-predicate form (and presumably there are analytic statements not of this form, but Quine does not mention any here) and {2} its notion of containment remains only at a metaphysical level (perhaps because it is not defined formally). Quine sees Kant’s intent and redefines Kant’s analyticity as “a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact.” (21) We turn now to the notion of meaning used here. (<a href="#1.3">1.3</a>) Meaning cannot be mere reference, because there are cases where two different names name the same thing, but each name has a different meaning, as for instance Frege’s ‘Evening Star = Morning Star’. As the two names are not identical in meaning, this statement is not analytic. (In fact, the meaning of ‘the evening star’ is almost the opposite of the meaning of ‘morning star’.) Also the identity made between the two is a statement of fact that is demonstrated through astronomical observation. (Thus it does not fulfill either of the Kantian requirements that an analytic statement be “true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact.”). (<a href="#1.4">1.4</a>) Another example of a case where equated names do not render an analytic statement is Russell’s “Scott is the author of <em>Waverley</em>.” (<a href="#1.5">1.5</a>) Even with abstract terms, like number values,  we still have this problem, as “9” and “the number of planets” names one and the same abstract entity (the number value of nine), but the equation of the two is not analytic; for, observation was needed to make that equation, and a reflection on their meanings is insufficient to. (<a href="#1.6">1.6</a>) A general term or predicate does not name an entity, but it is true of an entity or entities, or of none. The extension of a general term is that class of all entities that a general term is true of. With singular terms, we distinguished its meaning from its extension (Evening Star and Morning Star have the same extension, the planet Venus, but different meanings); similarly, we must do the same for general terms. So for example, the general terms “creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney” may have an identical extension (supposing all creatures with the one organ also in fact have the other), but they are not alike in meaning. (<a href="#1.7">1.7</a>) We sometimes contrast <em>intension </em>(or meaning) and <em>connotation</em> with <em>extension</em> or <em>denotation. </em>(<a href="#1.8">1.8</a>) Aristotle’s notion of essence was a forerunner for what we now call intension (meaning). Aristotle distinguishes the essential from the accidental, so for humans, it is essential to be rational, but it is accidental to have two legs. Quine notes a problem. Consider a human person. They will be both rational and two-legged. Quine observes however that we may classify this person either as a human or a biped. Insofar as they are a human, their rationality is essential and their bipedalism is not. But insofar as they are a biped, their two-leggedness is essential and their rationality is not. (Here Quine claims that we are dealing with meanings rather than essences. We might say under a doctrine of essences that for some particular individual person, their rationality is essential and their bipedalism is not. However, under a doctrine of meanings, for this individual’s predicates of being rational and bipedal, it cannot be said that one of them is essential and the other is not. For, by the same reasoning that we would use to designate one over the other, we may equally use it to designate the other over the first. (We might say, “here is a human,” and take their rationality as essential; or, for the same person, we might say, “here is a biped” and take their two-leggedness as essential. This is because in that case we are concerned with meanings (of “human” and of “biped”) rather than with the entity itself’s proper essence).) “Things had essences, for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings. Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.” (22) (<a href="#1.9">1.9</a>) In a theory of meaning, we would need to explain what kind of objects meanings are. They seem to be ideas. For semanticists, they are mental ideas. For others, they are Platonic ideas. But these characterizations are not sufficient because such entities are too elusive to erect “a fruitful science about them.” (22) Some things are often not clear about such entities: {1} whether we have two or one; and {2} when linguistic forms are synonymous or not. (<a href="#1.10">1.10</a>) But once we distinguish a theory of meaning from a theory of reference, we can then think of meanings just in terms of synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements. (<a href="#1.11">1.11</a>) We began wondering how to define analyticity. (We saw in the Kantian conception that it can be understood as being true by meanings and independently of fact. See <a href="#1.2">1.2</a>. We distinguished meaning from extension. Then we found that meanings are hard to define and unnecessary when we have extension.) We now no longer consider a “special realm of entities called meanings.” (23) That means we must find other ways to understand analyticity. (<a href="#1.12">1.12</a>) Statements that are often considered analytic in philosophy are generally of two types. {1} Ones that are logically true, for instance (1) No unmarried man is married. (This is true no matter what the interpretations are of the terms. It is formally true.) (<a href="#1.13">1.13</a>) {2} The other kind of analytic statements are ones that can be rendered into a logically true format by substituting synonyms. For example, (2) “No bachelor is married” can be rendered “No unmarried man is married” but substituting the synonyms “bachelor” and “unmarried man”. Yet, we do not have a proper (formal?) characterization of these kinds of analytic statements, especially since we do not have a (formal?) definition of synonymy. Thus we do not have an adequate (formal?) characterization of analyticity. (<a href="#1.14">1.14</a>) Carnap defines analyticity in the following way. We begin by assigning all the truth values to every atomic statement in a language. Each complete combination of assignments for all the atomic sentences is what he calls a “state description.” We can then compositionally build up the complex statements of the language using logical means, with their truth values being computable based on logical laws. A statement is analytic when it is true under every state description. Since a state description is like a possible world (it is one combination of facts), this can be seen as following Leibniz’ notion of being true in all possible worlds. (Quine then explains a problem with this conception: if the language has extralogical synonym-pairs, such as ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’, then statements like “All bachelors are married” will turn out to be synthetic rather than analytic. Thus) “The criterion in terms of state-descriptions is a reconstruction at best of logical truth.” (24) (<a href="#1.15">1.15</a>) Yet, Carnap’s main concern was clarifying probability and induction, not analyticity, which is our concern, “and here the major difficulty lies not in the first class of analytic statements, the logical truths, but rather in the second class, which depends on the notion of synonymy.” (23)</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.1">1.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Forerunners of Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction in Hume and Leibniz. M. White’s Account for the Inadequacy of Defining Analyticity as Denial Rendering a Contradiction]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.2">1.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Reformulation Kant’s Notion of Analyticity as Being True by its Meanings and Independently of Fact]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.3">1.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Meaning as Not Referential Naming]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.4">1.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Russell’s “Author of <em>Waverley</em>” as Another Example of an Identifying Naming Statement That Is Not Analytical]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.5">1.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Abstract Terms as Also Having This Problem (“9” and “The Number of Planets”)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.6">1.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Meaning and Extension for General Terms (“Creature with a Heart” and “Creature with a Kidney”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.7">1.7</a></p> <p align="center">[Intention (Meaning)/Connotation Vs. Extension/Denotation]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.8">1.8</a></p> <p align="center">[Aristotle’s Essence as Being Similar to Meaning, but Not Identical]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.9">1.9</a></p> <p align="center">[Difficulty in Defining What Kind of Entities Meanings Are]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.10">1.10</a></p> <p align="center">[Defining Meaning as Superfluous]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.12">1.12</a></p> <p align="center">[Logically True Analytic Statements]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.13">1.13</a></p> <p align="center">[Statements Made Logically True by Substitutions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.14">1.14</a></p> <p align="center">[Carnap’s Definition of Logical Truths (Analyticity)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.15">1.15</a></p> <p align="center">[Turning Instead to Analyticity From Synonymy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="1.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.1">1.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Forerunners of Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction in Hume and Leibniz. M. White’s Account for the Inadequacy of Defining Analyticity as Denial Rendering a Contradiction]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There are forerunners to Kant’s analytic/synthetic judgment distinction. {1a} Hume’s relations of ideas, which are logically certain (because their contraries imply contradictions), as for example mathematical equations, and {1b} matters of fact, which are probable, because their contraries are not contradictions, as for example ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’. (<em>Enquiry</em> <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2017/04/hume-42-enquiry-concerning-human.html">4.2</a>) {2a}  Leibniz’ truths of reason, which are necessary because their opposite is impossible, and {2b} truths of fact, which are contingent, because their opposite is possible. (<em>Monadology</em> 33, <em>Philosophical Texts</em> p.272) Morton White shows that the definition of analyticity as “Analytic statements are those whose denials are self-contradictory” is insufficient, because there are cases of denials that render contradictions, but it is not a syntactical case of “<em>A </em>and not-<em>A;</em>” for instance “All men are rational animals” would be denied as “It is not the case that all men are rational animals” (or “Some men are not rational animals”).]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify">[We are dealing with the first dogma (see section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.1">0.1</a>), which is that truths are distinctly either: {1a} synthetic, meaning that they they are grounded in fact, or they are {1b} analytic, meaning that they grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact. Hume made the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact (recall from his <em>Enquiry concerning Human Nature, </em>Section 4, <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2017/04/hume-42-enquiry-concerning-human.html">part 2</a> that we have knowledge either of {1} relations of ideas, which are logically certain (because their contraries imply contradictions), as for example mathematical equations, or we have knowledge of {2} matters of fact, which are probable, because their contraries are not contradictions, as for example ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’ (for, it is not a contradiction to think, ‘the sun will not rise tomorrow’). We trust such conclusions regarding matters of fact, because we come to have knowledge of causal relations governing such regularities. And this causal knowledge is obtainable only through experience. Leibniz makes a similar distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact: “There are also two kinds of <em>truths</em>, those of <em>reasoning </em>and those of <em>fact</em>. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and simpler truths until we reach the primitives.” (<em>Monadology</em> 33, <em>Philosophical Texts</em> p.272) Kant’s analytic and synthetic judgment distinction is similar to both of these (we examine it below). Quine notes how Morton White claims that “Analytic statements are those whose denials are self-contradictory.” (324) Here White is presenting this as an anti-intensional view that he is critical of. This is not sufficient, White says, because in many cases of a denied formulations that intuitively present a contradiction, there is no syntactically obvious contradiction. For example, “All men are rational animals” would be denied as “It is not the case that all men are rational animals” or as converted to “Some men are not rational animals.” But here we do not have a syntactical contradiction of the form “<em>A </em>and not-<em>A.</em>” Thus, defining analyticity as resulting in a contradiction when denied does not suffice, because we still need a formal account of contradiction (for these cases where it is not syntactically apparent.)]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Kant’s cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths was foreshadowed in Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and in Leibniz’s distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Leibniz spoke of the truths of reason as true in all possible worlds. Picturesqueness aside, this is to say that the truths of reason are those which could not possibly be false. In the same vein we hear analytic statements defined as statements whose denials are self-contradictory. But this definition has, small explanatory value; for the notion of self-contradictoriness, in the quite broad sense needed for this definition of analyticity, stands in exactly the same need of clarification as does the notion of analyticity itself.<sup>2</sup> The two notions are the two sides of a single dubious coin.</p> <p align="justify">(20)</p> <p align="justify">2. See White, op. cit., p. 324.</p> <p align="justify">(20)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.2">1.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Reformulation Kant’s Notion of Analyticity as Being True by its Meanings and Independently of Fact]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[For Kant, an analytic statement is one that “attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject. (20) Quine notes two problems with this definition: {1} it is limited only to statements in a subject-predicate form (and presumably there are analytic statements not of this form, but Quine does not mention any here) and {2} its notion of containment remains only at a metaphysical level (perhaps because it is not defined formally). Quine sees Kant’s intent and redefines Kant’s analyticity as “a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact.” (21) We turn now to the notion of meaning used here.]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p>[<em>ditto</em>. Here are some relevant passages from Kant’s <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>:</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">On the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. </p> <p align="justify">In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought […], this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate <i>B</i> belongs to the subject <i>A</i> as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept <i>A</i>; or <i>B</i> lies entirely outside the concept <i>A</i>, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. Analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity, but those in which this connection is thought without identity are to be called synthetic judgments. One could also call the former judgments of clarification and the latter judgments of amplification, since through the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly); while the latter, on the contrary, add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through any analysis; e.g., if I say: “All bodies are extended,” then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go outside the concept that I combine with the word “body” in order to find that extension is connected with it, but rather I need only to analyze that concept, i.e., become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein; it is therefore an analytic judgment. On the contrary, if I say: “All bodies are heavy,” then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment. </p> <p align="justify">Now from this it is clear: 1) that through analytic judgments our cognition is not amplified at all, but rather the concept, which I already | have, is set out, and made intelligible to me; 2) that in synthetic judgments I must have in addition to the concept of the subject something else (<i>X</i>) on which the understanding depends in cognizing a predicate that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it.</p> <p align="justify">In the case of empirical judgments or judgments of experience there is no difficulty here. For this <i>X</i> is the complete experience of the object that I think through some concept <i>A</i>, which constitutes only a part of this experience. For although I do not at all include the predicate of weight in the concept of a body in general, the concept nevertheless designates the complete experience through a part of it, to which I can therefore add still other parts of the very same experience as belonging to the former. I can first cognize the concept of body analytically through the marks of extension, of impenetrability, of shape, etc., which are all thought in this concept. But now I amplify my cognition and, in looking back to the experience from which I had extracted this concept of body, I find that weight is also always connected with the previous marks. Experience is therefore that <i>X</i> that lies outside the concept<i> A</i> and on which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight <i>B</i> with the concept <i>A</i> is grounded. </p> <p align="justify">(Kant, <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>, 130-131)</p> </blockquote> <p>]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Kant conceived of an analytic statement as one that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject. | This formulation has two shortcomings : it limits itself to statements of subject-predicate form, and it appeals to a notion of containment which is left at a metaphorical level. But Kant’s intent, evident more from the use he makes of the notion of analyticity than from his definition of it, can be restated thus : a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact. Pursuing this line, let us examine the concept of <i>meaning</i> which is presupposed.</p> <p align="justify">(20-21)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.3">1.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Meaning as Not Referential Naming]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Meaning cannot be mere reference, because there are cases where two different names name the same thing, but each name has a different meaning, as for instance Frege’s ‘Evening Star = Morning Star’. As the two names are not identical in meaning, this statement is not analytic. (In fact, the meaning of ‘the evening star’ is almost the opposite of the meaning of ‘morning star’.) Also the identity made between the two is a statement of fact that is demonstrated through astronomical observation. (Thus it does not fulfill either of the Kantian requirements that an analytic statement be “true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact.”).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">We must observe to begin with that meaning is not to be identified with naming, or reference. Consider Frege’s example of ‘Evening Star’ and ‘Morning Star’. Understood not merely as a recurrent evening apparition but as a body, the Evening Star is the planet Venus, and the Morning Star is the same. The two singular terms name the same thing. But the meanings must be treated as distinct, since the· identity ‘Evening Star = Morning Star’ is a statement of fact established by astronomical observation. If ‘Evening Star’ and ‘Morning Star’ were alike in meaning, the identity ‘Evening Star = Morning Star’ would be analytic.</p> <p align="justify">(21)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.4">1.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Russell’s “Author of <em>Waverley</em>” as Another Example of an Identifying Naming Statement That Is Not Analytical]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Another example of a case where equated names do not render an analytic statement is Russell’s “Scott is the author of <em>Waverley</em>.”]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>. It seems Sir Walter Scott wrote <em>Waverley </em>anonymously, and published certain subsequent writings under “the author of <em>Waverley.</em>” (see <a href="https://janeausten.co.uk/blogs/authors-artists-vagrants/sir-walter-scott-author-critic">here</a> and <a href="https://wordsworth-editions.com/author/scott-sir-walter">here</a>) And “His identity as the author of the novels was widely rumoured, and in 1815 Scott was given the honour of dining with George, Prince Regent, who wanted to meet ‘the author of Waverley’’.” (<a href="https://janeausten.co.uk/blogs/authors-artists-vagrants/sir-walter-scott-author-critic">source</a> for this quote) Here are some relevant passages from Russell’s “On Denoting”:</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">If we say “Scott is the author of <em>Waverley</em>,” we assert an identity of denotation with a difference of meaning.” </p> <p align="justify">(483)</p> <p align="justify">If <em>a </em>is identical with <em>b</em>, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV. wished to know whether Scott was the author of <em>Waverley</em>; and in fact Scott <em>was</em> the author of <em>Waverley</em>. Hence we may substitute <em>Scott</em> for <em>the author of “Waverley</em>,” and thereby prove that George IV. wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.</p> <p align="justify">(485)</p> </blockquote> <p align="justify">Quine’s point might seem to be the following. George IV knew about the author of <em>Waverley</em>, and he may have even known Sir Walter Scott. But neither name is contained in the other.]</p> <blockquote> <p>Again there is Russell’s example of ‘Scott’ and ‘the author of <i>Waverley’</i>. Analysis of the meanings of words was by no means sufficient to reveal to George IV that the person named by these two singular terms was one and the same.</p> <p>(21)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.5">1.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Abstract Terms as Also Having This Problem (“9” and “The Number of Planets”)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Even with abstract terms, like number values,  we still have this problem, as “9” and “the number of planets” names one and the same abstract entity (the number value of nine), but the equation of the two is not analytic; for, observation was needed to make that equation, and a reflection on their meanings is insufficient too.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The distinction between meaning and naming is no less important at the level of abstract terms. The terms ‘9’ and ‘the number of planets’ name one and the same abstract entity but presumably must be regarded as unlike in meaning; for astronomical observation was needed, and not mere reflection on meanings, to determine the sameness of the entity in question.</p> <p align="justify">(21)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.6"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.6">1.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Meaning and Extension for General Terms (“Creature with a Heart” and “Creature with a Kidney”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[A general term or predicate does not name an entity, but it is true of an entity or entities, or of none. The extension of a general term is that class of all entities that a general term is true of. With singular terms, we distinguished its meaning from its extension (Evening Star and Morning Star have the same extension, the planet Venus, but different meanings); similarly, we must do the same for general terms. So for example, the general terms “creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney” may have an identical extension (supposing all creatures with the one organ also in fact have the other), but they are not alike in meaning.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Thus far we have been considering singular terms. With general terms, or predicates, the situation is somewhat different but parallel. Whereas a singular term purports to name an entity, abstract or concrete, a general term does not; but a general term is <i>true</i> of an entity, or of each of many, or of none. The class of all entities of which a general term is true is called the <i>extension</i> of the term. Now paralleling the contrast between the meaning of a singular term and the entity named, we must distinguish equally between the meaning of a general term and its extension. The general terms ‘creature with a heart’ and | ‘creature with a kidney’, e.g., are perhaps alike in extension but unlike in meaning.</p> <p align="justify">(21-22)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.7"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.7">1.7</a></p> <p align="center">[Intention (Meaning)/Connotation Vs. Extension/Denotation]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[We sometimes contrast <em>intension </em>(or meaning) and <em>connotation</em> with <em>extension</em> or <em>denotation.</em>]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Confusion of meaning with extension, in the case of general terms, is less common than confusion of meaning with naming in the case of singular terms. It is indeed a commonplace in philosophy to oppose intension (or meaning) to extension, or, in a variant vocabulary, connotation to denotation.</p> <p align="justify">(22)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.8"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.8">1.8</a></p> <p align="center">[Aristotle’s Essence as Being Similar to Meaning, but Not Identical]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Aristotle’s notion of essence was a forerunner for what we now call intension (meaning). Aristotle distinguishes the essential from the accidental, so for humans, it is essential to be rational, but it is accidental to have two legs. Quine notes a problem. Consider a human person. They will be both rational and two-legged. Quine observes however that we may classify this person either as a human or a biped. Insofar as they are a human, their rationality is essential and their bipedalism is not. But insofar as they are a biped, their two-leggedness is essential and their rationality is not. (Here Quine claims that we are dealing with meanings rather than essences. We might say under a doctrine of essences that for some particular individual person, their rationality is essential and their bipedalism is not. However, under a doctrine of meanings, for this individual’s predicates of being rational and bipedal, it cannot be said that one of them is essential and the other is not. For, by the same reasoning that we would use to designate one over the other, we may equally use it to designate the other over the first. (We might say, “here is a human,” and take their rationality as essential; or, for the same person, we might say, “here is a biped” and take their two-leggedness as essential. This is because in that case we are concerned with meanings (of “human” and of “biped”) rather than with the entity itself’s proper essence).) “Things had essences, for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings. Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.” (22)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The Aristotelian notion of essence was the forerunner, no doubt, of the modern notion of intension or meaning. For Aristotle it was essential in men to be rational, accidental to be two-legged. But there is an important difference between this attitude and the doctrine of meaning. From the latter point of view it may indeed be conceded (if only for the sake of argument) that rationality is involved in the meaning of the word ‘man’ while two-leggedness is not; but two-leggedness may at the same time be viewed as involved in the meaning of ‘biped’ while rationality is not. Thus from the point of view of the doctrine of meaning it makes no sense to say of the actual individual, who is at once a man and a biped, that his rationality is essential and his two-leggedness accidental or vice versa. Things had essences, for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings. Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.</p> <p align="justify">(22)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.9"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.9">1.9</a></p> <p align="center">[Difficulty in Defining What Kind of Entities Meanings Are]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[In a theory of meaning, we would need to explain what kind of objects meanings are. They seem to be ideas. For semanticists, they are mental ideas. For others, they are Platonic ideas. But these characterizations are not sufficient because such entities are too elusive to erect “a fruitful science about them.” (22) Some things are often not clear about such entities: {1} whether we have two or one; and {2} when linguistic forms are synonymous or not. ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">For the theory of meaning the most conspicuous question is as to the nature of its objects: what sort of things are meanings? They are evidently intended to be ideas, somehow – mental ideas for some semanticists, Platonic ideas for others. Objects of either sort are so elusive, not to say debatable, that there seems little hope of erecting a fruitful science about them. It is not even clear, granted meanings, when we have two and when we have one; it is not clear when linguistic forms should be regarded as synonymous, or alike in meaning, and when they should not. If a standard of synonymy should be arrived at, we may reasonably expect that the appeal to meanings as entities will not have played a very useful part in the enterprise.</p> <p align="justify">(22)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.10"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.10">1.10</a></p> <p align="center">[Defining Meaning as Superfluous]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[But once we distinguish a theory of meaning from a theory of reference, we can then think of meanings just in terms of synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">A felt need for meant entities may derive from an earlier failure to appreciate that meaning and reference are distinct. Once the theory of meaning is sharply separated from the theory of reference, it is a short step to recognizing as the business of the theory of meaning | simply the synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements; meanings themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may well be abandoned.</p> <p align="justify">(22-23)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.11"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.11">1.11</a></p> <p align="center">[Abandoning Meaning for Defining Analyticity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[We began wondering how to define analyticity. (We saw in the Kantian conception that it can be understood as being true by meanings and independently of fact. See <a href="#1.2">1.2</a>. We distinguished meaning from extension. Then we found that meanings are hard to define and unnecessary when we have extension.) We now no longer consider a “special realm of entities called meanings.” (23) That means we must find other ways to understand analyticity.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The description of analyticity as truth by virtue of meanings started us off in pursuit of a concept of meaning. But now we have abandoned the thought of any special realm of entities called meanings. So the problem of analyticity confronts us anew.</p> <p align="justify">(23)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.12"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.12">1.12</a></p> <p align="center">[Logically True Analytic Statements]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Statements that are often considered analytic in philosophy are generally of two types. {1} Ones that are logically true, for instance (1) No unmarried man is married. (This is true no matter what the interpretations are of the terms. It is formally true.)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Statements which are analytic by general philosophical acclaim are not, indeed, far to seek. They fall into two classes. Those of the first class, which may be called <em>logically true</em>, are typified by:</p> <p align="justify">(1) No unmarried man is married.</p> <p align="justify">The relevant feature of this example is that it is not merely true as it stands, but remains true under any and all reinterpretations of ‘man’ and ‘married’. If we suppose a prior inventory of logical particles, comprising ‘no’, ‘un-’, ‘not’, ‘if’, ‘then’, ‘and’, etc., then in general a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles.</p> <p align="justify">(23)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="1.13"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.13">1.13</a></p> <p align="center">[Statements Made Logically True by Substitutions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[{2} The other kind of analytic statements are ones that can be rendered into a logically true format by substituting synonyms. For example, (2) “No bachelor is married” can be rendered “No unmarried man is married” but substituting the synonyms “bachelor” and “unmarried man”. Yet, we do not have a proper (formal?) characterization of these kinds of analytic statements, especially since we do not have a (formal?) definition of synonymy. Thus we do not have an adequate (formal?) characterization of analyticity.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">But there is also a second class of analytic statements, typified by: </p> <p align="justify">(2) No bachelor is married.</p> <p align="justify">The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms; thus (2) can be turned into (1) by putting ‘unmarried man’ for its synonym ‘bachelor’. We still lack a proper characterization of this second class of analytic statements, and therewith of analyticity generally, inasmuch as we have had in the above description to lean on a notion of “synonymy” which is no less in need of clarification than analyticity itself.</p> <p align="justify">(23)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.14"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.14">1.14</a></p> <p align="center">[Carnap’s Definition of Logical Truths (Analyticity)]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Carnap defines analyticity in the following way. We begin by assigning all the truth values to every atomic statement in a language. Each complete combination of assignments for all the atomic sentences is what he calls a “state description.” We can then compositionally build up the complex statements of the language using logical means, with their truth values being computable based on logical laws. A statement is analytic when it is true under every state description. Since a state description is like a possible world (it is one combination of facts), this can be seen as following Leibniz’ notion of being true in all possible worlds. (Quine then explains a problem with this conception: if the language has extralogical synonym-pairs, such as ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’, then statements like “All bachelors are married” will turn out to be synthetic rather than analytic. Thus) “The criterion in terms of state-descriptions is a reconstruction at best of logical truth.” (24)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>. (Note: I did not understand Quine’s objection. According to Quine, a statement is analytically true (L-true) in a system if it is true in all possible state-descriptions. It is L-false if its negation is L-true, meaning that the statement does not hold in any state description.  The sentence is L-determinate if it is either L-true or L-false. And it is L-indeterminate or factual (synthetic) if it is not L-determinate, meaning that there is at least one state-description in which it holds and at least one in which it does not hold. (See Carnap block quotes below.) Now, suppose two cases. {1} In our system, we have a way to derive formulas based on meaning, so in worlds where ‘John is a bachelor’ is true, then in that same world, ‘John is married’ is false (and vice versa). That would presumably make ‘All bachelors are married’ false in every state description. That would make ‘All bachelors are married’ L-false, and thus L-determinate. As such, it would not be synthetic. Yet, Quine claims it makes it synthetic. I did not understand why yet. (I can only see it working if it is both true and false that John is a bachelor and both true and false that John is married.) However, it also would not be analytic, because it is not true in all worlds. {2} In the second case, Quine says we do not have such sentences with mutually dependent truth values. But does he mean we cannot have both “bachelor” and “married” in the same world? What kind of a language would we have without terms that imply opposite meanings? Would it be just a formal system of symbols? Or is he saying that we do have ‘John is a bachelor’ and ‘John is married’ , but the truth of the one does not entail the falsity of the other? Still, that would not make “All bachelors are married” analytic, because there would still be worlds where we assign ‘John is a bachelor’ as true and ‘John is married’ as false. Thus still “All bachelors are married” would not hold in every possible world (state description). So I am not sure what Quine’s objection is here yet.)  Below are some relevant passages from Carnap’s text.</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In order to speak about expressions in a general way, we often use ‘<em><strong>A</strong><sub>i</sub></em>’, ‘<em><strong>A</strong><sub>j</sub></em>’, etc.,  for expressions of any kind and ‘<em><strong>S</strong><sub>i</sub></em>’, ‘<em><strong>S</strong><sub>j</sub></em>’, etc., for sentences ...</p> <p align="justify">(Carnap 4. Note: here and below, the bold “<strong><em>A</em></strong>” should instead be <a href="https://unicode-table.com/en/1D56C/">Mathematical Bold Fraktur Capital A</a>; and the Bold “<strong>S</strong>” should be <a href="https://unicode-table.com/en/1D57E/">Mathematical Bold Fraktur Capital S</a>)</p> <p align="justify">The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, | or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks of logical analysis and logical construction. We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an <em><strong>explication</strong></em> for, the earlier concept; this earlier concept, or sometimes the term used for it, is called the <em><strong>explicandum</strong></em>; and the new concept, or its term, is called an <em><strong>explicatum</strong></em> of the old one.  Thus, for instance, Frege and, later, Russell took as explicandum the term ‘two’ in the not quite exact meaning in which it is used in everyday life and in applied mathematics; they proposed as an explicatum for it an exactly defined concept, namely, the class of pair-classes [...]; other logicians have proposed other explicata for the same explicandum. Many concepts now defined in semantics are meant as explicata for concepts earlier used in everyday language or in logic. For instance, the semantical concept of truth has as its explicandum the concept of truth as used in everyday language (if applied to declarative sentences) and in all of traditional and modern logic. [...] Generally speaking, it is not required that an explicatum have, as nearly as possible, the same meaning as the explicandum; it should, however, correspond to the explicandum in such a way that it can be used instead of the latter. </p> <p align="justify">The L-terms (‘L-true’, etc.) which we shall now introduce are likewise intended as explicata for customary, but not quite exact, concepts. ‘L-true’ is meant as an explicatum for what Leibniz called necessary truth and Kant analytic truth. We shall indicate here briefly how this and the other L-terms can be defined. </p> <p align="justify">(Carnap 7-8)</p> <p align="justify">A class of sentences in S<sub>1 </sub>which contains for every atomic sentence either this sentence or its negation, but not both, and no other sentences, is called a <em><strong>state-description</strong></em> in S<sub>1 </sub>, because it obviously gives a complete description of a possible state of the universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations expressed by predicates of the system. Thus the state-descriptions represent Leibniz' possible worlds or Wittgenstein's possible states of affairs. </p> <p align="justify">It is easily possible to lay down semantical rules which determine for every sentence in S<sub>1 </sub>whether or not it <em>holds in</em> a given <em>state-description</em>. That a sentence holds in a state-description means, in nontechnical terms, that it would be true if the state-description (that is, all sentences belonging to it) were true. A few examples will suffice to show the nature of these rules: (1) an atomic sentence holds in a given state-description if and only if it belongs to it; (2) ~<em><strong>S</strong><sub>i </sub></em>holds in a given state-description if and only if <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>does not hold in it; (3) <em><strong>S</strong><sub>i </sub></em>∨ <em><strong>S</strong><sub>j</sub></em>, holds in a state-description if and only if either <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>holds in it or <strong>S</strong><sub><em>j</em></sub> or both; ...</p> <p align="justify">(Carnap 9)</p> <p align="justify">Our concept of L-truth is, as mentioned above, intended as an explicatum for the familiar but vague concept of logical or necessary or analytic truth as explicandum. This explicandum has sometimes been characterized as truth based on purely logical reasons, on meaning alone, independent of the contingency of facts. Now the meaning of a sentence, its interpretation, is determined by the semantical rules (the rules of designation and the rules of ranges in the method explained above). Therefore, it seems well in accord with the traditional concept which we take as explicandum, if we require of any explicatum that it fulfil the following condition: </p> <p align="justify"><strong>2-1. <em>Convention</em>. </strong>A sentence <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>is <strong><em>L-true</em></strong> in a semantical system <em>S </em>if and only if <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>is true in <em>S</em> in such a way that its truth can be established on the basis of the semantical rules of the system <em>S</em> alone, without any reference to (extra-linguistic) facts. </p> <p align="justify">This is not yet a definition of L-truth. It is an informal formulation of a condition which any proposed definition of L-truth must fulfil in order to be adequate as an explication for our explicandum. Thus this convention has merely an explanatory and heuristic function.</p> <p align="justify">How shall we define L-truth so as to fulfil the requirement 2-1? A way is suggested by Leibniz' conception that a necessary truth must hold in all possible worlds. Since our state-descriptions represent the possible worlds, this means that a sentence is logically true if it holds in all state-descriptions. This leads to the following definition: </p> <p align="justify"><strong>2-2. <em>Definition</em></strong>. A sentence <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>is <em><strong>L-true</strong></em> (in <em>S1</em>) =<sub>Df  </sub><strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>holds in every state-description (in S<sub>1</sub>).</p> <p align="justify">(Carnap 10)</p> <p align="justify"><strong>2-3. <em>Definitions</em></strong></p> <p align="justify"><strong>a.</strong> <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em>  </sub>is <em><strong>L-false</strong></em> in (S<sub>1</sub>) =<sub>Df </sub>~<strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>is L-true.</p> <p align="justify">[...]</p> <p align="justify"><strong>d.</strong> <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>is <em><strong>L-determinate</strong></em> (in S<sub>1</sub>) =<sub>Df </sub><strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em>  </sub>is either L-true or L-false.</p> <p align="justify">[...]</p> <p align="justify"><strong>2-4.</strong> <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>is L-false if and only if <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>does not hold in any state-description.</p> <p align="justify">(Carnap 11)</p> <p align="justify">We have seen that our concept of L-truth fulfils our earlier convention 2-1. Therefore, according to the definition 2-3d, a sentence is L-determinate if and only if the semantical rules, independently of facts, suffice for establishing its truth-value, that is, either its truth or its falsity. This suggests the following definition, 2-7, as an explication for what Kant called synthetic judgments. The subsequent result, 2-8, which follows from the definition, shows that the concept defined is indeed adequate as an explicatum. </p> <p align="justify"><strong>2-7. <em>Definition</em>.</strong> <strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub>is <em><strong>L-indeterminate</strong></em> or <em><strong>factual </strong></em>(in S<sub>1</sub>) =<sub>Df   </sub><strong><em>S</em></strong><sub><em>i</em> </sub> is not L-determinate. </p> <p align="justify"><strong>2-8. </strong>A sentence is factual if and only if there is at least one state-description in which it holds and at least one in which it does not hold.</p> <p align="justify">(Carnap 12)</p> </blockquote> <p align="justify">]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In recent years Carnap has tended to explain analyticity by appeal to what he calls state-descriptions.<sup>3</sup> A state-description is any exhaustive assignment of truth values to the atomic, or noncompound, statements of the language. All other statements of the language are, Carnap assumes, built up of their component clauses by means of the familiar logical devices, in such a way that the truth value of any complex statement is fixed for each state-description by specifiable logical laws. A statement is then explained as analytic when it comes out true under every state-description. This account is an adaptation | of Leibniz’s “true in all possible worlds.” But note that this version of analyticity serves its purpose only if the atomic statements of the language are, unlike ‘John is a bachelor’ and ‘John is married’, mutually independent. Otherwise there would be a state-description which assigned truth to ‘John is a bachelor’ and falsity to ‘John is married’, and consequently ‘All bachelors are married’ would turn out synthetic rather than analytic under the proposed criterion. Thus the criterion of analyticity in terms of state-descriptions serves only for languages devoid of extralogical synonym-pairs, such as ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’: synonym-pairs of the type which give rise to the “second class” of analytic statements. The criterion in terms of state-descriptions is a reconstruction at best of logical truth. </p> <p align="justify">(23-24) </p> <p>3. R. Carnap, <i>Meaning and Necessity</i> (Chicago, 1947), pp. 9ff.; <i>Logical Foundations of Probability</i> (Chicago, 1950), pp. 70ff. </p> <p>(23)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"> </p> </blockquote> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.15"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.15">1.15</a></p> <p align="center">[Turning Instead to Analyticity From Synonymy]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Yet, Carnap’s main concern was clarifying probability and induction, not analyticity, which is our concern, “and here the major difficulty lies not in the first class of analytic statements, the logical truths, but rather in the second class, which depends on the notion of synonymy.” (23)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">I do not mean to suggest that Carnap is under any illusions on this point. His simplified model language with its state-descriptions is aimed primarily not at the general problem of analyticity but at another purpose, the clarification of probability and induction. Our problem, however, is analyticity; and here the major difficulty lies not in the first class of analytic statements, the logical truths, but rather in the second class, which depends on the notion of synonymy. </p> <p align="justify">(24)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p>Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” <i>The Philosophical Review</i> 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p>Carnap, Rudolf. <i>Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic</i>. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1947.</p> <p> </p> <p>Kant, Immanuel. <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998.</p> <p> </p> <p>Leibniz, Gottfried. “Monadology.” In <i>Philosophical Texts</i>, edited and translated by Richard Francks and Roger Woolhouse, 267–81. Oxford: Oxford University, 1998.</p> <p> </p> <p>Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting.” <i>Mind</i> 14, no. 56 (1905): 479–93.</p> <p> </p> <p>White, Morton. “The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism.” In <i>John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom. a Symposium</i>, edited by Sidney Hook, 316–30. New York: Dial, 1950.</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-7555488385101591732021-07-23T07:54:00.001-07:002021-07-24T12:08:53.953-07:00Quine (0) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, section 0 [introductory material], summary<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-entry-directory.html">[Quine, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-ed-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-entry.html">[Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of the text. More analysis is still needed and will be updated when conducted. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive all my various mistakes.]</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">W. V. Quine</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">0.</p> <p align="center">[introductory material]</p> <p> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#0.1">0.1</a>)</p> <p align="justify">[Quine claims that modern empiricism is largely under the influence of two main beliefs (“dogmas”). Quine will show that both lack foundation. {1} This first one is that truths are distinctly either: {1a} synthetic, meaning that they they are grounded in fact, or they are {1b} analytic, meaning that they grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact. {2} The second belief is reductionism, namely, that every meaningful statement is equivalent to a formulation that is constructed using rules of logic and whose terms refer to immediate experience. Were we to abandon these dogmas, there would be two effects: {A} the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science would blur; and {B} we would shift to pragmatism.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#0.1">0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Two Dogmas of Empiricism (Analytic/Synthetic; Reductionism). Results of Abandoning Them.]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="0.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#0.1">0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Two Dogmas of Empiricism (Analytic/Synthetic; Reductionism). Results of Abandoning Them.]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Quine claims that modern empiricism is largely under the influence of two main beliefs (“dogmas”). Quine will show that both lack foundation. {1} This first one is that truths are distinctly either: {1a} synthetic, meaning that they they are grounded in fact, or they are {1b} analytic, meaning that they grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact. {2} The second belief is reductionism, namely, that every meaningful statement is equivalent to a formulation that is constructed using rules of logic and whose terms refer to immediate experience. Were we to abandon these dogmas, there would be two effects: {A} the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science would blur; and {B} we would shift to pragmatism.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are <em>analytic</em>, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are <em>synthetic</em>, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is <em>reductionism</em>: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism.</p> <p align="justify">(20)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="0.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p>Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” <i>The Philosophical Review</i> 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-16117560569949919972021-07-23T07:18:00.001-07:002021-07-25T09:11:55.732-07:00Quine (ED) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, entry directory<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-entry-directory.html">[Quine, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center">Entry Directory for</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">W. V. Quine</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-0-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">0</a></p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-0-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">[introductory material]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">1</a></p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-1-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">Background for Anayticity</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-2-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">2</a></p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-2-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">Definition</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-3-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">3</a></p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-3-two-dogmas-of-empiricism.html">Interchangeability</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><a style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y2PINMt1C9Q/Xqk4sGbamRI/AAAAAAAAWQw/YaY23YiEhsM8fkGfR2M1JUFX5OhS00caQCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/prof%2Broland%2Bbreeur%2B%2528with%2Bgrad%2Bstudents.%2Bhiw.kuleuven.be%2529.JPG" imageanchor="1"></a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify">Bibliography:</p> <p>Quine, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” <i>The Philosophical Review</i> 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-44187275452461901572021-07-23T05:52:00.001-07:002021-08-02T04:38:17.255-07:00Quine, entry directory<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center">Entry Directory for</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">W. V. Quine</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-FFYsBr5Y58M/YPq604MTgTI/AAAAAAAAWuY/OTFKFWqYS3EOfHOVuxUetp5nxUWi_6oewCLcBGAsYHQ/s200/Quine%2B..%2Bprinceton.edu.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-FFYsBr5Y58M/YPq604MTgTI/AAAAAAAAWuY/OTFKFWqYS3EOfHOVuxUetp5nxUWi_6oewCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/Quine%2B..%2Bprinceton.edu.jpg" data-original-height="200" data-original-width="164" /></a></p> <p align="center">(image source: <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~harman/NEH/Project.html">princeton.edu</a>)</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“On What There Is”</p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/quine-on-what-there-is-summary.html">[Summary]</a></p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/08/labels-continuation-for-entry-quine-on.html">(labels continuation)</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”</p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/07/quine-ed-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-entry.html">[Entry Directory]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><a style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y2PINMt1C9Q/Xqk4sGbamRI/AAAAAAAAWQw/YaY23YiEhsM8fkGfR2M1JUFX5OhS00caQCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/prof%2Broland%2Bbreeur%2B%2528with%2Bgrad%2Bstudents.%2Bhiw.kuleuven.be%2529.JPG" imageanchor="1"></a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify">Image taken gratefully from:</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://www.princeton.edu/~harman/NEH/Project.html" href="https://www.princeton.edu/~harman/NEH/Project.html">https://www.princeton.edu/~harman/NEH/Project.html</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-83588710564992997072021-05-21T07:41:00.001-07:002021-05-21T08:39:04.095-07:00Dumoncel (1.0) “Les modalités deleuziennes”, Section 1.0, “[introductory material]”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/jean-claude-dumoncel-ed-entry-directory.html">[Dumoncel, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/dumoncel-ed-les-modalites-deleuziennes.html">[Dumoncel, “Les modalités deleuziennes,” entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Dumoncel’s text. Unless otherwise indicated, boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Jean-Claude Dumoncel</p> <p align="center">[Dumoncel’s <a href="https://cef.academia.edu/JeanClaudeDumoncel">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Claude_Dumoncel">wikipedia</a> page]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Les modalités deleuziennes”</p> <p align="center"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES">[link to the article]</a> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part I</p> <p align="center">La fondation leibnizienne</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Section 0</p> <p align="center">[introductory material]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#1.0.1">1.0.1</a>) On account of his teacher Canguilhem, Deleuze was possibly familiar with Apuleius' square of logical oppositions. We will now examine Leibniz’ version. (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#1.0.2">1.0.2</a>) Here is the the “AEIO” square of logical oppositions:</p> <p align="center">All              None</p> <p align="center">Some        Not all</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">∀<em>x         ¬</em>∃<i>x</i></p> <p align="center">∃<i>x</i>         ¬∀<i>x</i></p> <p align="center"><em></em> (p.2)</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#1.0.3">1.0.3</a>) We can place the elementary logical modalities, possible and necessary, along with their variations, impossible and contingent, into their own oppositional square of modalities:</p> <p align="center">Necessary         Impossible</p> <p align="center">Possible          Contingent</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">□<i>p</i>         ¬◇<i>p</i></p> <p align="center"> ◇<i>p       </i>¬□<i>p </i></p> <p align="center">(pp.2-3)</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#1.0.1">1.0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Apuleius’ Square of Logical Oppositions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#1.0.2">1.0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The Square of Logical Oppositions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#1.0.3">1.0.3</a></p> <p align="center">[The Modal Square of Opposition]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="1.0.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.0.1">1.0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Apuleius’ Square of Logical Oppositions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[On account of his teacher Canguilhem, Deleuze was possibly familiar with Apuleius' square of logical oppositions. We will now examine Leibniz’ version.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.0.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.0.2">1.0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The Square of Logical Oppositions]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify">[Here is the the “AEIO” square of logical oppositions:</p> <p align="center">All              None</p> <p align="center">Some        Not all</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">∀<em>x         ¬</em>∃<i>x</i></p> <p align="center">∃<i>x</i>         ¬∀<i>x</i></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center">(p.2)]</p> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="1.0.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#1.0.3">1.0.3</a></p> <p align="center">[The Modal Square of Opposition]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify">[We can place the elementary logical modalities, possible and necessary, along with their variations, impossible and contingent, into their own oppositional square of modalities:</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Necessary         Impossible</p> <p align="center">Possible          Contingent</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">□<i>p</i>         ¬◇<i>p</i></p> <p align="center"> ◇<i>p       </i>¬□<i>p</i></p> <p align="justify"><em></em></p> <p align="center">(pp.2-3)</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify">Leibniz will make two fundamental and highly influential advances on this.]</p> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify">Dumoncel, Jean-Claude. “Les modalités deleuziennes.” Web. Accessed 2021.05.21.</p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES" href="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES">https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-80693045485020794842021-05-21T06:52:00.001-07:002021-05-21T07:08:39.484-07:00Dumoncel (0) “Les modalités deleuziennes”, Section 0, “[introductory material]”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/jean-claude-dumoncel-ed-entry-directory.html">[Dumoncel, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/dumoncel-ed-les-modalites-deleuziennes.html">[Dumoncel, “Les modalités deleuziennes,” entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Dumoncel’s text. Unless otherwise indicated, boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Jean-Claude Dumoncel</p> <p align="center">[Dumoncel’s <a href="https://cef.academia.edu/JeanClaudeDumoncel">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Claude_Dumoncel">wikipedia</a> page]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Les modalités deleuziennes”</p> <p align="center"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES">[link to the article]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 0</p> <p align="center">[introductory material]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">(<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.1">0.1</a>) Analytic philosophers and Deleuze share a common interest: Leibniz. (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.2">0.2</a>) Deleuze’s fundamental intuition regarding Leibniz is that for him, monads are possible worlds, and possible worlds are monads. (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.3">0.3</a>) First we will have a brief introduction to Leibniz, secondly an examination of mathematized modal logic, and finally we uncover Deleuzian modalities. (<a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.4">0.4</a>) Dumoncel’s study also aims to explicate a page of Deleuze & Guattari’s<em> What Is Philosophy?</em></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.1">0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Common Interest of Deleuze and Analytic Philosophers as Being Leibniz]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.2">0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Deleuze’s Claim That for Leibniz, Monads are Possible Worlds and Vice Versa]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.3">0.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Preview]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.4">0.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Relevant Quote from <em>What Is Philosophy?</em>]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Dumoncel’s study also aims to explicate a page of Deleuze & Guattari’s<em> What Is Philosophy?</em>]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="0.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#0.1">0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Common Interest of Deleuze and Analytic Philosophers as Being Leibniz]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Analytic philosophers and Deleuze share a common interest: Leibniz.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="0.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#0.2">0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Deleuze’s Claim That for Leibniz, Monads are Possible Worlds and Vice Versa]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Deleuze’s fundamental intuition regarding Leibniz is that for him, monads are possible worlds, and possible worlds are monads.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="0.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#0.3">0.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Preview]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[First we will have a brief introduction to Leibniz, secondly an examination of mathematized modal logic, and finally we uncover Deleuzian modalities.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/#0.4">0.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Relevant Quote from <em>What Is Philosophy?</em>]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Dumoncel’s study also aims to explicate a page of Deleuze & Guattari’s<em> What Is Philosophy?</em>]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[Here are the passages in <em>What Is Philosophy?</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Let us proceed in a summary fashion: we will consider a field of experience taken as a real world no longer in relation to a self but to a simple “there is.” There is, at some moment, a calm and restful world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something out of the field. The other person appears here as neither subject nor object but as something that is very different: a possible world, the possibility of a frightening world. This possible world is not real, or not yet, but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in its expression—the face, or an equivalent of the face. To begin with, the other person is this existence of a possible world. And this possible world also has a specific reality in itself, as possible: when the expressing speaks and says, “I am frightened,” even if its words are untruthful, this is enough for a reality to be given to the possible as such. This is the only meaning of the “I” as linguistic index. But it is not indispensable: China is a possible world, but it takes on a reality as soon as Chinese is spoken or China is spoken about within a given field of experience. This is very different from the situation in which China is realized by becoming the field of experience itself. Here, then, is a concept of the other that presupposes no more than the determination of a sensory world as condition. On this condition the other appears as the expression of a possible. The other is a possible world as it exists in a face that expresses it and takes shape in a language that gives it a reality. In this sense it is a concept with three inseparable components: possible world, existing face, and real language or speech.</p> <p align="justify">Obviously, every concept has a history. This concept of the other person goes back to Leibniz, to his possible worlds and to the monad as expression of the world. But it is not the same problem, because in Leibniz possibles do not exist in the real world. It is also found in the modal logic of propositions. But these do not confer on possible worlds the reality that corresponds to their truth conditions (even when Wittgenstein envisages propositions of fear or pain, he does not see them as modalities that can be expressed in a position of the other person because he leaves the other person oscillating between another subject and a special object). </p> <p align="justify">(Deleuze & Guattari,<em> What Is Philosophy?, </em>17-18)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="0.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify">Dumoncel, Jean-Claude. “Les modalités deleuziennes.” Web. Accessed 2021.05.21.</p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES" href="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES">https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Félix. <em>What Is Philosophy?</em> Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University, 1994.</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-9418332586019603252021-05-21T06:17:00.001-07:002021-05-21T08:30:48.393-07:00Dumoncel (ED) “Les modalités deleuziennes,” entry directory<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/jean-claude-dumoncel-ed-entry-directory.html">[Dumoncel, entry directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center">Entry Directory for</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Jean-Claude Dumoncel</p> <p align="center">[Dumoncel’s <a href="https://cef.academia.edu/JeanClaudeDumoncel">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Claude_Dumoncel">wikipedia</a> page]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Les modalités deleuziennes”</p> <p align="center"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES">[link to the article]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 0</p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/dumoncel-0-les-modalites-deleuziennes.html">[introductory material]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part I</p> <p align="center">La fondation leibnizienne</p>   <p align="center">Section 0</p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/dumoncel-10-les-modalites-deleuziennes.html">[introductory material]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><a style="margin-right: 1em; margin-left: 1em;" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y2PINMt1C9Q/Xqk4sGbamRI/AAAAAAAAWQw/YaY23YiEhsM8fkGfR2M1JUFX5OhS00caQCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/prof%2Broland%2Bbreeur%2B%2528with%2Bgrad%2Bstudents.%2Bhiw.kuleuven.be%2529.JPG" imageanchor="1"></a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify">Dumoncel, Jean-Claude. “Les modalités deleuziennes.” Web. Accessed 2021.05.21.</p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES" href="https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES">https://www.academia.edu/23505679/LES_MODALITES_DELEUZIENNES</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-5095676767890696832021-05-21T06:06:00.001-07:002021-05-21T06:49:53.126-07:00Jean-Claude Dumoncel (ED), entry directory<p> </p> <p>by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a></p> <p> </p> <p>[<a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy"><strong>Search Blog Here</strong></a>. Index tabs are found at the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center">Entry Directory for</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Jean-Claude Dumoncel</p> <p align="center">[Dumoncel’s <a href="https://cef.academia.edu/JeanClaudeDumoncel">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Claude_Dumoncel">wikipedia</a> page]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a style="margin-right: 1em; margin-left: 1em;" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Zbwa38SRW7Y/YKeuNrg9pnI/AAAAAAAAWmg/3YCnpd6o0CUPBUBuZZLVsOO_H1o3MH8SQCLcBGAsYHQ/s375/dumoncel..%2Beditions-hyx.com.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Zbwa38SRW7Y/YKeuNrg9pnI/AAAAAAAAWmg/3YCnpd6o0CUPBUBuZZLVsOO_H1o3MH8SQCLcBGAsYHQ/s320/dumoncel..%2Beditions-hyx.com.jpg" width="320" data-original-height="235" data-original-width="375" /></a></p> <p align="center">(image source: <a href="https://www.editions-hyx.com/fr/dumoncel-jean-claude">editions-hyx.com</a>)</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">“Les modalités deleuziennes”</p> <p align="center"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2021/05/dumoncel-ed-les-modalites-deleuziennes.html">[Entry Directory]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><a style="margin-right: 1em; margin-left: 1em;" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Y2PINMt1C9Q/Xqk4sGbamRI/AAAAAAAAWQw/YaY23YiEhsM8fkGfR2M1JUFX5OhS00caQCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/prof%2Broland%2Bbreeur%2B%2528with%2Bgrad%2Bstudents.%2Bhiw.kuleuven.be%2529.JPG" imageanchor="1"></a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify">Image taken gratefully from:</p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://www.editions-hyx.com/fr/dumoncel-jean-claude" href="https://www.editions-hyx.com/fr/dumoncel-jean-claude">https://www.editions-hyx.com/fr/dumoncel-jean-claude</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-68556869963737053852021-03-17T07:48:00.001-07:002021-03-17T07:48:00.521-07:00Breeur (2.3) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.3, “The Right to be Stupid”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.2</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">2.3</p> <p align="center">“The Right to be Stupid”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#2.3.1">2.3.1</a>) (As the opinions espoused in the reduction to stupidity are not based on truth,) it would seem that any opinion whatsoever can be insisted upon, regardless of its value. In other words, we would expect that any opinion whatsoever can stand in the place of a better judgement. However, Breeur notes that in fact, “<i>some</i> opinions are intolerable if not disqualified” (40). So we wonder, under these conditions of the destructive warfare of discourse that brings all judgments, no matter how worthy, down to the level of opinions, how is it that some are nonetheless deemed to be unworthy? (<a href="#2.3.2">2.3.2</a>) There is a first possible answer to why there are some opinions that cannot even legitimately enter the discourse despite the reduction to stupidity’s power to promulgate seemingly any opinion whatsoever: perhaps in fact the powers of the reduction to stupidity are limited. Perhaps it is unable to place these opinions on the same level as all other judgments. Breeur argues that this cannot be the right answer. Rather, these opinions are excluded not because they bear some value that the reduction to stupidity is powerless to reduce but rather because it has already exercised its power to reduce them, only in this case,  to reduce them to ruble. (<a href="#2.3.3">2.3.3</a>) The attacks that the reduction to stupidity levels at some opinions to destroy them “are often inane, asinine, mean, or base” (42). They do not even try to argue against the judgments they are attacking; they rather aim just “to close down argumentation, to short-circuit discussion once and for all, and with an air of self-righteousness,” and often take the form of “Clichés, unarticulated critique (“ungegliederte Kritik”, as Musil would say), excessive castigation, etc.” (42) This means that in substance these attacks are of little worth themselves. (They are all offense and no defense; no ground is held by them.) “The irony is that, though ostensibly in defense of its own position, such attacks defend precisely <i>nothing</i>. This is the core of this nihilistic program” (42).  (In a sense, stupidity exists in an artificial realm of discourse of its own making that lacks any potential for truth-value, where opinions that prevail do so only arbitrarily by force.)</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3.1">2.3.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Despite the Reduction to Stupidity’s Power to Elevate Opinions, Some Opinions Still Being Excluded from the Discourse]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3.2">2.3.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The 1st Considered Explanation Being That the Reduction to Stupidity Has Limitations to Its Reductive Powers. The Reply That No, Rather, This Demonstrates Its Limitless Destructive Powers.]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3.3">2.3.3</a></p> <p align="center">[The Nihilistic Program of the Reduction to Stupidity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.3.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3.1">2.3.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Despite the Reduction to Stupidity’s Power to Elevate Opinions, Some Opinions Still Being Excluded from the Discourse]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[(As the opinions espoused in the reduction to stupidity are not based on truth,) it would seem that any opinion whatsoever can be insisted upon, regardless of its value. In other words, we would expect that any opinion whatsoever can stand in the place of a better judgement. However, Breeur notes that in fact, “<i>some</i> opinions are intolerable if not disqualified” (40). So we wonder, under these conditions of the destructive warfare of discourse that brings all judgments, no matter how worthy, down to the level of opinions, how is it that some are nonetheless deemed to be unworthy?]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[(Recall the “reduction to stupidity” from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/12/breeur-22-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch22.html#2.2.5">2.2.5</a>. Breeur was discussing how one’s insistence on their opinions is an instance of stupidity, because they persist with their faulty views even when confronted by superior ones. It would be better to have flexibility and drop bad judgements in favor of more informed and considered ones, and then to espouse the better ones instead. This would facilitate the flow and prosperity of truth, which involves development, refinement, adaptation, and so forth. When instead that flow is blocked because some people insist on keeping their faulty opinions in the face of other people’s better ones, this depletes those superior ones of their power to flow, promulgate, and have influence on other people’s minds. In that way, the better views are “reduced to hot air” so to speak, and overall it reduces the general discourse to inferior judgments. This reduction of the truth-flow power of evolving judgments is the “reduction to stupidity”.) (See summary above.)]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Why not simply keep silent and withhold our judgments in domains in which we do not have the requisite knowledge and/or experience to have informed opinions? Unfortunately, the reduction to stupidity has a tendency to absoluteness. I do not simply adopt an opinion and repeat it without too many scruples,<i> I claim the right to utter it</i>. That is, I claim the right to speak and think without the fear of critique and in absence of any personal commitment and responsibility. At first sight, the proliferation of stupidity seems to be the articulation of a vast program, a program to endorse opinions to whatever extent the circumstances require. However, there is a puzzling inconsistency inasmuch as <i>some</i> opinions are intolerable if not disqualified. On the one hand, we proudly proclaim the bringing into effect of a global reduction to stupidity. The proliferation of opinions is by definition boundless and unlimited. That is the driving force behind its functioning. Its reign | and supremacy persist as the general devastating fires that turn every resisting piece of value, sense, or “das Bedeutende” to ash. Not only does the sovereign power of the opinion participate in the radical reduction to stupidity, this reduction itself functions as a force tearing judgments down to the level of opinions. On the other hand, even though it is “opinions all the way down,” some opinions are not allowed. Why is this?</p> <p align="justify">(40-41)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.3.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3.2">2.3.2</a></p> <p align="center">[The 1st Considered Explanation Being That the Reduction to Stupidity Has Limitations to Its Reductive Powers. The Reply That No, Rather, This Demonstrates Its Limitless Destructive Powers.]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[There is a first possible answer to why there are some opinions that cannot even legitimately enter the discourse despite the reduction to stupidity’s power to promulgate seemingly any opinion whatsoever: perhaps in fact the powers of the reduction to stupidity are limited. Perhaps it is unable to place these opinions on the same level as all other judgments. Breeur argues that this cannot be the right answer. Rather, these opinions are excluded not because they bear some value that the reduction to stupidity is powerless to reduce but rather because it has already exercised its power to reduce them, only in this case,  to reduce them to ruble.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">One answer might be that there are still some fortresses of meaning (the “Truth”) resisting the devastating power of what Frankfurt called the “contemporary proliferation of bullshit.” This does not seem to be the case. To wit, consider the stupidity of some of the awkward reactions to statements determined to be insulting or injurious. Such reactions are most of the time completely out of proportion, excessive, or inappropriate, hence stupid (or hysterical, but that’s a subject all its own). They illustrate what Robert Musil says about stupidity vis-a-vis the brutal, clumsy, and bungling behavior of someone who, feeling threatened by some isolated enemy on the other side, throws a grenade instead of aiming at him with his gun. No risks! Destroy everything in the immediate area and the stain of the enemy will be rubbed out.<sup>40</sup> Stupidity, to use a military term, “saturates” a target with a volley or with sweeping fire, or, indeed, when it uses shrapnel or a grenade. Moreover, stupid reactions and words (clichés) are vast and vague, thus their lack of precision becomes an advantage: They can be used in all manner of situations and circumstances without discernment. Thus, lack of tolerance for some (kinds of) opinions is not indicative of the “failure” of the reduction to stupidity, but rather, of its radical achievement. That is, such lack of tolerance is not confirmation of the existence of some resisting meaningfulness,<i> it is a symptom of its absence</i>. In this realm, <em>everything can hurt because nothing protects</em>, therefore any and all opinions which are deemed “threatening” are immediately and mercilessly attacked. As Sartre would say, the stupid world is full of snares.<sup>41</sup></p> <p align="justify">(41-42)</p> <p align="justify">40. See Robert Musil, “On stupidity,” in: <i>Precision and Soul: Essays and Addresses</i>, Ed. and Trans. Burton Pike and David S. Luft (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 279.</p> <p align="justify">(41) </p> <p align="justify">41. Jean-Paul Sartre, <i>Notebooks for an Ethics</i> (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 302.</p> <p align="justify">(42)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.3.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.3.3">2.3.3</a></p> <p align="center">[The Nihilistic Program of the Reduction to Stupidity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[The attacks that the reduction to stupidity levels at some opinions to destroy them “are often inane, asinine, mean, or base” (42). They do not even try to argue against the judgments they are attacking; they rather aim just “to close down argumentation, to short-circuit discussion once and for all, and with an air of self-righteousness,” and often take the form of “Clichés, unarticulated critique (“ungegliederte Kritik”, as Musil would say), excessive castigation, etc.” (42) This means that in substance these attacks are of little worth themselves. (They are all offense and no defense; no ground is held by them.) “The irony is that, though ostensibly in defense of its own position, such attacks defend precisely <i>nothing</i>. This is the core of this nihilistic program” (42).  (In a sense, stupidity exists in an artificial realm of discourse of its own making that lacks any potential for truth-value, where opinions that prevail do so only arbitrarily by force.) ]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Not surprisingly, such attacks are often inane, asinine, mean, or base. This is to be expected, for<strong> stupidity thrives on negating the meaningful.</strong> Indeed, stupid attacks never challenge or defy an enemy; rather, they try to reduce that which they oppose to stupidity. The tools are the tools of the stupid: Clichés, unarticulated critique (“ungegliederte Kritik”, as Musil would say), excessive castigation, etc. The goal is not to argue but to close down argumentation, to short-circuit discussion once and for all, and with an air of self-righteousness. The vicious and paradoxical dynamic of stupidity is that the opinions it has adopted in its war on all that conflicts with it ultimately function as a protective crust. This explains the nervousness and irritability discernible in the stupid attacks against anything that threatens its weak edifice. The irony is that, though ostensibly in defense of its own position, such attacks defend precisely <i>nothing</i>. This is the core of this nihilistic program. Stupid opinions are kept alive artificially in order to prolong or extend the negative activity of stupidity. As a phenomenon, stupidity exists in a “closed system,” or an “Orde der Dunsen.” One could even suspect stupidity of deliberately installing and promoting some artificial values it could tear down afterwards (freedom of speech, equality, fraternity). There is something perverse and inappropriate about it: It is, as Musil would say, a bit like the behavior of a frustrated child slashing at nettles baptized with the names of those it fears.</p> <p align="justify">(42)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-37244666523504964722020-12-31T03:25:00.001-08:002020-12-31T03:25:59.791-08:00Breeur (2.2) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.2, “Reduction to Stupidity”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 1</p> <p align="center">Lies and Stupidity</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.2 </p> <p align="center">Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity</p> <p> </p> <p align="center">2.2.</p> <p align="center">“Reduction to Stupidity”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#2.2.1">2.2.1</a>) Truth can have a value in the sense of it having a significance to the situation or to the people involved; it has a sense or meaningfulness. Stupidity is not so much the error itself but rather an indifference and negligence toward a truth’s significance. “<strong>Someone is stupid as soon as he or she tends to <i>neutralize the value of the truth they missed</i>. Hence, for example, a puerile or clumsy reaction to diminish or even to annihilate the relevance of the things they ignored. With this reaction, the stupid act betrays pure weakness, betrays <i>a lack of power</i>, a stupid reaction is negative and sometimes vicious – it could be attributed to the frustration caused by the failure to deal with what the situation demands from them</strong>” (38). (<a href="#2.2.2">2.2.2</a>) Stupidity also then is more than merely making an erroneous statement resulting from a mistake in our understanding or reason; it also requires that we diminish the value of the truths we neglected. For example, suppose we say something wrong about an important book. (The error is the act of saying the false thing.) The stupidity would manifest to the extent that we try to diminish the value of the book or of literature in general. The error here makes a difference, on account of the fact that the truth we ignored has real importance (the book truly is worth our closest attention, and we should have learned more about it), but we try to make it seem like it made no difference. “<strong>That act of irreverence targets the frame of values and meaning in which the truths about that book emerge. To mock these values is a mean way of excluding them from my world, it is a way of narrowing the domain of what counts and is at stake in my existence to that realm of things that I can tolerate and abide” (38). Breeur then notes that by trying to demean the truths we ignored, thereby “narrowing the domain of what counts is at stake in my existence,” we also enact “<em>a narrowing of responsibility, i.e. of my necessity to grasp things vitally</em>” (38).</strong> There are a number of ways we accomplish this. One is to adopt opinions. Since we do not form them ourselves, we are still thereby ignoring the value of the truths they mask over, when we adopt them. (<a href="#2.2.3">2.2.3</a>) Breeur offers an example. He was listening to the radio. On the program were people sampling a particular kind of music. One listener did not know or recognize that music, and it also seemed to offend his tastes. He says that he hates it and offers criticisms. Another listener on the program, a musicologist, tried to explain how it actually holds notable musical value, even in the face of these critiques. The first listener conceded all the positive and interesting traits about the music but still could not acknowledge its overall value; “he was not ‘open to it’.” We wonder, wherein lies this person’s stupidity? (<a href="#2.2.4">2.2.4</a>) Although the first music listener on the radio program was given ample reason to appreciate the music’s value, his response was still to devalue it, with his justification being that “this was simply his opinion, and that he couldn’t do anything about it” (39). He believed that he could not change his character in such a way as to appreciate it. At the same time, he preferred not to “question and discuss the truth of the musicologist’s claims regarding that kind of music” (39). (In other words, he “knowingly” ignored the significance of these true things about the music’s interesting traits.) This means that by positing some inexplicable inner cause for his not liking the music, he is saying that these truths about the music are not significant enough to override his supposed inner sources for dismissing its value. He strips these truths of their power to command one’s appreciation. And herein lies the listener’s stupidity. “Reference to some deeper, opaque, mystical origin of his tactless reaction is simply a way of neutralizing truth claims in the musical (if not the broader artistic) realm. He ‘accepts’ the truth, but only after having denuded it of its value and function” (39). (<a href="#2.2.5">2.2.5</a>) Making use of opinions functions in two ways. {1} It immunizes us from the criticism that we are really in fact in error. For, we reason, “My opinion does not aim at any | truth, and hence cannot be false. I escape the danger of being blamed, and the necessity of assuming that responsibility” (39-40). Here the stupidity lies in the fact that we deny the importance of truths that in fact do matter. {2} By adopting and spreading opinions, we block the flow of truths in others, whose statements of truth are reduced “to hot air”, in that we may note to them that these statements could be true, but nonetheless they have no value for us anyway. Breeur calls this the “reduction to stupidity.”</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.1">2.2.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity as Negligence Toward the Significance of Truth]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.2">2.2.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Diminishing the Value of Truths We Ignore; Doing This By Means of Opinion Adoption]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.3">2.2.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Illustration: Listener Who Denies the Value of True Things About Music]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.4">2.2.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Stupidity of the Listener as Residing in Them Holding to an Opinion Rather Than Developing an Appreciation for the Music]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.5">2.2.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Opinions as Protecting Us from Criticism for Our Errors and as Spreading the Flow of Others’ Truths]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.2.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.1">2.2.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity as Negligence Toward the Significance of Truth]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Truth can have a value in the sense of it having a significance to the situation or to the people involved; it has a sense or meaningfulness. Stupidity is not so much the error itself but rather an indifference and negligence toward a truth’s significance. “<strong>Someone is stupid as soon as he or she tends to <i>neutralize the value of the truth they missed</i>. Hence, for example, a puerile or clumsy reaction to diminish or even to annihilate the relevance of the things they ignored. With this reaction, the stupid act betrays pure weakness, betrays <i>a lack of power</i>, a stupid reaction is negative and sometimes vicious – it could be attributed to the frustration caused by the failure to deal with what the situation demands from them</strong>” (38).</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[(Recall from section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/12/breeur-21-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch21.html#2.1.6">2.1.6</a> that: (quoting the summary)</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In order to overcome stupidity, it may not be enough to simply favor realism (which holds that there is an objective reality to which our claims might veridically correspond) over skepticism (which holds we can have no such reliable access to reality and may make room for bullshitting, because bullshitting involves an indifference to the truth values of one’s claims.) The reason this strategy can fail is that “The truth a realist has access to can be as stupid as the errors of the antirealist” (37). Breeur also notes that antirealists do not simply deny that we can have access to reality or that there even is an objective reality in the first place. Rather, antirealists hold that any such access to reality is insufficient for guaranteeing “sense and meaning” (37).</p> </blockquote> <p align="justify">So, simply insisting that truth is correspondence to reality is insufficient to guard against stupidity, because there very well may be no meaning, sense, or significance to that reality or truth (so it might be “stupid” to take note of such truths), and also, many false things can have great value (and so it would not be stupid to utter them). Let me try to put this in my own words. Statements might be said to have an aletheic value of true or false. That is one sort of value. A statement might also be said to have a semantic content, something perhaps like an intensional meaning, or however we want to construe it. That could be yet another “value” of the true or false statement. Yet, what concerns us here seems to be an altogether different sort of value: a true statement (and possible a false one too) can be said to have a significance-value. By this I mean that the semantic meaning of the sentence indicates something that <em>makes a difference</em> in the world or in our lives, somehow. This might be most basically illustrated with practical values, perhaps. “The cat is on the mat” could be true, supposing the cat is on the mat, but if someone utters it, the statement could very well lack significance-value. First suppose you are walking through the room while holding a tray of drinks, not able to see your feet or what is below you, and you are about to trip on the cat. If I yell, “the cat is on the mat!” then this would have great significance to you. Or, if we are writing a childish poem and we are looking for a memorable rhyme, it could prove significant (even if false). Or, if we are looking for a convenient sentence to illustrate a philosophical point about meaning, it could prove handy (and often in those cases it is false or its actual truth is irrelevant). However, if you and I are sitting in our chairs, chatting, both looking at the cat sitting on the mat right there in front of us, and I utter, “the cat is on the mat,” that statement (although true) could have absolutely no value or worth in that situation. You may even look at me like I am a total imbecilic for saying it. The fact of the cat being on the mat does not indicate something that makes a difference to us. Stupidity, Breeur says, is an indifference or negligence toward the meaningfulness of truth: “the real domain of stupidity is not error or indifference to truth – its ‘real element’ is an indifference, obtuseness, and dullness concerning the value of a truth, concerning what Musil called ‘das Bedeutende’ (the meaningful). [...] Some truth may be meaningless – some error may have some dignity. [...] Someone is stupid as soon as he or she tends to <i>neutralize the value of the truth they missed</i>. Hence, for example, a puerile or clumsy reaction to diminish or even to annihilate the relevance of the things they ignored. With this reaction, the stupid act betrays pure weakness, betrays <i>a lack of power</i>, a stupid reaction is negative and sometimes vicious – it could be attributed to the frustration caused by the failure to deal with what the situation demands from them” (38). I will try to see if I may find an illustration. Suppose you are in a situation that calls for one kind of behavior. But you do not realize that this behavior is called for, and you act inappropriately instead. Then next the truth is brought to your attention, namely, that a different behavior was called for. You cannot take the mistake back, so instead you try to make the situation you are in seem to lack any significance, thus it did not matter what behaviors you took. I am not sure if that is on track and also how to make it more concrete. But suppose you and a friend walk into a room, and you see people are sad. You want to cheer them up, so you start telling jokes. The people respond with horrified faces. You turn around and see a dead body in a coffin: you walked in upon a funeral commemoration. Perhaps your friend witnesses your mistake, but your response to her or him is to insult the people attending the funeral in order to make it seem like – although it really was a terrible mistake – it did not matter, because the people there do not matter. The stupidity here would not seem to be the fact that you made the mistake in the first place of telling jokes at a funeral (perhaps that is more properly the “error); rather, the stupidity is your negligence toward the significance of that truth (that you acted very inappropriately). (If so, this strikes me as also being a sort of foolishness). (P.S.: Breeur’s example in the next paragraph is far better than this poor attempt).)]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">We have the truth we merit, dependent upon our way of measuring ourselves against the exigencies of reality. Truth has no meaning at all outside of this fact. The real friend of truth, says Deleuze,<sup>38</sup> is the one who makes truth submit to the hardest | test, the test of sense and value. Hence<strong> the real domain of stupidity is not error or indifference to truth – its “real element” is an indifference, obtuseness, and dullness concerning the value of a truth, concerning what Musil called “das Bedeutende” (the meaningful). </strong>What makes sense, in a truth, and what does not.<strong> Some truth may be meaningless – some error may have some dignity.</strong> More generally, one could venture that even passions, emotions, and activities or actions may be stupid, stupidity extending beyond the realm of thought. <strong>Someone is stupid as soon as he or she tends to <i>neutralize the value of the truth they missed</i>. Hence, for example, a puerile or clumsy reaction to diminish or even to annihilate the relevance of the things they ignored. With this reaction, the stupid act betrays pure weakness, betrays <i>a lack of power</i>, a stupid reaction is negative and sometimes vicious – it could be attributed to the frustration caused by the failure to deal with what the situation demands from them</strong>.</p> <p align="justify">(37-38)</p> <p align="justify">38 Gilles Deleuze, <i>Nietzsche et la philosophie</i> (Paris: PUF, 1997), p. 118.</p> <p align="justify">(37)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.2.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.2">2.2.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Diminishing the Value of Truths We Ignore; Doing This By Means of Opinion Adoption]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Stupidity also then is more than merely making an erroneous statement resulting from a mistake in our understanding or reason; it also requires that we diminish the value of the truths we neglected. For example, suppose we say something wrong about an important book. (The error is the act of saying the false thing.) The stupidity would manifest to the extent that we try to diminish the value of the book or of literature in general. The error here makes a difference, on account of the fact that the truth we ignored has real importance (the book truly is worth our closest attention, and we should have learned more about it), but we try to make it seem like it made no difference. “<strong>That act of irreverence targets the frame of values and meaning in which the truths about that book emerge. To mock these values is a mean way of excluding them from my world, it is a way of narrowing the domain of what counts and is at stake in my existence to that realm of things that I can tolerate and abide” (38). Breeur then notes that by trying to demean the truths we ignored, thereby “narrowing the domain of what counts is at stake in my existence,” we also enact “<em>a narrowing of responsibility, i.e. of my necessity to grasp things vitally</em>” (38).</strong> There are a number of ways we accomplish this. One is to adopt opinions. Since we do not form them ourselves, we are still thereby ignoring the value of the truths they mask over, when we adopt them.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[(Some comments. I find interesting here the notion that we have a responsibility to acknowledge and even appreciate the truths that we ignored while in error. And this is also a “necessity to grasp things vitally.” In other words, we <em>should not</em> be stupid in this way; yet, as we noted, we do this because we feel powerless and perhaps also ashamed of our ignorance or mistake. What is called for is a full and profound acceptance of that pain. It seems that it might involve a deep humility. It is not that we “beat ourselves up” for making the error, which we acknowledge. Yeth we still endure the pain and humiliation for the sake of living life more “vitally”. Truths that matter, that make a difference, that count in our lives, which we might have erroneously ignored and thereby caused us pain, are at the same time things that can grant us vitality when instead of demeaning or neglecting their value, we rather fully acknowledge their worth. Perhaps we might find this in our normal daily behavior. We might frequently be neglecting truths in our lives that in fact are of great significance, but are unpleasant to acknowledge the value of. By doing so, we “narrow the domain of what counts” and perhaps this is why we often find ourselves occupied with trivialities as distractions.)]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"><strong>Stupidity in this sense exceeds the domain of erroneous statements controlled by understanding and reason. Suppose, for instance, that I make some erroneous statements about an important book. The stupidity emerging from these statements will be “a project” (as Sartre would say) to conceal the awareness I would have of my ignorance and error by discounting the value of that book, or of literature in general. That act of irreverence targets the frame of values and meaning in which the truths about that book emerge. To mock these values is a mean way of excluding them from my world, it is a way of narrowing the domain of what counts and is at stake in my existence to that realm of things that I can tolerate and abide. That narrowing finally means <i>a narrowing of responsibility, i.e. of my necessity to grasp things vitally</i>.</strong> There are several manners of achieving this neutralization. One of them rests on the propagation of opinions. Indeed, an opinion claims to be neutral with regard to our responsive relation to being. An opinion never compromises me, it is opaque and heavy as a stone. Contrary to concepts, you do not have to | <i>form</i> opinions, you <i>adopt</i> them. Hence, they do not signify or manifest any original endeavor to understand what happens to you, they do not emerge in an effort to determine yourself in relation to some affliction or situation in the world. On the contrary, an opinion helps you to mask such necessity.</p> <p align="justify">(38-39)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.2.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.3">2.2.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Illustration: Listener Who Denies the Value of True Things About Music]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Breeur offers an example. He was listening to the radio. On the program were people sampling a particular kind of music. One listener did not know or recognize that music, and it also seemed to offend his tastes. He says that he hates it and offers criticisms. Another listener on the program, a musicologist, tried to explain how it actually holds notable musical value, even in the face of these critiques. The first listener conceded all the positive and interesting traits about the music but still could not acknowledge its overall value; “he was not ‘open to it’.” We wonder, wherein lies this person’s stupidity?]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Consider the following: I was recently listening to the reaction of someone on the radio who was asked to comment on a piece of music he did not seem to know or recognize. Moreover, that kind of music apparently was not his style. His reaction was surprisingly annoyed and irritated in the vein of “I hate that kind of music, it is a pure mixture of genres, has no structure, misses any purity, etc...” In answer to this, a colleague musicologist tried to explain the importance of that music, the inner structure, refinement, ingenuity and inventiveness of it, etc. The original respondent listened to this and, in response, conceded that his points may be true, but that did not change the fact that he simply could not stand it, that he was not “open to it.” Of course, one may wonder why this lack of openness causes so much irritation. But this is another problem. The question is: Where is the stupidity in this case?</p> <p align="justify">(39)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.2.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.4">2.2.4</a></p> <p align="center">[The Stupidity of the Listener as Residing in Them Holding to an Opinion Rather Than Developing an Appreciation for the Music]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Although the first music listener on the radio program was given ample reason to appreciate the music’s value, his response was still to devalue it, with his justification being that “this was simply his opinion, and that he couldn’t do anything about it” (39). He believed that he could not change his character in such a way as to appreciate it. At the same time, he preferred not to “question and discuss the truth of the musicologist’s claims regarding that kind of music” (39). (In other words, he “knowingly” ignored the significance of these true things about the music’s interesting traits.) This means that by positing some inexplicable inner cause for his not liking the music, he is saying that these truths about the music are not significant enough to override his supposed inner sources for dismissing its value. He strips these truths of their power to command one’s appreciation. And herein lies the listener’s stupidity. “Reference to some deeper, opaque, mystical origin of his tactless reaction is simply a way of neutralizing truth claims in the musical (if not the broader artistic) realm. He ‘accepts’ the truth, but only after having denuded it of its value and function” (39).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In trying to justify his reaction to (i.e. his lack of comprehension of/receptiveness to) that music, the respondent said that this was simply his opinion, and that he couldn’t do anything about it. It was beyond him in some sense. His temperament, his character, his personality, his psychology, it simply refused to tolerate that kind of thing. But, at the same moment, he didn’t want to question and discuss the truth of the musicologist’s claims regarding that kind of music. Hence the stupidity: Reference to some deeper, opaque, mystical origin of his tactless reaction is simply a way of neutralizing truth claims in the musical (if not the broader artistic) realm. He “accepts” the truth, but only after having denuded it of its value and function.</p> <p align="justify">(39)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.2.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.2.5">2.2.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Opinions as Protecting Us from Criticism for Our Errors and as Spreading the Flow of Others’ Truths]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Making use of opinions functions in two ways. {1} It immunizes us from the criticism that we are really in fact in error. For, we reason, “My opinion does not aim at any | truth, and hence cannot be false. I escape the danger of being blamed, and the necessity of assuming that responsibility” (39-40). Here the stupidity lies in the fact that we deny the importance of truths that in fact do matter. {2} By adopting and spreading opinions, we block the flow of truths in others, whose statements of truth are reduced “to hot air”, in that we may note to them that these statements could be true, but nonetheless they have no value for us anyway. Breeur calls this the “reduction to stupidity.”]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">The role of promulgating opinions in this context is clear. First, it is a manner of escaping the risk and the inevitable charge of being “in error.”<strong> My opinion does not aim at any | truth, and hence cannot be false. I escape the danger of being blamed, and the necessity of assuming that responsibility</strong>.<sup>39</sup> But to so reduce judgment is stupid: It is merely a refusal of the fact that truth may be at stake, that truth may matter. Second, in this manner I reduce the other’s thoughts to hot air (“What you say may be true, but it is of no value to me”). This neutralization is precisely what I would call, as a phenomenologist, the <i>reduction to stupidity</i>. It is a kind of short-circuit that hinders the truth from flowing and shining. To claim the right and freedom to utter, state, and propagate one’s opinions is a manner of claiming the right to exercise this reduction without constraints.</p> <p align="justify">(39-40)</p> <p align="justify">39 For an insightful illustration and confirmation of this line of thought, cf. Kyle Barrowman, “Signs and Meaning: Film Studies and the Legacy of Poststructuralism”, <i>Offscreen</i>, Volume 27, Issue 7, Available at: <a href="https://offscreen.com/view/signs-and-meaning-film-studies-and-the-legacy-of-poststructuralism">https://offscreen.com/view/signs-and-meaning-film-studies-and-the-legacy-of-poststructuralism</a></p> <p align="justify">(40)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p>The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page.</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-68941510607747412782020-12-11T09:27:00.001-08:002020-12-11T10:17:16.182-08:00Breeur (2.1) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.1, “Stupidity and Errors”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 1</p> <p align="center">Lies and Stupidity</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.2 </p> <p align="center">Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity</p> <p> </p> <p align="center">2.1</p> <p align="center">“Stupidity and Errors”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#2.1.1">2.1.1</a>) Normally we define stupidity as being error. And error here is understood as not knowing something we should have known. We furthermore suppose that all humans have a “natural disposition towards truth as such” (35) and we think that we all have the good sense to discern the true from the false. So if we fail to judge the true as true or the false as false (including when we fail to judge at all), then we are being stupid, according to this conception. (<a href="#2.1.2">2.1.2</a>) Now, both error and lie involve the confusion of true and false. Lies, we suppose, involve the intention to deceive. However, we think that stupidities that cause errors are more or less innocent and perhaps harmless (as they do not arise from this intention to deceive, and) because, rather than endangering the truth, they instead confirm “the existence of our natural disposition towards it” (35). (In other words, perhaps, because we make room for innocent errors, we recognize that we think truth should prevail in the end, which can be accomplish by correcting the errors.) (<a href="#2.1.3">2.1.3</a>) Each era may hold a different view on truth, the mind, and the intellect. As a result, each era might have its own idea of what would qualify as being erroneous or “contrary to established evidence and conviction” (35). People of the Enlightenment, for instance, denounced “obscurantism and superstition,” while “contemporary advocates of the Enlightenment” confuse “postmodernism with post-truth”  (35). (<a href="#2.1.4">2.1.4</a>) Although society may, with utopian ambitions, embark on crusades to abolish stupidity, “such emancipation projects conceal deeper and less decent ambitions but because stupidity as such cannot be eliminated outright or once and for all: It threatens thought from within” (36). (<a href="#2.1.5">2.1.5</a>) Harry Frankfurt discusses a particular type of stupidity called “bullshit” (in his “On Bullshit”). Bullshit results when people lack any interest in whether or not what they say is true, because for them, truth itself is not of interest. Frankfurt furthermore connects bullshit to stupidity. “Frankfurt asserts that a general skepticism, ‘which den[ies] that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality,’ is responsible for the proliferation of stupidity.” But, Breeur questions this notion, noting that even if we maintain such a realist standpoint and advocate for speech that remains true to such an objective reality, still there is no guarantee we will not succumb to stupidity. For, “there exist a lot of calamitous stupidities that, as Deleuze said, are made up entirely of truths” (36). (<a href="#2.1.6">2.1.6</a>) In order to overcome stupidity, it may not be enough to simply favor realism (which holds that there is an objective reality to which our claims might veridically correspond) over skepticism (which holds we can have no such reliable access to reality and may make room for bullshitting, because bullshitting involves an indifference to the truth values of one’s claims.) The reason this strategy can fail is that “The truth a realist has access to can be as stupid as the errors of the antirealist” (37). Breeur also notes that antirealists do not simply deny that we can have access to reality or that there even is an objective reality in the first place. Rather, antirealists hold that any such access to reality is insufficient for guaranteeing “sense and meaning” (37). Realists are presupposing “a value framework,” and their “notion of truth functions as an undetermined concept in an ontological vacuum” (37). (<a href="#2.1.7">2.1.7</a>) Frankfurt makes an interesting distinction between bullshit and lies. Lies oppose truth, and liars reject the authority of truth. But in order to do so, they in the first place recognize truth’s status, value, and power. Furthermore, lies dissimulate something supposed to be true, and as such ultimately affirm the value of truth. Bullshitters, however, are completely indifferent to what is true and what is false, and for this reason bullshit is a much greater threat to truth than lies are. Breeur ends by noting that “This indifference to the difference between what is true and what is false is precisely what is at stake in stupidity and the proliferation of opinions” (37).</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.1">2.1.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity as Error: Failing to Judge the True or False as Being Such]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.2">2.1.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity’s  Supposed Innocence]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.3">2.1.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Each Era’s Errors]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.4">2.1.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Doomed Efforts for a Stupidity-less Utopia]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.5">2.1.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Bullshit & Stupidity: Harry Frankfurt’s “On Bullshit”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.6">2.1.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Realism’s Inability to Protect Us from Stupidity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.1.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.1">2.1.1</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity as Error: Failing to Judge the True or False as Being Such]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Normally we define stupidity as being error. And error here is understood as not knowing something we should have known. We furthermore suppose that all humans have a “natural disposition towards truth as such” (35) and we think that we all have the good sense to discern the true from the false. So if we fail to judge the true as true or the false as false (including when we fail to judge at all), then we are being stupid, according to this conception.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">What is stupidity? Usually, we tend to identify stupidity with error. In other words, we reduce it to a lack of truth, the | absence of something we should have known. That conception presupposes human being to share a universal and natural disposition towards truth as such. Good sense, for example, being the best thing distributed in the world, and naturally equal in all men, allows every individual subject to discern autonomously the true from the false. We behave stupidly when we neglect our power to judge well, or when we don’t use our power at all.</p> <p align="justify">(34-35)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.1.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.2">2.1.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity’s  Supposed Innocence]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Now, both error and lie involve the confusion of true and false. Lies, we suppose, involve the intention to deceive. However, we think that stupidities that cause errors are more or less innocent and perhaps harmless (as they do not arise from this intention to deceive, and) because, rather than endangering the truth, they instead confirm “the existence of our natural disposition towards it” (35). (In other words, perhaps, because we make room for innocent errors, we recognize that we think truth should prevail in the end, which can be accomplish by correcting the errors.)]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">But these stupidities, given their nature as <i>errors</i>, can easily be corrected or rectified. Contrary to lies, which presuppose the intention to deceive, stupidity is supposed to be innocent and, one would be inclined to believe, harmless. Such stupidity never endangers the truth – on the contrary, it confirms the existence of our natural disposition towards it. And, given the premise that this disposition coincides with the nature of our mind, our thinking, or our intellect, stupidity will normatively be ascribed to anything that deflects the spontaneous tendency to what counts as “intelligent” or “thoughtful” The intellect heads for the truth by itself, as long as its exercise is not deflected by emotions, feelings, ignorance, illness, etc., i.e. everything by definition exterior to thinking: What distracts the disposition from its pure openness towards the truth refers to the body or the animality (the beast) in us. The <i>stupids</i> are silly sheep, donkeys, or owls.</p> <p align="justify">(35)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.1.3"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.3">2.1.3</a></p> <p align="center">[Each Era’s Errors]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Each era may hold a different view on truth, the mind, and the intellect. As a result, each era might have its own idea of what would qualify as being erroneous or “contrary to established evidence and conviction” (35). People of the Enlightenment, for instance, denounced “obscurantism and superstition,” while “contemporary advocates of the Enlightenment” confuse “postmodernism with post-truth”  (35).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Of course, every epoch presents its proper form of stupidity. Dependent upon what it believes to be true, and what it believes to be the nature of mind and intellect, every new culture allows itself to denounce what seems contrary to established evidence and conviction. Hence, the Enlightenment (for example of Voltaire) denouncing obscurantism and superstition, Marx denouncing cretinism as a product of capitalism (to tie the workers slavishly to the means of production), the more recent so-called “black books” denouncing Marxism, and contemporary advocates of the Enlightenment confusing postmodernism with post-truth.</p> <p align="justify">(35)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.1.4"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.4">2.1.4</a></p> <p align="center">[Doomed Efforts for a Stupidity-less Utopia]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Although society may, with utopian ambitions, embark on crusades to abolish stupidity, “such emancipation projects conceal deeper and less decent ambitions but because stupidity as such cannot be eliminated outright or once and for all: It threatens thought from within” (36).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">These tendencies to denounce and surpass stupidity are often accompanied by weak or strong versions of utopian aspirations or ideals concerning the nature of reality. The crusade against stupidity is part of a program to emancipate the human being from everything that hinders his or her access to the truth. But, unfortunately, such inquisitions often reflect what Melville once said about how “the greater idiot ever scolds the lesser.”<sup>32</sup> And this is not only because such emancipation projects conceal deeper and less decent ambitions but because stupidity as such cannot be eliminated outright or once and for all: It threatens thought from within.</p> <p align="justify">(36)</p> <p align="justify">32. Herman Melville, <em>Moby Dick</em> (London, Penguin Books, 1994), p. 489.</p> <p align="justify">(36)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.1.5"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.5">2.1.5</a></p> <p align="center">[Bullshit & Stupidity: Harry Frankfurt’s “On Bullshit”]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Harry Frankfurt discusses a particular type of stupidity called “bullshit” (in his “On Bullshit”). Bullshit results when people lack any interest in whether or not what they say is true, because for them, truth itself is not of interest. Frankfurt furthermore connects bullshit to stupidity. “Frankfurt asserts that a general skepticism, ‘which den[ies] that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality,’ is responsible for the proliferation of stupidity.” But, Breeur questions this notion, noting that even if we maintain such a realist standpoint and advocate for speech that remains true to such an objective reality, still there is no guarantee we will not succumb to stupidity. For, “there exist a lot of calamitous stupidities that, as Deleuze said, are made up entirely of truths” (36).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">In a recently (and much-commented-on) rediscovered article, Harry Frankfurt complained about the proliferation of a form of stupidity which he called <i>bullshit</i>, which he described as a direct consequence of our lack of interest in the truth-value of what we state or claim. Someone producing bullshit deceives us, because he or she hides from us the fact that truth is of no interest to him or her. The motive guiding and controlling her speech, Frankfurt says, has nothing whatsoever to do with how the things about which he or she speaks truly are.<sup>33</sup> But on the basis of what criterion does one claim that she knows how the things truly are? Frankfurt asserts that a general skepticism, “which den[ies] that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality,” is responsible for the proliferation of stupidity. But how can he guarantee that his notion of realism and the promotion of speech that is concerned with the kind of truth it presupposes can protect us against stupidity? After all, there exist a lot of calamitous stupidities that, as Deleuze said,<sup>34</sup> are made up entirely of truths.<sup>35</sup></p> <p align="justify">(36)</p> <p align="justify">33. Harry G. Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” in: <i>The Importance of What We Care About</i> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [1988] 2005), pp. 117-133.</p> <p align="justify">34. Cited by François Zourabichvili, <i>Deleuze. Une philosophie de l’événement </i>(Paris: PUF, 1994), p. 26.</p> <p align="justify">35. See his remarks on “contemporary” forms of “anti-realist” doctrines, e.g. skepticism “which den[ies] that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which therefore reject[s] the possibility of knowing how things truly are” (Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” p. 133).</p> <p align="justify">(36)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.1.6"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.6">2.1.6</a></p> <p align="center">[Realism’s Inability to Protect Us from Stupidity]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[In order to overcome stupidity, it may not be enough to simply favor realism (which holds that there is an objective reality to which our claims might veridically correspond) over skepticism (which holds we can have no such reliable access to reality and may make room for bullshitting, because bullshitting involves an indifference to the truth values of one’s claims.) The reason this strategy can fail is that “The truth a realist has access to can be as stupid as the errors of the antirealist” (37). Breeur also notes that antirealists do not simply deny that we can have access to reality or that there even is an objective reality in the first place. Rather, antirealists hold that any such access to reality is insufficient for guaranteeing “sense and meaning” (37). Realists are presupposing “a value framework,” and their “notion of truth functions as an undetermined concept in an ontological vacuum” (37).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Perhaps claiming to contest and resist stupidity simply by defending “realism’’ against “skepticism’’ might be a little bit naïve. The truth a realist has access to can be as stupid as the errors of the antirealist. Moreover, it is too easy to declare that the antirealists deny the ability to access and/or the existence of objective reality. Rather, what they wish to disclose is the fact that being able to access objective reality provides no guarantee of sense and meaning; on the contrary, reliance upon an idealized conception of objectivity in order to defend some notion of truth itself presupposes a value framework. For the realist, the notion of truth functions as an undetermined concept in an ontological vacuum. (This is far from self-evident, as we will see.)</p> <p align="justify">(37)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.1.7"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.1.7">2.1.7</a></p> <p align="center">[Bullshit as a Greater Danger to Truth than Lies]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Frankfurt makes an interesting distinction between bullshit and lies. Lies oppose truth, and liars reject the authority of truth. But in order to do so, they in the first place recognize truth’s status, value, and power. Furthermore, lies dissimulate something supposed to be true, and as such ultimately affirm the value of truth. Bullshitters, however, are completely indifferent to what is true and what is false, and for this reason bullshit is a much greater threat to truth than lies are. Breeur ends by noting that “This indifference to the difference between what is true and what is false is precisely what is at stake in stupidity and the proliferation of opinions” (37).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Interesting, however, are Frankfurt’s claims opposing bullshit to lies. A lie still dissimulates something supposed to be truth, and in that sense a person who lies is “responding to the truth.” To that extent, argues Frankfurt, he is still “respectful of it.”<sup>36 </sup>But the “bullshitter” is “neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false,” he does not “reject the authority of the truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to [it]. He pays no attention to it at all.” By virtue of this indifference, bullshit is finally a “greater enemy of the truth than [are] lies.”<sup>37</sup> This indifference to the difference between what is true and what is false is precisely what is at stake in stupidity and the proliferation of opinions.</p> <p align="justify">(37)</p> <p align="justify">36. Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” p. 131.</p> <p align="justify">37. Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” p. 132.</p> <p align="justify">(37)</p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p>The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page.</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-39987170601777791852020-10-26T04:27:00.001-07:002020-10-26T12:15:54.571-07:00Shores. Logic of Gilles Deleuze: Basic Principles. Announcement and Preview<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/corry-shores-entry-directory.html">[Corry Shores, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/10/shores-logic-of-gilles-deleuze-1-basic.html">[Shores, <em>Logic of Deleuze 1</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Announcement and Preview of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Corry Shores</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><em>The Logic of Gilles Deleuze: </em></p> <p align="center"><em>Basic Principles</em></p> <p align="center"><a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-logic-of-gilles-deleuze-9781350062252/">[Publisher’s book-webpage]</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"><a style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-XGaY51aLfto/X5ahcwqK9WI/AAAAAAAAWbo/QF3t8t21qj4I3QGEM_pWZ45WptqkxQinACLcBGAsYHQ/s2048/Corry%2BShores.%2BLogic%2Bof%2BGilles%2BDeleuze.%2BBasic%2BPrinciples.%2BFront%2BCover.png" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-XGaY51aLfto/X5ahcwqK9WI/AAAAAAAAWbo/QF3t8t21qj4I3QGEM_pWZ45WptqkxQinACLcBGAsYHQ/s320/Corry%2BShores.%2BLogic%2Bof%2BGilles%2BDeleuze.%2BBasic%2BPrinciples.%2BFront%2BCover.png" width="355" height="538" data-original-height="2048" data-original-width="1348" /></a></div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both" align="justify"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both" align="right"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <p align="justify">My book on Deleuze’s logic is now in press. A preview of the table of contents, acknowledgments, and introduction is available here:</p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://www.academia.edu/44372079/The_Logic_of_Gilles_Deleuze_Basic_Principles" href="https://www.academia.edu/44372079/The_Logic_of_Gilles_Deleuze_Basic_Principles">https://www.academia.edu/44372079/The_Logic_of_Gilles_Deleuze_Basic_Principles</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">The publisher offers a preview of the first chapter here:</p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://bloomsburycp3.codemantra.com/viewer/5f4e5a6fdc0e82000176fab1" href="https://bloomsburycp3.codemantra.com/viewer/5f4e5a6fdc0e82000176fab1">https://bloomsburycp3.codemantra.com/viewer/5f4e5a6fdc0e82000176fab1</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Here is the publisher’s webpage for the book:</p> <p align="justify"><a title="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-logic-of-gilles-deleuze-9781350062252/" href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-logic-of-gilles-deleuze-9781350062252/">https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-logic-of-gilles-deleuze-9781350062252/</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">And here is an Amazon.com link:</p> <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B08FVJ9X7N/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=B08FVJ9X7N&linkCode=as2&tag=corryshores-20&linkId=3c953f0381d8596eb6f56d69fa1fdd71" target="_blank">The Logic of Gilles Deleuze: Basic Principles (Bloomsbury Studies in Continental Philosophy)</a><img style="border-top-style: none !important; border-left-style: none !important; border-bottom-style: none !important; border-right-style: none !important; margin: 0px" border="0" alt="" src="//ir-na.amazon-adsystem.com/e/ir?t=corryshores-20&l=am2&o=1&a=B08FVJ9X7N" width="1" height="1" /> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p> </p> <p>I thank a number of people in the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/44372079/The_Logic_of_Gilles_Deleuze_Basic_Principles">acknowledgements</a> (also see below). But here on this blog post I want to especially thank readers of this blog who have helped me on the book and supported me throughout the process, including <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/09/clifford-duffy-entry-directory.html"><strong>Clifford Duffy</strong></a>, <a href="https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/"><strong>Terrance Blake</strong></a>, and<strong> </strong><a href="https://scottwollschleger.com/"><strong>Scott Wollschleger</strong></a>.</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p align="center">Full Acknowledgements:</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">This book was first made possible by <strong>Roland Breeur</strong>, who recommended me to the person who became one of my main editors, <strong>Liza Thompson</strong>. Much of what I know about philosophy and how it should be conducted, I learned from Prof. Breeur. And Liza, along with my other editors, <strong>Frankie Mace</strong> and <strong>Lucy Russell</strong>, have extended to me an incredible amount of generosity with the scheduling for the book. It never would have made it without their help, so I thank you all very much.</p> <p align="justify">The basic content of the book was first made possible by the participants and organizers of the 2014 Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics conference at Ludwig Maximilian University: <strong>Peter Verdée</strong>, <strong>Holger Andreas</strong>, <strong>David Ripley</strong>, <strong>Graham Priest</strong>, <strong>Diderik Batens</strong>, <strong>Fenner Tanswell</strong>, <strong>Marcos Silva</strong>, <strong>Bryson Brown</strong>, <strong>Hitoshi Omori</strong>, <strong>Heinrich Wansing</strong>, <strong>Andreas Kapsner</strong>, <strong>Cian Chartier</strong>, <strong>Franz Berto</strong>, <strong>Itala Maria Loffredo D’Ottaviano</strong>, <strong>Zach Weber</strong>, <strong>João Marcos</strong>, <strong>Luis Estrada-González</strong>, <strong>Nick Thomas</strong>, <strong>Maarten McKubre-Jordens</strong>, <strong>Maria Martinez</strong>, <strong>Diego</strong> <strong>Tajer</strong>, and <strong>Otávio Bueno</strong>. They graciously allowed me to present, despite being quite incapable with logic, and they afterward did much to help me begin my project. <strong>Peter Verdée</strong> and <strong>Holger Andreas</strong> edited an edition of the proceedings for Springer, and they were kind enough to include my paper in it, the text of which is partly used here. I thank everyone for getting me started in non-classical logics, which still I love to this day.</p> <p align="justify">I could not have written this book without the enduring, loving support of my wife, <strong>Gülben Salman</strong>. Her sacrifices and efforts are the reason I was able to do all the work necessary here. As a philosopher herself, she also made substantial contributions throughout the whole compositional process, and I cannot thank her enough. Gülben, I dedicate this book to you. I also thank <strong>Yasin Ceylan, Aziz Fevzi Zambak, Deniz Yılmaz Zambak, Aret Karademir, Hikmet Ünlü, Bolkar Özkan, Scott Wollschleger, Kurt Ozment, Samet Bağçe, Karen Vanhercke, Vykintas Baltakas</strong>, along with my family, <strong>Patricia, Ebbie Victor, Fatma, Hasan, Ebbie Paul, Brandon, Aimee, Mandy, Austin, </strong>and <strong>Joseph</strong> for the companionship, support, and advice they gave me all throughout.</p> <p align="justify">Certain parts specifically benefited from help I received from other scholars. <strong>Oğuz Akçelik</strong> reviewed the logic parts (and any mistakes are mine). Many of the cinema parts (Chapters 4, 7, 8) were made possible by the guidance and teaching of <strong>Ahmet Gürata</strong>. The section on Plato in Chapter 8 was improved with<strong> Hikmet Ünlü</strong>’s expert assistance, and his instruction in Ancient Greek proved indispensable for working through the Stoic material in Chapter 5. <strong>Dorothea Olkowski</strong> taught me about intuitionism and its importance in Deleuze’s philosophy, so all of Chapter 6 was made possible by her writings and comments, and also she reviewed and made suggestions on most of Chapter 5.<strong> Roland Breeur</strong>’s work on imposture influenced much of what I write on the Falsifier in Chapter 8, and he reviewed and made suggestions for both Chapters 7 and 8. Along the way, I also received help with interpretation, sourcing, and translation from <strong>Antoine Dolcerocca, Terence Blake, Clifford Duffy, Roger Vergauwen, Julie Van der Wielen, Griet Galle, Iain McKenzie, Guillaume Collet, and Steven Spileers. Meriç Aytekin</strong> contributed much to the sourcing in Chapter 2, and <strong>Çi̇si̇l Vardar</strong>, to Chapter 1. At the beginning stages, my project benefitted from the comments provided by anonymous referees and from <strong>Ronald Bogue</strong>. I am very grateful to them. And I have taken great inspiration from the work of <strong>Jeffrey Bell</strong>, who has pioneered this particular field of study and whose advice I deeply appreciate. I am also heavily indebted to the archivists, transcribers, and translators (listed in the bibliography, but let me here mention <strong>Richard Pinhas</strong>) who have made Deleuze’s courses accessible. I thank everyone mentioned here so very much.</p> <p align="justify">And many of the logic parts were improved through my correspondences and conversations with <strong>Graham Priest</strong>. His philosophy is the original inspiration for this book, and he has been nothing but the most generous and supportive toward this project. I thank him for patiently and thoroughly answering all of my questions about his writings and ideas. The philosophical world is so much better because of him, and I will always be deeply grateful.</p> <p align="justify">I also could not have completed this book without the support and understanding of my colleagues at the Middle East Technical University: <strong>Halil Turan, Barış Parkan, Murat Baç, David Grünberg, Ayhan Sol, Samet Bağçe, Elif Çırakman, Mehmet Hilmi Demir, Aziz Fevzi Zambak, Fulden İbrahimhakkıoğlu, Yasin Ceylan, Teo Grünberg, Ahmet İnam, Ertuğrul Rufayi Turan, Refik Güremen, James Griffith, Selma Aydın Bayram, Dilek Başar Başkaya, Ercan Erkul, Gülizar Karahan Balya, Hikmet Ünlü, Erdinç Sayan, </strong>and <strong>Tahir Kocayiğit</strong>. (<strong>Ayhan Sol</strong> helped me especially with freeing up my scheduling for more time to write.)</p> <p align="justify">Many students in my classes and seminars have contributed ideas and insights to this book, including: <strong>Bolkar Özkan, Gürkan Kılınç, Ilgın Aksoy, Yıldırım Bayazit, Faik Tekin Asal, Ekin Demirors, Hazal Babur, Tanayça Ünlütürk, Aybüke Aşkar, Meli̇ke Başak Yalçın, Ulaş Murat Altay, Sedef Beşkardeşler, Toprak Seda Karaosmanoğlu, İlkyaz Taşdemir, Çınar Uysal, Handan Ağirman, Tunahan Akbulut, Yasemin Karabaş, Aybüke Aşkar, Mahsasadat Shojaei, Umut Kesi̇kkulak, Ayşe Pekdiker, Seyran Sam Kookiaei, Atakan Botasun, Esra Saçlı, Firuza Rahimova, Sona Mustafayeva, İrem Kayra Özdemir, Erkan Özmacun, Ezel Ortaç, Rada Nur Ergen, </strong>and <strong>Yiğit Baysal</strong>. I thank all of you for your interest in these topics, for your original philosophical thinking, and for helping me interpret the texts.</p> <p align="justify">And finally, I thank the following publishers and journals who granted me permission to reprint texts and figures (and additionally, I thank their blind referees, who helped me improve the articles):</p> <p align="justify"><i>Tijdschrift voor Filosofie</i> / Peeters Publishers. (“The Primacy of Falsity: Deviant Origins in Deleuze.” <i>TijdschriftVoorFilosofie</i> 81 (2019): 81–130).</p> <p align="justify">Routledge. (“Affirmations of the False and Bifurcations of the True: Deleuze’s Dialetheic and Stoic Fatalism.” In <i>Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of Freedom: Freedom’s Refrains</i>, edited by Dorothea Olkowski and EftichisPirovolakis, 178–223. New York: Routledge, 2019.)</p> <p align="justify">Springer. (“Dialetheism in the Structure of Phenomenal Time.” In <i>Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics</i>, edited by Holger Andreas and Peter Verdée, 145-157. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016.)</p> <p align="justify"><i>Deleuze and Guattari Studies</i> / Edinburgh University Press. (“In the Still of the Moment: Deleuze’s Phenomena of Motionless Time.” <i>Deleuze Studies</i> 8, no. 2 (2014): 199–229.)</p> </blockquote> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>Shores, Corry. <i>The Logic of Gilles Deleuze: Basic Principles</i>. London: Bloomsbury, 2020.</p> <blockquote> <p><a href="https://bloomsburycp3.codemantra.com/viewer/5f4e5a6fdc0e82000176fab1">[Publisher’s book-webpage]</a></p> </blockquote> <p><img style="float: none; margin-left: auto; display: block; margin-right: auto" border="0" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-7bQVutujVUM/X5ahcTvNCCI/AAAAAAAAWbk/QUgclUBNmUY-VzgU2jF5-pT8eB1EPfgMACLcBGAsYHQ/s320/Corry%2BShores.%2BLogic%2Bof%2BGilles%2BDeleuze.%2BBasic%2BPrinciples.%2BBack%2BCover.png" width="324" height="493" data-original-height="1656" data-original-width="1089" /></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-41978277212005763002020-10-26T03:32:00.001-07:002020-10-26T12:15:18.031-07:00Shores. Logic of Gilles Deleuze, 1: Basic Principles, entry directory<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/corry-shores-entry-directory.html">[Corry Shores, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Entry Directory for</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Corry Shores</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><em>The Logic of Gilles Deleuze: </em></p> <p align="center"><em>Basic Principles</em></p> <p align="center"><a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-logic-of-gilles-deleuze-9781350062252/">[Publisher’s book-webpage]</a></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"><a style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-XGaY51aLfto/X5ahcwqK9WI/AAAAAAAAWbo/QF3t8t21qj4I3QGEM_pWZ45WptqkxQinACLcBGAsYHQ/s2048/Corry%2BShores.%2BLogic%2Bof%2BGilles%2BDeleuze.%2BBasic%2BPrinciples.%2BFront%2BCover.png" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-XGaY51aLfto/X5ahcwqK9WI/AAAAAAAAWbo/QF3t8t21qj4I3QGEM_pWZ45WptqkxQinACLcBGAsYHQ/s320/Corry%2BShores.%2BLogic%2Bof%2BGilles%2BDeleuze.%2BBasic%2BPrinciples.%2BFront%2BCover.png" width="297" height="450" data-original-width="1348" data-original-height="2048" /></a></div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/10/shores-logic-of-gilles-deleuze-basic.html">Announcement and Preview</a></div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"> </div> <div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both"></div> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Shores, Corry. <i>The Logic of Gilles Deleuze: Basic Principles</i>. London: Bloomsbury, 2020.</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"><a href="https://bloomsburycp3.codemantra.com/viewer/5f4e5a6fdc0e82000176fab1">[Publisher’s book-webpage]</a></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"><a style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em" href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-7bQVutujVUM/X5ahcTvNCCI/AAAAAAAAWbk/QUgclUBNmUY-VzgU2jF5-pT8eB1EPfgMACLcBGAsYHQ/s1656/Corry%2BShores.%2BLogic%2Bof%2BGilles%2BDeleuze.%2BBasic%2BPrinciples.%2BBack%2BCover.png" imageanchor="1"><img style="float: none; margin-left: auto; display: block; margin-right: auto" border="0" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-7bQVutujVUM/X5ahcTvNCCI/AAAAAAAAWbk/QUgclUBNmUY-VzgU2jF5-pT8eB1EPfgMACLcBGAsYHQ/s320/Corry%2BShores.%2BLogic%2Bof%2BGilles%2BDeleuze.%2BBasic%2BPrinciples.%2BBack%2BCover.png" width="324" height="493" data-original-width="1089" data-original-height="1656" /></a></p> <p> </p> <p><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1703983863002652001.post-79187921311165614352020-09-25T13:55:00.001-07:002020-09-25T13:55:55.574-07:00Breeur (2.0) Lies – Imposture – Stupidity, Ch.2.0, “Introduction”, summary<p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">by <a href="https://metu.academia.edu/CorryShores">Corry Shores</a> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<strong><a href="http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=004096569012008203867:ddhvuo4dxpy">Search Blog Here</a></strong>. Index-tags are found on the bottom of the left column.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2011/07/central-entry-directory.html">[Central Entry Directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/roland-breeur-ed-entry-directory.html">[Roland Breeur, entry directory]</a></p> <p><a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/05/breeur-ed-lies-imposture-stupidity.html">[Breeur, <em>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</em>, entry directory]</a></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[The following is a paragraph by paragraph summary of Breeur’s text. Boldface, underlining, and bracketed commentary are my own. Proofreading is incomplete, so please forgive my mistakes. The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center">Summary of</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Roland Breeur</p> <p align="center">[Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page]</p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Part 1</p> <p align="center">Lies and Stupidity</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Ch.2 </p> <p align="center">Alternative Facts and Reduction to Stupidity</p> <p> </p> <p align="center">2.0</p> <p align="center">“Introduction”</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="center"></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">Brief summary (collecting those below):</p> <p align="justify">(<a href="#2.0.1">2.0.1</a>) We noted before that “<strong><u>A lie has the same ambivalence as a fact, a duplicity between the real and the possible.</u></strong>” (31) (A fact has a duplicity between the real and the possible, because insofar as a fact is a given, we cannot change it (it is real); but, insofar as it is something we work toward altering, by means of our imagination and freedom, it is a possible. See section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/08/breeur-12-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch12.html">1.2</a>.) Liars exploit this duplicity (by imagining alternatives to the facts (simulation) and concealing the real facts (dissimulation) (see section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-13-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch13.html#1.3.5">1.3.5</a>).) But in our times, the distinction between what is real and false has broken down (see section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-16-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch16.html">1.6</a>). Facts have lost their normal power of truth in our public discourse. Institutions are no longer able to establish truth from falsehood, resulting in our indifference to what the truth may happen to be. “this deceptive strategy of dissimulation and simulation breaks down in circumstances where the distinction between what is real and what is false is blown up. This is the situation in which, to use the words of Katherine Viner, “the currency of facts ha[s] been badly debased.”<sup>31</sup> Facts don’t work, they are often reduced to what someone <i>feels</i> to be the case. When trust in institutions (the “gatekeepers of truth”) crumbles, any criterion hoping to impose any limit between facts and falsehoods is weakened. This weakness creates – whether intentionally or unintentionally – a generalized indifference to truth” (31-32). (<a href="#2.0.2">2.0.2</a>) Liars and imposters need us to believe that what they are saying is the truth and not something false (which in fact it is). (But in our post-truth era, we noted, that distinction breaks down, and probably-false statements are given equal presence and emphasis as probably-true ones, and we all become indifferent to truth itself. Thus,) “the so-called proliferation of alternative facts in the post-truth era profits from the general anesthesia towards it.” Social media, as gatekeeper of the truth, has instead equalized all claims, true and false. “Facts and opinions, truths and falsehoods, are spread the same way, simultaneously, and as a consequence their synchronized proliferation suffocates any desire for discernment” (34). (So we have established that in such an environment, liars will not succeed. See section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-16-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch16.html#1.6.8">1.6.8</a>.) “This is not the realm or the biotope of liars and imposters, but rather, of <em>stupidity</em>” (34). Breeur calls this sort of Arendtian transformation of truth into opinion the “<i>reduction to stupidity </i>(<em>reductio ad stupiditam</em>)” (34). Breeur will show how this reduction results from certain factors in new media, including social media’s “information cascade” and  “the context in which ‘alternative facts’ diminish not only the status of scientifically validated truths but the difference between such truths and opinions” (34). Of course there are no such things as alternate facts (a term coined by Kellyanne Conway to elevate the truth status to the false figures for Trump’s inauguration attendance). Instead, “this term represents a contraction based on a (malicious or ignorant) conflation of facts and opinions” (34).</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="contents"></a> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">Contents</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.0.1">2.0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Debasement of Truth]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.0.2">2.0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity Instead of Deception]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">Summary</p> <a name="2.0.1"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.0.1">2.0.1</a></p> <p align="center">[The Debasement of Truth]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[We noted before that “<strong><u>A lie has the same ambivalence as a fact, a duplicity between the real and the possible.</u></strong>” (31) (A fact has a duplicity between the real and the possible, because insofar as a fact is a given, we cannot change it (it is real); but, insofar as it is something we work toward altering, by means of our imagination and freedom, it is a possible. See section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/08/breeur-12-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch12.html">1.2</a>.) Liars exploit this duplicity (by imagining alternatives to the facts (simulation) and concealing the real facts (dissimulation) (see section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-13-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch13.html#1.3.5">1.3.5</a>).) But in our times, the distinction between what is real and false has broken down (see section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-16-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch16.html">1.6</a>). Facts have lost their normal power of truth in our public discourse. Institutions are no longer able to establish truth from falsehood, resulting in our indifference to what the truth may happen to be. “this deceptive strategy of dissimulation and simulation breaks down in circumstances where the distinction between what is real and what is false is blown up. This is the situation in which, to use the words of Katherine Viner, “the currency of facts ha[s] been badly debased.”<sup>31</sup> Facts don’t work, they are often reduced to what someone <i>feels</i> to be the case. When trust in institutions (the “gatekeepers of truth”) crumbles, any criterion hoping to impose any limit between facts and falsehoods is weakened. This weakness creates – whether intentionally or unintentionally – a generalized indifference to truth” (31-32).]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Hannah Arendt once complained that, in many regimes, unwelcome factual truths are often, “consciously or unconsciously, transformed into opinions”<sup>30</sup> – as if some events (the invasion of Belgium in 1914, the existence of concentration camps, the genocides during the wars, etc.) were not a matter of historical record but of mere conjecture. Factual truths are from the start not more evident than opinions (which is why they can be so easily discredited). In our first chapter, we analyzed the internal or structural link between facts and lies: <strong><u>A lie has the same ambivalence as a fact, a duplicity between the real and the possible.</u></strong> We argued hence how the liar profits from this duplicity and reproduces it on the level of discourse or communication in order to deceive. <strong>But this deceptive strategy of dissimulation and simulation breaks down in circumstances where the distinction between what is real and what is false is blown up. This is the situation in which, to use the words of Katherine Viner, “the currency of facts ha[s] been badly debased.”<sup>31</sup> Facts don’t work, they are often reduced to what someone <i>feels</i> to be the case. When trust in institutions | (the “gatekeepers of truth”) crumbles, any criterion hoping to impose any limit between facts and falsehoods is weakened. This weakness creates – whether intentionally or unintentionally – a generalized indifference to truth</strong>.</p> <p align="justify">(31-32)</p> <p align="justify">30 Arendt, ‘‘Truth and Politics,” p. 236.</p> <p align="justify">31 Viner (2016).</p> <p align="justify">(31)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.0.2"></a> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center"><a href="#2.0.2">2.0.2</a></p> <p align="center">[Stupidity Instead of Deception]</p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="center">[Liars and imposters need us to believe that what they are saying is the truth and not something false (which in fact it is). (But in our post-truth era, we noted, that distinction breaks down, and probably-false statements are given equal presence and emphasis as probably-true ones, and we all become indifferent to truth itself. Thus,) “the so-called proliferation of alternative facts in the post-truth era profits from the general anesthesia towards it.” Social media, as gatekeeper of the truth, has instead equalized all claims, true and false. “Facts and opinions, truths and falsehoods, are spread the same way, simultaneously, and as a consequence their synchronized proliferation suffocates any desire for discernment” (34). (So we have established that in such an environment, liars will not succeed. See section <a href="http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2020/09/breeur-16-lies-imposture-stupidity-ch16.html#1.6.8">1.6.8</a>.) “This is not the realm or the biotope of liars and imposters, but rather, of <em>stupidity</em>” (34). Breeur calls this sort of Arendtian transformation of truth into opinion the “<i>reduction to stupidity </i>(<em>reductio ad stupiditam</em>)” (34). Breeur will show how this reduction results from certain factors in new media, including social media’s “information cascade” and  “the context in which ‘alternative facts’ diminish not only the status of scientifically validated truths but the difference between such truths and opinions” (34). Of course there are no such things as alternate facts (a term coined by Kellyanne Conway to elevate the truth status to the false figures for Trump’s inauguration attendance). Instead, “this term represents a contraction based on a (malicious or ignorant) conflation of facts and opinions” (34).]</p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify">[<em>ditto</em>]</p> <blockquote> <p align="justify">Whereas liars – and, as we will see, impostors – play with our trust in the existence of that difference, the so-called proliferation of alternative facts in the post-truth era profits from the general anesthesia towards it. This is one of the effects of social media on the gatekeepers of truth. Facts and opinions, truths and falsehoods, are spread the same way, simultaneously, and as a consequence their synchronized proliferation suffocates any desire for discernment. This is not the realm or the biotope of liars and imposters, but rather, of <i>stupidity</i>. What Arendt claimed about the transformation of truth into opinion is a good example of what I will call the <i>reduction to stupidity </i>(<i>reductio ad stupiditam</i>). This reduction, as I will try to explain, is rampant due to, for example, the proliferation of social media, its “information cascade” and the context in which “alternative facts” diminish not only the status of scientifically validated truths but the difference between such truths and opinions. The notion of an “alternative fact” is in itself a provocation: A fact has, given its “stubborn’’ nature, <i>per definition</i> no “alternative.” It is what it is: A fact. As we know, the cynical term “alternative fact” was used by the U.S. counsellor to the president Kellyanne Conway during an interview in January 2017, in which she defended White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer’s false statement about the attendance numbers of Trump’s inauguration as President of the United States. In itself, this term represents a contraction based on a (malicious or ignorant) conflation of facts and opinions.</p> <p align="justify">(34)</p> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="center"><a href="#contents">[contents]</a></p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <a name="2.0.3"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="center"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"> </p> <a name="Bibliography"></a> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><a href="#Bibliography">Bibliography</a>:</p> <p align="justify">Breeur, Roland. <i>Lies – Imposture – Stupidity</i>. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jakubas, 2019.</p> <p>The book can be purchased <a href="https://www.jonasirjokubas.lt/produktas/roland-breeur-lies-imposture-stupidity/">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p align="justify">Breeur’s <a href="https://kuleuven.academia.edu/RolandBreeur">academia.edu</a> page and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Roland_Breeur">researchgate</a> page.</p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> </blockquote> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="justify"></p> <p align="center"><em></em></p> <p align="justify"> </p> <p align="justify"><font color="#fff6d9">.</font></p> <p align="justify"><font color="#ffffff"></font></p>Corry Shoreshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10021754334885248079noreply@blogger.com0