22 Jun 2009

The Simplicity of Composition, para 47, Supplementary B1 to: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

[The following is summary.]





The Simplicity of Composition


Edmund Husserl

On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

B: Supplementary Texts

I "On the Introduction of the Essential Distinction between 'Fresh' Memory and 'Full' Recollection and about the Change in Content and Differences in Apprehension in the Consciousness of Time"


No. 5

Enduring Perception as Simple Act


Paragraph 47


We previously discussed simple perceptions. A tone may sustain its qualities over a period of time. Or, it might fade-away. Its continuous disappearance might be uniform. So at every moment it will be fading at the same rate.

We might call these two sorts of perceptions “simple perceptions.” But in a sense, they are composite. For, they are made-up of discrete moments. However, what we perceive in each moment is uniform with the rest. So by ignoring the fact that one moment of time is different from another moment, we are able to consider the content of each moment to be identical. And hence we call it ‘simple’ rather than complex.

We therefore intend to accept as simple each act in which we can ascertain no diversity other than that which arises through temporal division. (161c)





Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917).Vol 4 ofEdmund Husserl: Collected Works. Ed. Rudolf Bernet. Trans. John Barnett Brough.Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.


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